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Resume
La Loi constitutionnelle de 1867 ne contient aucune disposition expresse concernant
un quelconque pouvoir pour les gouvernements federal et provinciaux de conclure des
traites internationaux - ce pouvoir etant reserve, a l'epoque de l'adoption de la Loi
constitutionnelle de 1867, au pouvoir imperial britannique. Aussi, une seule disposition
prevoyait les modalites de mise en ceuvre des traites imperiaux au sein de la federation
canadienne et cette disposition est aujourd'hui caduque. Puisque I'autonomie du Canada
face a l'Empire britannique ne s'est pas accompagnee d'une refonte en profondeur du texte
de la constitution canadienne, rien n'a ete expressement prevu concernant Ie droit des
traites au sein de la federation canadienne. Le droit constitutionnel touchant les traites
internationaux est donc Ie fruit de la tradition du « constitutionnalisme organique»
canadien. Cette these examine donc ce type de constitutionnalisme a travers Ie cas
particulier du droit constitutionnel canadien relatif aux traites internationaux. Elle examine
ce sujet tout en approfondissant les consequences juridiques du principe constitutionnel du
federalisme reconnu par la Cour supreme du Canada dans Ie Renvoi relatif it la secession
du Quebec, [1998] 2 R.C.S. 217.
De maniere plus specifique, cette these analyse en detail l' affaire Canada (P.G.) c.
Ontario (P. G.), [1937] A.C. 326 (arret des conventions de travail) ou Ie Conseil prive a
conclu que si l'executiffederal peut signer et ratifier des traites au nom de l'Etat canadien,
la mise en ceuvre de ces traites devra se faire - lorsqu'une modification legislative est
necessaire acet effet - par Ie palier legislatif competent sur la matiere visee par l'obligation
internationale. Le Conseil Prive ne specifia toutefois pas dans cet arret qui a competence
pour conclure des traites relatifs aux matieres de competence provinciale. Cette these
s'attaque donc a cette question. Elle defend la position selon laquelle aucun principe ou
regIe de droit constitutionnel canadien ou de droit international n'exige que l'executif
federal ait un pouvoir plenier et exclusif sur la conclusion des traites. Elle souligne de plus
que de tres importants motifs de politique publique fondes notamment sur les imperatifs
d'expertise, de fonctionnalite institutionnelle et de democratie militent a l'encontre d'un tel
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pouvoIr federal plenier et exclusif. L'agencement institutionnel des differentes
communautes existentielles presentes au Canada exige une telle decentralisation. Cette
these demontre de plus que les provinces canadiennes sont les seules aposseder un pouvoir
constitutionnel de conclure des traites portant sur des domaines relevant de leurs champs de
competence - pouvoir dont elles peuvent cependant deleguer l'exercice au gouvemement
federal. Entin, cette these analyse de maniere systematique et approfondie les arguments
invoques au soutien d'un renversement des principes etablis par l'arret des conventions de
travail en ce qui conceme la mise en reuvre legislative des traites relatifs a des matieres
provinciales et elle demontre leur absence de fondement juridique. Elle demontre par
ailleurs que, compte tenu de l'ensemble des regles et principes constitutionnels qui sous-
tendent et completent Ie sens de cette decision, renverser l'arret des conventions de travail
aurait pour effet concret de transformer l' ensemble de la federation canadienne en etat
quasi unitaire car Ie Parlement pourrait alors envahir de maniere permanente et exclusive
l'ensemble des champs de competence provinciaux. Cette consequence est assurement
interdite par Ie principe du federalisme constitutionnellement enchasse.
Mots-cles : Canada, Provinces, Quebec, Constitution, Partage des competences, Traites
intemationaux, Arret des Conventions de travail (1937), Doctrine Gerin-Lajoie,
Constitutionnalisme organique
vAbstract
The Constitution Act, 1867 contains no express provision on federal or provincial
treaty-making powers. These powers were reserved to the Imperial government at the time
when the Constitution Act, 1867 was adopted by the Imperial Parliament. The Constitution
Act, 1867 also contained only one provision that dealt with the implementation of Imperial
treaty obligations in the Canadian federation and that provision is now obsolete. Because
Canada's gradual autonomy from the British Empire was not accompanied by a thorough
modification of the text of the Canadian constitution, nothing has been expressly provided
in relation to treaty powers in the Canadian federation. Canadian constitutional law dealing
with treaty powers is therefore a pure product of the Canadian "organic constitutionalism"
tradition. This thesis examines this form of constitutionalism through the specific case of
the treaty powers in Canada. In particular, this study hopes to deepen our understanding of
the multiple legal consequences of the constitutionally entrenched principle of federalism
recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Reference re Secession of Quebec,
[1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
More specifically, the thesis presents an in-depth analysis of Canada (A. G.) v.
Ontario (A.G.), [1937] A.C. 326 (the Labour Conventions case) where the Privy Council
decided that the federal executive power could sign and ratify treaties in the name of
Canada but that the implementation of treaty obligations - when legislative action is
required - is the responsibility of the legislature that has jurisdiction over the obligations'
subject-matters. The Privy Council did not specify, however, which institution(s) has the
power to conclude treaties in relation to provincial subject-matters. This thesis tackles this
problem. It is demonstrated in this thesis that no rule or principle of Canadian constitutional
law nor of international law grants plenary and exclusive treaty-making powers to the
federal executive. It highlights some very important policy reasons based on the needs for
expertise, for institutional effectiveness and for respect for democracy not to recognize such
plenary and exclusive treaty-making powers to the federal executive. The institutional
arrangements necessary for the survival and flourishing of the diverse existential
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communities require that the federal executive does not possess such powers. It is moreover
demonstrated that only provinces possess the constitutional powers to conclude treaties
related to their subject-matters - the exercise of which powers may however be delegated to
the federal government. Finally, the thesis presents a systematic and in-depth analysis of
the arguments invoked in favour of reversing the rules set out in the Labour Conventions
case in relation to legislative implementation of treaty obligations related to provincial
subject-matters. It demonstrates that those arguments have no legal basis. Moreover, the
thesis shows that because of the many underlying and interconnected constitutional rules
and principles that support and give meaning to the Labour Conventions case, reversing
that decision would have the concrete effect of transforming the Canadian federation into a
quasi-unitary state because Parliament would thus be allowed to oust provinces from the
entirety of their legislative jurisdiction. This consequence is most certainly prohibited by
the federal principle entrenched in the Constitution.
Keywords : Canada, Provinces, Quebec, Constitution, Division of powers, International
treaties, Labour Conventions case (1937), Gerin-Lajoie Doctrine, Organic
Constitutionalism
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Introduction
I
On a brisk April 1ih 1965, in Montreal, a man braved the rain.] He had something
very important to do. He knew that a storm might ensue but he believed that it was
necessary to brave the rain for the future to be brighter. There had already been an
important political storm a little more than a month earlier because of what he did in Paris
and he needed to clear the air. With his conference notes under his arm - notes that he had
prepared meticulously with the help of a visionary statesman2 -, he walked confidently into
a room filled with foreign dignitaries. He - and the People who were going to speak
through his voice - were literally stepping on the world stage. After eXIJressing his pleasure
at hosting the Consular Corps, he told them something that is still not totally understood
today. He spoke clearly but many who heard him could not make sense of what he said.
Blinded by their own assumptions, many believed that his speech was, if not revolutionary
in character, at least revolutionary in its intent. But interpreting intents is a risky business,
particularly in moments of anxiety.
] Canada, Environment Canada, Daily Data Report for April 1965, online: Environment
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Canada <http://www.climat.meteo.ec.gc.ca/climateData/dailydata_f.html>.
I will often refer to Internet webpages in this document. We all know that such
webpages have a variable lifespan. However, it is often possible to retrieve web pages that
have been taken down by searching the Internet Archive, Wayback Machine found at
<http://www.archive.org/web/web.php>. The Internet Archive apparently contains over 55
billion web pages archived since 1996.
2 Robert Aird, Andre Patry et fa presence du Quebec dans fe monde (Montreal: VLB, 2005)
at 57-73.
2So what did Paul Gerin-Lajoie tell the Consular Corps? The constitutional law
scholar turned Vice-President of the Quebec Executive Council of the Liberal government
of Jean Lesage told them, in short, that Quebec, while still being a federated state of
Canada, had both the capacity and the desire to engage herself3 on the world stage in order
to fulfil her governmental missions. That assertion explained the agreement that Quebec
had concluded with France, in the previous month, on education.4 Paul Gerin-Lajoie's
3 The use of the feminine in relation to a "state" might seem dated to the contemporary
reader. However, I have decided to revert to the older English usage of feminising states
and countries to better highlight the fact that such collective entities are conceived as
"persons" in our political culture. I will address in more depth the issue of the
personification of states in section 2.a.iiA of this thesis. However, I will use neuter words
to refer to "governments", "Parliament" and "legislatures" because those entities are not
personalised in the same way as are states and countries. While "governments",
"Parliament" and "legislatures" are collective decision mechanisms, they are not necessarily
considered to be the collective itself.
4 See Quebec, Ministere des relations internationales, Echange de fettres entre fe ministere
de fa Jeunesse du Quebec et f'Association pour f'organisation des stages en France
(ASTEF) concernant un programme de cooperation technique, 1964-01, online: Ministere
des relations internationales du Quebec
<http://www.mri.gouv.qc.ca/fr/infonner/ententes/pdf/1964-0 l.pdf>. See also Jacques-Yvan
Morin, "La conclusion d'accords internationaux par les provinces canadiennes ala lumiere
du droit compare" (1965) 3 Can. Y.B. Int'l Law 127 at 173-76 [J.-Y. Morin, "La
conclusion d'accords internationaux par les provinces canadiennes"] for a discussion of the
reactions to that agreements. Morin's article is also quite instructive on the way different
federations dealt with treaty-making powers until the mid-60s.
3speech was luminous in its pragmatism and far from being revolutionary; it was in the pure
British tradition of constitutional evolution and continuity.
Unfortunately, many could not imagine that Quebec's position on her capacity to
conclude international agreements was anything but a demand for secession or, at least, a
step in that direction. While they tried to understand Quebec's position on her capacity to
conclude international agreements, they were prisoners of their own conceptual prejudices.
Too many listeners had forgotten that other forms of political institutions existed before we
imagined the "sovereign nation-state". In effect, the long history of pluralistic arrangements
between ecclesiastical, imperial and local governments that covered the European continent
from the Middle Age on was a good source of examples as to the different ways one could
distribute exclusive, concurrent or complementary jurisdictions between autonomous or
semi-autonomous authorities.s But these arrangements were somehow forgotten and
S The German legal historian and theorist Otto Friederich von Gierke had done much to
keep alive the memory of the pluralist structure of the Medieval political order in Europe
with his four volumes Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht (Berlin: Weidmann, 1868-1913).
At the tum of the 20th Century, the famous Downing professor of the laws of England at
Cambridge, Frederic William Maitland, introduced to the English-speaking world part of
Gierke's opus. He translated a section of volume 3 of Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht
and wrote an introductory note to the German scholar's work. See Otto Friederich von
Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, trans. and introd. by Frederic William
Maitland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1900) [Gierke, Political Theories ofthe
Middle Age]. Frederic William Maitland's work also dealt significantly with the issue of
political pluralism and the multiplicity of superimposed forms of government that
4replaced by the concept of the "sovereign nation-state". Probably influenced by a
decolonization movement that was in full swing, many listeners became somehow
amnesiac. Their forgetfulness brought with it an incapacity to imagine that alternative
institutional arrangements might better describe contemporary and future political
arrangements. To put it differently: the revolution was not to be found in Gerin-Lajoie's
speech but in the fearful and forgetful minds of others. All this seems clear when one takes
a sober look at the main lines of Paul Gerin-Lajoie's speech.
Gerin-Lajoie proceeded by reminding his guests that the consular function consists
in encouraging the development of relations between the represented state and the state of
residence, i.e. the state of Quebec. Because Quebec's status as a "state" might have been a
point of contention, he elaborated on that point. First, he recognized that Quebec, being a
member of the Canadian federation, is not sovereign in all domains. But after reviewing the
constitute the history of political order in England and Europe. In general, one can consult
the essays collected in Frederic William Maitland, Collected Papers of Frederic William
Maitland, ed. by Herbert Albert Laurens Fisher, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1911) vol. 3 . Political pluralism was also widely discussed in England in the first half of
the 20th Century thanks to the works of George Douglas Howard Cole, John Neville Figgis
and Harold Joseph Laski. Laski taught at McGill from 1914 until 1916 when he left for
Harvard. On the intellectual relations between Harold Laski and Vicount Haldane, see
David Schneiderman's very instructive article, "Harold Laski, Viscount Haldane and the
Law of the Canadian Constitution in the Early Twentieth Century" (1998) 48 U.T.LJ. 521
[D. Schneiderman, "Harold Laski, Viscount Haldane and the Law of the Canadian
Constitution in the Early Twentieth Century"].
5criteria of statehood, he concluded that Quebec nonetheless met the characteristics of a
state. Gerin-Lajoie went further and argued that, beyond simply meeting those criteria,
Quebec had a unique vocation in North America: she was the "political expression of a
people distinguished, in a number of ways, from the English-language communities
inhabiting North America", "the political instrument of a cultural group, distinct and unique
in all of North America.".6 Thus, the Quebec statehood had to be viewed as one possible
institutional embodiment of a particular People.
Once he had established that Quebec was the institutional embodiment of a
particular political community, he went on to describe the needs of that community. These
needs were the ones of a political community which was coming of age. He described with
6 The address by Paul Gerin-Lajoie, Vice-President of the Executive Council and Quebec's
Minister of Education was delivered, as I noted earlier, in Montreal to the Consular Corps
on April 12, 1965. For a complete version of this address see Quebec, Ministere des
relations intemationales, Paul Gerin-Lajoie's speech delivered at the Montreal to the
Consular Corps on April 12, 1965, trans. by Ministere des relations intemationales, online:
Ministere des relations intemationales
<http://www.mri.gouv.qc.ca/en/ministere/documentation/textes/discoursyauCgerin_lajoie.
asp> [Paul Gerin-Lajoie, Address to the Consular Corps]. The original French version of
this speech is available in Quebec, Ministere des relations intemationales, Discours de Paul
Gerin-Lajoie devant Ie corps consulaire de Montreal Ie 12 avril 1965, online: Ministere des
relations intemationales
<http://www.mri.gouv.qc.ca/fr/ministere/documentation/textes/discoursyaul_gerin_lajoi~.
asp> [Paul Gerin-Lajoie, Discours de Paul Gerin-Lajoie devant Ie corps consulaire de
Montreal].
6excitement the Quebecois of the "Quiet Revolution" as overflowing with a superabundant
energy and engaged in a wide range of productive activities. 7 He described a Quebec
determined to take her "rightful place in the contemporary world" and eager "to provide, in
external as well as internal affairs, all the means necessary for the realization of the
aspirations of the society for which it stands."g And to optimise the results of those
endeavours, to attain their destiny, the Quebecois knew that they needed the appropriate
"material and constitutional means".9
It is important to note that Gerin-Lajoie was convinced that the fulfilment of those
needs was within reach. 10 While he thought that major constitutional revisions were needed
in relation to, inter alia, the division of legislative powers and the institutional structures of
7 Gerin-Lajoie said, ibid.:
[t]he Quebecer has assumed his responsibilities and has taken his fate [in]
his own hands. The economy, natural resources, education, community and
social organization have been the main fields of action of the new Quebec
citizen. I shall note simply by way of landmarks the creation of the
Departments of Education, of Natural Resources, and of Cultural Affairs, the
setting up of the General Finance Corporation, the nationalization of
electricity, the approaching creation of a siderurgical complex, of a universal
pension plan and its investment fund which will soon be a reality, along with
the introduction of hospitalization insurance as a forerunner to a complete
system of sickness insurance ...
g Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 He was confident that the Quebec society knew "that from now on the realization of its
own ends and aspirations l[ay] within its reach." Ibid.
7the Canadian state, II he was, however, convinced that Quebec already had the
constitutional powers to engage in international affairs related to her own fields of
legislative powers. Therefore, Gerin-Lajoie was not advocating for constitutional changes
to allow Quebec to take her place on the world stage. Rather, he claimed that Quebec was
simply awakening a latent power that already lay in the constitution of Canada. 12 A power
that was simply a logical consequence of a series of already accepted constitutional
imperatives.
The legal grounds for Gerin··Lajoie's argument were presented in a clear and
succinct manner. First, Gerin-Lajoie stated that "the constitution which Canada was given
in 1867 assigns to Canadian provinces the status of states fully and absolutely
sovereign III certain definite domains.,,13 He cited the famous judgment of the Privy
Council in Hodge v. R. to support his c:laim:
[The provincial legislatures] are in no sense delegates of or acting under any
mandate from the Imperial Parliament. When the British North America Act
enacted that there should be a legislature for Ontario, and that its legislative
assembly should have exclusive authority to make laws for the Province and
II See Paul Gerin-Lajoie, Constitutional Amendment in Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1950).
12 In the French version of Paul Gerin-Lajoie's address, this point is made in unequivocal
terms: "C'est dire que l'activite debordante que manifeste l'Etat du Quebec depuis cinq ans
dans les domaines qu'il n'avait pas jusqu'alors abordes ne doit apparaitre en aucune fa90n
comme revolutionnaire sur Ie plan constitutionnel." (Paul Gerin-Lajoie, Discours de Paul
Gerin-Lajoie devant Ie corps consulaire de Montreal, supra note 6).
13 Ibid.
8for provincial purposes in relation to the matters enumerated in sect. 92, it
conferred powers not in any sense to be exercised by delegation from or as
agents of the Imperial Parliament, but authority as plenary and as ample
within the limits prescribed by sect. 92 as the Imperial Parliament in the
plenitude of its power possessed and could bestow. Within these limits of
subjects and area the local legislature is supreme, and has the same authority
as the Imperial Parliament, or the Parliament of the Dominion, would have
had under like circumstances ... 14
Second, he highlighted the fact that "[i]n the matter of international competence, the
Canadian constitution is silent. With the exception of Article 132, which has become a dead
letter since the Statute of Westminster, in 1931, there is nothing which says that
international relations are solely under the jurisdiction of the federal state.,,15 What he
meant here by "the Canadian constitution" was the series of entrenched enacted
constitutional texts. He wanted to remind the audience that the federal authorities did not
enjoy plenary powers over international matters. "Therefore", he added, "it is not by virtue
of written law, but rather by repeated practice over the past forty years, that the Federal
Government has assumed an exclusive role with regard to relations with foreign
countries.,,16 But those times were past and Quebec wanted to step in and take her rightful
place.
Having first established that Canadian provinces had "the status of states fully and
14 Hodge v. R., [1883-84] 9 A.C. 117. [Hodge v. R.]
15 Paul Gerin-Lajoie, Address to the Consular Corps, supra note 6.
16 Ibid.
9absolutely sovereign in certain definite domains,,17 and, second, that nothing conferred to
the federal authorities exclusive jurisdiction over international affairs, Gerin-Lajoie argued
that provinces already enjoyed such constitutional powers in relation to the subject-matters
of their jurisdictional domains.
He reminded his audience that the implementation of treaties in Canada, when it
required modifications to domestic law, had to be undertaken by the legislature that has
power over the subject-matter involved in the treaty obligation. 18 This rule was the result of
the very important decision of the Privy Council in what is known as the Labour
Conventions case. 19 From there, he moved on to three legal conclusions.
1) Gerin-Lajoie claimed that Quebec possesses "a limited "jus
tractatum"",20 that is, a limited treaty-making power, and that she had no
intention to give away that power to the federal Parliament. In effect, Gerin-
Lajoie commented on the absurdity that would characterise a system in
which the authority charged with the execution of an obligation would not be
able to sign and negotiate that obligation. He said: "Is an agreement not
concluded with the essential purpose of putting it into application, and
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Canada (A.G.) v. Ontario (A.G.), [1937] A.C. 326, [1937] 1 W.W.R. 299, [1937] 1
D.L.R. 673 (P.C.) [Labour Conventions case with references to A.C.].
20 Paul Gerin-Lajoie, Address to the Consular Corps, supra note 6.
10
should those who will have to implement it not have the right to work out the
conditions in advance?,,21 While Gerin-Lajoie was speaking to a crowd of
diplomats, he did not get into the details of the argument in favor of
recognizing a jus tractatum for Quebec apart from arguing that it would be
absurd to attribute to separate authorities the power to make and the power to
execute international obligations. The "absurdity" argument was obviously
not sufficient since it could cut both ways: if treaty-making and treaty
implementation ought to belong to the same authority, why shouldn't they
belong to the federal authority?22 If the federal executive has the power to
conclude treaties on all and any subjects, why couldn't the federal
Parliament execute the obligations thus created? The answer to that
objection lies in the fact that, in the Canadian federation, it is the legislative
jurisdiction that determines the primordial scope of the executive powers and
not the other way around. This argument would be fleshed out a few years
later.23
21Ibid.
22 G.R. Morris,"The Treaty-Making Power: A Canadian Dilemma" (1967) 45 Can. Bar
Rev. 478 at 490 [G.R. Morris, "The Treaty-Making Power: A Canadian Dilemma"].
23 See, for example, Lome Giroux, "La capacite internationale des provinces en droit
constitutionnel canadien" (1967-1968) 9 C. de D. 241 [L. Giroux, "La capacite
internationale des provinces en droit constitutionnel canadien"] who referred to the Privy
Council decision in Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Co. v. R., [1916] 1 A.C. 566 (P.c.)
[Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Co.] where it was stated that "[i]t is to be observed that the
11
2) Having affirmed Quebec's limited jus tractatum and capacity to
intervene on the world stage to achieve her objective, Gerin-Lajoie added
that it was inadmissible "for the federal state to exert a kind of supervision
and adventitious control over Quebec's international relations.,,24
3) In parallel to these conclusions, Gerin-Lajoie claimed a right for
Quebec to "participate in the activity of certain international organizations of
a non-political character.,,25 What he meant by "international organizations
of a non-political character" was "interstate organizations ... founded for
the sole purpose of bringing about a solution, by international cooperation"
to "problems which up to now have been purely local in nature".26
British North America Act has made a distribution between the Dominion and the
provinces which extends not only to legislative but to executive authority. the
distribution under the new grant of executive authority in substance follows the distribution
under the new grant of legislative powers" (at 479-80. Emphasis added). Jacques-Yvan
Morin, in his article "Conclusion d'accords internationaux par les province", supra note 4
at p. 180, had hinted at the argument by referring to Liquidators of the Maritime Bank v.
New Brunswick (Receiver-General), [1892] A.C. 437 [Liquidators of the Maritime Bank]
where the Privy Council stated that the Lieutenant-Governor is as much the representative
of Her Majesty for provincial purposes as the Governor General is for the Dominion.
24 Paul Gerin-Lajoie, Address to the Consular Corps, supra note 6.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
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It is not because Quebec or other provinces had not made great use of their powers
that they had lost them. If there was a time when an almost exclusive participation of the
federal authorities in international affairs was not detrimental to provinces because such
affairs were fairly limited, Gerin-Lajoie's address was meant to say that those days were
over27: "Interstate relations now touch every aspect ofsociallije.,,28
In effect, international relations were no longer dominated by issues of war and
peace but dealt increasingly with issues traditionally characterized as "domestic" such as
labour conditions, education, family, etc. In many ways, being able to cooperate with other
jurisdictions was becoming, for provinces, necessary if they were to fully accomplish their
missions. This is why Gerin-Lajoie argued that the "collectivites membres" of the
federation ought to be able "to participate actively and directly in the preparation of
international agreements with which they are immediately concerned.,,29 Gerin-Lajoie
noted that a "large number of interstate organizations have been founded for the sole
purpose of bringing about a solution, by international cooperation, [to] problems which up
to now have been purely local in nature,,30 and it made good sense for those responsible for
dealing with those issues to participate: in those organizations.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid. (emphasis added).
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
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The "Gerin-Lajoie doctrine" - or, as it is often called, the doctrine of "the external
extension of internal competence,,31 - has been accepted by all subsequent Quebec
governments.32 Recently, for example, Liberal Premier Jean Charest declared:
31 The Government of Quebec, Ministere des Relations Internationales website summarizes
the Gerin-Lajoie doctrine in the following terms:
In areas in which the Government of Quebec is the only government
empowered to keep a commitment, it is normal that such commitment be
made by the Government of Quebec and that any foreign agreement in this
area be made by the Government of Quebec.
In short, Quebec is responsible for the international extension of its domestic
areas ofjurisdiction.
See Quebec, Ministere des relations internationales, Gerin-Lajoie's doctrine presentation,
online: Ministere des relations internationales
(<http://www.mri.gouv.qc.calen/politique_internationale/fondements/fondements.asp#doctr
ine> )
32 The Government of Quebec states:
Following the change in government in the wake of the 1966 Quebec general
election, the new government solemnly confirmed the political legitimacy of
the Gerin-Lajoie doctrine and the legal foundations of Quebec's international
involvement. This position was further confirmed by a debate on April 13,
1967, in the Legislative Assembly (today's National Assembly) leading up to
the unanimous adoption of an act creating the Ministere des Affaires
intergouvernementales.
Ibid. All subsequent Quebec governments have adopted this line of thought and have
worked to endow Quebec with the appropriate institutional structures for her participation
in international relations. See Daniel Turp, "La doctrine Gerin-Lajoie et l'emergence d'un
droit quebecois des relations internationales" in Stephane Paquin, ed., Les relations
internationales du Quebec depuis la Doctrine Gerin-Lajoie (1965-2005), (Quebec: Presses
14
II est d'ailleurs interessant de constater que les gouvernements qui se sont
succede au Quebec depuis ce temps ont agi, en matiere internationale, avec
une remarquable constance. Tant les gouvernements souverainistes que les
gouvernements federalistes ont trouve normal et necessaire de pousser
toujours plus loin l'engagement du Quebec sur la scene internationale. Cette
unanimite de la classe politique quebecoise autour de I'engagement
international du Quebec trouve sa source dans ce qu'on a appele la doctrine
Gerin-Lajoie, dont Ie principe demeure toujours aussi actuel aujourd'hui que
lorsqu'elle a ete formulee pour la premiere fois en 1965 par Paul Gerin-
Lajoie, alors ministre du gouvernement de Jean Lesage. Pour bien
comprendre la portee de cette doctrine, il faut savoir que, contrairement a
l'idee re<;ue, la competence en matiere de politique etrangere n'est pas
attribuee a l'un ou l'autre des ordres de gouvernement dans les textes
constitutionnels. Je n'ai pas l'intention de m'etendre sur ce sujet, deja bien
documente, si ce n'est que pour preciser que nous croyons que lorsque Ie
gouvernement du Quebec est Ie seul gouvernement competent pour
appliquer un engagement international, il est normal qu'il soit celui qui
prenne cet engagement. En somme, il revient au Quebec d'assumer, sur Ie
plan international, Ie prolongement de ses competences internes. Par ailleurs,
les divers gouvernements ont toujours pris soin d'exercer cette competence
dans Ie respect de la politique etrangere canadienne. En d'autres mots, ce qui
est de competence quebecoise chez nous, est de competence quebecoise
partout.33
de l'Universite Laval, 2006).
33 Quebec, Cabinet du Premier ministre, "Address of the Premier of Quebec to ENAP,
February 25th, 2004", Discours du mois de fevrier 2004, online: Premier ministre du
Quebec <http://www.premier.gouv.qc.ca/general/discours/2004/fevrier/dis20040225.htm>.
The phrase "ce qui est de competence quebecoise chez nous, est de competence quebecoise
partout" was also used by Premier Charest in his speech "Pour redecouvrir l'esprit federal"
(Address pronounced at the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Confederation Centre of
the Arts in Charlottetown (P.E.I.), November 8th, 2004), online: Premier ministre
<http://www.premier.gouv.qc.ca/general/discours/2004/novembre/dis20041108.htm> .
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Not only did subsequent Quebec governments accept the three conclusions that Gerin-
Lajoie teased out of his constitutional analysis, but they ultimately added a fourth: federal
authorities cannot bind Quebec to an international agreement without that latter's consent.
This fourth conclusion would ultimately be arrived at by the Quebec National Assembly
when it formalised Quebec's positions by adopting declaratory legislation that stating that:
The Quebec State is free to consent to be
bound by any treaty, convention or
international agreement in matters under
its constitutional jurisdiction.
No treaty, convention or agreement in the
areas under its jurisdiction may be binding
on the Quebec State unless the consent of
the Quebec State to be bound has been
formally expressed by the National
Assembly or the Government, subject to
the applicable legislative provisions.
The Quebec State may, in the areas under
its jurisdiction, establish and maintain
relations with foreign States and
international organizations and ensure its
representation outside Quebec.34
L'Etat du Quebec est libre de consentir a
etre lie par tout traite, convention ou
entente internationale qui touche a sa
competence constitutionnelle.
Dans ses domaines de competence, aucun
traite, convention ou entente ne peut
l'engager a moins qu'il n'ait formellement
signifie son consentement a etre lie par la
voix de I'Assemblee nationale ou du
gouvernement selon les dispositions de la
loi.
II peut egalement, dans ses domaines de
competence, etablir et poursuivre des
relations avec des Etats etrangers et des
organisations internationales et assurer sa
representation al'exterieur du Quebec.
The legislature of Quebec also adopted An Act respecting the Ministere des Relations
internationales35 in which it specified that the Government of Canada can negotiate
34 An Act respecting the exercise of the fundamental rights and prerogatives ofthe Quebec
people and the Quebec State, R.S.Q. c. E-20.2, s. 7.
35 An Act respecting the Ministere des Relations Internationales, R.S.Q. c. M-25.1.1, s. 22.1
[An Act respecting the Ministere des Relations Internationales].
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international agreements with foreign governments or international organisations on
matters within the constitutional jurisdiction of Quebec if authorized by that province. In
effect, following Quebec's traditional claim that executive prerogatives parallel legislative
jurisdiction, s. 22.1 provides that:
The [Quebec] Minister [of International
Relations] may agree to the signing of such
an accord by Canada.
The Government must, in order to be
bound by an international accord
pertaining to any matter within the
constitutional jurisdiction of Quebec and to
give its assent to Canada's expressing its
consent to be bound by such an accord,
make an order to that effect. The same
applies in respect of the termination of
such an accord.
Le ministre [des Relations internationales
du Quebec] peut donner son agrement ace
que Ie Canada signe un tel accord.
Le gouvernement doit, pour etre lie par un
accord international ressortissant a la
competence constitutionnelle du Quebec et
pour donner son assentiment a ce que Ie
Canada exprime son consentement a etre
lie par un tel accord, prendre un decret a
cet effet. 11 en est de meme a l'egard de la
fin d'un tel accord.
However, most of these positions were not entirely new. Other provinces had made
similar cla~ms in the past. For example, Ontario had argued to the Privy Council that the
only "authority competent to sign a treaty creating obligations is the King or some authority
specially delegated to do so by the King ... ,,36 and that "[t]here are no grounds whatever
for saying that the parties to advise His Majesty in matters relating to the jurisdiction of the
provinces have in some way come to be the Dominion Ministers.,,37 Therefore, Ontario
36 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at p. 333.
37 Ibid.
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claimed that she had jurisdiction to conclude treaties on matters within her jurisdiction.38
Whether or not this position was 'new' it still caused a certain amount of fear. As
mentioned above, it is probable that the decolonisation movement that was sweeping the
World at the time had something to do with the anxiety of some of Gerin-Lajoie's listeners.
Decolonisation was meant for peoples living in colonies and brought with it a
newfound right to self-determination. The main way in which colonized peoples exercised
their right to self-determination was secession from the old metropoles. Thus, secession
might have appeared as the paradigmatic act of decolonisation. While in the 1960s, Canada
was already autonomous from the British Parliament, it still required the formal
participation of the latter to amend certain parts of the Constitution Act, 1867. 39 The fact
that the Canadian constitution had not been entirely given back to Canadians - and, in some
Quebec nationalist circles, the fact that the Head of State was still the same individual as
the Head of State of the United Kingdom - was seen as evidence that the colonial ties had
not been completely broken yet. And, according to many Quebec nationalists, the
decolonisation paradigm appeared to fit their situation. Thus, there were fears that Quebec
was not simply making claims about having rights to participate in international affairs but
that she was rather taking steps towards fuller claims of independence from both the United
38 See 1.C.i., below.
39Constitution Act. 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No.
5 [Constitution Act, 1867]. This statute was originally entitled British North America Act.
The name of this statute was changed by the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, Sch.,
item 1.
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Kingdom and the rest of Canada. In fact, thinking that possession of an "international legal
personality" or of a power to make treaties were exclusive attributes of completely
sovereign states, some thought that recognizing Quebec's claim was equivalent to
.. Q'b' . ,40recogmzmg ue ec s secessIOn.
More generally, those opposed to the Gerin-Lajoie doctrine often shared a
conception of an independent Canada that must speak with one voice and in which that
voice came from the same place as where Canadian sovereignty lay: in the federal
authorities. The absence of an express constitutional enactment explicitly distributing
powers over international relations and diverging visions of the respective roles of Canada
and the provinces on the world stage had been, early in the withdrawal process from the
declining British Empire, an important cause of tensions between the federal and provincial
governments. Accordingly, the question of the creation and implementation of treaty
obligations in Canada has been the subject of a great number of debates that are still
ongoing.41 In effect, the succeeding federal governments never accepted the "Gerin-Lajoie
40 See, for example: Bora Laskin, "The Provinces and International Agreements" in
Ontario, Ontario Advisory Committee on Confederation, Background Papers and Reports,
vol. 1 (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1967) at 108 [8. Laskin, "The Provinces and International
Agreements"]; Jean-Yves Grenon, "De la conclusion des traites et de leur mise en oeuvre
au Canada" (1962) 40 Can. Bar Rev. 151 [J.-Y. Grenon, "De la conclusion des traites et de
leur mise en reuvre au Canada"]; G.R. Morris, "The Treaty-Making Power: A Canadian
Dilemma", supra note 22.
41 See, for example, the following classical articles on those issues: Clarence W. Jenks,
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"The Present Status of the Bennett Ratifications of International Labour Conventions"
(1937) 15 Can. Bar Rev. 464 [C.W. Jenks, "The Present Status of the Bennett Ratifications
of International Labour Conventions"]; W. Ivor Jennings, "Dominion Legislation and
Treaties" (1937) 15 Can. Bar Rev. 455 [W.I. Jennings, "Dominion Legislation and
Treaties"]; Norman A.M. Mackenzie, "Canada and the Treaty-Making Power" (1937) 15
Can. Bar Rev. 436; Richard J. Matas, "Treaty Making in Canada" (1947) 25 Can. Bar Rev.
458; David C. Vanek, "Is International Law Part of the Law of Canada?" (1949-50) 8
V.T.L.J. 251 [D.C. Vanek, "Is International Law Part of the Law of Canada?"]; John Peter
Nettl, "The Treaty Enforcement Power in Federal Constitutions" (1950) 28 Can. Bar Rev.
1051; Jean-Yves Grenon, "De la mise reuvre du futur Pacte international des droits de
l'homme dans l'Etat federatif canadien" (1951-52) 1-2 R.J.T. 195; George J. Szablowski,
"Creation and Implementation of Treaties in Canada" (1956) 34 Can. Bar Rev. 28; Ivan e.
Rand, "Some Aspects of Canadian Constitutionalism" (1960) 38 Can. Bar Rev. 135 [I.e.
Rand, "Some Aspects of Canadian Constitutionalism"]; Gerald V. La Forest, "May the
Provinces Legislate in Violation ofInternational Law?" [1961] 39 Can. Bar Rev. 78 [G.V.
La Forest, "May the Provinces Legislate in Violation of International Law?"]; J.-Y.
Grenon, "De la conclusion des traites et de leur mise en reuvre au Canada", ibid.; J.-Y.
Morin, "La conclusion d'accords internationaux par les provinces canadiennes", supra note
4; Edward McWhinney, "The Constitutional Competence Within Federal Systems as to
International Agreements" (1964-68) 1 Can. Legal Stud. 145 [Edward McWhinney, "The
Constitutional Competence Within Federal Systems as to International Agreements"]; G.R.
Morris, "The Treaty-Making Power: A Canadian Dilemma", ibid.; B. Laskin, "The
Provinces and International Agreements", ibid.; Edward McWhinney, "Canadian
Federalism and the Foreign Affairs and Treaty Power: The Impact of Quebec's Quiet
Revolution" (1969) 7 Can. Y.B. Int'l. Law 3 [E. McWhinney, "Canadian Federalism and
the Foreign Affairs and Treaty Power: The Impact of Quebec's Quiet Revolution"]; Ronald
G. Atkey, "The Role of The Provinces in International Affairs" (1970) 26 IntJ. 249; Andre
Dufour, "Federalisme canadien et droit international" in Ronald St. John MacDonald,
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Gerald L. Morris and Douglas M. Johnston, eds., Canadian Perspectives on International
Law and Organization (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) 72; Ronald St John
MacDonald, "The Relationship Between International Law and Domestic Law in Canada"
in Ronald St John MacDonald, Gerald L. Morris, Douglas M. Johnston, eds., Canadian
Perspectives on International Law and Organization (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1974) 88 [R. St John MacDonald, "The Relationship Between International Law and
Domestic Law in Canada"]; Gerald L. Morris, "Canadian Federalism and International
Law" in Ronald St. John MacDonald, Gerald L. Morris and Douglas M. Johnston, eds.,
Canadian Perspectives on International Law and Organization (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1974) 55; Covey T. Oliver, "The Enforcement of Treaties by a Federal
State" (1974) 14 Can.YB. Int'l. Law 331; Ronald St. John MacDonald, "International
Treaty Law and the Domestic Law of Canada" (1975) 2 Dal. L.J. 307 [R. St. John
MacDonald, "International Treaty Law and the Domestic Law of Canada"]; Anne-Marie
Jacomy-Millette, "L'Etat federe dans les relations internationales contemporaines: Ie cas du
Canada" (1976) 14 Can. YB. Int. L 20; Thomas A. Levy, "Provincial International Status
Revisited" (1976-77) 3 Dal. L.J. 70; Brian M. Mazer, "Sovereignty and Canada: An
Examination of Canadian Sovereignty from a Legal Perspective" (1977-78) 42 Sask. L.R.
1; Claude C. Emmanuelli and Stanislas Slosar, "L'application et l'interpretation des traites
internationaux par Ie juge canadien" (1978) 13 R.J.T. 69; Anne-Marie Jacomy-Millette, "Le
role des provinces dans les relations internationales" (1979) 10 Etudes internationales 285;
Francis Rigaldies and Jose Woehrling, "Le juge interne canadien et Ie droit international"
(1980) 21 C. de D. 293 [F. Rigaldies and J. Woehrling, "Le juge interne canadien et Ie droit
international"]; John Claydon, "The Application of International Human Rights Law by
Canadian Courts" (1981) 30 Buff. L. R. 727 [1. Claydon, "The Application oflnternational
Human Rights Law by Canadian Courts"]; Alice Desjardins, "La mise en oeuvre au Canada
des traites relatifs aux droits de la personne" (1981) 12 R.G.D. 359; Maxwell Cohen and
Anne Bayefsky, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and International Law"
(1983) 61 Can. Bar Rev. 265 [M. Cohen and A. Bayefsky, "The Canadian Charter of
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Rights and Freedoms and International Law"]; Jacques-Yvan Morin, "La personnalite
internationale du Quebec" (1984) 1 R.Q.D.I. 163 [J.-Y. Morin, "La personnalite
internationale du Quebec"]; Daniel Turp, "Le recours en droit international aux fins de
l'interpretation de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertes: un bilan jurisprudential"
(1984) 18 R.J.T. 353; John Humphrey, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and
International Law" (1985-86) 50 Sask. L. Rev. 13; Michel Lebel, "L'interpretation de la
Charte canadienne des droits et liberte au regard du droit international des droits de la
personne - Critique de la demarche suivie par la Cour supreme du Canada" (1988) 48 R. du
B. 743; Armand L.C. de Mestral, "Le Quebec et les relations internationales" in Pierre
Patenaude, ed., Quebec - Communaute fram;aise de Belgique, (Montreal: Wilson &
Lafleur, 1991) 209[A.L.C. de Mestral, "Le Quebec et les relations internationales"]; Anne
Bayefsky, "International Human Rights Law in Canadian Courts" in Irwin Cotler and Pearl
Eliadis, eds., International Human Rights Law - Theory and Practice, Montreal, CHRF,
1992, 115 [A. Bayefsky, "International Human Rights Law in Canadian Courts"]; Douglas
Sanders, "The Canadian Charter and the Protection of International Human Rights" (1993)
4 Crim. L.F. 413; Irit Weiser, "Effect in Domestic Law of International Human Rights
Treaties Ratified Without Implementing Legislation" (1998) 27 Can. Council Int'l L. Proc.
132; Karen Knop, "Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts" (2000) 32
N.Y.U.J. Int'l Law & Pol. 501 [K. Knop, "Here and There: International Law in Domestic
Courts"]; Hugh Kindred, "Canadians as Citizens of the International Community: Asserting
Unimplemented Treaty Rights in the Courts" in Stephen G. Coughlan and Dawn Russell,
ed., Citoyennete et participation al'administration de la justice / Citizenship and Citizen
Participation in the Administration ofJustice (Montreal: Themis, 2001) 265 [H. Kindred,
"Canadians as Citizens of the International Community: Asserting Unimplemented Treaty
Rights in the Courts"]; Stephen J. Toope, "Inside and Out: The Stories ofInternational Law
and Domestic Law" (2001) 50 U.N.B L.J. 11; Stephen J. Toope, "The Uses of Metaphor:
International Law and the Supreme Court of Canada" (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 534,
reprinted in Stephen G. Coughlan and Dawn Russell, ed., Citoyennete et participation a
22
l'administration de la justice II Citizenship and Citizen Participation in the Administration
of Justice (Montreal: Editions Themis, 2001) 289 (also available at
<http://www.themis.umontreal.calpdf/icaLcitoyennete/full_icaLcitoyennete.pdf» [S.J.
"The Uses of Metaphor: International Law and the Supreme Court of Canada" with
referene to the version published in Stephen G. Coughlan and Dawn Russell, ed.,
Citoyennete et participation a l'administration de la justice II Citizenship and Citizen
Participation in the Administration ofJustice (Montreal: Editions Themis, 2001)]; France
Houle, "L'arret Baker: Le role des regles administratives dans la reception du droit
international des droits de la personne en droit interne" (2002) 27 Queen's L.J. 511 [F.
Houle, "L'arret Baker"]; Louis LeBel and Gloria Chao, "The Rise of International Law in
Canadian Constitutional Litigation: Fugue or Fusion? Recent Developments and
Challenges in Internalizing International Law" (2002) 16 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2nd) 23 [L.
LeBel and G. Chao, "The Rise of International Law in Canadian Constitutional Litigation:
Fugue or Fusion? Recent Developments and Challenges in Internalizing International
Law"]; Stephane Beaulac, "Recent Developments on the Role of International Law in
Canadian Statutory Interpretation" (2004) 25 Stat. L. Rev. 19; Stephane Beaulac, "National
Application of International Law: The Statutory Interpretation Perspective" (2004) Can.
Y.B. of Int'! L. 225; France Houle, "La legitimite constitutionnelle de la reception directe
des normes du droit international des droits de la personne en droit interne canadien"
(2004) 45 C. de D. 295 [F. Houle, "La legitimite constitutionnelle de la reception directe
des normes du droit international des droits de la personne en droit interne canadien"]
(edited version of France Houle, "La reception du droit international des droits de la
personne en droit interne canadien : de la theorie de la separation des pouvoirs vers une
approche fondee sur les droits fondamentaux" in Patricia Hughes and Patrick Molinari,
eds., Justice et participation dans un monde global : la nouvelle regie de droit? I
Participatory Justice in a Global Economy: The New Rule of Law? Proceedings of the
Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice Conference, Banff, 2003 (Montreal:
Themis, 2004)) 173); Stephane Beaulac, "The Canadian Federal Constitutional Framework
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and the Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol" (2005) 5 R.J.P. 125; Joanna Harrington,
"Redressing the Democratic Deficit in Treaty Law Making" (2005) 50 McGill LJ. 465 [J.
Harrington, "Redressing the Democratic Deficit in Treaty Law Making"]; Joanna
Harrington, "Scrutiny and Approval: The Role for Westminster-style Parliaments in Treaty-
Making" (2006) 55 LC.L.Q. 121 [J. Harrington, "Scrutiny and Approval: The Role for
Westminster-style Parliaments in Treaty-Making"]; Joanna Harrington, "The Role for
Parliament in Treaty-Making" in Oonagh Fitzgerald, et ai, eds., The Globalized Rule of
Law: Relationships between International and Domestic Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006)
159.
Books have also been written about the treaties and Canadian domestic law. See
among others: James M. Hendry, Treaties and Federal Constitutions, (Washington: Public
Affairs Press, 1955); Jacques Brossard, Andre Patry and Elisabeth Weiser, eds., Les
pouvoirs exterieurs du Quebec (Montreal: Presses Universitaires de l'Universite de
Montreal, 1967); Allan E. Gotlieb, Canadian Treaty Making (Toronto: Butterworths,
1968); Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs, Federalism and International Relations by
Paul Martin, Sr. (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968) [Po Martin, Sr., Federalism and
International Relations]; Anne-Marie Jacomy-Millette, Treaty Law in Canada, trans. by
Thomas V. Helwig (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1975) [Anne-Marie Jacomy-
Millette, Treaty Law in Canada]; William Schabas, International Human Rights Law and
the Canadian Charter, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1996); Gibran van Ert, Using
International Law in Canadian Courts (New York: Kluwer Law International, 2002) [G.
van Ert, Using International Law in Canadian Courts].
As for general constitutional doctrine, one can refer to the following classic
references: Kenneth C. Wheare, Federal Government, 3rd ed. (London: Oxford University
Press, 1953) at 178ff.;Frederick P. Varcoe, The Constitution of Canada (Toronto:
Carswell, 1965) at 178ff.; Bora Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law, 4th ed. by Albert S.
Abel and John L Laskin (Toronto: Carswell, Toronto, 1975), at 202ff.; Fran<;:ois Chevrette
and Herbert Marx, Droit constitutionnel: notes et jurisprudence (Montreal: Presses de
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doctrine". They all claimed that the federal authorities were the ones who could speak for
Canada and that provinces may, with the consent of federal authorities, play certain limited
roles in Canada's foreign relations. But sovereignty was the prism through which political
desires were read. And, according to this mindset, because a sovereign state ought not only
to enjoy the powers to make treaties but should also enjoy the domestic powers to
implement them, many authors favourable to Ottawa's position have, over the years, called
for a reversal of the famous Labour Conventions decision.
The issue of provincial treaty powers was never entirely resolved. However, Quebec
did not wait for approval to engage more deeply in international affairs. In effect, the
Ministere des Relations Internationales claims that Quebec is currently engaged in
"prospecting and promotion" . .. 42actIvItIes, "intergovernmental cooperation" and
l'Universite de Montreal, 1982) at 1181£f. [F. Chevrette and H. Marx, Droit
constitutionnel] .
42 The Ministere des Relations Internationales explains these two terms in the following
way:
Prospecting consists in recruiting investors and immigrants, exploring export
markets, targeting groups of potential tourists and encouraging organizers to
hold their conventions and cultural events in Quebec. The deployment of
these functions is greatly facilitated by Quebec's permanent presence abroad.
In the case of recruiting and selecting immigration candidates, this foreign
presence is essential.
Efforts by Quebec to promote its attractions, socioeconomic characteristics
and culture are distinct from but closely related to prospecting activities, as
they contribute to enhancing international awareness of Quebec. This
objective is achieved through lectures, Web sites, articles, advertising, and
participation in trade shows, symposiums and exhibitions.
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development of intemational nonns.43 These actions are made possible not only by an
important bureaucratic apparatus in Quebec city but also by six "general delegations"
covering all sectors of provincial jurisdiction,44 four delegations with a more limited
mandate,45 nine government bureaux offering limited service to a single sector,46 six trade
branches headed by a resident of the host country and offering services in limited sectors47
and three business agents.48
See Quebec, Ministere des Relations Intemationales, Activities - Prospecting and
Promotion, online: Ministere des relations intemationales
<http://www.mri.gouv.qc.calen/politique_intemationale/activites/prospection-.promotion.as
p> [Quebec, Activites - Prospecting and Promotion] .
43 See Quebec, Ministere des Relations Intemationales, Types of Activities, online:
Ministere des relations intemationales
<http://www.mri.gouv.qc.calen/politique_intemationale/activites/activites.asp>. The
English version of the Ministere's text refer to "shared general standards" but the French
version is more precise and uses the expression "nonnes intemationales".
44 They are in Brussels, London, Mexico City, New York City, Paris and Tokyo.
45 They are in Boston, Buenos Aires, Chicago and Los Angeles.
46 They are in Barcelona, Beijing, Damascus (Immigration Office), Hong Kong
(Immigration Office), Miami, Munich, Shanghai, Vienna (Immigration Office) and
Washington (Tourism Office).
47 They are in Atlanta, Berlin, Rome, Santiago, Seoul and Taipei.
48 They are in Lima, Hanoi and Milan. All these infonnations are found at Quebec,
Ministere des Relations Intemationales, Quebec Offices Abroad, online: Ministere des
relations intemationales
<http://www.mri.gouv.qc.calen/action_intemationale/representations_etranger/representati
ons_etranger.asp>.
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It is of particular interest to us here what the government of Quebec does in terms of
"intergovernmental cooperation" and development of international norms. Of the first type
of action, the Ministere writes:
For purposes of mutual support, economy and efficiency, governments often
decide to pool their resources and expertise. The Government of Quebec has
thus developed official relations with a number of American states,
particularly border states, over the years. It has also forged links with states
and regions on other continents, based mainly on cultural affinities and
economic complementarity. The framework for this type of cooperation is
generally specified in an intergovernmental agreement.4
As for the second type of actions, the one about the development of international norms, the
Ministere explains that "[t]he Government of Quebec is affected in a number of ways by
international standards,50 particularly in areas under its jurisdiction such as labour, health,
civil law, education and justice administration.,,51 The Ministere states that certain norms
"are negotiated bilaterally by individual governments - e.g., standards negotiated by
Quebec with respect to recognition of driver's licences, international adoption and judicial
49 Quebec, Ministere des Relations Internationales, Activities - Intergovernmental
Cooperation, online: Ministere des relations internationales
<http://www.mri.gouv.qc.ca/en/politique_internationale/activites/cooperation.asp>.
50 Again, the French version uses the expression "norme".
51 Quebec, Ministere des Relations Internationales, Activities - Development of Shared
General Standards, online: Ministere des relations internationales
<http://www.mri.gouv.qc.ca/en/politique_internationale/activites/normes.asp>
Activities - Development o.fShared General Standards].
[Quebec,
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cooperation." Since 1964, Quebec has entered into at least 550 international agreements
with international bodies and foreign governments on a wide range of issues (e.g.
agriculture, education, energy, transportation, telecommunications, environment, etc.)52
Regarding the complex issue of international norms that are elaborated by
international organisations or adopted at international conferences, the Ministere writes:
In most cases, Quebec is not a member of the international organization in
question. It nevertheless contributes to the organization's efforts by assigning
experts to organizational task forces and cooperating with the federal
government prior to input by the latter as a member of the organization. In
some cases, Quebec participates in organizational decision-making as part of
the Canadian delegation. In the case of the Organisation internationale de la
francophonie ("La Francophonie") and its agencies, the Government of
Quebec participates directly as a full-fledged member.
The Government of Quebec also participates directly in negotiations aimed
at harmonizing certain legislation of federal component states in various
countries.
In some cases, thanks to its experience and the expertise available in
Quebec, the Government of Quebec plays a highly influential international
role. In 1999, for instance, Quebec was responsible for the original initiative
aimed at promoting and developing an international legal instrument in the
area of cultural diversity. 53
52 Quebec, Ministere des Relations Internationales, International Commitments, online:
Ministere des relations internationales
<http://www.mri.gouv.qc.calenlaction_internationale/ententes/index.asp>.
53 See Quebec, Activities - Development ofShared General Standards, supra note 51. The
Ministere refers to the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of
Cultural Expressions approved at the General Conference of the United Nations
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All the while Quebec and other provinces are actively involved internationally, the
federal government refuses to recognize that provinces possess a limited jus tractatus.
However, in the last few years, probably as a result of the increasing impacts of
globalisation and the creation of transnational legal regimes, the issue of managing treaty
powers has resurfaced with vigour in Canada, as it has in other federations. 54 The tensions
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) on 20 October, 2005
(UNESCO, Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural
Expressions, 20 October, 2005 online: UNESCO
<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001429/142919e.pdf». On 10 November, 2005,
the AssembIee nationale unanimously adopted the following resolution: "... conformement
it l'article 22.3 de la Loi sur Ie ministere des Relations internationales, l'Assemblee
nationale approuve l'entente internationale concernant la Convention sur la protection et la
promotion de la diversite des expressions culturelles." (Quebec, National Assembly,
Journal ofDebates, 3ih Leg. 1st sess., Vol. 38 No. 182 (10 November 2005).
54 For example, the debates about federalism and international law in the United States have
regained a lot of vigour in the last few years. See for example: Jack L. Goldsmith, "Federal
Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism" (1997) 83 Va. L. Rev. 1617; Gerald L. Neuman,
"The Global Dimension of RFRA" (1997) 14 Const. Commentary 33; Gavin R. Villareal,
"One Leg to Stand On: The Treaty Power and Congressional Authority for the Endangered
Species Act After United States v. Lopez", Note, (1998) 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1125; James A.
Deeken, "A New Miranda For Foreign Nationals? The Impact of Federalism on
International Treaties that Place Affirmative Obligations on State Governments in the
Wake of Printz v. United States", Note, (1998) 31 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 997; Thomas
Healy, "Is Missouri v. Holland Still Good Law? Federalism and the Treaty Power", Note,
(1998) 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1726; G. Edward White, "The Transformation of the
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Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations" (1999) 85 Va. L. Rev. 1; Michael D. Ramsey,
"The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original Understanding of Foreign Policy
Federalism" (1999) 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 341; Curtis A. Bradley, "The Treaty Power and
American Federalism" (1998) 97 Mich. L. Rev. 390; Curtis A. Bradley, "The Treaty Power
and American Federalism II" (2000) 99 Mich. L. Rev. 98; David M. Golove, "Treaty-
Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the
Treaty Power" (2000) 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1075; Omar N. White, "The Endangered Species
Act's Precarious Perch: A Constitutional Analysis Under the Commerce Clause and the
Treaty Power", Comment, (2000) 27 Ecology L.Q. 215; Edward T. Swaine, "Negotiating
Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power" (2000) 49 Duke L.J. 1127;
Janet R. Carter, "Commandeering Under the Treaty Power", Note, (2001) 76 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 598; Robert Anderson IV, ""Ascertained in a Different Way": The Treaty Power at the
Crossroads of Contract, Compact, and Constitution" (2001) 69 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 189;
Robert Knowles, "Starbucks and the New Federalism: The Court's Answer to
Globalization", Note, (2001) 95 Nw. U.L. Rev. 735; James J. Pascoe, "Time for a New
Approach? Federalism and Foreign Affairs After Crosby v. National Foreign Trade
Council" (2002) 35 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 291; Edward T. Swain, "Does Federalism
Constrain the Treaty Power?" (2003) 103 Colum. L. Rev. 403; Ana Maria Merico-
Stephens, "Of Federalism, Human Rights, and the Holland Caveat: Congressional Power
To Implement Treaties" (2004) 25 Mich. J. Int'l L. 265; Katrina L. Fischer, "Harnessing the
Treaty Power in Support of Environmental Regulation of Activities That Don't
"Substantially Affect Interstate Commerce": Recognizing the Realities of the New
Federalism" (2004) 22 Va. EnvtI. L.J. 167; Nicholas Quinn Rosenkrantz, "Executing the
Treaty Powers" (2005) 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1867; Ryan Patton, "Federal Preemption in an
Age of Globalization", Note, (2005) 37 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. Ill. See also the articles
published in the three following Symposia: Foreign Affairs Law at the End of the Century,
(1999) 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1089; New Voices on the New Federalism, (2001) 46 ViII. L.
Rev. 907; Federal Courts and Foreign Affairs, (2002) 42 Va. J. Int'l L. 365.
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between centralism and provincial self-government as well as the need felt for an effective
presence at the international level have fuelled intense political debates.55 It is time to
55 Here is a sample of the newspaper articles published on the issue between October 2004
and October 2005: Gilles Toupin, "Martin re90it l'aval de Chirac pour son G20" La Presse
(15 October 2004) A21; Serge Joyal, "La fin du Canada? D'une asymetrie al'autre, il risque
de rester bien peu de la federation" La Presse (22 October 2004) A19; Lysiane Gagnon,
"Howard Dean aMontreal" La Presse (28 October 2004) A21; Mario Cloutier, "Rencontre
Charest-Fox" La Presse (29 October 2004) A8; Louise Beaudouin, "Remettre Ie Quebec a
sa place" La Presse (19 November 2004) A14; Mario Cloutier, "Mission au Mexique" La
Presse (20 November 2004) A19; Joel-Denis Bellavance, "Harper promet de laisser Ie
Quebec s'exprimer sur la scene internationale" La Presse (28 Noven:ber 2005) A3; Benoit
Pelletier, "Un role accru" La Presse (1 December 2004) A21; Gilles Normand, "Conseil de
la federation" La Presse (27 December 2004) A16; Eric Clement, "Le Quebec et la France
main dans la main" La Presse (8 January 2005) A6; Jocelyne Richer, "Quebec veut
contribuer au succes des elections en HaIti" La Presse (5 February 2005) A8; Isabelle
Hachey, "Le debut d'un temps nouveau" La Presse (6 February 2005) PLUS 5; Constant
Brand, "Charest reclame un plus grand role international pour Ie Quebec" La Presse (5
March 2005) A14; Jocelyne Richer, "Jean Charest souhaite rencontrer Hilary Clinton a
Washnington" La Presse (12 March 2005) A18; Tommy Chouinard et Joel-Denis
Bellavance, "Conseil de la federation" La Presse (10 August 2005) A9; Isabelle Rodrigue,
"Pettigrew tient son bout face a Charest" La Presse (9 September 2005) All; Isabelle
Rodrigue, "Pettigrew et Pelletier bientot face aface" La Presse (13 September 2005) A23;
Tommy Chouinard, "Relations internationales" La Presse (15 September 2005) AIO;
Michel Gauthier, "Le parti liberal n'a pas de le90n a donner a personne" La Presse (16
September 2005) A21; Marie-Claude Lemieux, "Boisclair veut faire mieux que Rene-
Levesque" La Presse (19 September 2005) AI; Andre Pratte, "Deux doctrines" La Presse
(19 September 2005) A16; Gilles Toupet, "Rejet du projet de loi sur la consultation des
provinces" La Presse (30 September 2005) A7; Presse Canadienne, "Line Beauchamp
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parlera pour Ie Canada" La Presse (4 October 2005) A7; Sylvain Larocque, "Desaccord sur
Ie role du Quebec sur la scene internationales" (5 October 2005) A5; Reginald Harvey,
"Concertation et cooperation" Ie Devoir (9 octobre 2004) G3; Antoine Robitaille, "La
goutte d' eau de trop dans Ie vase asymetrique" Ie Devoir (16 October 2004) B4; Michel
David, "La doctrine Charest" Ie Devoir (23 November 2004) A3; Alec Castonguay, "Paul
Martin envoie des renforts a Sgro et Frulla" Ie Devoir (3 December 2004) A3; Jean-
Guillaume Dumont, "Faute de leadership, Ie Quebec stagne" Ie Devoir (5 February 2005)
G5; Christian Rioux, "Quebec veut participer aux negociations avec I'Europe" Ie Devoir (4
March 2005) A2; Normand Theriault, "Au creur des nations" Ie Devoir (9 March 2005)
Cl; Claude Morin, "L'obstacle oublie" Ie Devoir (9 March 2005) C6; Mylene Tremblay,
"Retour sur la doctrine Gerin-Lajoie" Ie Devoir (9 March 2005) C7; Stephane Paquin,
"Une reforme indispensable" Ie Devoir (9 March 2005) C6; Jean-Guillaume Dumont, "Le
gouvernement doit agir pour preserver l'identite quebecoise" Ie Devoir (9 March 2005)
C5; Robert Aird, "Signe Andre Patry" Ie Devoir (9 March 2005) C4; Michel David, "Les
slogans creux" Ie Devoir (19 March 2005) B3; Eric Desrosiers, "Se meIer de ses affaires"
Ie Devoir (19 March 2005) C3; Michel David, "Le prix de la mollesse" Ie Devoir (30 June
2005) A3; Robert Dutrisac, "Ottawa se crispe, Quebec s'alarme" Ie Devoir (2 July 2005)
AI; Jocelyne Richer, "Quebec veut s'avancer sur la scene intemationale" Ie Devoir (9
August 2005) A3; Louise Harel et Gilles Duceppe, "Le Quebec n'est plus libre de ses
choix" Ie Devoir (18 August 2005) A7; Danic Parenteau et Ian Parenteau, "La question de
l'identite quebecoise a l'heure de l'altermondialisme" Ie Devoir (22 August 2005) A6;
Lucie Lamarche, "La place du Quebec sur la scene intemationale : qu' en est-il des droits de
la personne 7" Ie Devoir (24 August 2005) A7; Daniel Turp, "Je ne suis pas candidat et
j'appuie Andre Boisclair" Ie Devoir (26 August 2005) A9; Monique Gagnon-Tremblay,
"L'action intemationale du Quebec et les droits de la personne: des efforts reels" Ie
Devoir (31 August 2005) A7; Robert Dutrisac, "Le Canada doit parler d'une seule voix" Ie
Devoir (2 September 2005) AI; Robert Dutrisac, "Quebec entend renforcer la doctrine
Gerin-Lajoie" Ie Devoir (3 September 2005) A5; Bernard Descoteaux, "Le corset de M.
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Pettigrew" Le Devoir (6 September 2005) A6; Stephane Paquin, "La reforme proposee par
Ie gouvernement du Quebec est plus necessaire que jamais" Le Devoir (9 September 2005)
A9; Robert Aird, "La magie canadienne" Le Devoir (9 September 2005) A9; Louise
Beaudouin, "Mensonges et reculs" Le Devoir (9 September 2005) A9; Isabelle Rodrigue,
"Pettigrew craint une recuperation par les « fanatiques de l'independance »" Le Devoir (9
September 2005) AI; Benoit Pelletier et Monique Gagnon-Tremblay, "La doctrine Gerin-
Lajoie: un cadre de reference toujours d' actualite" Le Devoir (10 September 2005) B5;
Bernard Descoteaux, "Les sophismes de Pettigrew" Le Devoir (10 September 2005) B4;
Presse Canadienne et Le Devoir, "Quebec hausse Ie ton" (10 September 2005) »A1;
Chantal Hebert, "Pettigrew Kamikaze" Le Devoir (12 September 2005) A3; Presse
Canadienne, "Pettigrew et Pelletier se parleront" Le Devoir (13 September 2005) A3;
Robert Dutrisac, "Quebec fera sa place dans Ie monde apres entente avec Ottawa" Le
Devoir (15 September 2005) A3; Helene Buzzetti, "La bonne vieille methode" Le Devoir
(21 September 2005) A3; Monique Gagnon-Tremblay, "C'est la meilleure entente qui soit"
Le Devoir (23 September 2005) A8; Tomy Menninger, "Les Etats federes et la scene
internationale" Le Devoir (28 September 2005) A6; Antoine Robitaille, "C'est aOttawa de
parler de droit de l'homme, dit l'entourage de Charest" Le Devoir (30 September 2005) A4;
Sylvain Larocque, "Pettigrew fait baisser les attentes" Le Devoir (3 October 2005) A3;
Alec Castonguay, Diversite culturelle: derniere ligne droit a l'UNESCO Le Devoir (3
October 2005) AI; Antoine Robitaille, "Le debat sur la place du Quebec continue de faire
rage" Le Devoir (5 October 2005) A2; The Gazette, "Ex-MNA Christos Sirros named as
Quebec's man in Brussels" The Gazette (7 October 2004) A16; Mike de Souza, "Harper
touts Belgium as a Federal model" The Gazette (16 October 2004) A13; Anne Dawson,
"Harper back ADQ program" The Gazette (19 October 2004) A.12; The Gazette, "Who
wants a more complicated Canada" The Gazette (20 October 2004) A30; Anne Dawson,
"Belgium" plan might be tough sell in Ontario" The Gazette (22 October 2004) A14; Mike
de Souza, "Charest as little to say on anti-missile shield" The Gazette (1 December 2004)
A12; Kevin Dougherty, "Our man in London" The Gazette (5 December 2004) D.l.BRE;
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Mike de Souza, "Ex-ambassador challenges Quebec's international role" The Gazette (18
February 2005) A9; Mike de Souza, "Canada should play bigger. international role:
Pettigrew" The Gazette (19 February 2005) All; Elizabeth Thompson, "Feds set to work
with Quebec" The Gazette (6 March 2005) A6; Irwin Block and Mike de Souza, "Pelletier
makes pitch for greater Quebec role" The Gazette (18 March 2005) A8; Kevin Dougherty,
"Vietnam orphans caught in war of words: Accord scuttled Ottawa, Quebec in jurisdiction
fight" The Gazette (2 July 2005) A12; Kevin Dougherty, "Feds, province end Vietnam
adoption spat" The Gazette (13 September 2005) A17; Don Macdonald, "Charest outlines
goals of trip to China" The Gazette (14 September 2005) BI; Kevin Dougherty, "Wider
role sought on world stage: Provincial minister takes hard line with Pettigrew" The Gazette
(15 September 2005) All; Josee Legault, "Pettigrew makes me pine for the Stephane Dion
days" The Gazette (16 September 2005) A21; Kevin Dougherty, "Deal signed in Quebec to
resume Vietnamese adoptions" The Gazette (16 September 2005) A9; Don Macpherson,
"Quebec, Ottawa spar over foreign affairs" The Gazette (17 September 2005) A31; The
Gazette "Canada must speak in one united voice" The Gazette (19 September 2005) A22;
Monique Gagnon-Tremblay, "Quebec needs place at table" The Gazette (3 September
2005) A21; Elizabeth Thompson, "Province, feds jockey over roles in world: Quebec
minister to read part of UNESCO speech" The Gazette (4 October 2005) Al 0; Anne
Dawson, "Harper's Canada: Belgium: Calls for devolved powers, backs Dumont's Quebec
plan" National Post (19 October 2004) AI; National Post, "Firewall folly, take two"
National Post (20 October 2004) A23; Robert Fife, "PM threatens 'one Canada,' Liberal
says: Asymmetrical federalism" National Post (21 October 2004) A4; Stephen Harper, "My
plan for 'open federalism" National Post (27 October 27 2004) A19; Graeme Hamilton,
"'Country' of Quebec" National Post (15 November 2004) A6; Mike de Souza, "Quebec
bids to improve international presence" National Post (18 February 2005) A8; Monique
Gagnon-Tremblay, "Quebec and America" National Post (14 March 2005) A17; Robert
Sauve, "Americans' view of Quebecers" National Post (15 March. 2005) A17; Jack Aubry,
"Ottawa set to discuss Quebec's world role: Seeks increased profile" National Post (1
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review the state of Canadian constitutional law in relation to treaty-making powers and to
reassess the assumptions that have lain behind the different positions in order to better
imagine ways to go forward in the new world order that we are now facing.
The Canadian federation is deeply involved in the web of relations with other states
and non-state actors that form our current world order. However, despite the fact that the
federal and provincial governments are actively engaged in establishing and maintaining
such relations, the exact operational boundaries of each player is the subject of
disagreement among them. As we have seen, this is partly due to the fact that the written
Constitution of Canada does not expressly attribute the powers to make and implement
September 2005) A9; Lome Gunter, "Who may speak for Canada?" National Post (12
September 2005) All; The Globe and mail, "France and Quebec plant joint mission" The
Globe and Mail (14 October 2004) AI; Jeffrey Simpson, "Ottawa, please stop trying to
please" The Globe and Mail (15 October 2004) A23; Jeffrey Brooke et aI., "With the
Liberal Party holding a policy convention this weekend, the Globe and Mail asked a·
sampling of members for their views on three issues" The Globe and Mail (5 March 2005)
A4; Alan Freeman, "Premiers raise fear over border plans. Charest, McGuinty talk to US
official" The Globe and Mail (19 April 2005) A18; The Globe and Mail, "Martin chats with
Globe's editorial board. Sweeping conversation covers successes, economy, NDP, Darfur
and Gomery probe" The Globe and Mail (26 April 2005) A6; Shawn McCarthy, "Chretien
defends handling of ad scandal" The Globe and Mail (30 April 2005) A19; Konrad
Yakabuski, "Big dreams in Canada's city that never sleeps. The mayor is working overtime
to help Montreal get its groove back" The Globe and Mail (16 July 2005) A3; Rheal
Seguin, "Quebec will work with Ottawa in representing Canada abroad" The Globe and
Mail (15 September 2005) A4.
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international agreements binding on Canada or the provinces. A second factor that helps
explain the lack of express resolution of the operational boundaries between the federal
government and the provinces in relation to international agreements flows from a mistaken
association between two questions: the recognition of the international capacity to make
treaties and the international recognition of an independent state. Again, as I have said,
fearing that any recognition of provincial powers over treaties could feed the Quebec
sovereignist theses, the federal government has, over the second-half of the last century,
tended systematically to downplay the federalist nature of the treaty powers in favour of a
centralisation of such powers in Ottawa.
However, it appears that there is more than enough constitutional material to
construct an appropriate and rather precise set of operational rules defining the respective
roles of the federal and provincial authorities. Furthermore, it is entirely possible to solve
the longstanding conflict between Ottawa and Quebec on this issue without having any
impact - positive or negative - on the strength of a potential provincial bid to obtain
international recognition after having declared secession from the rest of Canada. In the
next section, I will briefly flesh out the constitutional traditions that inform the way in
which I will go about uncovering the set of constitutional imperatives that govern treaty
powers in Canada.
A. The Voluntarist and the Organic
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Constitutional
Perspectives
The reader might wonder why the Constitution Act, 186756 does not expressly
allocate either to the federal or provincial authorities the powers to engage in international
relations. Why is there such an obvious gap? While many states have clear constitutional
provisions dealing with international relations and the incorporation of international law
within their domestic sphere,57 Canada did not have at the time of Gerin-Lajoie's address -
and still, to this day, does not have - any active constitutional provision expressly referring
56 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 39.
57 For example, Article VI, § 2 of the Constitution ofthe United States ofAmerica declares
that:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
The Constitution of the United States declares at art. II, § 2, cl. 2 that the President "shall
have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided
two thirds of the Senators present concur .,. "and at art. I, § 10, cis. 1 and 3 that "[n]o
state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation" and "[n]o state shall, without the
consent of Congress ... enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or with a
foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as
will not admit of delay".
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to those subjects. Section 132 of the Constitution Act. 1867 might seem relevant at first
glance since it states that the Parliament and Government of Canada "shall have all Powers
necessary or proper for performing the Obligations of Canada or of any Province thereof, as
Part of the British Empire, towards Foreign Countries, arising under Treaties between the
Empire and such Foreign Countries". 58 However, as Gerin-Lajoie rightly pointed out, this
provision has become obsolete since Canada gained her international autonomy from Great
Britain. Canada can no longer be bound by Imperial treaties adopted since then59 and s. 132
is simply not applicable to treaties that Canada ratifies.60 It must be remembered that the
58 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 39.
59 Of course, Imperial treaties formed prior to Canada's international autonomy can still
bind Canada according to the regular rules of state succession. However, s. 132 can no
longer be used to justify implementation measures by the federal Parliament or Government
of those treaties since those treaties no longer impose obligations on "Canada or of any
Province thereof, as Part of the British Empire" [Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 39 s.
132 [emphasis added]. Contra R. v. Sikeya, [1964] 2 C.C.C. 325,43 C.R. 83, affd. [1965]
2 C.C.C. 129,44 C.R. 266.
60 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 350 ("While it is true, as was pointed out in
the Radio case, [1932] A.C. 304, that it was not contemplated in 1867 that the Dominion
would possess treaty-making powers, it is impossible to strain the section [132] so as to
cover the uncontemplated event."). This position is fully accepted by the federal
government. In a letter dated February 1, 1985 (reproduced in Edward G. Lee, "Canadian
Practice in International Law at the Department of External Affairs ILa pratique canadienne
en droit international en 1985 au ministere des Affaires exterieures" (1986) 24 Can. Y.B.
Int. L. 386, at 397 in 1985 [Canada, Letter from the Legal Bureau of the Department of
External Affairs to the Council of Europe (1 February 1985)], the Legal Bureau of the
Department of External Affairs replied to a Council of Europe questionnaire on treaty
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Constitution Act, J867 was a colonial constitution and that the British Parliament did not
expect, at the time of its enactment, that Canada and the provinces would engage in
international relations on par with "sovereign states" and independently from London's
Foreign Office.61 This would not mean, however, that provincial governments, for example,
could not engage in some activities abroad such as the recruitment of immigrants.62 It
simply means that, when the Constitution Act, J867 was adopted, treaty powers were not
attributed to the federal government nor to the provinces but remained an Imperial
prerogative.
making practices that: "The Canadian Constitution contains no provisions regarding treaty-
making apart from Section 132 of the Constitution Act, 1867 [supra note 39], which has
fallen into disuse because it has no relevance to present day conditions."
61 It is to be noted, however, that the Federal Parliament has power over "Militia, Military
and Naval Service, and Defence." See Constitution Act, J867, ibid. s. 91 (7). However, this
allocation of legislative jurisdiction did not mean that the Federal government was free to
develop its own defence policies independently from London. S. IS of the Constitution Act,
J867, ibid. clearly states that the Queen is the Commander-in-Chief of the militia, military
and naval service and at the time, the Crown was still a pretty unified concept. For the
gradual division of the Crown in the Empire, see section 2.a.i.2.
62 Constitution Act, J867, ibid., s. 95 provides for concurrent federal and provincial power
over immigration. For a brief overview of official representations made abroad by the
province of Quebec (starting in 1871 with the dispatch of immigration agents to the
European continent, the British islands and to New England and with the opening of
permanent offices in 1872 in Ireland and Scotland) see Quebec, Ministere des Relations
Internationales, History, online: Ministere des relations internationales
<www.mri.gouv.qc.caJen/politique_internationale/historique/historique.asp>.
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The issue concerning the division of powers between federal authorities and the
provinces in relation to international affairs thus emerged only as Canada gained her
autonomy from the British Empire. Canada's autonomy from Great Britain was gained
gradually. In the British tradition of flexible constitutionalism, changes were brought
slowly and pragmatically through a series of statutes, administrative instruments, executive
decisions and judicial opinions. Thus, in 1871, Canadian representatives participated in
negotiations leading to an imperial treaty affecting Canada (Treaty of Washington, 1871 63 ).
Canada then signed such international agreements as a member of the Empire (Treaty of
Versailles, 191964) and finally signed such agreements on her own behalf (Halibut
Fisheries Treaty, 192365). At the 1926 Imperial Conference, the general principle to the
effect that no autonomous Dominion could be bound by commitments incurred by the
Imperial Government except with the consent of the Dominion concerned was confirmed.
The Balfour declaration stated that "They (Great Britain and the Dominions) are
autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate
one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a
common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British
63 Treaty Between the United Kingdom and the United States for the Amicable Settlement of
All Causes ofDifferences Between the Two Countries, 8 May 1871, 17 U.S. Stat. 863, 143
Conso!. T.S. 145 [Treaty ofWashington].
64 Treaty ofPeace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, 28 June 1919,
225 Cons. T.S. 188,2 Bevans 43 (entered into force 28 June 1919) [Treaty ofVersailles].
65 Halibut Fisheries Convention 1923, 1923,32 L.N.T.S. no. 93.
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commonwealth of Nations".66 The Statute of Westminster gave, in large parts, legal effect
to that declaration in 1931.67 The process leading to independence seems to have been
66 U.K., Inter-Imperial Relations Committee, Proceedings and Memoranda (Balfour
Declaration), E (I.R.l26) Series, p. 2 [Balfour Declaration]. See also Maurice Olliver, ed.,
The Colonial and Imperial Conferences from 1887 to 1937, vol. 3. (Ottawa: Queen's
Printer, 1954) at 146.
67 S. 4 of the Statute of Westminster, 1931, (U.K.), 22 & 23 Geo. V, c. 4 [Statute of
Westminster] proclaimed that "No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after
the commencement of this Act shall extend or be deemed to extend, to a Dominion as part
of the law of that Dominion, unless it is expressly declared in that Act that that Dominion
has requested, and consented to, the enactment thereof." However, s. 7 provided that:
7. (1) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to apply to the repeal, amendment
or alteration of the British North America Acts, 1867 to 1930, or any order,
rule or regulation made thereunder.
(2) The provisions of section two of this Act shall extend to laws made by
any of the Provinces of Canada and to the powers of the legislatures of such
Provinces.
(3) The powers conferred by this Act upon the Parliament of Canada or upon
the legislatures of the Provinces shall be restricted to the enactment of laws
in relation to matters within the competence of the Parliament of Canada or
of any of the legislatures of the Provinces respectively.
The Supreme Court of Canada claimed, in 1967 that "[t]here can be no doubt now
that Canada has become a sovereign state. Its sovereignty was acquired in the period
between its separate signature of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and the Statute of
Westminster. Section 3 of the Statute of Westminster, provides in an absolutely clear
manner and without any restrictions that the Parliament of a Dominion has full power to
make laws having extra-territorial operation" (Re Ownership of Offshore Mineral Rights,
[1967] S.C.R. 792, 816). S. 3 of the Statute of Westminster also provided that "the
Parliament of a Dominion has full power to make laws having extra-territorial operation."
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mainly achieved by the end of the 1930s, when Canada entered World War II with a formal
declaration of war issued separately from the United Kingdom's deciaration of war. But the
independence process was not completely over. Canada had gained her international status,
her international autonomy, but she had not yet completely gained her formal independence
from the United Kingdom. In 1947, the King issued new Letters Ftatent to the Governor
General devolving his remaining executive powers in relation to "Canada" to him:
II. And We do hereby authorize and empower Our Governor General, with
the advice of Our Privy Council for Canada or of any members thereof or
individually, as the case requires, to exercise all powers and authorities
lawfully belonging to Us in respect of Canada, and for greater certainty but
not so as to restrict the generality of the foregoing to do and execute, in the
manner aforesaid, all things that may belong to his office and to the trust We
have reposed in him according to the several powers and authorities granted
or appointed him by virtue of the Constitution Acts, 1867 to 1940 and the
powers and authorities hereinafter conferred in these Letters Patent and in
such Commission as may be issued to him under Our Great Seal of Canada
and under such laws as are or may hereinafter be in force in Canada.68
In 1949, the possibility of appeal to the Privy Council was terminated. Canada had to wait
until 1982 for the "patriation" of the Canadian constitution.69 But the Constitution Act,
However, as I will show later (section 2.a.iA), gaining international status does not
necessarily mean gaining full formal independence.
68 Letters Patent Constituting the Office ofthe Governor General o/Canada, reproduced at
R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, no. 31 [Letters Patent Constituting the Office of the Governor
General ofCanada].
69 The appeals to the judicial committee of the Privy Council were completely abolished by
An Act Amending the Supreme Court Act, S.C. 1949, c.37, s. 3.
For various political reasons, including the fact that the federral government and the
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198270 was not the formal result of the Canadian Parliament and provincial legislatures but
an annex to a British statute!
Because the independence of Canada from the United Kingdom was acquired over
time through a continuous transformation of their mutual relationship, there is simply no
clear demarcation line between the dependence and the independence periods. Thus, trying
to identify the exact moment of their separation is akin to trying to identify the moment at
which a man has lost enough hair to be considered bald...
Understanding that Canada's independence was achieved over time and not a
specific moment helps us understand two important things for the purpose of making sense
of the evolution of treaty powers in Canada. First, it helps understand why Canada's "birth"
as an independent country did not cause - nor was it the result of - an entirely new
constitutional order but happened through a continuous process of constitutional
transformations. Second, because Canadian constitutionalism is not exclusively the product
of constitutional enactments at specific points in time, the ways in which constitutional
changes are conceived in Canada differ in very important ways from the ways those
changes are conceived in a constitutionalism primarily based on narratives of popular will.
provinces could not agree on (l) a proper constitutional amending formula and on (2) an
appropriate redistribution of powers between the center and the provinces, the core of the
Canadian constitution could be amended only by London even after 1931.
70 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11
[Constitution Act. 1982].
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Canadian constitutional law relating to international relations is much more a product of
immanent progressive growth than an instant act of will. Let me say more about this.
Constitutional regimes that portray themselves as products of popular revolutions
(such as the United States or France) have clearer narratives about their founding moments.
I will call "Voluntarists" those revolutionary traditions and the traditions of others who
mainly emphasise Will as the source of constitutional legitimacy. The narratives of those
traditions are often constructed around the idea that the constitution is the product of the
will of "the People",71 a will that expressed itself through a rejection of past authorities.
These traditions imagine "Peoples" as constitution-makers that intervene intermittently to
set up structures of government after having made tabula rasa of their previous settings.
Thus, revolutionary constitutionalism advocates both the destruction of a past and the
71 The famous preamble of the Constitution ofthe United States ofAmerica, supra note 57
declares: "We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union,
establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the
general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain
and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." The "We the People"
appeared as a collective agent earlier with the American Declaration of Independence.
Jacques Derrida highlighted the aporia in the production of that Declaration: the People
whose representatives signed the document was simultaneously constituted as a People by
this Declaration. In other words, the Declaration was simultaneously a "declarative" and
"performative" act. See Jacques Derrida, "Declarations d'independance", dans
Otobiographies: L 'enseignement de Nietzsche et la politique du nom propre (Paris: Galilee,
1984) at l3ff., translated in English at "Declarations of Independence" (1986) 15 New
Political Science 7.
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construction of new institutional arrangements. 72 And because Peoples are conceived as
capable of creating ex nihilo their new forms of government, they are constrained only by
their own wills and desires. However, because the individuals who form Peoples would not
be ready to submit themselves to arbitrary decisions (the alleged arbitrariness of authorities
being often a motive invoked for revolutions), the constitutions that Peoples set up are
imagined to be not only the result of their will, but also the expression of Reason. In fact,
not being constrained by the remnants of the previous regimes, Peoples imagine themselves
trying to put in place the most "rational" system. They imagine themselves starting from
scratch and putting in place an overall plan. The new constitutional imperatives are taken to
be the will of the People which, hopefully, corresponds to reason institutionally
incarnated. 73 The work of those who then follow the "founders" is to implement the
72 For an interesting discussion of the tensions between law and revolution, see Paul W.
Kahn, The Reign Of Law: Marbury v. Madison and the Construction of America (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).
73 Paul W. Kahn has demonstrated how Will and Reason have been perceived as separate
and often conflicting sources of legitimacy in the American constitutional tradition (Paul
W. Kahn, Legitimacy and History: Self-Government In American Constitutional Theory
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992) [P.W. Kahn, Legitimacy and History].
Legitimacy, in the dominant American constitutional narratives, depends on the idea that
(1) self-government has been established by the will of the People and continues to be
exercised as the expression of that continuous will and (2) the Constitution is the
embodiment of Reason. By Reason, I mean here a theorized form of practical reason that
presents itself either in an achieved form or as a work in progress. Thus, Reason embodied
in the Constitution is perceived as a limit on the unreflective moments of the People and as
the result of its finer instants. A democratic polity might hope that the Will of the People
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founders' Will, to fill the gaps left in the masterwork of the founders and to protect the
founders' achievements - at least until "the People" wakes up again after discovering that it
had made a mistake earlier on74 or that its will has changed. 75 This leads the Voluntarist to
will coincide with what is perceived as the requirements of Reason but it might not always
be the case. When the two do not coincide, the polity has the gut-wrenching task of
privileging one over the other. There is no necessary conflict here but there is always a
potential one.
74 There are at least two possible senses of "mistake" from the point of view of the
Voluntarist. The first one refers to mistakes in the implementation of the initial Will of the
People. Such mistakes can be corrected by the agents responsible for the implementation of
the constitution. For example, courts might come to the conclusion that this or that
constitutional doctrine that they have applied for some time is in fact not in conformity with
the People's Will as expressed in the constitution. They will then go on to correct it without
awakening the sleeping giant that is the People in order to do so. Such modification, at least
in its rhetoric, is a restoration of the true meaning of the constitutional norm and does not
require the intervention of the Constituent power. The second type of "mistake" is one that
would require the intervention of the Constituent power to correct and that is a mistake in
the constitutional imperative itself. In other words, that mistake would consist in the
adoption of a wrong constitutional imperative or omission to adopt a proper constitutional
imperative. Such mistake would require the intervention of the Constituent power since it
means modifying the Will of the People.
Obviously, unless one has views as to how it is possible to determine with any
precision the content of the Will of the collective agent that is "the People", the frontier
between those two types of mistakes is not always easy to identify in practice.
Understanding this helps to explain why so much attention has been brought in American
constitutional scholarship to the proper interpretative methods to be used by judges when
they are engaged in judicial review of state action. In effect, from the Voluntarist
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perspective, if one cannot distinguish between the two types of mistakes, one has a hard
time justifying judicial review unless one finds a way for unelected judges to be conceived
as not merely repeating what the People has said, repeating the voice of the Constituent
power, but directly speaking in its name. One can read two of the most influential
American constitutional theories of the 20th Century as attempts to do just that. See
Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar ofPolitics
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962) who, when the exercise of "passive virtues" was not
sufficient, imagined Courts as trying to anticipate the future will of the People (but see
Bickel's important qualifications in Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress (New York:
Harper and Row, 1970), p. 173-181) and John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory
of Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980) who imagined courts as
guardians of the accessibility of the political process rather than enforcers of substantive
views. However, for Ely, when the process has been deficient, courts have a representation-
reinforcement role that entails that they may substitute for an actual result the putative
outcome that would have resulted from the political process had it been kept sufficiently
open. On the other hand, the difficulty of identifying judicial review with the "voice of the
People" and the need to heed the Will of the latter has led Robert Bork to suggest a
constitutional amendment so that the current People could be able to override through
legislative means every decision of the Supreme Court. See Robert Bork, Slouching
Toward Gomorrah: Modern Liberalism And American Decline (New York: Regan Books,
1996) at 117-19. For an exploration of some other difficulties associated with the idea of
constitutionality as the "voice of the People", see Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom And Time: A
Theory OfSelf-Government (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).
75 On how the succeeding generations of American constitutionalists imagined their roles in
relation to the American Constitution from its adoption until the 1990s, see the enlightening
account ofP.W. Kahn, Legitimacy and History, supra note 73.
Because American constitutionalism relies heavily on the "We the People" both as a
source of legitimacy for the Constitution and as a source of legitimacy for everyday
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allow for both dramatic changes in constitutional setting and very conservative attitudes
once he believes that the constitutional imperatives in place are the institutionalised eternal
truths of theoretical reason.
A purely Voluntarist perspective does not adequately fit Canadian constitutionalism.
Although constitutional enactments account for large parts of Canada's governmental
skeleton, the Will that is behind them is not clearly the one of "the People". Rather, the
main Canadian constitutional narratives describe those constitutional enactments as the
products of the will of a series of collective agents. For example, the Constitution Act, 1867
was described recently by the Supreme Court as being the result of (a) the "initiative of
elected representatives of the people then living in the colonies scattered across part of what
is now Canada", (b) the approval of the "local Parliaments" and (c) a formal enactment by
the Imperial Parliament in London. 76 And because Canada gradually became independent
political decisions made by legislatures and the executive, it has to offer an account as to
why these latter decisions ought to be constrained by the Constitution. In other words, if
"the People" modifies the Constitution and the same "People" speaks through its elected
officials in the legislatures, why are legislatures bound by constitutional norms? Would not
it be an implicit indication that the People have changed their mind over certain
constitutional issues when they adopt laws incompatible with the Constitution? Many
constitutionalists have tried to solve that problem by distinguishing between the People
acting as the "Constituent power" and the People acting in the course of "normal politics".
For a version of such a "democratic dualism" theory, see Bruce Ackerman, We The People:
Foundations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), esp. c. 1,9,10 and 11.
76 See Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 ~ 35-47 [Reference Re
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from the United Kingdom, that independence did not result in a momentous reconstruction
of the Canadian constitutional order. As we have seen, independence was not the product
of, nor did it result in, a complete reformulation of Canadian constitutional texts that would
mark clearly the transition from dependence. In other words, the bulk of the Constitution
Act, 1867 has remained intact and the Constitution Act, 1867 still dictates the division of
powers between the federal government and the provinces according to the same terms.
Even when the Constitution Act, 1982 was adopted, seventeen years after Gerin-Lajoie's
speech, changes made to the division of powers established by the Constitution Act, 1867
between the center and the provinces were limited to the adoption of new constitutional
amending formulas,77 express provisions dealing with "equalization payments" between
provinces78 and provincial jurisdiction in relation to natural resources. 79 In other words, the
"People" of Canada seems to have acquired their independence in absentia. It was not the
occasion of a new start trumpeted by the People but rather the gradual transformation of
power structure within organic wholes.
Although the Constitution Act, 1982 broke the last constitutional ties to the British
Secession ofQuebec].
77 See Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 70 ss. 38-49.
78 S. 36 (2) of the Constitution Act. 1982, ibid. provides that "Parliament and the
government of Canada are committed to the principle of making equalization payments to
ensure that provincial governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably
comparable levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation."
79 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 39 s. 92A.
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Parliament by providing for an entirely Canadian amending formula,80 formal constitutional
changes did not deal with the attribution of the authorities to form and implement treaties
nor did they deal with the issue of who can intervene in international forums and maintain
external relations.8l From a Voluntarist perspective, it would appear utterly strange - if not
80 In light of the uncertainties about the effects of devolutions on the so-called sovereignty
of Parliament, one could possibly argue that the British Parliament still has the legal
capacity to repeal the Canada Act of 1982. However, even if that repeal were to be valid for
the purposes of the British legal system, the Canadian legal system would simply ignore it.
To borrow a phrase from autopoiesis, the independence of the Canadian legal system means
that it is now "operatively closed" to the British system.
8l In fact, the Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 70, only mentions international law in the
Charter ofRights and Freedoms once, guaranteeing that:
11. Any person charged with an 11. Tout inculpe a Ie droit:
offence has the right
(g) not to be found guilty on
account of any act or omission
unless, at the time of the act or
omission, it constituted an
offence under Canadian or
international law or was criminal
according to the general
principles of law recognized by
the community of nations; ...
g) de ne pas etre declare coupable
en raison d'une action ou d'une
omission qui, au moment ou elle est
survenue, ne constituait pas une
infraction d'apres Ie droit interne du
Canada ou Ie droit international et
n'avait pas de caractere criminel
d'apres les principes generaux de
droit reconnus par l'ensemble des
nations ...
This section, at best, recognizes implicitly through the word "or" placed between
"Canadian" and "international law" that international law is distinct from Canadian law and
that the former is not automatically incorporated into the latter - otherwise the word
"Canadian" would be redundant.
50
a complete sign of weakness of will - that a state acquiring its independence does not have
a comprehensive constitutional text that provides for at least all the essential aspects of its
new autonomous life. And treaty powers seem quite important for a state that hopes to
develop fruitful relations with other members of the international community. But the
Canadian constitution is made of much more than simply Voluntarist constitutional
enactments. The fact that the written constitutional texts are not taken to be exhaustive of
the Constitution helps to understand why the Voluntarist perspective may sound partly
foreign to Canadians. In fact, like its British counterpart, Canadian constitutionalism also
relies greatly on an "Organic" constitutional narrative.82
The British Organic tradition83 is one of slow, careful, pragmatic and continuous
82 Lord Sankey famously wrote that the Canadian constitution was like a "living tree
capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits" (Edwards v. Canada (A. G.),
[1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.) at 136 [Edwards]).
83 The British Organic tradition is made up of many strands of thought that emphasize
different purported similarities between law and biology. One of the major strands uses the
organic metaphor to describe the nature of the polity by comparing it to an organic entity. A
classic example of such use of the organic metaphor is to be found in John of Salisbury's
Policraticus (John of Salisbury, Policraticus (1159). transl. and ed. by Cary J. Nederman
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 66-69) where Salisbury analogized the
polity to a person to highlight both the mutual dependency of each member of the polity
and to justify a certain structure of authority where each "member" and "organ" has a
specific function in the maintenance of the general body. For a stimulating history of the
idea of the "body politic" and the "corpus mysticum" in the Middle Age, see Ernst
Kantorowicz, The Kings Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton:
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jurisprudential developments through analogical reasoning from case to case.84 But what
Princeton University Press, 1957) [Kantorowicz, The Kings Two Bodies]. See also: David
George Hale, The Body Politic: A Political Metaphor in Renaissance English Literature
(The Hague-Paris, Mouton, 1971).
It is important to note, however, that the organic perspective does not have to be
committed to the "human body" metaphor. For example, in the context of understanding
the place of Aboriginal rights in Canada, Brian Slattery argues that an organic conception
of the Constitution ought to be viewed as an appropriate alternative to what he conceived as
the inappropriate "Imperial model" of constitutionalism that emphasises monism and
sovereignty as the power to command obedience (see Brian Slattery, "The Organic
Constitution: Aboriginal Peoples and the Evolution of Canada" (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 101). Thus, Slattery argues that Canada is a "multinational federation" (ibid. at 107)
with a Constitution that "is the product of slow and continuing growth" (ibid. at 108). And
that Constitution is "not limited to such enactments as the Constitution Acts of 1867 and
1982" and "[t]hese enactments depend for their legitimacy on a more fundamental body of
law, which may be called the common law of the Constitution" (ibid. at 109). Slattery's
organic model, "subscribes to a pluralist conception of the sources of law and authority,
viewing the Crown as the constitutional trustee of coordinate spheres of jurisdiction rather
than their exclusive source" and "it portrays the law as immanent in our collective practices
and traditions" (ibid. at 111). Jean Leclair proposes a similar organic model as the
foundation of his "federal constitutionalism" (see Jean Leclair, "Federal Constitutionalism
and Aboriginal Difference" (2006) 31 Queen's L. J. 521). Thus, according to this organic
model, law is not mainly the product of the command expressed by the "Head" to the other
"members" of the "body politic" but is rather the result of the immanent growth of the
different parts within the body itself. This leads to another strand of the Organic tradition
(legal development as organic growth) that will be presented in more detail in what follows.
84 Earl of Halsbury L.C. wrote in Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] A.C. 495 (H.L.), at p. 506
[Quinn]) that:
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characterises the Organic perspective is not only the fact of gradual growth but also the
imperative that each decision be harmoniously integrated within an already dense web of
earlier decisions. The Organic perspective is biased towards incremental changes that have
to fit within an already well-developed structure. From an Organic perspective, order is
conceived as the preservation of a dense fabric of assumptions and expectations.85 Past
there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and
one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must
be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved,
since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not
intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by
the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found.
The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides.
Albert V. Dicey also agreed with these two principles. See Albert V. Dicey, An
Introduction to the Study of the Constitution, 10th ed. with an introduction of Emlyn C.S.
Wade (London: MacMillan, 1967), at 291.
85 The House of Lords, at a time when it did not claim the power to overrule itself,
displayed an extreme cautiousness in treating very narrowly the rule of precedents (see
Quinn, ibid) Recently, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that it was no longer
necessary to hold on to such a narrow view of precedents (see Henry v. R, [2005] 3 S.C.R.
609, 2005 SCC 76 [Henry] ~ 53 (Binnie J. for a unanimous panel of 9 judges)). This was
particularly true in light of the fact that "much of the Court's work (particularly under the
Charter) required the development of a general analytical framework which necessarily
went beyond what was essential for the disposition of the particular case" and that "the
Court nevertheless intended that effect be given to the broader analysis" ((ibid):
Nonetheless, the Court maintained that (ibid ~ 57):
The issue in each case, to return to the Halsbury question, is what did the
case decide? Beyond the ratio decidendi which, as the Earl of Halsbury L.C.
pointed out, is generally rooted in the facts, the legal point decided by this
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decisions are perceived as worthy for having withstood the test of time. 86 However, for that
very reason, past wisdom is not venerated as eternal truth, it is rather taken to be right so
long as it is adapted to its time.87 From the Organic perspective, the rightness of
Court may be as narrow as the jury instruction at issue in Sellars or as broad
as the Oakes test. All obiter do not have, and are not intended to have, the
same weight. The weight decreases as one moves from the dispositive ratio
decidendi to a wider circle of analysis which is obviously intended for
guidance and which should be accepted as authoritative. Beyond that, there
will be commentary, examples or exposition that are intended to be helpful
and may be found to be persuasive, but are certainly not "binding" in the
sense the Sellars principle in its most exaggerated form would have it. The
objective of the exercise is to promote certainty in the law, not to stifle its
growth and creativity. The notion that each phrase in a judgment of this
Court should be treated as if enacted in a statute is not supported by the cases
and is inconsistent with the basic fundamental principle that the common law
develops by experience.
86 For a fascinating study of the origins of the common law doctrine of the "Ancient
Constitution", see John G.A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A
Study of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1957), chap. II, VII and IX and Pocock's further developments on the
issue at John G.A. Pocock, "Burke and the Ancient Constitution: A Problem in the History
of Ideas" in John G.A. Pocock, Politics, Language & Time: Essays on Political Thought
and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989),202.
87 There is, however, a strong presumption that past decisions are right. In Henry, supra
note 85, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that:
The Court's practice, of course, is against departing from its precedents
unless there are compelling reasons to do so: R. v. Salituro, [1991] 3 S.C.R.
654; R. v. Chaulk, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303; R. v. B. (K.G.), [1993] 1 S.C.R.
740, at pp. 777-83; and R. v. Robinson, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 683, at paras. 16-46.
Nevertheless, while rare, departures do occur. In Clark v. Canadian National
Railway Co., [1988] 2 S.C.R. 680, it was said that "[t]his Court has made it
clear that constitutional decisions are not immutable, even in the absence of
constitutional amendment" (p. 704), and in the Charter context the Court in
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institutional forms and legal imperatives is not determined by "theoretical reason" but
rather by "practical reason" (phronesis).88 This means that institutional forms and legal
imperatives are not cast in stone, but that changes ought to be brought smoothly and
incrementally through gradual adaptation to particular circumstances. As Daniel J. Boorstin
United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, 2001 SCC 7, effectively
overturned the result (if not the reasoning) in Kindler v. Canada (Minister of
Justice), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, and Reference re Ng Extradition (Can.),
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 858. In the area of human rights, important reappraisals
were made in Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights
Commission), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489 (overturning the reasoning in Bhinder v.
Canadian National Railway Co., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 561), and Brooks v.
Canada Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219 (overturning Bliss v. Attorney
General ofCanada, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183). The Court should be particularly
careful before reversing a precedent where the effect is to diminish Charter
protection.
88 Practical reason is always situated and, at common law, this means practical reason takes
into consideration a web of past decisions. The fact that the exercise of practical reason at
common law requires a deep knowledge of past practices can be illustrated by the very
important opinion given by Sir Edward Coke to King James I as to why the latter did not
enjoy the privilege of personally deciding cases at law. Coke reports the exchange between
him and King James I in the following terms:
Then the King said, that he thought the law was founded upon reason, and
that he and others had reason, as well as the Judges: to which it was
answered by me, true it was, that God had endowed his Majesty with
excellent Science, and great endowments of nature; but his Majesty was not
learned in the laws of his realm of England, and causes which concern the
life, or inheritance, or goods, or fortunes of his subjects, are not to be
decided by natural reason, but by the artificial reason and judgment of law,
which law is an act which requires long study and experience before that a
man can attain to the cognizance ofit '"
(Emphasis added. Prohibitions del Roy, [1607] 12 Co. Rep. 63, 64-65, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342,
1342- 43).
55
once noted, in Great Britain, "constitutional theory has taken for granted the gradual
formulation of a theory of society.,,89 He therefore added:
No sensible Briton would say that his history is the unfolding of the truths
implicit in Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights. Such documents are seen as
only single steps in a continuing process of definition.9o
Moreover, changes are brought piecemeal because jurists are aware that a small change in
one part of the web of constitutional law might require many constitutional adaptations
elsewhere.
While the Organic perspective is open to constant reforms or, to be more precise,
"development",91 it is generally biased, for pragmatic reasons, against massive systemic
modifications. In effect, wiping out significant parts of a web of imperatives would leave
agents with little guidance as to how to resolve particular issues until a new experience pool
has been developed. The need for heuristic devices might help to explain why, despite self-
proclaimed revolutionary changes, people often continue to rely on older categories and
89 Daniel J. Boorstin, The Genius of American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1953), at p. 15 [The Genius ofAmerican Politics].
90 Ibid.
91 An organic conception of constitutionalism does not have to distinguish between
"mistakes of constitutional implementation" and "mistakes in constitutional norms" since
constitutional imperatives are not conceived as determinate pre-existing rules to which
situations must "conform". Rather, constitutional imperatives are indicators of the elements
that must necessarily be integrated in our practical reasoning process on particular issues. In
other words, the constitutional imperative is not necessarily the solution to a particular
problem but the way to arrive at it.
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habits. Thus, while the Organic perspective might at first sight appear more conservative
than the Voluntary perspective, it is not necessarily the case. In effect, because the actual is
known to be simply an approximation of the good, it leaves plenty of space to the
Organicist for the quest for a better arrangement. While contentment might be the attitude
resulting from the Voluntary perspective,92 prudent hope might be what animates the
Organic perspective.
To better highlight the differences between these two ways of looking at
constitutionalism, let me use another metaphor. The Voluntarist imagines "the People" as
an architect who attempts to design a perfect house. To succeed, the architect must have at
least a general knowledge of the future dwellers and of their needs, she must be aware of
the properties of the materials available and of the land upon which the house will be
erected and she must have a sufficient understanding of building techniques to ensure that
her plans will be able to be concretely put in place. According to the Organic perspective,
the presumed architect necessary lacks the experience to design the perfect house on her
first attempt. To the extent that it is ready to think of the "People" as a "person" that
92 Daniel Boorstin made a similar point about the American Voluntarist perspective when
he wrote in The Genius ofAmerican Politics, supra note 89, that:
Our theory of society is thus conceived as a kind of exoskeleton, like the
shell of a lobster. We think of ourselves as growing into our skeleton, filling
it out with the experience and resources of recent ages. But we always
suppose that the outlines were rigidly drawn in the beginning. Our mission,
then, is simply to demonstrate the truth - or rather the workability - of the
original theory.
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inhabits a constitutional house, the Organic perspective would rather imagine that the
People has inherited her constitutional house from past times. The house might not be
perfect, it might have parts that were suited for past needs and that no longer serve any
useful or meaningful purposes, but the general structure has withstood the test of time. It
then belongs to the current inhabitants to maintain and renovate the building to suit their
needs while being aware that they are also holding it in trust for future generations. Having
lived in that house, its current inhabitants have had time to acquire the skills and expertise
to renovate the house and have been able to experience its concrete shortcomings.
Renovations may require that an entire part of the house be demolished and rebuilt - or that
the house be divided to be transformed into a condominium building - but the Organic
view does not start from nothing. In effect, the new construction will not be possible until
the old one is taken out of the way and the new building will necessarily be built in
opposition to certain key features of the old one; otherwise, it would have been wiser to
simply renovate it. While the Voluntarist perspective imagines the constitution as the
rational product of a brilliant architect, the Organic perspective sees it more as the well-
maintained house ofa particularly dextrous handyman.
Canadian constitutional law, despite being partly made of explicit constitutional
enactments, remains shot through with this Organic perspective.93 In effect, the Supreme
93 While American Constitutionalism seems to be strongly animated by the Volontarist
perspective, the Organic perspective is not totally absent. For example, Woodrow Wilson,
wrote that "government is not a machine, but a living thing. It falls, not under the theory of
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Court of Canada recently stated that "our constitutional history demonstrates that our
governing institutions have adapted and changed to reflect changing social and political
values. This has generally been accomplished by methods that have ensured continuity,
the universe, but under the theory of organic life. It is accountable to Darwin, not to
Newton." (Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1908), at 56-57.). On the historic use of the organic metaphor
in American constitutionalism, see P.W. Kahn, Legitimacy and History, supra note 73,
chap. 2; Thomas H. Peebles, "A Call To High Debate: The Organic Constitution in its
Formative Era, 1890-1920" (1980-1981) 52 U. Colo. L. Rev. 49 and Anonymous, "Organic
and Mechanical Metaphors in Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought"
(1996-1997) 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1832.
A contemporary return to a form of organic perspective has been heralded in the
United States by David A. Strauss under the expression "common law constitutionalism".
See, in particular, David A. Strauss, "Common Law Constitutional Interpretation" (1996)
63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877; David A. Strauss, "Tragedies Under the Common Law
Constitution" in William Eskridge and Sanford Levinson, eds. Constitutional Stupidities,
Constitutional Tragedies (New York: New York University Press, 1998); David A. Strauss,
"Constitutions, Written and Otherwise" (2000) 19 Law and Philosophy 451; David A.
Strauss, "The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments" (2001) 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1457;
David A. Strauss, "Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle" (2003) 112
Yale L.J. 1717.
This form of "common law constitutionalism" ought not to be confused with its
British homonym criticised by Thomas Poole. See: Thomas Poole, "Dogmatic Liberalism?
T.R.S. Allan and Common Law Constitutionalism" (2002) 65 Modem L. Rev. 463;
Thomas Poole, "Back to the Future? Unearthing the Theory of Common Law
Constitutionalism" (2003) 23 O.J.L.S. 435; Thomas Poole, "Questioning Common Law
Constitutionalism" (2005) 25 L.S. 142.
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stability and legal order.,,94 These are not the words of a post-revolutionary court.
Therefore, Canada's constitution, from both a Voluntarist and an Organic
perspective is a strange beast. It is partly made of Voluntarist elements in the form of
constitutional enactments of the Imperial Parliament, the federal Parliament and provincial
legislatures. However, these are not the works of a single collective author. Thus, the Will
expressed in those enactments does not necessarily emerge from a single entity; Canada is a
complex multinational state that is the result of a pact between different political
communities, a pact sanctioned by an imperial power.95 Nonetheless, these are expressions
94 Reference Re Secession ofQuebec, supra note 76 ~ 33.
95 Although the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada declared in Re Resolution to
Amend the Constitution (Manitoba (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General),
[1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, 803 [ [Patriation Reference] that the Compact Theory was merely a
political doctrine and does not "engage the law", the majority nonetheless recognized that it
"might have some peripheral relevance to actual provisions of the British North America
Act and its interpretation and application". Despite this modest role recognized by the
Supreme Court, the Compact Theory nonetheless still plays an important role in Canadian
foundational narratives. In effect, in an age when democracy and self-government are taken
to lie at the heart of political legitimacy, there are immense pressures to find ways to justify
constitutions on the basis of popular will. Because Canada was not the result of a
revolutionary movement that united "the People", the Compact theory plays a similar role.
However, while this Voluntarist narrative provides legitimacy to constitutional enactments,
it also logically imposes constraints. In effect, to the extent that a constitutional enactment
is considered a pact, it means that it cannot be changed without the prior approval of the
representatives of the collective agents that formed it or - depending on the interpretation
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given to the meaning of the pact - the new collective agents that they have agreed to form.
That being said, the Canadian Compact Theory comes in different versions. In
effect, there are at least three important narratives concerning the identity of the relevant
collective agents who took part in the pact to form a new political entity. These narratives
are in tension with one another. The first one sees the Constitution Act, 1867, supra note
39, as a pact between the (French-)Canadiens and the British Crown (and Her English-
speaking subjects). A similar narrative has taken hold among many Aboriginal Peoples who
see the treaties signed with the British Crown and "recognized and affirmed" by the
Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 70 s. 35 as a pact between themselves and the British
Crown. The second narrative is one about a pact between self-governing colonial
legislatures on the one hand, and the British Parliament, on the other, to form a local
federation or confederation that would be a subpart of the larger hnperial system. Thus, the
first type of narratives identify collective agents through "pre-political" attributes - that is,
attributes not entirely produced by existing state institutions - while the second type starts
from the perspective that existing state institutions already incarnate the relevant collective
agents. See Paul Romney, "Provincial Equality, Special Status and the Compact Theory of
Canadian Confederation" (1999) 32 Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue
canadienne de science politique 21. I wish to suggest that a third narrative, a
complementary variant of the first two, also exists. That variant sees territorially defined
"regions" (Ontario, Quebec, the Maritime, Western provinces) as the relevant collective
agents. Equal representation of regions in the Senate would be an outcome of that
sensibility. At any rate, those narratives have often been seen by commentators as colliding
with one another because they all assume the equality of incompletely overlapping
collective identities. However, those narratives can be reconciled if one imagines that
provinces deserve equal respect among themselves but a specific province might have the
particular duty to protect and promote the existence of the Francophones in light of the fact
that it is the only province in which the French-Canadiens are a majority. In light of that
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of Will and the Organic perspective must try to make sense of the existence of such
expressions. One way in which it tries to do so is simply to integrate such expressions into
the larger web of constitutional imperatives; to make those rules examples of larger patterns
or instantiations of more general principles.96 That way, acts of will are presented as
increments in the development of the whole.97
special duty, that province might need to enjoy particular powers to fulfil her mission
without having a higher status than other provinces. An alternative way to overcome this
tension would be to clearly create a third level of government that would incarnate the
linguistic communities and that would be responsible for their protection and promotion -
as it has been done in Belgium.
96 A similar strategy is at play in Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 76 when
the Court declared that: "Our Constitution is primarily a written one, the product of 131
years of evolution. Behind the written word is an historical lineage stretching back through
the ages, which aids in the consideration of the underlying constitutional principles. These
principles inform and sustain the constitutional text: they are the vital unstated assumptions
upon which the text is based." (, 49, emphasis added.) Thus, particular constitutional rules
are taken to make sense only when viewed from the perspective of the whole system; they
are not merely acts of Will, they are instantiations of a larger constitutional principle.
97 One might be tempted to think that the Organic perspective will necessarily have a harder
time competing against the Voluntarist narrative when formal constitutional enactments
have been adopted precisely to repudiate past constitutional imperatives. In such cases, the
image of natural growth might tend to lose to the image of the victorious Will, the image of
horizontal or diagonal legal developments being displaced by one of vertical authority.
However, when the organic narrative succeeds in dominating the general constitutional
culture, constitutional amendments are not necessarily interpreted in a narrow originalist
way but, rather, they may be taken as contextual indications about the directions towards
which further progressive interpretations must be heading. The Reference re Employment
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However, fully harmonizing those two perspectives is not simple because one bases
legitimacy on the identity of the rule-maker - and, incidentally, on the ultimate truth of the
rules - while the other perspective bases legitimacy on the virtues ofpractical reasons and
because both perspectives affirm that their claim to legitimacy must be paramount to the
other. But that problem should not, in principle, arise in the current context since the
constitutional imperatives relative to treaty powers in Canada are entirely the product of the
Organic growth of the Canadian constitution.
In effect, in Canada, the issue of treaty powers is entirely governed by the large web
of rules, principles and other legal heuristics flowing from judicial decisions that have
Insurance Act (Can.), ss. 22 and 23, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 669 [Reference re Employment
Insurance Act] illustrates this quite well. Justice Deschamps writes (~ 40):
While the views of the framers are not conclusive where constitutional
interpretation is concerned, the context in which the amendment was made is
nonetheless relevant. If the objectives of the framers are taken as a starting
point, it will be easier to determine the scope of the jurisdiction that was
transferred, and then to determine how it may be adapted to contemporary
realities.
In light of the changes in the labour market, a 1940 constitutional amendment transferring
from provinces to the federal Parliament legislative powers over "Unemployment
insurance" (s. 91 (2A)) was interpreted as allowing the federal Parliament to legislate in
order to establish "a public insurance program the purpose of which is to preserve workers'
economic security and ensure their re-entry into the labour market by paying income
replacement benefits in the event of an interruption of employment" (~ 68) in the form of
maternity and parental benefits.
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developed in hannony with other constitutional doctrines. Thus, while Canada and the
provinces cut their colonial ties to the British Parliament, their connections with the
external world were left to be defined by the natural growth of pre-existing constitutional
sources rather than through an explicit new constitutional text.
At the center of the constitutional web is the Labour Conventions case. In that case,
the Privy Council fleshed out the consequences of the Canadian federal structure and
concluded, in short, that the implementation of treaty obligations was not an independent
matter that belonged to the federal Parliament but, rather, that the authority to implement
such obligations was divided according to the subject-matter of the obligations. Therefore,
if a treaty dealt with matters belonging to the provincial jurisdiction, it was up to the
provincial legislatures to adopt the proper laws to implement the obligations flowing from
the treaty.
However, despite the fact that Organic growth has been in confonnity with the
expressed will of different provinces over time, there has been a counter will expressed
mainly by the representatives of the federal government. The federal representatives and
the scholars who support them have claimed that the division of responsibilities between
the federal Parliament and the provincial legislatures is not appropriate. They usually claim
that it would be more efficient if the powers to implement treaty obligations were
centralised at the federal level. They claim that the current division of powers might
weaken Canada's ability to negotiate with her international partners because Canada is not
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in a position to assure those partners that she will be capable of respecting her obligations. I
have not seen any credible evidence yet that substantiates those claims. At any rate, one of
the main problems for those who oppose the result of the natural growth of the Canadian
doctrine is that they cannot rely on any solid constitutional foundations to make their point;
their position is simply foreign to the actual web of constitutional doctrines. To reverse the
current position would not simply mean adjusting a few constitutional strings here and
there; it would mean a radical redrawing of the Canadian federation.
In effect, this is a great example of how a seemingly little change in the
constitutional web of doctrines can actually mean the total unfolding of the web. While this
might not be apparent at first sight, I will argue in this thesis that rules dealing with treaty
powers are now at the very heart of Canadian federalism. It is important to have this fact
clearly in mind if we are going to think about reforming those rules. In the next section, I
will briefly outline the spirit in which I intend to propose organic reforms.
B. An Exercise in Conceptual Maintenance
In order to adapt the legal framework of the Canadian federation for the purpose of
meeting the needs of international relations in the 21 st Century, we need to do some
conceptual work. We have to sift through our current stocks of constitutional conceptions,
keep the ones that continue to resonate with our reality, refurbish the ones that are dated but
that can still be salvaged, parsimoniously delete the ones that have outlived their usefulness
or that are just plain detrimental- and propose alternative conceptions when necessary.
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This exercise in conceptual maintenance is always an important, but difficult part of
law reform. It is an important task to accomplish lest we develop legal doctrines that
assume the existence of a world that either no longer exists or that has never existed. For
example, developing legal doctrines based on the conception that Canada is a Dominion in
the British Empire98 would be nonsensical since the status of "Dominion" no longer
signifies anything in the current world order.
Conceptual maintenance is a difficult task for at least two reasons. First, it is
difficult because we often grow so comfortable using age-old conceptions that we do not
think about questioning their contemporary relevance. The conventional use of conceptions
is often taken as sufficient proof of their appropriateness. A legitimate fear that we might
lose an important knot in our web of meanings also reinforces this tendency: we are afraid
that by discarding or transforming a conception in use we might adversely affect the other
ideas that depend on it. However, when conceptions remain unquestioned despite
significant changes in the cultural, material, and political conditions that made them
possible, there is always the risk that such conceptions will prove ill-structured to grasp our
current reality. Luckily, this is not the case here with the idea of "Dominion" or the idea
98 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 39, Preamble, where reference is made to the fact that
the "Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick have expressed their Desire to
be federally united into One Dominion" and that "such a Union would conduce to the
Welfare of the Provinces and promote the Interests of the British Empire".
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that Canada is a member of the "British Empire". We therefore do not have to disentangle
this obsolete conceptual web to solve our problem since this has already been done in the
last century by our predecessors.
Second, the exercise in conceptual maintenance is a difficult task because finding
viable alternatives to legal conceptions that we have either trashed or that we want to
reform is quite complex. Oftentimes, adapting the meaning of existing legal vocabularies
will do. The classic example here is the famous Edwards case in which the Privy Council
decided that the term "person" in the Constitution Act, 1867 had now to be read as applying
both to men and women despite the fact that the term might have been originally taken to
be applicable only to men.99 The trick here is to come up with an interpretation that is
different from the original and yet, is consistent with the developing narratives in which
other parts of the constitution are embedded.
Sometimes, however, no such vocabulary is available inthe relevant constitutional
texts because the older conceptions precluded the development of such a vocabulary in the
first place. When this happens, we can either modify the Constitution through formal
amendments or it can be adapted through changes in constitutional conventions or in the
conceptual web that forms the background assumptions that render the constitutional texts
intelligible. Either way, the challenge is to pick a conceptual apparatus fit for the job, an
assemblage of conceptions that will easily be inscribed in political narratives and capable of
99 Edwards, supra note 82.
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future development and adjustments.
One of the risks that we have to avoid when selecting the proper conceptual
apparatus is laziness: instead of coming up with an appropriate framework designed for our
conditions, we might be tempted to simply borrow inadequate conceptual frameworks
developed by other polities despite their structural differences and despite the fact that they
may already be obsolete for the polities that had developed them. This risk reflects one of
the ironies of decolonisation: too often, former colonies gained their independence simply
to return to their colonial habit of mimicking the ways of the colonialist. Former colonies
often brought in state structures as they were being abandoned by the colonial powers for
being obsolete in a globalisation era. One of the conceptual frameworks that we should
avoid buying from Europe's flea-market of political thoughts is "sovereignty".
That concept was constructed around the need to justify the autonomy of the
Princes, the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire and the Pope from each other's claims of
supremacy. At the same time it was used to justify the monopolisation of powers within
each realm. Thus, the concept was meant to protect each realm from any de jure and de
facto intrusion by external authorities (what has been called "external"loo or "negative
100 Daniel Philpot, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International
Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) at 18 [Daniel Philpot, Revolutions
in Sovereignty].
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sovereignty" 10 I) and to ensure that the monopoly of de jure authority would be
concentrated within one institution within that realm (what has been called "internal
sovereignty,,102 or "positive sovereignty"103). This system was believed to ensure the
stability of the world order; if each state remains within its jurisdiction, peace would ensue.
Thus, according to this conception of sovereignty, international law - or to be more
accurate, "inter-state" law - is mainly oriented towards protecting each state's conditions of
existence through the principle of non-intervention. Hurting another Monarch's subject
meant hurting his possession and his claim to exclusive power over his possessions, thus, it
meant hurting that other Monarch's dignity. Treaties were originally conceived as the
personal obligations of the Monarch and, as states were abstracting themselves from the
person of the King, they kept the older conceptual framework. According to this dated view
of the world order, treaties are inter-state agreements that correspond roughly to the liberal
conception of contracts between individuals. But this theory was developed with a view of
the world order that no longer corresponds to today's reality. In effect, while certain aspects
of that theory remain valid today - for example, states e~oy a high degree of autonomy to
make laws within their realm and external military intervention is only exceptionally
permitted - we no longer live in that world.
101 Paul W. Kahn, "The Question of Sovereignty" (2004) 40 Stan. J. Int'l L. 259, 260 [Paul
W. Kahn, "The Question of Sovereignty"].
102 Daniel Philpot, Revolutions in Sovereignty, supra note 100 at 18.
103 Paul W. Kahn, supra note 101 at 260.
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There has been a paradigm shift in international relations. 104 As Secretary General
Kofi Annan has pointed out: "States are now widely understood to be instruments at the
service of their peoples,. and not vice versa.,,105 This shift has two very important
consequences. First, to the extent that states are to be understood as service providers, it
means that we can evaluate them in instrumental terms. And if states are our instruments,
they can be shaped to optimise the interests of those to whom they belong. Second, because
states are no longer merely the embodiment of an "existential community,,106 but rather
104 For different perspectives on these changes, see for example: Louis Henkin,
"International Law: Politics, Values, Functions" (1990) 216 Rec. des Cours 13,24-25; John
H. Jackson, "The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance and
Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results" (1997) 36 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 157;
John O. McGinnis, "The Decline of the Western Nation State and the Rise of the Regime of
International Federalism" (1996) 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 903; Oscar Schachter, "The Decline
of the Nation-State and its Implications for International Law" (1997) 36 Colum. J.
Transnat'l L. 7; Christoph Schreuer, "The Waning of the Sovereign State: Toward a New
Paradigm of International Law?" (1993) 4 E.J.I.L. 447 [CO Schreuer, "The Waning of the
Sovereign State: Toward a New Paradigm ofInternational Law?"].
lOS Kofi A. Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty" The Economist 352 (18 September
1999) 49, at 49. See also Kofi Annan, Annual Report of the UN Secretary-General to the
54th General Assembly session, UN Press Release, SG/SM 7136, GA/9596 (20 September
1999). Leon Duguit predicted this transformation much earlier. See: Leon Duguit, Les
transformations du droit public (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1913), at 32-72.
106 I will describe later in this thesis "existential communities" as "communities through
which individual' selfhood is constituted by a deep sense of "love", loyalty and identity to
the other members of the group. In other words, an existential community is what makes it
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serve certain functions, states can serve more than one existential community at the time. In
other words, the state seen as an instrument may serve more than one nation. It does not
mean that a state can no longer be the embodiment of an existential community, it simply
means that this may or may not be the primary way in which every member of that state
relates to it.
With the rise of the welfare and regulatory state and with the increasing worldwide
mobility and economic integration made possible by technological advances, our models
for securing peace, order and good governance have changed. IO? State powers are divided
both functionally (between the different branches of the government and within those
branches according to the specialized expertise of different departments) and territorially.
States are no longer the only actors in our world order; our world's ontology now includes
possible for the self to transcend the individual." See 2.b.iv.
10? One of the things that is often eclipsed in the story about the shift from the old world of
Monarchs to our world is the transformation of what was merely a technique to guarantee
one State against another State's intrusion into an organising principle of the new world
order: mutual pledges. While Monarchs often sent their children to be married to the sons
and daughters of other regents for the purpose of creating new alliances, they served as
"guarantee deposits" to ensure the peace. To the extent that the parents had affection for the
child that they had sent to a foreign land, they were cautious in their conduct with the
receiving family. On the other hand, to the extent that the receiving family cared about their
son's or daughter's well-being with his or her husband or wife, they had an interest in not
hurting their in-laws. In the post-industrial age, corporations, non-governmental
organisations and the mobile citizenry have replaced the sons and daughters of monarchs.
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international organisations, non-governmental organisations, transnational corporations,
individuals, etc. 108 As domestic law is no longer dominated by the criminal law model of
prohibitions and sanctions but by distributive, enabling and coordinating legal rules, the
ordinary life of international law is no longer primarily occupied with boundary protection
but with transnational cooperation, harmonization and integration. Thus, while international
law was mainly preoccupied by inter-state affairs, it is now mainly occupied with what was
previously seen as "domestic" affairs: "private" law (family law, law of persons, property
law, contracts, etc.), education, individual and collective rights, economic development, etc.
We have moved from an opaque inter-state model to a multi-layered transnational
governance model where different governmg institutions coordinate their actions or
compete with one another in their many roles.
Also, we increasingly recognize that individuals are members of a multitude of
often overlapping existential communities. Because we recognize that nation-states are not
the only political model available, we can now imagine multinational states where
individuals are members of more than one political community. If we can already imagine
that individuals may be citizens of more than one state - dual citizenship is accepted in
Canada -, we certainly can imagine that individuals might have different forms of
attachment to the different parts of the state: one individual might see herself primarily as
Canadian while another might see himself primarily as Quebecois, while they both feel that
they belong to the two communities. The state apparatus ought to be able to accommodate
108 S . 2 . 4ee sectIOn .a.I. .
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these different senses of belonging. Thus, our challenge is to imagine the state without
using the centralising idea of sovereignty. We ought to imagine a state that will be both the
incarnation of different existential communities and will provide us with the necessary
apparatuses of functional regimes.
I will demonstrate in this thesis that once actual Canadian constitutional rules are
freed from the artificial cast of the "sovereignty" frame in which a plethora of scholars have
decided to put them and once we start taking seriously Canadian constitutional law sources,
we will discover that the Canadian constitution is far more adapted to that new global
reality than what many might have thought. In effect, the federalism principle entrenched in
the Canadian constitution109 is far more adapted to today's reality than the "sovereignty"
model that certain scholars are trying to impose on the Constitution. As William Paul
Maclure Kennedy had already written in 1922: the "evolution of Canadian government has
constituted a decisive challenge to the absolute Austinian doctrine of sovereignty.,,11O
I will demonstrate that it is often the views of those centralist scholars who cry that
the modem world requires treaty powers to be held exclusively in the hands of the federal
109 Reference Re Secession ofQuebec. supra note 76 ~ 32,47,49,55-60,66, 76, 88, 90-92,
148, 149, 151.
110 William P. M. Kennedy, The Constitution of Canada: An Introduction to Its
Development and Law (London U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1922) at vii. I am indebted
to David Schneiderman, "Harold Laski, Viscount Haldane, and the Law of the Canadian
Constitution in the Early Twentieth Century", supra note 5 for this quote.
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authorities that are not attuned with the reality of our current world order. We will see that
their complaints often stem from the fact that our actual constitutional rules do not
sufficiently accord with their obsolete "sovereignist" views. Thus, I will propose here a
very orthodox reading of the Constitution, one that takes seriously the traditional sources of
constitutional law and examines them with all the diligence they deserve. The picture that
will emerge from this analysis is a truly federalist one where federal and provincial
authorities have the means to fulfil their respective constitutional missions, including
making binding international agreements to ensure the cooperation of foreign jurisdictions.
To advance my argument, I will proceed in the following way: Since most of the
terms of the modem debate between the federal government and the provinces about treaty
powers can be found in the famous 1930s Labour Conventions case, III it is worth
reviewing at length that case. Therefore, chapter I will be dedicated to that review. This
thorough review is quite important because the case has been commented upon by so many
scholars 112 over the years that one might legitimately be afraid that the comments have
III Labour Conventions case, supra note 19.
112 See for example: C.W. Jenks, "The Present Status of the Bennett Ratifications of
International Labour Conventions", supra note 41; W.I. Jennings, "Dominion Legislation
and Treaties", supra note 41; Vincent C. MacDonald, "The Canadian Constitution Seventy
Years Later" (1937) 15 Can. Bar Rev. 401 [V.C. MacDonald, "The Canadian Constitution
Seventy Years Later"]; Arthur B. Keith, "The Privy Council Decisions: A Comment from
Great Britain" (1937) 15 Can. Bar Rev. 428 [A.B. Keith, "The Privy Council Decisions: A
Comment from Great Britain"]; Frederick C. Cronkite, "The Social Legislation References"
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taken a life of their own, killing the original and substituting themselves for the wise words
of the Privy Council! Therefore, I will try to stay clear from impersonation charges by
letting the Privy Council speak for itself and by limiting myself to paraphrasing it, or by
making it clear when I am adding my own comments. Also, to get a better understanding of
the debate, I will reconstruct the federal and provincial arguments from the notes taken by
the court reporter in a way that highlights their respective vision of the post-independence
Canadian polity. This reconstruction will be useful in re-discovering the initial claims of the
participants in the debate but, mostly, it will help in presenting different institutional
options and their likely constitutional consequences. Thus, I will focus on technical details
(1937) Can. Bar Rev. 495; William P.M. Kennedy, "The British North America Act: Past
and Future" (1937) 15 Can. Bar Rev. 393; Frank R. Scott, "The Consequences of the Privy
Council Decisions" (1937) 15 Can. Bar Rev. 485 [F.R. Scott, "The Consequences of the
Privy Council Decisions"]; Frank R. Scott, "Centralization and Decentralization in
Canadian Federalism" (1951) 29 Can. Bar Rev. 1095; Lord WRright of Durley,
Commentaire, (1955) 33 Can. Bar Rev. 1123; Frank R. Scott, "Labour Conventions Case:
Lord Wright's Undisclosed Dissent" (1956) 35 Can. Bar Rev. 114; Gerald V. La Forest,
"The Labour Conventions Case Revisited" (1974) 12 Can. y.B. Int'l L. 137 [G.V. La
Forest, "Labour Conventions Case Revisited"]; Jean-Charles Bonenfant, "L'etancheite de
l'AAN.B. est-elle menacee?" (1977) C. de D. 383; Pierre Patenaude, "L'erosion graduelle
de la regIe d'etancheite: une nouvelle menace al'autonomie du Quebec" (1977) 20 C. de D.
229; Armand L.c. de Mestral, "L'evolution des rapports entre Ie droit canadien et Ie droit
international un demi-siecle apres l'affaire des conventions internationales de travail"
(1987) 25 Can. y.B. Int'! L. 301 [AL.C. de Mestral, "L'evolution des rapports entre Ie
droit canadien et Ie droit international un demi-siecle apres l'affaire des conventions
internationales de travail"].
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of the arguments to the extent that they tell us something about political ViSiOns and
constitutional arrangements. Finally, I will contextualise the varying claims made by the
actors by giving some background information on the constitutional cases upon which they
rely.
Chapter II will examine the state of the current constitutional law of treaty-making
powers. When we carefully examine all the arguments invoked in favour of recognizing
plenary treaty-making powers to the federal government - be it the Letters Patent of 1947,
the prerogatives of the Crown, constitutional conventions, constitutional usage or
international Law -, none of these is able to withstand a strict constitutional scrutiny; if
federal authorities possess treaty-making powers in relation to provincial subject-matters, it
is only as the result of a form of implied consent by provinces. I will also argue that there
are very strong policy arguments in our current context in favour of not recognizing a
federal exclusive plenary treaty-making power to federal authorities.
I will then examine the case for provincial treaty-making powers. I will first offer an
overview of the extensive practices that the different Canadian provinces (and territories)
are engaged in at the international level. I will then examine the legality of provincial
treaty-making powers in light of both Canadian constitutional law and at international law.
When considering international law, I will not limit myself to examining arguments based
on orthodox international law. Rather, taking cues from game theory and from
constructivism, I will show why the weak centralised sanction mechanisms of international
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law create incentives to recognize federated states at the international level.
The third chapter will be concerned with treaty implementation and, more precisely,
with examining the arguments often invoked in favour of reversing the Labour Conventions
case. I will review the basis upon which arguments often invoked in favour of reversing the
Labour Conventions case are built (i.e. the possibility of reviving s. 132 of the Constitution
Act, 1867 (3.a), the possibility of using the "Peace, Order and Good Government" clause 113
(3.b.) and the possibility of invoking the allegedly "extra-territorial" character of treaty
implementation (3.c.)), and I will demonstrate that all those arguments are based on
fundamentally flawed assumptions about Canadian constitutional law. Those who want to
reverse the Labour Conventions case do not seem to realize that reversing that fundamental
case as they wish to do would ring the death knell of federalism: Canada would become
akin to a unitary state. None of the powers invoked by those who would want the Labour
Conventions case reversed are exclusive federal powers. Finally, I will show that the current
amending procedures actually advocates against judicially overruling the Labour
Conventions case.
***
113 See Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 39, s. 91.
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1. Stepping Out of the Footsteps of the Empire: The
Labour Conventions Case
This chapter will serve as the entry point into the diverse parts of the Canadian
constitutional web that are involved in the issue of treaty-making powers. I will not limit
myself to analysing the particular outcome of the Labour Conventions case but I will be
attentive to the immediate consequences of the alternative solutions proposed by the
different actors and to the consequences that those proposals would have had on this
constitutional web.
Thus, the first section (1.a.) will present the general factual and legal context in
which the Labour Conventions case was heard and decided. The next sections will present
the federal (1.b.) and provincial (1.c.) arguments presented to the Privy Council. And
finally, section I.d. will present a detailed analysis of the decision rendered in the Labour
Conventions case by the Privy Council.
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a. The Factual and Legal Context of the Labour
Conventions Case
Let's start with the often-forgotten context of the case. 114 When the first World War
ended, a Treaty of Peace was made at Versailles on June 28, 1919115 between the Allied
and Associated Powers and a defeated Germany. The "British Empire" was described as
one of the Allied and Associated Powers with His Majesty the King as one of the High
Contracting Parties. The King was represented generally by English Ministers and for the
Dominion of Canada by two Canadian Ministers. Canada was thus present as a member of
the Empire and not as a High Contracting Party.
In Part I of the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties convened to set up the League
of Nations and agreed that all signatories named in the annex to the covenant were to be the
original members of the League. Canada, by being a signatory, became a member of the
League. Part XIII of the Treaty, entitled "Labour," provided that the High Contracting
Parties agree to the establishment of the International Labour Organisation (LL.O.) for the
promotion of social justice and improved labour conditions throughout the world. The
114 The next two paragraphs, giving an account of the factual context, is a paraphrased
version of the Privy Council's own version of the facts in the Labour Conventions case,
supra note 19 at 343-44.
115 Treaty ofVersailles, supra note 64.
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Treaty provided that the members of the League of Nations shall be the members of this
organisation. The organisation was to consist, among other things, of a general conference
of representatives of the members. Art. 405 (2) provided that a draft convention could be
adopted with two-thirds of the votes cast by the delegates present at one such conferences.
According to Art. 405 (5), once a draft convention was adopted each of the members had
no more than 18 months after the closing of the session of the conference to "bring the ...
draft convention before the authority or authorities within whose competence the matter
lies, for the enactment of legislation or other action.,,116 Also, it provided that "if it obtains
the consent of the authority or authorities within whose competence the matter lies, [the
member will] communicate the formal ratification of the convention to the Secretary-
General and will take such action as may be necessary to make effective the provisions of
such convention." 117
The current case arose out of three such conventions adopted by I.L.O. conferences
between 1919 and 1928. 118 In the mid-30s, the federal Parliament decided to adopt statutes
116 Ibid. Art. 405 (5).
117 Ibid. Art. 405 (7).
liS fLO Convention Limiting the Hours of Work in Industrial Undertakings to Eight in the
Day and Fourty-Eight in the Week, 3 November 1919, 38 U.N.T.S. 17 [fLO Convention
Limiting the Hours of Work in Industrial Undertakings]; fLO Convention Concerning the
Application ofthe Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertakings, 17 November 1921,38 U.N.T.S.
187 [fLO Convention Concerning the Application of the Weekly Rest]; fLO Convention
Concerning the Creation ofMinimum Wage-Fixing Machinery, 16 June 1928,39 UN.T.S.
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to implement the three above-mentioned conventions, which it had claimed to have ratified
in 1935."9 The Governor-General in Council then referred the question of the validity of
the statutes to the Supreme Court of Canada. Upon receiving the divided opinion of the
Supreme Court, the federal government then appealed it to the Privy Council.
But why did the case only arise in the mid-30s? Why not earlier since the delay to
"bring the draft convention before the authority or authorities within whose
competence the matter lies, for the enactment of legislation or other action" was of only 18
months after the closing of the session of the conference and the first draft convention dated
1919? The Privy Council offers a striking explanation that seems to have been largely
forgotten:
In 1925 the Governor-General in Council referred to the Supreme Court
questions as to the obligations of Canada under the provisions of Part XIII.
of the Treaty of Versailles, and as to whether the Legislatures of the
Provinces were the authorities within whose competence the subject-matter
of the conventions lay. The answers to the reference, which are to be found
in In re Legislative Jurisdiction over Hours of Labour, [1925] Can. S.C.R.
505, were that the Legislatures of the Provinces were the competent
authorities to deal with the subject-matter, save in respect of Dominion
servants, and the parts of Canada not within the boundaries of any Province:
and that the obligation of Canada was to bring the convention before the
Lieutenant-Governor of each Province to enable him to bring the appropriate
3 [ILO Convention Concerning the Creation ofMinimum Wage-Fixing Machinery].
119 Resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada approving the conventions
were adopted and an order of the Governor-General in Council approved the ratification.
That order was then recorded in an instrument of ratification by the Secretary of State for
External Affairs for Canada and communicated to the Secretary-General of the League of
Nations. Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 346.
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subject-matter before the Legislature of his Province, and to bring the matter
before the Dominion Parliament in respect of so much of the convention as
was within their competence. This advice appears to have been accepted, and
no further steps were taken until those which took place as stated above in
1935. 120
In fact, the unanimous position of the Supreme Court in the 1925 reference simply
confirmed the views earlier expressed in a report by the then federal Minister of Justice and
embodied in an Order in Council taken on November 6, 1920. 121 The then Minister of
Justice ofthe Dominion was of the view that the provisions of the conventions
involve legislation which is competent to Parliament in as far as Dominion
works and undertakings are affected, but which the provincial legislatures
have otherwise the power to enact and apply generally and
comprehensively. 122
As the Privy Council would later state, the legislation "is not within the enumerated classes
of subjects in s. 91: and it appears to be expressly excluded from the general powers given
by the first words of the section.,,123 But why then was there a sudden change in attitude by
the federal government in 1935? Why, if the Supreme Court had decided in 1925 in relation
to two out of three of the conventions at issue here l24 that this type of labour legislation
came within the class of subjects assigned exclusively to the provinces by virtue of s. 92
120Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 347.
121Reference re Legislative Jurisdiction over Hours of Labour, [1925] S.C.R. 505
[Reference re Legislative Jurisdiction over Hours ofLabour].
122 Ibid at 508.
123 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 350.
124 ILO Convention Limiting the Hours of Work in Industrial Undertakings, supra note 118
and ILO Convention Concerning the Application ofthe Weekly Rest, ibid.
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(13) Constitution Act, 1867, did the federal government think fit to again refer the issue ten
years later to the same Court?
The reason is that in the intervening years, the federal government came to have
reasons to believe that it had the exclusive powers to implement any treaty binding on
Canada and the provinces on the basis of the opening words of s. 91 Constitution Act, 1867
(the power to adopt laws for "Peace, Order and Good Government"). That impression was
first created by the Aeronautics Reference 125 in which the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council, after examining an aviation treaty characterised as a s. 132 treaty, stated that:
[t]here may also be cases where the Dominion is entitled to speak for the
whole, and this not because of any judicial interpretation of ss. 91 and 92,
but by reason of the plain terms of s. 132, where Canada as a whole, having
undertaken an obligation, is given the power necessary and proper for
.c. h bl· . 126perlormmg suc 0 IgatlOn.
It then concluded that:
To sum up, having regard (a) to the terms of s. 132; (b) to the terms of the
Convention which covers almost every conceivable matter relating to aerial
navigation; and (c) to the fact that further legislative powers in relation to
aerial navigation reside in the Parliament of Canada by virtue of s. 91 (2) (5)
and (7), it would appear that substantially the whole field of legislation in
regard to aerial navigation belongs to the Dominion. There may be a small
portion of the field which is not by virtue of specific words in the B.N.A.
Act vested in the Dominion; but neither is it vested by specific words in the
Provinces. As to such small portion it appears to the Board that it must
necessarily belong to the Dominion under its power to make laws for the
peace, order and good government of Canada. Further their Lordships are
125 In re Regulation and Control of Aeronautics in Canada (The Aeronautics Reference),
[1932] A.C. 54 [Aeronautics Reference].
126 Ibid. at 73 (emphasis added).
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influenced by the facts that the subject of aerial navigation and the fulfilment
of Canadian obligations under s. 132 are matters of national interest and
importance; and that aerial navigation is a class of subject which has attained
such dimensions as to affect the body politic of the Dominion. 127
Although it talked of obligation undertaken by "Canada as a whole", that case was, in the
end, simply hinting at a general power over treaties to be found in s. 91. That is because the
case was in fact one of s. 132 application:
With regard to some of them, no doubt, it would appear to be clear that the
Dominion has power to legislate, for example, under s. 91(2), for the
regulation of Trade and Commerce, and under (5) for the Postal Services,
but it is not necessary for the Dominion to piece together its powers under s.
91 in an endeavour to render them co-extensive with its duty under the
Convention when s. 132 confers upon it full power to do all that is
legislatively necessary for the purpose. 128
One point must be added here. This case was very much anchored in the colonial mindset
in the sense that s. 132 was not only granting powers to the Dominion but it was also
imposing obligations for the protection of the Empire. In effect, the Privy Council, after
stating that the Dominion had powers to adopt the statute in question, wrote "and we think
that the Dominion Parliament not only has the right, but also the obligation, to provide by
statute and by regulation that the terms of the Convention shall be duly carried OUt.,,129
What truly gave the federal Parliament the impression that it had exclusive powers
to legislatively implement treaties was to come a few months later. In effect, in the Radio
127 Ibid. at 77.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid. (emphasis added).
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Reference of 1932, the Judicial Committee appeared to have decided that the power to
legislate for the purpose of perfonning treaty obligations resides exclusively in the
Parliament of Canada:
This idea of Canada as a Dominion being bound by a convention equivalent
to a treaty with foreign powers was quite unthought-of in 1867. It is the
outcome of the gradual development of the position of Canada vis-a-vis to
the mother country Great Britain, which is found in these later days
expressed in the Statute of Westminster (1931 (Can.), p. v.). It is not
therefore to be expected that such a matter should be dealt with in explicit
words in either s. 91 or s. 92. The only class or treaty which would bind
Canada was thought of as a treaty by Great Britain, and that was provided
for by s. 132. Being therefore not mentioned explicitly in either s. 91 or s.
92, such legislation falls within the general words at the opening of s. 91
which assign to the Government of the Dominion the power to make laws
"for the Peace, Order and good Government of Canada, in relation to all
Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned
exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces." 130
Being under the impression that it was now in charge of international relations for Canada,
the Dominion wanted to assert its newfound powers by adopting the three statutes referred
above. However, to make sure that the Dominion's interpretation of its newfound powers
was right, it wanted the opinion of the Supreme Court. In particular, there could have been
uncertainties as to the real ratio of the Radio Reference: was that opinion truly based on a
"treaty power" found in s. 91 or was it simply the result of a conclusion that radio
communications in itself fell within s. 91 ?131 After all, the Privy Council had left the door
130 In re Regulation and Control ofRadio Communication in Canada, [1932] A.C. 304 at 312
[Radio Reference].
131 There might also have been uncertainties as to the correctness of the Radio Reference,
ibid. For example, Vincent C. MacDonald, "Canada's Power to Perfonn Treaty
Obligations" (1933) 11 Can. Bar Rev. 581 [V.C. MacDonald, "Canada's Power to Perfonn
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open to the latter interpretation by writing that "the question does not end with the
consideration of the convention,,132 and had stated that radio broadcasting could fit under
the exception to the provincial powers granted to Parliament at 92(10)(a).133 The federal
government thus needed a clear finding on the issue. To get such a finding, Ottawa needed
a case in which the subject-matter would clearly fall within s. 92 before any consideration
related to the issue of treaty implementation. The implementation of the Labour
Conventions raised exactly that question. 134 Hence the reference to the Supreme COurt. 135
Treaty Obligations"], 581 argued that the Privy Council was mistaken to read any treaty-
powers in s. 91. According to him, s. 132 was the only section applicable: "It is the
submission of the writer that this section [so 132] properly construed is the sufficient and
sole source of Canada's power to perform any and all treaties and that the Privy Council
has not only placed an erroneous construction upon it, whereby it reached the result that
some treaties fall within it and others fall within the "peace, order and good government"
clause of sec. 91 of the BNA Act, but, further, that it reached this unsatisfactory result by a
method of approach to the Act which is both wrong and dangerous."
132 Radio Reference, ibid. at 314.
133 Radio Reference, ibid. The Constitution Act, 1867, s. 92 (10) grants power to
Legislatures in relation to "Local Works and Undertakings other than such as are of the
following Classes: (a) Lines of Steam or other Ships, Railways, Canals, Telegraphs, and
other Works and Undertakings connecting the Province with any other or others of the
Provinces, or extending beyond the Limits of the Province ... " (emphasis added.)
134 It is true that the Attorney General initially submitted to the Privy Council that the
Reference re Legislative Jurisdiction over Hours ofLabour, supra note 121, "was wrongly
decided" (Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 329) but in the end, "[i]t was admitted
at the bar that each statute affects property and civil rights within each Province; and that it
was for the Dominion to establish that nevertheless the statute was validly enacted under
86
Unhappy with a tie (three to three) in the Supreme Court on the validity of the legislation,
the federal government appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London
to get a clear answer to its question. That was particularly important in light of the fact that
many provinces were clearly opposed to the federal views on treaty-powers.
In effect, two very different conceptions of the nature of the Canadian state opposed
each other. While the federal government tended to imagine itself as the sole heir to the
Empire, the provinces saw in the newly automonous Canadian state a true federation. Those
opposing conceptions were reflected in their respective interpretations of the legal
consequences of Canada's recently gained autonomy from the Empire. And it is these
visions underlying the arguments that the federal governement and the provinces presented
to the Privy Council. Let's examine them in tum.
b. "There is Only One Heir to the Mother Country":
The Federal Government's Sovereignist Arguments
As we have seen, Canada's new international status was the result of de facto
changes, developing conventions, official policy statements and then, de jure
the legislative powers given to the Dominion Parliament by the British North America Act,
1867" (Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 342).
135 Reference Re: Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertakings Act (Canada), [1936] S.C.R. 461
[Labour Conventions case - SCC].
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recognition. 136 The Statute of Westminster did not speak of treaties but allowed the
Dominions to adopt extraterritorial laws. 137 As a result of Canada's new autonomy, the
Attorney General for Canada argued that the Dominion's Ministers had been vested with
the right to advise His Majesty in relation to international obligations affecting Canada,
thus inheriting the effective exercise of the Imperial foreign affairs prerogatives to make
treaties for Canada. 138 But it also claimed to be alone in having inherited these prerogatives;
provinces would have no such powers. 139 Once the Dominion had claimed the prerogative
to make treaties, it further claimed that it necessarily had the powers to implement them. In
other words, it claimed that Canada's new international status brought to the federal
136 The 1923 and 1926 Imperial conferences recognized that Dominion governments had
powers to conclude treaties and set up rules of practice between members of the Empire.
See in particular the Balfour Declaration, supra note 66.
137 Statute ofWestminster, supra note 67 s. 3.
138 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 330-31:
By the constitutional developments, particularly since the Treaty of
Versailles, the constitutional right to advise His Majesty in respect of
international obligations affecting Canada has become vested in his
Canadian Ministers. That is sometimes expressed by saying that the right to
exercise the prerogative in respect of Canadian affairs has been transferred to
the Canadian executive.
And later, at 341 :
Canada has the right to enter into international obligations so far as Canada
is concerned. With regard to the growth and development of the treaty-
making power, Canada has a duty to make treaties; nobody else can make
them for her ...
139Ibid. at 341 ("The Provinces have no status to enter into international obligations of any
kind. They have only Provincial jurisdiction legislatively.")
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government the capacity to conclude treaties and, consequently, the capacity to implement
them legislatively.
Thus, despite the fact that the federal government recognized that the subject-matter
of the statutes in question here would ordinarily come within provincial powers under s. 92
(13), it claimed that those questions had been taken out of provinces' jurisdiction. This was
to be the result of the new international status of Canada. The Dominion presented two
arguments in favour of its position.
The Dominion first argued that the issue pertained to s. 132. She generally argued
that the Dominion had the duty under the Treaty of Versailles to adopt the impugned
legislation and that it had the power to do so by virtue of s. 132. She argued that while s.
132 "speaks of obligations as part of the British Empire towards foreign countries", the
expression "Empire" ought to be read to mean "His Majesty".140 In other words, s. 132
would have had to be read to apply to treaties entered into by the Dominion as if it were the
immediate successor of the Empire. However, it did not put too much emphasis on those
arguments. In fact, it seems, from the Privy Council's report of the federal government's
arguments, that the Attorney General for Canada did not even make reference to the
Aeronautics Reference. This may indicate that the federal government was really looking
for a decision that would free Parliament from the colonial structure of s. 132.
140 Ibid. at 332.
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Thus, the Dominion argued that if the issue here was not one flowing from s. 132-
and despite the absence of any formal change in the text of the Constitution - then the
power to implement international agreements in Canada had been exclusively bestowed on
her by reason of the "residuary clause" of s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which grants
Parliament the power"... to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of
Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act
assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces ... "
Here, the Dominion did not simply argue for an overriding federal power but for
what I would call a preemption doctrine:
where Canada has properly incurred an international obligation with
respect to any matter whatsoever, that within whatever classes in ss. 91 and
92 it may be described as coming under other circumstances, once the matter
has assumed the aspect of an international bargain it is no longer to be
treated as belonging to anyone ofthe enumerated classes.,,141
In this, the Dominion was seeking a confirmation of her reading of the Radio Reference. 142
The Attorney General also argued that "[a] matter which may be local and
Provincial in its nature may assume another aspect once the country becomes committed as
a whole to some other country under a treaty." At first, this may sound like what we now
know as the double aspect doctrine. In 1883, the Privy Council had announced in Hodge v.
R. that "subjects which in one aspect and for one purpose fall within s. 92, may in another
141 Ibid. at 330 (emphasis added).
142 Supra note 130.
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aspect and for another purpose fall within s. 91".143 In such cases, Legislatures and
Parliament can validly adopt statutes on the same object and at the same time so long as
they deal with different aspects of that object. But on a closer look, we discover that the
Attorney General did not mean to argue for the application of the double aspect doctrine. In
fact, from the court's report, the Attorney General for Canada does not seem to have argued
Hodge v. R. at all. 144
Instead, he argued two other cases in support ofhis claim. The first case upon which
the Attorney General for Canada relied had established a non-exclusive yet overriding
federal power to fix prices during times of national emergencies, such as war. 145 The
distinct "federal aspect" is hard to discern in that case. Nonetheless, the Privy Council
recognized a federal power to intervene in what would otherwise be considered as falling
within the provincial jurisdiction over "property and civil rights". This power was to be
limited to the time of the emergency. In all fairness, this case is probably better seen as one
of those "wartime jurisprudence" where anxiety took over juridical orthodoxy and
expediency replaced legality.146 Of course, it is always hazardous to rely on wartime
143 Hodge v. R., supra note 14 at 130.
144 Hodge v. R., ibid. is not cited once in either the Privy Council opinion or the Supreme
Court decision.
145 Fort Frances Pulp & Power Co. v. Manitoba Free Press Co., [1923] A.C. 695 [Fort
Frances Pulp & Power Co.].
146 See, for example, Fort Frances Pulp & Power Co.. ibid at 706 where the Privy Council
exceptionally allowed the federal executive to effectively suspend the division of powers
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jurisprudence to discern longstanding principles. 147 But at any rate, it could be used to
rules during a wartime crisis and, unless "very clear evidence that the crisis had wholly
passed away" was provided to the judiciary, the Privy Council left it to the statesmanship of
the federal executive to decide when the suspension of the normal rules of federalism was
no longer necessary:
The question of the extent to which provision for circumstances such as
these may have to be maintained is one on which a Court of law is loathe to
enter. No authority other than the central government is in a position to deal
with a problem which is essentially one of statesmanship. It may be that it
has become clear that the crisis which arose is wholly at an end and that
there is no justification for the continued exercise of an exceptional
interference which becomes ultra vires when it is no longer called for. In
such a case the law as laid down for distribution of powers in the ruling
instrument would have to be invoked. But very clear evidence that the crisis
had wholly passed away would be required to justify the judiciary, even
when the question raised was one of ultra vires which it had to decide, in
over-ruling the decision of the Government that exceptional measures were
still requisite.
This comes close to Carl Schmitt's conception of the role of the executive in deciding of
the "exception", that is, of the suspension of the Constitution (see Carl Schmitt, Political
Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. by George Schwab
(London: MIT Press, 1985.) [C. Schmitt, Political Theology]
147 The Privy Council itself stated that it was bending the normal rules in light of
exceptional circumstances (Fort Frances Pulp & Power Co., ibid. at 703):
It is clear that in normal circumstances the Dominion Parliament could not
have so legislated as to set up the machinery of control over the paper
manufacturers which is now in question. The recent decision of the Judicial
Committee in the Board of Commerce Case (1) [Canada (A. G.) v. Alberta
(A.G.), [1922] 1 A.C. 191,60 D.L.R. 513], as well as earlier decisions, shew
that as the Dominion Parliament cannot ordinarily legislate so as to interfere
with property and civil rights in the Provinces, it could not have done what
the two statutes under consideration purport to do had the situation been
normal. But it does not follow that in a very different case, such as that of
sudden danger to social order arising from the outbreak of a great war, the
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suggest that there might be, at least temporarily, concurrent jurisdiction on an issue based
on a state of national emergency; something that might otherwise be "local" could be
temporarily said to be affecting "Canada as a whole" .148
The second precedent upon which the Dominion relied was more directly connected
to the issue here: British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General). 149
That case involved the validity of a British Columbia statute that provided that in contracts,
licences and leases made by the government, a provision should be made that no Chinese or
Japanese person should be employed in connection therewith. That provincial statute ran
against a federal legislation that had been adopted to implement an imperial treaty with
Japan that provided, among other things, that the subjects of each of the High Contracting
Parties should be treated equally in relation to their industries to the subjects or citizens of
the most favoured nation. The Privy Council recognized federal powers to adopt laws to
implement s. 132 treaties and to deal with "naturalization and aliens" (91 (25)) that would
Parliament of the Dominion cannot act under other powers which may well
be implied in the constitution.
148 See Fort Frances Pulp & Power Co., ibid. at 704:
The general control of property and civil rights for normal purposes remains
with the Provincial Legislatures. But questions may arise by reason of the
special circumstances of the national emergency which concern nothing
short of the peace, order and good government of Canada as a whole. The
over-riding powers enumerated in sec. 91, as well as the general words at the
commencement of the section, may then become applicable to new and
special aspects which they cover of subjects assigned otherwise exclusively
to the Provinces.
149 British Columbia (A.G.) v. Canada (A.G.), [1924] A.C. 203.
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override provincial laws on "property and civil rights".
At first glance, this case might suggest more clearly the idea of the double aspect
doctrine that we know today. But the Attorney General for Canada saw something else in
that case; he believed that it stood for the proposition that Parliament "is the only competent
authority to pass the legislation where a convention has been entered into" and that "[t]he
legislation could not be enacted by the provinces afterwards". 150 From this last statement, it
is hard to see how we could characterise the Dominion's position as one supporting the
"double aspect" doctrine. At best, one could say that the Dominion contented that there
were two temporal aspects: (a) when, in the absence of a treaty binding Canada on a
subject-matter, the province would have full jurisdiction over that subject-matter, and (b)
when, after Canada being bound by a treaty, the Parliament would have full and exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the treaty. This is incompatible with the simultaneous
nature of statutes validated by the double aspect doctrine.
To summarize, the federal government claimed to act on the international stage as
the successor of the Imperial government for Canada, that Imperial powers related to
maintaining and developing international relations were transferred to Ottawa through a
transfer of the Imperial prerogatives 151 and that the Parliament had exclusive jurisdiction
150 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 331 (emphasis added).
151 Ibid. at 330-31 :
By the constitutional developments, particularly since the Treaty of
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over any matter that was related to an international obligation incurred by treaty. In short,
the federal government claimed to incarnate the new sovereign for Canada, that newly
emancipated daughter of the "the mother country, Great Britain." 152
c. "But We Are Equally Sisters": The Provinces'
Federalist Arguments
Ontario, New Brunswick and British Columbia contradicted those pretensions by
claiming that no such powers were devolved to the federal government and that, in essence,
the Constitution Act, 1867 established a federation and not a unitary state. 153
Versailles, the constitutional right to advise His Majesty in respect of
international obligations affecting Canada has become vested in his
Canadian Ministers. That is sometimes expressed by saying that the right to
exercise the prerogative in respect of Canadian affairs has been transferred to
the Canadian executive.
152 The expression is taken from the Radio Reference, supra note 130 at 312 ("This idea of
Canada as a Dominion being bound by a convention equivalent to a treaty with foreign
powers was quite unthought-of in 1867. It is the outcome of the gradual development of the
position of Canada vis-a-vis to the mother country, Great Britain.")
153 Arguments presented by the provinces are reconstructed from the reporter's notes
presented with the decision of the Judicial Committee at Labour Conventions case, supra
note 19 at 327-41. Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Quebec had presented arguments
when the reference was heard by the Supreme Court of Canada (see Labour Conventions
case - SCC], supra note 135) but did not participate in the appeal to the Privy Council.
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1. Ontario
Ontario's general constitutional arguments relied in large part on the assumption
that what was at play here was a federal claim to be acting under s. 132 powers. However,
because the arguments relied on the general structure of the Canadian constitution, they
were also largely applicable to cases falling outside the purview of s. 132.
Ontario first argued for the equal constitutional status and parallel powers of the
provinces and the Dominion. She argued that the only "authority competent to sign a treaty
creating obligations is the King or some authority specially delegated to do so by the King.
... ,,154 and that "[t]here are no grounds whatever for saying that the parties to advise His
Majesty in matters relating to the jurisdiction of the provinces have in some way come to be
the Dominion Ministers.,,155 After all, "[t]here is nothing in the British North America Act
which suggests that foreign affairs as affecting Provincial jurisdiction have been committed
to the Dominion Government.,,156 Therefore, when a s. 132 treaty affecting a matter within
the provincial legislative competence is contemplated, Ontario argued that the King should
give his assent on the advice of his provincial advisers as opposed to his federal advisers. 157
Doing otherwise would mean that s. 132 would defeat the purposes of the main provisions
154 Labour Conventions case, ibid. at 333.
155 Ibid.
156Ibid. at 340.
157 Ibid. at 333 and 340.
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of the Constitution (i.e. ss. 91 and 92).158
And since "[t]he Province is as equally sovereign as the Dominion in its own
sphere",159 the consequence of the recognition of the equal status of the executive and
legislative authority of the provinces and the Dominion was the claim that "Ontario has a
right to enter into an agreement with another part of the British Empire or with a foreign
State.,,160 Thus, Ontario considered herself to be bound directly - not through the Dominion
- by the Treaty of Versailles as a member of the British Empire. 16\
In other words, neither the Dominion nor the provinces were superior to the other,
they were simply responsible for different issues: the "division of powers" was also meant
to be a "division oflabour" among equals. Neither of them could speak for the other.
Ontario argued that the powers given to the Parliament and the federal government
by virtue of s. 132 became effective only once binding obligations flowing from an
Imperial treaty was in force. Also, once those powers were activated, they were not to be
158Ibid. at 334 ("It is not to be considered that those who drafted the Canadian constitution
intended to write a constitution which was subject to defeat in its main provisions by
competing jurisdictions. The concentration of power in the hands of the Dominion is fatal
to Canada as it has been known in the past.")
159 Ibid. at 340 (emphasis added).
160 Ibid. at 333 (emphasis added).
161 Ibid. at 333-34.
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exclusive but simply overriding. This meant that once an Imperial treaty was imposing
obligations related to provincial matters - property law, for example - provinces did not
lose jurisdiction over that subject-matter. It simply meant that the Parliament could adopt
implementing legislation that would override a conflicting provincial statute. In other
words, s. 132 would merely be a remedial provision for when provinces would renege on
their international promises in ways that would effect the responsibility of the Empire as a
whole.
Then, after making the general constitutional argument on the status of provinces in
the federation, Ontario made a series of arguments specific to the case at hand: (1) the only
thing that could amount to a s. 132 obligation in the Treaty of Versailles might be Art. 405
(5) duty to "bring the .. . draft convention before the authority or authorities within whose
competence the matter lies, for the enactment of legislation or other action,,162 and that duty
was fulfilled when the said conventions were brought to the attention of provinces; (2) the
Parliament could not have gained legislative competence over the subject-matter of the
conventions by virtue of s. 132 because no Imperial obligation binding on the Dominion or
the provinces could have been created by the alleged Dominion's ratification of the
conventions; such ratification was not in accordance with the dates set by the Treaty of
Versailles; (3) moreover, the alleged Dominion's ratification could not be said to amount to
an independent agreement between countries but merely to an offer.
162 See footnote 116 and 117 and accompanying text.
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Turning to a pure division of legislative powers issue, Ontario also distinguished
this case from the Radio Reference 163 and the Aeronautics Reference 164 by arguing that
those cases dealt with subject-matters that fell within s. 91 and not s. 92. That is, the real
ratio of those cases was not about treaty-implementation powers but rather about powers
over radio communications (and the infrastructures that made them possible l65 ) and
163 Supra note 130.
164 Supra note 125.
165 Crocket J. had read the Radio Reference, supra note 130 in a similar way (Labour
Conventions case - SCC, supra note 135 at 534-35):
Their Lordships held that broadcasting fell within the excepted matters as
being an undertaking connecting one province with another, and extending
beyond the limits of the province and therefore came within enumerated
head 29 of s. 91. ... Their Lordships, moreover, held that broadcasting fell
within the description of "telegraphs," which subject is excepted from "local
words and undertakings," specified in s. 92(10), and therefore takes its place
in 91 (29). ... It appears, therefore, to me that, while one of the grounds of
the decision in the Radio case [[1932] A.C. 304] was the form and nature of
the convention itself, was the basis of the decision, as put in the judgment
itself, "the pre-eminent claims of s. 91," which, I take it to refer to the fact
that the subject matter of that convention fell under one of the enumerated
heads of s. 91, viz: no. 29. For that reason the authority of Parliament in
relation to the subject matter of the convention and of the legislation would
override the legislative authority of the provinces in relation thereto, not
because of the residuary clause in the introduction of that section, but in
virtue of the declaration that,
notwithstanding anything in this Act, the exclusive legislative
authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all matters coming
within the classes of subjects
set forth in the 29 enumerated heads of that section, and the closing words of
s. 91 as well that,
Any matter coming within any of the classes of subjects enumerated
in this section shall not be deemed to come within the class of matters
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aeronautics as such. Respective legislative powers had to be kept separate because "[t]he
concentration of power in the hands of the Dominion is fatal to Canada as it has been
known in the past.,,166
However, quite surprisingly, after having so strongly defended the autonomy of
provinces, and after having argued that "[i]t is not to be considered that those who drafted
the Canadian constitution intended to write a constitution which was subject to defeat in its
main provisions by competing jurisdictions", 167 Ontario accepted that the statute might be
valid on the basis of an extended version of what has come to be known to us as the
"national concern" doctrine under s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867:
. .. present matters were of such national importance, of such wide import as
to affect the body politic of the Dominion in the overriding way that was
found in Russell v. The Queen, ... ,168 if they were taken out of the specific
heads of s. 92, then Ontario is satisfied to see his legislation supported. . ..
The Acts are of national importance, and the subject has attained such
proportions as to affect the body politic.,,169
of a local or private nature comprised in the enumeration of the
classes of subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the
Legislatures of the Provinces.
This, as I read the judgment, is the fundamental basis of the decision.
166 Labour Conventions case Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 334.
167 Ibid.
168 Russell v. R, (1882) 7 A.C. 829 [Russell v. R.].
169 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 334-35. One must note that the authority of
the Russell v. R. decision to which the Attorney General for Ontario was referring had been
significantly gutted by the Local Prohibition case (Ontario (A.G) v. Canada (A. G), [1896]
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A.C. 348). That decision basically restricted Russell v. R. to the specific facts of the case. It
therefore recognized that provinces could adopt statutes prohibiting alcohol. On what
would later be interpreted as part of the "national concern" doctrine, Lord Watson wrote
(Local Prohibition case, ibid. at p. 361):
If it were once conceded that the Parliament of Canada has authority to make
laws applicable to the whole Dominion, in relation to matters which in each
province are substantially of local or private interest, upon the assumption
that these matters also concern the peace, order and good government of the
Dominion, there is hardly a subject enumerated in section 92 upon which it
might not legislate, to the exclusion ofthe provincial legislature.
Their Lordships do not doubt that some matters, in their origin local and
provincial, might attain such dimensions as to affect the body politic of the
Dominion, and to justify the Canadian Parliament in passing laws for their
regulation or abolition in the interest of the Dominion. But great caution
must be observed in distinguishing between that which is local or provincial,
and therefore within the jurisdiction of the provincial legislatures, and that
which has ceased to be merely local or provincial, and has become matter of
national concern, in such sense as to bring it within the jurisdiction of the
Parliament of Canada. [Emphasis added.]
Russell v. R., then largely discredited, gained a second lease on life in 1946 when it was
reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Ontario (A.G.) v. Canada (A.G.), [1946] A.C. 193
[Reference re Canada Temperance Act]. The "national concern" doctrine will be discussed
in more details at notes 242-260 and accompanying text. On this so-called "national
concern" or "national interest", see also Hugo Cyr, "L'interpretation constitutionnelle, un
exemple de postpluralisme" (1998) 43 McGill L.J. 565, 575-76 [H. Cyr, "L'interpretation
constitutionnelle, un exemple de postpluralisme"]; Jean Leclair, "The Elusive Quest for the
Quintessential "National Interest" (2005) 38 V.B.C. L. Rev. 353 and Kenneth Lysyk, "The
Constitutional Reform and the Introductory Clause of Section 91: Residual and Emergency
Law-Making Authority" (1979) 57 Can. Bar Rev. 531.
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This concession confirmed that Ontario still demanded that the Parliament have
jurisdiction over the subject-matter by virtue of s. 91 to be able to implement the
Convention but, at the same time, it was gutting provincial powers by taking subject-
matters completely out of the provinces' purview. Ultimately, after having argued for
multi-layered political communities, she seemed to have reverted to the image of Canada as
a single "body politic". New Brunswick and British Columbia would not retreat down that
path.
2. New Brunswick
New Brunswick first argued that no s. 132 obligations were involved here and that
therefore, to succeed, the Attorney General for Canada had to demonstrate "two
propositions or principles: (1.) That the Dominion has the capacity to create treaty
obligations binding on the Provinces; and (2.) that the Parliament of Canada has power to
perform such obligations.,,170 New Brunswick argued that the Dominion failed on both
counts.
New Brunswick based her arguments on a vision of Canada as being an aggregate
of self-governing entities that took part in a second layer of aggregation that corresponded
to the Commonwealth of nations that had replaced the Empire. Thus, before arguing on
170 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 335.
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those two propositions, New Brunswick made one important preliminary point. It briefly
reviewed the historical changes in the treaty powers in the Empire over the last centuries to
show that despite the fact that "[0]riginally in Great Britain the treaty-making power and
the treaty-performing power were vested in the same person", that situation had changed
greatly due to a number of changes in British constitutionalism: gone where the days when
"the King was sovereign in fact as in name". 171 As a result of those changes, treaty-making
and treaty-performing were powers that now rested on separate entities. Among the
changes highlighted by New Brunswick were "(a) the growth of representative institutions;
(b) parliamentary sovereignty; (c) responsible government; (d) colonial self-government;
(e) the federal system of government in Canada; and (t) the growth of the British
Commonwealth of nations". 172 Thus, New Brunswick's historical contextualisation tells the
tale of the fragmentation of the Imperial Crown along the lines of the self-governing
political communities: the Empire was transformed into a Commonwealth made of equal
and autonomous members and those Commonwealth members were sometimes further
fragmented into federal governments and "provinces" (e.g. Canada) or "states" (e.g.
Australia) to better allow overlapping political communities to govern themselves. This
helps to explain New Brunswick reluctance to see in s. 132 and in the doctrine of national
173 h· b I . ·d· I . I . 174emergency powers anyt mg ut non-exc USIve, yet overn mg, egIs atIve powers.
171 Ibid. at 336.
172 Ibid.
173 Ibid. On the "national emergency" doctrine, see infra note 146 and accompanying text.
174 Ibid.
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From this historical narrative, New Brunswick moved to the first question. After
reviewing different possible sources for the Dominion's alleged power to enter into treaties
binding upon provinces, she concluded that no such sources granted that power. "[T]he
Dominion can only enter into agreements with other states in respect of matters which fall
within her legislative competence.,,175 And since labour issues were admittedly provincial
issues falling under s. 92 (13) ("Property and Civil Rights in the Province "), that meant
that the federal government did not have the power to ratify such conventions.
On the second question, she refused the analogy between treaties and contracts that
was used by the Dominion to suggest that the power to conclude an agreement presupposes
a capacity to perform it. New Brunswick argued that a new international status for Canada
did not result in granting legislative supremacy to Parliament. This new status simply
changed the constitutional relation between Canada and the government of Great Britain
and nothing more: "If by virtue of a new status Canada is to have the right by treaties to
change the law of the Provinces it should be by constitutional amendment." I 76
As to the Radio Reference, New Brunswick contended, as Ontario and Crocket J.
did,177 that it did not establish a general power to implement treaties but that it simply
175 Ibid at 337.
176 Ibid
177 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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stated that radio communications did not fall within s. 92 and that they either fell in one of
the subsections of s. 91 or within the federal residuary powers. New Brunswick further
supported her argument by suggesting that to decide otherwise would mean the destruction
of the "principle enunciated by this Board about the object of the British North America Act
in numerous cases".178 In particular, New Brunswick referred to Liquidators of the
Maritime Bank ofCanada. 179 In that important case, the Privy Council stated that the object
of the British North America Act was:
.. . neither to weld the provinces into one, nor to subordinate provincial
governments to a central authority, but to create a federal government in
which they should all be represented, entrusted with the exclusive
administration of affairs in which they had a common interest, each province
retaining its independence and autonomy. That object was accomplished by
distributing, between the Dominion and the provinces, all powers executive
and legislative, and all public property and revenues which had previously
belonged to the provinces; so that the Dominion Government should be
vested with such of these powers, property, and revenues as were necessary
for the due performance of its constitutional functions, and that the
remainder should be retained by the provinces for the purposes of provincial
government. But, in so far as regards those matters which, by sect. 92, are
specially reserved for provincial legislation, the legislation of each province
continues to be free from the control of the Dominion, and as supreme as it
was before the passing of the Act. 180
The Privy Council had also written that "a Lieutenant-Governor, when appointed, is as
much a representative of Her Majesty, for all purposes of Provincial government as the
Governor-General himself is for all purposes of Dominion government". 181 New Brunswick
178 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 338.
179 Supra note 23.
180 Ibid. at 441-42.
181 Ibid. at 443.
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thus pushed forcefully on the idea that provinces and the Dominion were equal within their
own spheres.
Finally, New Brunswick opposed Ontario's position that the statute should be
validated on grounds of expediency. Canada was a federation and, therefore, what was
good for one part might not necessarily be good for all parts.
3. British Columbia
British Columbia also highlighted the federal nature of the Constitution by making
reference to a version of the "compact theory": "The British North America Act, 1867, has
been said to be in the nature of a treaty by which the Provinces surrendered certain of their
rights and preserved others.,,182
From that starting point, British Columbia viewed with alarm the arguments made
on behalf of the Dominion and the concession that Ontario had made. She argued that if the
impugned bills were to be validated on the basis of s. 91 powers to make laws for the
"Peace, Order and Good Government", "it w[ould] be even more fatal, even more of an
invasion of Provincial rights, than if it [were] upheld under treaty-making powers".183 In
182 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 339.
183 Ibid. at 338.
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effect, it would mean that issues specifically attributed to provinces by s. 92 - and upon
which legislatures have validly legislated - would be taken out of provinces' powers and
given to Parliament merely on the basis of "what is termed a change in recognition of
conditions".184 One can sense that British Columbia, here, was not only worried that this
doctrine would endanger validly adopted provincial laws, but that the arbitrariness in the
"recognition" of "changes in condition" was really going to transform the initial
constitutional bargain.
She then argued that there is constitutional precedent for legislation by "subordinate
powers" to fulfil the international obligations of the supreme authority. Having established
that principle, she argued that provinces have all the legislative powers necessary to
implement the conventions. 18S This highlights something important here: complying with
184 Ibid.
18S Ibid. at 339. Here, the Privy Council's report of the argument is somewhat ambiguous.
It is unclear whether British Columbia considered provinces' powers to implement the
conventions as an application of the principle that subordinated powers can take part in
treaty implementation or whether it was an a fortiori argument to the effect that if
subordinated powers can do so, provinces, which are not subordinated, must necessarily be
capable too. Because it is not clear what British Columbia considered a "subordinate
power", it is hard to tell. Would, for example, British Columbia have considered the
Dominion a "subordinated power" in relation to the Imperial power? If "subordinate"
means a "delegation", then that would be wrong (see Hodge v. R., supra note 14).
However, if it means "non-autonomous", then it would be right. And then s. 132 would be
a good example of such precedent since it reflects an explicit recognition that Imperial
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treaty obligations can take multiple forms. As I will show later, even the executive can
implement certain treaty obligations without the participation of any legislative bodyl86;
just think, for example, of military orders commanding a ceasefire or a withdrawal of
troops following an armistice treaty.
British Columbia followed New Brunswick in argumg that Canada's new
international status only changed her relation to foreign states; it did not change in anyway
the distribution of powers provided by ss. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Thus, it
was to be "the nature of the subject-matter itself which determines the class into which it
falls".187 Here, the subject-matter of the legislation fell squarely within the exclusive
jurisdiction of provinces. In support of that argument, reference was made to the
Aeronautics Reference 188 and the Radio Reference. 189 This probably indicates that British
Columbia accepted the interpretation that Ontario and New Brunswick made of that
decision: radio communication in itself must fall within s. 91.
treaties could be implemented by "subordinate powers". However, the arguments presented
by New Brunswick, in particular, the absence of changes in the nature of relations between
the federal and the provinces after Canada's change of international status suggests that
British Columbia may have intended her argument to be one a fortiori.
186 See infra notes 219-221 and accompanying text.
187Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 339.
188 Supra note 125.
189 Supra note 130.
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After setting up those general arguments, the report is rather vague on the further
claims made by British Columbia. She apparently made two claims that must have been
alternative propositions. It was first claimed that Art. 405, paras. 5 and 7 of the Treaty of
Versailles had not been respected because the draft conventions had not been presented to
the relevant authorities for the purpose of obtaining their consent. This argument seems to
point to the absence of a binding international obligation due to a failure in respecting the
procedure set-up by Art. 405 of the Treaty of Versailles. The second claim seems to assume
that valid s. 132 obligations might have been created. In that context, New Brunswick
argued that when the subject-matters of a s. 132 treaty falls clearly within s. 92, it would
not be proper for Parliament to intervene when provinces have enacted or had not yet the
chance to enact appropriate legislation. In other words, s. 132 was interpreted as a remedial
provision. British Columbia then argued that provinces were not given the opportunity,
after ratification, to confirm whether or not they were ready to conform to their obligations.
d. "Canada is a Federation": The Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council
The assumption behind the Privy Council's decision is that Canada is a federation
and that was the only way to bring together her distinct parts. A legislative union, although
possibly more efficient, was simply not possible. The members of the Privy Council, if they
were not already aware of that political fact before hearing the appeal, had the chance to
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read in Cannon J.' s opinion accounts of the negotiations given by many key players at the
time. 190
Here is a brief taste of what the Law Lords were able to read from Cannon J.' s
opinion. Sir John A. Macdonald, then Attorney General for Upper Canada, had been in
favour of the idea of creating one single unified political unit in Canada. However, he
stated, before the Canadian Parliament in 1865, that he had retreated from his position:
The third and only means of solution for our difficulties was the junction of
the provinces either in a Federal or a Legislative Union. Now, as regards the
comparative advantages of a Legislative and a Federal Union, I have never
hesitated to state my own opinions. I have again and again stated in the
House, that, if practicable, I thought a Legislative Union would be
preferable. I have always contended that if we could agree to have one
government and one parliament, legislating for the whole of these peoples, it
would be the best, the cheapest, the most vigorous, and the strongest system
of government we could adopt. But, on looking at the subject in the
Conference, and discussing the matter as we did most unreservedly, and with
a desire to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion, we found that such a system
was impracticable. ... So that those who were, like myself, in favour of a
Legislative Union, were obliged to modifY their views and accept the project
of a Federal Union as the only scheme practicable, even for the Maritime
Provinces. 191
Macdonald concluded that the constitutional scheme that was agreed upon was the result of
multiple concessions and that "we must consider this scheme in the light of a treaty.,,192
Lord Carnavon said, on the second reading of the British North America Act in the House
190 Labour Conventions case - SCC, supra note 135 at 514-18.
191 Ibid. at 514-15.
192 Ibid. at 515.
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of Lords, that "[a] legislative union is under existing circumstances impracticable.,,193 Chief
Justice Dorion, who had participated in the Confederation Debates when he was a member
of the legislature wrote: "There is no difference between the powers of the local and
Dominion legislatures within their own sphere. That is the powers of the local legislature
within its own sphere are co-extensive with the powers of the Dominion government within
its own sphere. The one is not inferior to the other.,,194
In that spirit, the Privy Council wrote that "[n]o one can doubt that this distribution
is one of the most essential conditions, probably the most essential condition, in the inter-
provincial compact to which the British North America Act gives effect.,,195 It then went on
to specify why such system was necessary for the different parts of the federation. 196 The
193 Ibid. at 517. Lord Carnavon further added (ibid.):
The Maritime Provinces are ill-disposed to surrender their separate life, and
to merge their individuality in the political organization of the general body.
It is in their case, impossible, even if it were desirable, by a stroke of the pen
to bring about a complete assimilation of their institutions to those of their
neighbours. Lower Canada, too, is jealous, as she is deservedly proud, of
their ancestral customs and traditions; she is wedded to her peculiar
institutions, and will enter this Union only upon the distinct understanding
she retains them.
194 Ibid.
195 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 351.
196 Ibid. ("If the position of Lower Canada, now Quebec, alone were considered, the
existence of her separate jurisprudence as to both property and civil rights might be said to
depend upon loyal adherence to her constitutional right to the exclusive competence of her
own Legislature in these matters. Nor is it of less importance for the other Provinces,
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Privy Council thus wrote its decision with the awareness that Canada was the result of a
political compromise that required the utmost respect for the autonomy of provinces. That
is one of the reasons why, to put it shortly, the Privy Council concluded that "no further
legislative competence is obtained by the Dominion from its accession to international
status". 197
Let's examine in detail the opinion of the Privy Council.
1. Distinguishing Between Making and Implementing
Treaties
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council first responded that "[w]ithin the
British Empire there is a well-established rule that the making of a treaty is an executive
act, while the performance of its obligations, if they entail alteration of the existing
domestic law, requires legislative action.,,198 So it is important to distinguish between the
two first stages in the life of a treaty-based norm: (1) the period during which the treaty is
concluded - whereby the international obligation is formed 199 - and (2) the period during
though their law may be based on English jurisprudence, to preserve their own right to
legislate for themselves in respect of local conditions which may vary by as great a distance
as separate[s] the Atlantic from the Pacific.")
197 Ibid. at 352.
198 Ibid. at 347.
199 Depending on the type of agreement, different formalities will be applicable. In modem
day usage, "Heads of States" treaties (Le. treaties upon which the Head of the State him or
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which the treaty is implemented - or, in the words of the Judicial Committee, whereby the
obligation is "performed".200 Thus, the signature and ratification of treaties are traditionally
the prerogative of the Crown and, as such, fall to the executive branch.20t
The Privy Council noted that it is wise for the executive to obtain an expression of
approval from the legislature that would later be called to implement legislatively the
international obligations in question. However, such an expression of approval does not
herself puts his or her seal on the documents) have been abandoned for intergovernmental
treaties (i.e. treaties concluded by a representative of each government). In Canada, the
degree of formality of modem (written) treaties vary from more formal treaties where the
agreements are first signed by governments' negotiators and later ratified by decisions of
the government to simple exchanges on notes between governments.
200 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 347.
20t The fact that the federal executive now ratifies without necessarily seeking the approval
from the Parliament has been criticised for the lack of transparency and the undemocratic
character of the process. See J. Harrington, "Redressing the Democratic Deficit in Treaty
Law Making: (Re-)Establishing a Role for Parliament", supra note 41. On ratification, see
among others: Claude Emanuelli, Droit International Public, vol.1 (Montreal: Wilson &
Lafleur, 1990) at 64; J.-Y. Morin, "La conclusion d'accords internationaux par les
provinces canadiennes", supra note 4; J.-Y. Morin, "La personnalite internationale du
Quebec" supra note 41; A.L.C. de Mestral, "Le Quebec et les relations internationales",
supra note 41 at 209; Thomas A. Levy, "Provincial International Status Revisited" (1976-
77) 3 Dal. L.J. 70; R. St John MacDonald, 'The Relationship Between International Law
and Domestic Law in Canada", supra note 41; Edward McWhinney, "The Constitutional
Competence Within Federal Systems as to International Agreements", supra note 41.
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"operat[e] as law,,202 and does not preclude current and future legislatures from declining to
. I h bl'" d 203Imp ement t e treaty 0 IgatlOns mcurre .
2. Making Treaties on Provincial Matters: A Silent
Overruling
Contrary to what commentators sometimes assume,204 after distinguishing between
"forming" and "performing" international obligations, the Privy Council refused to rule on
the issue of whether or not the federal executive had powers to ratify the conventions; it
202 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 348.
203 Ibid.
204 See for example, Donald M. McRae and John H. Currie who, forgetting Ontario's, New
Brunswick's and Rinfret J.' s position (infra notes 154-161 and 175 and accompanying text)
in the case, wrote in "Treaty-Making and Treaty Implementation: The Kyoto Protocol"
(2003) 29:2 Canadian Council on International Law Bulletin that "[i]t has never been
seriously doubted that treaty-making authority rests exclusively with the federal executive
branch. No legislative concurrence, either by Parliament or the provincial legislatures, has
ever been legally required prior to ratification of treaties by the federal government. That
position was confirmed as early as 1936 by the Supreme Court in the Labour Conventions
case, and has not been seriously doubted since." McRae and Currie, while discussing the
respective roles of the executive and the legislative powers take for granted that the federal
executive has undivided powers to make treaties. However, Gerald-A. Beaudoin, Le
jederalisme au Canada (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2000) at 877 and Henri Brun and
Guy Tremblay, Droit constitutionnel, 4th ed. (Cowansville (Qc): Yvon Blais, 2002) at 66
note correctly that the Privy Council never recognised such jurisdiction to the federal
executive.
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was unnecessary to take position on that point since the case could be decided by simply
examining the question of legislative competence.205 It is true that when Lord Atkin wanted
to highlight the complexity of the relations between the executive and the legislative
concerning treaties in the context of federal states he wrote: "The obligations imposed by
treaty may have to be performed, if at all, by several Legislatures; and the executive have
the task of obtaining the legislative assent not of the one Parliament to whom they may be
responsible, but possibly of several Parliaments to whom they stand in no direct
relation".206 But in the end, the Privy Council could hardly be clearer:
Reverting again to the original analysis of the contentions of the parties, it
will be seen that the Provincial contention l.(b) ["[t]hat the Canadian
Government had no executive authority to make any such treaty as was
alleged.,,207]relates only to the formation of the treaty obligation, while 1.(c)
has reference to the alleged limitation of both executive and legislative
action by the express terms of the treaty. If, however, the Dominion
Parliament was never vested with legislative authority to perform the
obligation these questions do not arise. And, as their Lordships have come to
the conclusion that the reference can be decided upon the question of
legislative competence alone, in accordance with their usual practice in
constitutional matters they refrain from expressing any opinion upon the
questions raised by the contentions 1. (b) and (c), which in that event become
. . 1208lmmaterza.
Therefore, the extent of the federal power to negotiate, sign and ratify treaties dealing with
matters falling in the provincial sphere of legislative competence was explicitly left
205 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 349.
206 Ibid. at 348.
207 Ibid. at 342.
208 Ibid. at 348-49 (emphasis added).
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d 'd d 209un eCI e .
Nonetheless, some might want to argue that it seems that Lord Atkin later intuited,
in an obiter, that the federal executive may now have the power to conclude treaties with
other states on subject-matter relating to s. 92 when he wrote:
It is true, as pointed out in the judgment of the Chief Justice, that as the
executive is now clothed with the powers of making treaties so the
Parliament of Canada, to which the executive is responsible, has imposed
upon it responsibilities in connection with such treaties, for if it were to
disapprove of them they would either not be made or the Ministers would
meet their constitutional fate. But this is true of all executive functions in
their relation to Parliament. There is no existing constitutional ground for
stretching the competence of the Dominion Parliament so that it becomes
enlarged to keep pace with enlarged functions of the Dominion executive. If
the new functions affect the classes of subjects enumerated in s. 92
legislation to support the new functions is in the competence of the
Provincial Legislatures only. If they do not, the competence of the Dominion
Legislature is declared by s. 91 and existed ab origine. In other words, the
Dominion cannot, merely by making promises to foreign countries, clothe
itself with legislative authority inconsistent with the constitution which gave
it birth.21o
However, this statement in no way explains the legal basis for this federal power. In fact,
this excerpt can equally support two readings: (a) the federal executive possesses a
constitutional power to make treaties that is independent of the Parliament's sphere of
209 V.C. MacDonald, "The Canadian Constitution Seventy Years Later", supra note 112 at
418, fn 32, is of the same opinion: "The point taken by the provinces and expressly left
open by the Judicial Committee awaits determination, viz., whether the Dominion
Executive is competent to make any treaty as to subject-matters falling within provincial
legislative competence."
210 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 352 (emphasis added).
116
competence and that has an autonomous constitutional source, or (b) the federal executive
has the power to make treaties outside of the Parliament's jurisdiction through a delegation
of powers from the provinces. Thus, I will examine the possible constitutional basis of both
hypotheses to decide which one fits better within our constitutional web. This will be done
in Chapter II.
Before going any further, it is necessary to correct another assumption. Many think
that the majority of the Supreme Court (four out of six) has set a binding precedent in
favour of an exclusive federal power to make treaties and, not having been overruled by the
Privy Council, this ruling still stands. The argument goes: out of the six judges who took
part in the Supreme Court's reference, three (Duff C.J., and Davis and Kerwin JJ.) thought
that the Dominion had plenary powers to conclude and implement treaties and one (Crocket
J.) believed that the Dominion could conclude such treaties but that implementation had to
follow the normal division of legislative powers. However, once we examine the opinions
closely, we find that the reference cannot ultimately stand as a precedent for the proposition
that the federal executive has an exclusive plenary power to make treaties.
The position of the three judges who claimed that the federal government had such
plenary powers to conclude and implement treaties was quite undermined after the Privy
Council's decision. First, the trio took the view that the Dominion Parliament has the
authority to adopt the impugned statutes on the basis that it is implementing a s. 132 treaty
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obligation.211 This would mean that their position on the Dominion executive plenary
powers over treaties outside of s. 132 situations would simply be an obiter dicta. The trio
was later overruled on the applicability of s. 132 by the Privy Council. Second, the trio
relied on the idea that it is the Parliament that has plenary authority over foreign affairs and
treaty-implementation to derive the conclusion that the federal government has plenary
powers to conclude treaties - not the other way around. In effect, the treaty-making power,
in the trio's opinion, depends on Parliament's legislative powers.212 Thus, the Dominion's
executive powers were supposed to be hanging from the Dominion legislative hook, but
once the Privy Council said - as we will soon see - that no such plenary power existed, the
211 Labour Conventions case - SCC, supra note 135 at 500:
It follows from what has been said that this treaty obligation is an
obligation within section 132 and, consequently, that the authority to make
the convention effective exclusively rests in the Parliament and Goveriunent
of Canada and, therefore, that the Parliament of Canada is, at least, one of
the authorities before which the convention must be brought under the terms
of article 405.
212 Ibid. at 488-89 and 492:
The Canadian executive, again, constitutionally acts under responsibility to
the Parliament of Canada and it is that Parliament alone which can
constitutionally control its conduct of external affairs. ...
The judgments of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the
Aeronautics case [[1932] A.c. 54] and the Radio case [[1932] A.C. 304]
constrain us to hold that jurisdiction to legislate for the purpose of
performing the obligation - for bringing the law of the Canadian provinces
into harmony with the provisions of the convention, for example - resides
exclusively in the Parliament of Canada; and, by parity of reasoning, if not,
indeed, as an obvious logical consequence of that proposition, jurisdiction
resides, in so far as executive action is required, exclusively in the
Government of Canada.
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Dominion executive lost its attach to provincial legislative matters. In other words, the
Privy Council might not have commented on the capacity of the Dominion to form treaties
on subject-matters normally falling in the provincial legislative ambit, but it destroyed the
basis upon which the trio of the Supreme Court had constructed such power. It was an
indirect overruling. In those circumstances, the precedential value of the trio's position is
nil.
If we tum to the fourth judge, Crocket J., who disagreed with DuffC.J, Davis J. and
Kerwin J. on the result but agreed with the Chief Justice that the federal executive had the
power to conclude treaties dealing with provincial subject-matters, again, we see that his
position on treaty-making powers was an obiter.213 After all, if he believed the statutes to
be invalid on division of legislative powers ground, it was clearly unnecessary to say
whether or not the Dominion had powers to make treaties dealing with provincial
legislative subject-matters. In any case, he said nothing of the possible role of provinces in
213 Ibid. at 535:
While I agree with the learned Chief Justice that the Government of Canada
must now be held to be the proper medium for the formal conclusion of
international conventions, whether they affect the Dominion as a whole or
any of the provinces separately, I do not think that this fact can be relied on
as altering in any way the provisions of the B.N.A. Act as regards the
distribution of legislative power as between the Dominion Parliament and
the provincial legislatures or as necessarily giving to any matter, which may
be made the subject of legislation in Canada, any other meaning or aspect
than that which bears in our original constitution. Whether such a matter is
one which falls under the terms of either s. 91 or of s. 92 or of s. 132, must
depend upon the real intendment of the B.N.A. Act itself, as gathered from
the terms of those sections and the Act as a whole.
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the ratification process.
Rinfret J., contrary to the four previously mentioned judges, based his entire opinion
on the issue of the Dominion's treaty-making powers. Rinfret J., whose ratio decidendi
rested on that question, found that the Dominion could not create international obligations
dealing with subject-matters that would otherwise fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of
provinces without their consent.214 Rinfret believed that precedents established that once a
valid treaty was formed, legislative powers to implement such treaty were transferred to the
Parliament. However, if a proposed treaty was related to a provincial subject-matter, it had
214 Ibid. at511:
If the effect of the undertaking is that a subject of legislation within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the province will thereby be transferred from that
jurisdiction to the jurisdiction of the Dominion Parliament, I consider it to be
within the clear spirit of the British North America Act that the obligation
should not be created or entered into before the provinces have given their
consent thereto. In the particular case that we are now considering, it is my
humble view that such was the effect of the judgment of this Court in the
matter of the Reference of 1925 [[1925] S.C.R. 505]. ...
A civil right does not change its nature just because it becomes the
subject-matter of a convention with foreign States. It continues to be the
same civil right. When once the convention has been properly adopted and
ratified, it is, no doubt, transferred to the federal field for the enactment of
laws necessary or proper for performing the obligations arising under the
convention. That is, as I understand it, the effect of the decisions of the
Privy Council on the Aeronautics [[1932] A.C. 54] and Radio [[1932] A.c.
304] References. But before the international obligation has been properly
and competently created, the civil right under the jurisdiction of the
provinces is always the same civil right, and I cannot see where the
Dominion Parliament in the British North America Act finds the power to
appropriate it for the purpose of dealing with it internationally without
having previously secured the consent of the provinces.
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to be consented to by provinces before being validly fonned. Here, since Rinfret believed
that no such consent was given and no treaty obligation was duly created, the impugned
statutes were deemed ultra vires because there was no transfer of legislative powers from
the provinces to the Parliament on issues that fell squarely in the ambit of provincial
legislative jurisdiction.
Cannon J., took the position that the statutes fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the provinces and that the division of legislative powers could not be affected by the mere
adoption of international obligations. However, Cannon J. also added that before the
Dominion could ratify a treaty "affecting the provinces", there must be "consultations
between the federal and provincial self-governing parts of our Confederation".215 In this, he
215 Ibid. at 518-19:
The procedure recommended by the Imperial Conferences in 1926 and 1930
regarding legislation or international agreements by one of the self-
governing parts of the Empire which may affect the interests of other self-
governing parts, i.e. previous consultation between His Majesty's ministers
in the several parts concerned, should be applied by the central and
provincial governments specially before ratifying any international
agreement - not falling under Section 132 of the B.N.A. Act. The only
direct legislative authority expressly given to the Parliament and
Government of Canada concerning foreign affairs is found in this section
and is limited to the perfonnance of the obligations of Canada or any
province thereof arising under treaties between the Empire as a whole and a
foreign country. The Imperial Parliament saw to it that Imperial interests
would be protected by federal legislation. But to pass legislation - affecting
the provinces - to ratifY a treaty or agreement by Canada alone - under an
evolution which came to pass since Confederation - with a foreign power.
previous consultations between the federal and provincial sel.fgoverning
parts ofour Confederation seem to me logical and the only way to preserve
peace, order and good government in Canada and save the very roots ofthe
121
was in line with the rules adopted at the 1923 Imperial Conference and in the 1926 Balfour
declaration:
It was agreed in 1923 that any of the Governments of the Empire
contemplating the negotiation of a treaty should give due consideration to its
possible effect upon other Governments and should take steps to inform
Governments likely to be interested of its intention.
This rule should be understood as applying to any negotiations which any
Government intends to conduct, so as to leave it to the other Governments to
say whether they are likely to be interested.
When a Government has received information of the intention of any other
Government to conduct negotiations, it is incumbent upon it to indicate its
attitude with reasonable promptitude.
So long as the initiating Government receives no adverse comments and so
long as its policy involves no active obligations on the part of the other
Governments, it may proceed on the assumption that its policy is generally
acceptable. It must, however, before taking any steps which might involve
the other Governments in any active obligations, obtain their definite
assent.216
This statement helps to see why Cannon and Rinfret 11. do not necessarily hold
different opinions on the level of involvement required by provinces in the conclusion of
treaties. In effect, their positions can be reconciled. There is a distinction to be drawn
tree to which our constitution has been compared. In order to grow, if it be a
growing instrument, it must keep contact with its native soil - and draw from
the constituting provinces new force and efficiency. (Emphasis added.)
216 Balfour Declaration, supra note 66, 6-7. The term "government" is not defined and
could possibly be interpreted as applying to provincial governments. Remember that in
1923, the idea that the Dominion could conclude treaties on its own was no less a novelty
than imagining provinces doing so.
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between "laws relative to X" and "laws affecting X" in Canadian constitutional law. In the
first category, X refers to the dominant feature of the law, its "pith and substance". In the
second type of laws, X is a secondary feature of the law. So, for example, a province can
validly adopt a statute relative to "direct taxation" (s. 92 (2)) that would affect banking (s.
91 (15)).217 However, if the "pith and substance" of the provincial statute were not "direct
taxation" but banking, then the statute would be invalid.218 Thus, per Rinfret J., a treaty
relative to a subject-matter falling in the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of provinces
could only be ratified by the federal government after receiving the consent of the
provinces and, per Cannon J., a treaty affecting such provincial jurisdiction could only be
ratified by Ottawa after consultations. This was exactly the policy developed for the
relations in the Commonwealth.
From all this, it is hard to see how one can be confident in asserting that the
Supreme Court set a precedent recognizing the exclusive role of the federal executive in
treaty-making. In fact, it seems quite the contrary. What remains after the destruction by the
Privy Council of the basis of the obiter ofDuffC.J., and Davis and Kerwin 11. seems to be
(1) the ratio decidendi of Rinfret J. requiring consent of the provinces when the federal
government intends to ratify a treaty relative to a provincial subject-matter, (2) an obiter by
217 Bank of Toronto v. Lambe, (1887) 12 A.C. 575. On this point, see Peter Hogg,
Constitutional Law ofCanada: Student Edition 2002 (Toronto: Carswell, 2002) at §15.5 (a)
[Po Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2002] and Chevrette and Marx, Droit
constitutionnel, supra note 41 at 303-05.
218 Alberta (A.G.) v. Canada (A. G), [1939] A.C. 117 [Alberta Bank Taxation case].
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Cannon J. requiring consultations with the provinces before the ratification by the federal
executive of a treaty affecting a provincial subject-matter and, finally, (3) an obiter by
Crocket J. approving of Duff C.J. dictum that the federal government has the power to
conclude treaties.
3. Executive Roles in Implementing Treaties
The Privy Council stated that "performance of [the state's] obligations, if they entail
alteration of the existing domestic law, requires legislative action".219 I would note here that
with respect to the implementation stage, the executive branch can fulfill treaty obligations
of the state in such matters as national defence and diplomatic relations without legislative
action if fulfilling its obligations does not require a modification of domestic law.22o
However, legislative implementation of the treaty is necessary when (a) the treaty affects
private rights of individuals; (b) involves a modification of the common or statute law;221
219 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 347.
220 F. Rigaldies and J. Woehrling, "Le juge interne canadien et Ie droit international", supra
note 41 at 314 reported that around 1980, 296 treaties ratified by Canada did not require
any legislative action for their implementation. For a list of treaties falling within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the executive branch, see Francis v. R., [1956] S.C.R. 618 at 625ff
[Francis v. R.].
221 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 347. See also: Re Arrow and Tributaries
Slide & Boom Co., [1932] S.C.R. 495 at 510-11; Francis v. R., ibid. at 621 and 626;
Capital Cities Communications v. Canada (Canadian Radio-television and
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Telecommunications Commission), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141 at 173 [Capital Cities
Communications v. CR. TC] and Operation Dismantle v. Canada, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 455 at
484.
Joseph G. Starke, Introduction to International Law, 9th ed. (London: Butterworths,
1984) at 79, notes that there are under British law at least three exceptions to the rule that a
treaty affecting individuals' rights or involving a modification of the common or statute law
must be legislatively implemented. The first exception to the rule covers an agreement to
admit a foreign armed force and to concede certain immunities from the local jurisdiction to
its members (see Chow Hung Ching v. R., [1949] 77 C.L.R. 449). The second exception is a
treaty between Great Britain and a foreign government for the recognition of that
government. The third exception is that a peace treaty to which Great Britain is a party will
put an end to the situation under which persons carrying on business or voluntarily resident
in enemy territory are treated as enemy aliens who are not entitled to bring proceedings in
the courts without the permission of the Crown (see Porter v. Freudenberg, [1915] 1 K.B.
857 (U.K.)).
Under Canadian law, some decisions have dealt with the effect of a peace treaty, but
they were not quite conclusive. In Canada (Secretary of State) v. United States (Alien
Property Custodian), [1931] S.C.R. 168 at 198 [Canada (Secretary of State) v. United
States (Alien Property Custodian)], Duff J. writes this obiter: "The treaty it is to be
observed, being a Treaty of Peace, had the effect of law quite independently of legislation".
This proposition was referred to by Angers J. in obiter in Ritcher v. R., [1943] 3 D.L.R. 540
(Ex. Ct.) at 545. However, the Exchequer Court wrote another obiter in Bitter v. Canada
(Secretary ofState), [1943] 3 D.L.R. 482 [Bitter v. Canada], stating that Duff J. was wrong
in Canada (Secretary ofState) v. United States (Alien Property Custodian), ibid. and that as
any other treaty, a peace treaty cannot affect individuals' rights without legislation; its only
effect would be to end hostilities. R. St John MacDonald, "The Relationship Between
International Law and Domestic Law in Canada", supra note 41 at 119-121, submits that
the Bitter v. Canada, ibid., decision should be the leading authority and that the peace
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(c) requires the vesting of additional powers in the Crown; (d) imposes additional financial
obligations upon the government; or (e) involves a land cession. Of course, all this is apart
from the need for the government to secure from Parliament the necessary funds to fulfil its
obligations.
4. Section 132 Constitution Act, 1867, Only Applies to
Imperial Treaty Obligations
The Privy Council refused to apply s. 132 to the conventions at hand. In plain terms,
it concluded that the obligations in question were simply "not obligations of Canada as part
of the British Empire, but of Canada, by virtue of her new status as an international person,
and do not arise under a treaty between the British Empire and foreign countries.,,222 In
saying so, it confirmed the Radio Reference 223 ruling that s. 132 did not apply to all
international obligations that Canada or the provinces might have; the text of s. 132 limits
its applicability to obligations incurred "as part of the Empire" and "arising under Treaties
between the Empire and such Foreign Countries". Indeed, the Privy Council concludes that
treaty signed by the Crown can only end the hostilities and allow certain land cessions (a
power within the prerogative of the Crown). A middle ground solution seems desirable:
even if the content of the treaty is not directly incorporated into domestic law, some of its
effects must be recognized in the domestic legal order such as the change of status of the
belligerent State that ratifies the peace treaty. The peace treaty would thus have an impact
on the domestic law in that it is afact that modifies legal characterizations.
222 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 349.
223 Supra note 130.
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"it is impossible to strain the section so as to cover the uncontemplated event [that the
Dominion would possess treaty-making powers].,,224
The Privy Council also rejected the view that the Treaty of Versailles - to which s.
132 could be applicable - required the conventions to be implemented. No such obligation
to legislate arose until the Canadian executive decided to bind itself independently from the
Treaty ofVersailles.
5. No Treaty Powers In Section 91 of the Constitution
Act, 1867
Since s. 132 could not be counted on to justify the federal bill at issue, the Privy
Council reverted to the general division of powers regime provided at ss. 91 and 92 of the
Constitution Act, 1867. Lord Atkin noted right away that the impugned legislation would
normally fall "within the classes of subjects by s. 92 assigned exclusively to the
Legislatures of the Provinces" and that "it appears to be expressly excluded from the
general powers given by the first words" of s. 91. 225 He then referred to the 1925 Supreme
Court decision mentioned earlier and claimed that, but for the opinion of Chief Justice Duff
that the Aeronautics Reference 226 and the Radio Reference227 gave exclusive jurisdiction to
224 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 350.
225 Ibid.
226 Supra note 125.
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the Parliament of Canada to legislate for the purpose of performing the obligation of a
treaty, the Court would not have departed from its precedent.
Because the Aeronautics Reference 228 was governed by s. 132, the case was not a
relevant authority here. The crux of the decision thus resided in the interpretation that the
Privy Council would give to the Radio Reference. 229
The Privy Council read that latter case as one essentially based on the ordinary rules
of the division of powers. Radio communications did not come generally within the
enumeration of provincial powers in ss. 92 and 91, except for the express exclusion of s. 92
(10) (a) for inter-provincial telegraphs. Radio communications were thus to be regulated by
the Parliament based on s. 92 (10) (a) and the residuary powers of s. 91. The Privy Council
then not only stated that "neither case affords a warrant for holding that legislation to
perform a Canadian treaty is exclusively within the Dominion legislative power,,230 but also
that "[f]or the purposes of ss. 91 and 92, i.e., the distribution of legislative powers between
the Dominion and the Provinces, there is no such thing as treaty legislation as such.,,231 For
the purpose of the division of powers, there is no difference between legislation performing
treaty obligations and legislation adopted for any other reason; the ordinary rules governing
227 Radio Reference, supra note 130.
228 Supra note 125.
229 Radio Reference, supra note 130.
230 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 351.
231 Ibid. (emphasis added).
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the attribution of powers apply.
To better understand the Privy Council's decision, I would suggest that, taken as a
merely exegetic task, it was not easy to choose between the two alternative readings of the
Radio Reference. 232 What was the ratio? What was the obiter? The Privy Council's
hermeneutic choice is illuminated when one looks at two additional arguments it advanced
upon considering the consequences of reading the Radio Reference as recognizing plenary
treaty-performing powers.
The first argument is implicitly based on a combination of two deep-rooted
principles of constitutional law: first, a legal entity can have no greater power than its
constitutive rules provide for233 and, second, one is not allowed to do indirectly what one is
232 Radio Reference, supra note 130.
233 See for example In re The Initiative and Referendum Act, [1919] A.C. 935 [In re The
Initiative and Referendum Act] where the Privy Council decided that, although provincial
legislatures had the power to amend "from time to time, notwithstanding anything in this
Act, .. , the constitution of the Province, except as regards the office of Lieutenant-
Governor" under the old s. 92 (l), they could not amend their provincial constitutions to
transformed their legislatures by excluding the Lieutenant-Governor. The Privy Council
added (at 945):
Sect. 92 of the Act of 1867 entrusts the legislative power in a Province to its
Legislature, and to that Legislature only. No doubt a body, with a power of
legislation on the subjects entrusted to it so ample as that enjoyed by a
Provincial Legislature in Canada, could, while preserving its own capacity
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prohibited from doing directly. Thus, the Privy Council wrote that "the Dominion cannot,
merely by making promises to foreign countries, clothe itself with legislative authority
inconsistent with the constitution which gave it birth.,,234
The second argument is related to this first one but it emphasises more the practical
consequences that such interpretation would have over the general economy of the
Constitution. When Lord Atkin had questioned the Dominion on the constitutional
consequences of her position on the provinces, the Attorney General had made the
improbable claim that "[b]y the transference of the treaty-making power to the Dominion
executive, and correlative power to legislate to carry out the obligations, nothing is taken
from the Provinces.,,235 Lord Atkin, during the hearing of the case, had already seen that the
plausible consequences of that doctrine, if it were upheld, would have been quite radica1.236
intact, seek the assistance of subordinate agencies .,. but it does not follow
that it can create and endow with its own capacity a new legislative power
not created by the Act to which it owes its own existence.
The Privy Council did not make explicit reference to that case in its decision. However, as
the Privy Council reports, the Attorney General for Ontario had referred to the case in the
course of his argument. This argument was later used and elaborated upon by the Supreme
Court of Canada's opinion in the Reference Re Legislative Authority of the Parliament of
Canada in Relation to the Upper House, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 54 [Reference Re Senate Reform].
234 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 352.
235 Ibid. at 329-30.
236 Lord Atkin is reported as stating that the Dominion's argument was" ... a very far-
reaching doctrine: it means that Canada could make an agreement with any State which
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In effect, federal powers derived from the residuary clause are deemed exclusive.237
Basically, this doctrine would mean that Ottawa could simply ignore the division of powers
provided by ss. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 by concluding treaties on anything
with any other state - and nowadays, even with non-states actors238 - and thus could
completely oust provincial legislatures from their otherwise exclusive provincial sphere of
competence.
The Attorney General for Canada replied that "[t]his matter must not be looked at as
though Canada is going to look about the world to find some one with whom to make an
would seriously affect Provincial rights." (ibid. at 330).
237 Duff C.l., Davis and Kerwin JJ. were quite clear about this point when they wrote in
Labour Conventions case - SCC, supra note 135 at 489:
As the subject of agreements with foreign countries is not one of the subjects
embraced within section 92, or within any of the enumerated heads of
section 91, it follows that the authority must rest upon the residuary clause
from which Parliament derives its power to make laws for the peace, order
and good government of Canada; and it follows from what has already been
said that this power is plenary. It is for the Parliament of Canada to
determine the conditions upon which such agreements shall be entered into
as well as the manner in which they shall be performed and this may be done
by antecedent legislation or by legislation taking effect ex post facto. These
propositions are, indeed, corollaries of the proposition that the power is
plenary. (Emphasis added.)
238 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International
Organizations or between International Organizations, 21 March 1986, 25 ILM 543
[Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties between States and International Organizations
or between International Organizations].
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agreement for the purpose of robbing the Provinces of their constitutional rights.,,239
Obviously, the Attorney General for Canada had to concede that" ... logically, it must be
admitted that whatever Canada and such other country agree to do can be effected by
Canada.,,240 However, one did not have to "look about the world to find some one with
whom to make an agreement" on issues related to provincial matters. As the Labour
conventions exemplified, the nature of international agreements had been changing and
many more of them dealt with what was traditionally seen as "domestic matters". That is
surely one of the reasons why the Privy Council decided that the federal executive could
not extend Parliament's legislative powers simply by agreeing with a foreign country to
enact certain legislation. If it were otherwise, "[s]uch a result would appear to undermine
the constitutional safeguards of Provincial constitutional autonomy.,,241 As I will show in
the second part of this essay, this was prescient considering the later developments in
international law.
6. The Irrelevancy of the "National Concern" Doctrine
The Privy Council finally concluded that the impugned statutes could not be saved
by the "national concern" doctrine. The Law Lords were of the view that when Lord
239 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 330.
240 Ibid. at 330.
241 Ibid. at 352.
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Watson, in the Local Prohibition case,242 wrote his famous passage about the possibility
that "matters, in their origin local and provincial, might attain such dimensions as to affect
the body politic of the Dominion, and to justify the Canadian Parliament in passing laws for
their regulation or abolition in the interest of the Dominion",243 he never intended to
establish any principle of constitutional law. For the Privy Council, these were only
"cautious words intended to safeguard [against] possible eventualities which no one at the
time had any interest or desire to define.,,244
The Privy Council further declared that it considered the law settled on the issue in
the cases cited by the Chief Justice Duff and the principles that the latter declared in the
Reference Re Natural Products Marketing Act. 245 There, the Chief Justice declared that it is
not enough for a matter to have attained such proportions "as to affect the body politic of
242 Local Prohibition case, supra note 169.
243 Ibid. at 361 :
Their Lordships do not doubt that some matters, in their origin local and
provincial, might attain such dimensions as to affect the body politic of the
Dominion, and to justify the Canadian Parliament in passing laws for their
regulation or abolition in the interest of the Dominion. But great caution
must be observed in distinguishing between that which is local and
provincial, and therefore within the jurisdiction of the provincial legislatures,
and that which has ceased to be merely local or provincial, and has become
matter of national concern, in such sense as to bring it within the jurisdiction
of the Parliament of Canada.
244 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 353.
245 Reference Re Natural Products Marketing Act, [1936] S.C.R. 398 at 414ff [Reference
Re Natural Products Marketing Act].
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Canada" to "constitute a sufficient basis for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Dominion
Parliament".246 The presence of a general evil, present throughout Canada that "seriously
prejudiced the well being of the people of Canada as a whole" and that would be important
to suppress was not considered enough of a reason to allow for a provincial matter to
acquire a federal aspect sufficient to permit Parliament to legislate. 247 In this, the Chief
Justice had cited and followed the principles laid down in Re the Board ofCommerce Act,
1919, and the Combines and Fair Prices Act, 1919248 and Toronto Electric Commissioners
v. Snider. 249 In fact, Duff c.J. notes that Lord Watson's statement had been used only
once
250 to suggest that a matter which was prima facie of provincial jurisdiction had
acquired by exceptional circumstances aspects bringing it within the ambit of the
introductory words of s. 91.251 In fact, the Privy Council, citing previous cases, referred to
the different expressions used to suggest when such power could be justified: "abnormal
circumstances",252 "exceptional conditions",253 "standard of necessity",254 "some
246 Ibid. at 423.
247 Ibid at 422-23.
248 Re the Board of Commerce Act, 1919, and the Combines and Fair Prices Act, 1919,
[1922] 1 AC. 191 [Re the Board of Commerce Act, 1919, and the Combines and Fair
Prices Act, 1919].
249 Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925] AC. 396 [Toronto Electric
Commissioners v. Snider].
250 Fort Frances Pulp & Power Co., note 145.
251 Reference Re Natural Products Marketing Act, supra note 245 at 422.
252 Re the Board of Commerce Act, 1919, and the Combines and Fair Prices Act, 1919,
supra note 248 at 200 ("This is a principle which, although recognized in earlier decisions,
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extraordinary peril to the national life of Canada,,255 and "highly exceptional".256 Examples
of such possible situations are "war",257 "famine",258 or an "epidemic of pestilence,,?59 As
the Privy Council notes, "[t]he Chief Justice [Duff], naturally from his point of view,
excepted legislation to fulfil treaties.,,260
7. Cooperative
Compartments"
Federalism and "Watertight
To conclude, the Privy Council noted that Canada, as a whole, possessed all the
such as that of Russell v. The Queen ... , both here and in the Courts of Canada, has always
been applied with reluctance, and its recognition as relevant can be justified only after
scrutiny sufficient to render it clear that the circumstances are abnormal." (Emphasis
added.»
253 Ibid. ("It has already been observed that circumstances are conceivable, such as those of
war or famine, when the peace, order and good Government of the Dominion might be
imperiled under conditions so exceptional that they require legislation of a character in
reality beyond anything provided for by the enumerated heads in either s. 92 or s. 91 itself."
(Emphasis added».
254 Ibid.
255 Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, supra note 249 at 412.
256 Ibid.
257 Fort Frances Pulp & Power Co., note 145 (World War I).
258 Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, supra note 249 at 414.
259 Ibid. at 412.
260 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 353.
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necessary powers to legislate in performance of treaty obligations. However, such powers
were not held simply in one institution, they were distributed along the general division of
legislative powers. Thus, the famous image invoked by the Privy Council: "[w]hile the ship
of state now sails on larger ventures and into foreign waters she still retains the watertight
compartments which are an essential part of her original structure.,,261 Because each level
of government is responsible for certain issues and not others, all levels must cooperate.
I would add here that this cooperation is not only necessary for efficiency reasons, it
IS necessary because it makes it possible for the country to stay together. After all,
federalism IS a middle ground between two possible sovereignties: that of a central
Canadian state and that of the provinces. Respect for each jurisdiction is the necessary
condition for making the arrangement acceptable to all.
I will now tum to assessing a set of new approaches to understanding treaty powers
in the contemporary Canadian federation. Two main principles will guide this discussion.
The first one is methodological: my analysis will mostly focus on what is possible within
the bounds defined by current constitutional norms and their possible organic extension.
Thus, I will spend very little time on issues that would require formal constitutional
amendments. The second principle is substantive: this essay will develop treaty powers
from a federalist perspective. And by "federalist", I do not mean a form of "Canadian
sovereignism" whereby the federal government is deemed to be supreme over the provinces
261 Ibid. at 354.
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and deemed to speak for all Canadians in all circumstances. To the contrary, I will take up
the federalist idea that the federal and the provincial governments are equally legitimate
governments within their respective spheres of power because they incarnate two equally
legitimate and overlapping political communities. In this respect, I will examine what it
means for treaty powers genuinely to respect the Supreme Court's statement in the
Reference Re Secession of Quebec about the relation between the two entrenched
constitutional principles of "democracy" and "federalism":
It is, of course, true that democracy expresses the sovereign will of the
people. Yet this expression, too, must be taken in the context of the other
institutional values we have identified as pertinent to this Reference. The
relationship between democracy and federalism means, for example, that in
Canada there may be different and equally legitimate majorities in different
provinces and territories and at the federal level. No one majority is more or
less "legitimate" than the others as an expression of democratic opinion,
although, of course, the consequences will vary with the subject matter. A
federal system of government enables different provinces to pursue policies
responsive to the particular concerns and interests of people in that province.
At the same time, Canada as a whole is also a democratic community in
which citizens construct and achieve goals on a national scale through a
federal government acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. The function
of federalism is to enable citizens to participate concurrently in different
collectivities and to pursue goals at both a provincial and a federalleve1.262
I will thus start by re-examining the treaty-making powers. I will demonstrate that
there are no valid constitutional justifications for the proposition that the federal executive
has exclusive and plenary powers over treaty-making. I will also develop proposals to
increase democratic accountability in treaty-making, to ensure respect of the federal
262 Reference Re Secession ofQuebec, supra note 76 ~ 66.
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principle enshrined in the Constitution and to maintain both the flexibility and efficiency
required in today's international environment.
2. Trying to Find Our Own Path Beyond the Labour
Conventions Case: Treaty-Making in the Canadian
Federation
The federal government has been claiming for a long time that it has plenary and
exclusive treaty-making powers.263 But as we have seen earlier, neither the Privy Council
nor the Supreme Court of Canada can be said to have established in the Labour
Conventions case264 that the federal government has either plenary or exclusive jurisdiction
over treaty-making. To my knowledge, the Supreme Court of Canada has not, in any
subsequent case, explicitly establish those principles either.
Perhaps there is, however, one CUrIOUS and contradictory obiter dictum in a
concurring opinion by Justice L'Heureux-Dube and McLachlin J. (as she then was) in
Thomson v. Thomson265 that might be seen as siding with the federal government's claims.
In that opinion, Justice L'Heureux-Dube starts by contradicting the Privy Council's
decision in the Labour Conventions case (and every court and scholar ever since) by stating
263 See for example: P. Martin, Sr., Federalism and International Relations, supra note 41
at 11-16 and the letter dated February 1, 1985 from the Legal Bureau of the then
Department of External Affairs responding to a Council of Europe questionnaire (Canada,
Legal Bureau of the Department of External Affairs, Letter February 1, 1985, supra note
60).
264 See Labour Conventions case - SCC, supra note 135 and Labour Conventions case,
supra note 19.
265 Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 551 ,-r 112-114 [Thomson v. Thomson].
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that the "[f] ederal treaty-making power is found in s. 132 of the Constitution Act, 1867 ...
,,266 She then goes on to write that "[a]lthough this provision makes it clear that the treaty-
making power lies within federal jurisdiction, it has, nevertheless, been suggested that a
concurrent provincial jurisdiction for treaty-making may exist for matters within provincial
control.,,267 She nevertheless dismisses the provincial claim by quoting Peter Hogg, who
had written that "it suffices to say that the provincial claim has never been accepted by the
federal government, and the federal government does in fact exercise exclusive treaty-
making powers.,,268 This is, quite bluntly, an untenable argument for rejecting the
provincial position. First, since when does the federal government have monopoly over
deciding what is constitutional and what it is not? If the federal government had such
power, there would be no need anymore for constitutional judicial review... Second, it was
one of the main points of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Reference Re Secession of
Quebec that facts - effectivity - is not enough to make something constitutionally valid in
Canada:
A distinction must be drawn between the right of a people to act, and their
power to do so. They are not identical. A right is recognized in law: mere
physical ability is not necessarily given status as a right. The fact that an
individual or group can act in a certain way says nothing at all about the
legal status or consequences of the act. A power may be exercised even in
the absence of a right to do so, but if it is, then it is exercised without legal
foundation. Our Constitution does not address powers in this sense. On the
contrary, the Constitution is concerned only with the rights and obligations
266 Ibid. ~ 112.
267 Ibid.
268 Ibid. quoting Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3rd ed., Carswell,
Scarborough, 1992 at 283 [Po Hogg, Constitutional Law ofCanada, 1992].
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of individuals, groups and governments, and the structure of our institutions.
In our view, the alleged principle of effectivity has no constitutional or legal
status in the sense that it does not provide an ex ante explanation or
justification for an act. In essence, acceptance of a principle of effectivity
would be tantamount to accepting that the National Assembly, legislature or
government of Quebec may act without regard to the law, simply because it
asserts the power to do SO.269
Thus, to accept Justice L'Heureux-DuM's argument that it would suffice to say "that the
federal government does in fact exercise exclusive treaty-making powers,,270 in order to
establish that the federal government indeed has that exclusive constitutional power would
amount to suggesting that Quebec would indeed have the right to secede unilaterally if it
did so in fact! There is little doubt as to whether the federal government would agree with
this argument ...
At any rate, Justice L'Heureux-Dube goes on to write the ambiguous statement that
"[r]egardless of this exclusive jurisdiction, federal treaty-making power is, nonetheless,
limited by the constitutional division of powers,,271 and then hopes to support her statement
by adding that
As has long been set out in the Labour Conventions case ... :
But in a State where the Legislature does not possess absolute
authority, in a federal State where legislative authority is limited by a
constitutional document, or is divided up between different
269 Reference Re Secession ofQuebec, supra note 76,-r 106-107.
270 Which, as we will see later, is not true.
271 Thomson v. Thomson, supra note 265 ,-r 113.
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Legislatures in accordance with the classes of subject-matter
submitted for legislation, the problem is complex. The obligations
imposed by treaty may have to be performed, if at all, by several
Legislatures; and the executive have the task of obtaining the
legislative assent not of the one Parliament to whom they may be
responsible, but possibly of several Parliaments to whom they stand
. d' I' 272III no lrect re atlOn.
L'Heureux-Dube's statement has the dubious quality of being contradictory in each of its
two possible meanings. On a first reading, it makes the claim that the federal treaty-making
power is exclusive but yet limited to the division of powers. Because she later claims that
the particular treaty under consideration is relative to a provincial matter and that the
federal government nonetheless has concluded it validly, she appears to contradict her
statement that the treaty-making power is "limited by the constitutional division of
powers". On a second reading, however, she could rather be meaning that treaty-making is
an exclusive power of the federal government but that legislative implementation would be
subject to the division of powers. In other words, she would simply be conflating treaty-
making and treaty-implementing in her statement. That second reading is supported by her
later statement that "although the federal government had the necessary jurisdiction to sign
the Convention, it remains within the jurisdiction of the individual provinces to implement
the Convention.,,273 However, if that were the case, L'Heureux-DuM J. would then be
contradicting her earlier claim that treaty powers flow from s. 132 because that section
272 Ibid.
273 Ibid.,~ 114.
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explicitly gave Parliament the power to implement treaty obligations that it covered!274 In
fact, the Labour Conventions case quote that she uses was precisely written by the Privy
Council because s. 132 was not available to Parliament! Although she does well to support
the Labour Conventions case ruling on treaty-implementation, the opinion is so confused
on treaty-making that it would have been better had this obiter been omitted from
L'Heureux-DuM's opinion.
At any rate, if the Supreme Court ever intends to establish that the federal
government has plenary and exclusive treaty-making powers, it would have a very hard
time justifying it under current constitutional law. In effect, once past superficial
appearances, there is very little to support the federal government's claims that (a) it
inherited plenary powers to negotiate, sign and ratify treaties (i.e. treaty-making powers
over matters falling not only within its own legislative sphere but also on matters related to
provincial jurisdiction), and that (b) such powers are exclusive (i.e. that only the federal
government has treaty-making powers and not its provincial counterparts). In the first
section of this chapter (2.a.), I propose to focus the discussion on the claim that the federal
government inherited plenary treaty-making powers. To do so, I will first examine the
severe weaknesses of the legal arguments presented in favour of the federal claim (2.a.i.)
274 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 39 s. 132 reads: "The Parliament and Government of
Canada shall have all Powers necessary or proper for performing the Obligations of Canada
or of any Province thereof, as Part of the British Empire, towards Foreign Countries, arising
under Treaties between the Empire and such Foreign Countries."
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and then present some policy arguments against the federal government's position (2.a.ii).
The second claim - that of exclusivity - will be examined in the following section (2.b.).
There, I will show that the provinces are actively and openly involved in international
relations (2.b.i.) and that they do so in full respect of the law (2.b.ii). Finally, about the
legal soundness of the traditional federal government's claim regarding treaty-making
powers in the federation, I will present in a short section (2.c.) a way to understand the true
source of the federal power to make treaties related to provincial subject-matters.
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a. Rebutting the Case for Plenary Federal Treaty-
Making Powers
i. The Evanescent Legal Arguments in Favour of Federal
Plenary Treaty-Making Powers
Those who argue that the federal government possesses a general power to make
treaties on any substantive matter usually try to support their position with a series of
received legal arguments. Unfortunately for their claim, none of those is able to sustain
serious scrutiny in light of the current state of Canadian constitutional law. I propose to
. examine the strength of each one of those in tum.
1. The Letters Patent of 1947
Defenders of the traditional federal position on general treaty-making power first
rely on the "Letters Patent constituting the office of the Governor General",275 issued by the
King in 1947.276 Clause II of those Letters Patent authorizes the Governor General to
275 Letters Patent Constituting the Office of the Governor General of Canada, supra note
68.
276 See for example B. Laskin, "The Provinces and International Agreements", supra note
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"exercise all powers and authorities lawfully belonging to Us [the King] in respect of
Canada.,,277 On the surface, this might seem to support the idea that the federal government,
through the powers recognized to the Governor General, inherited the general prerogative
related to treaty-making. There is, however, a series of legal arguments that have struck
fatal blows to that seemingly transparent interpretation.
Gibran van Ert has highlighted that the Letters refer to powers and authorities
belonging to the King or Queen "in respect of Canada".278 Canadian constitutional law
does not simply use the expression "Canada" to refer to the entire country (federal and
provincial levels included); it also uses it when it refers exclusively to the federal entity.
For example, when s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 grants Parliament the power to
establish "any additional courts for the better administration ofthe laws ofCanada",279 it is
well-established that it only refers to federal laws as opposed to provincial laws.28o Or
40 at 108 and P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 1992, supra note 268 at 282-83
§11.2. As G. van Ert reminds us (G. van Ert, Using International Law in Canadian Courts,
supra note 41 at 75), this was also the interpretation given by the then Prime Minister,
Louis St-Laurent, of the meaning of the Letters (Canada, Hansard, House of Commons
Debates (12 February 1948) at 126 (Louis St-Laurent)).
277 Letters Patent Constituting the Office of the Governor General of Canada, supra note
68 § 2.
278 G. van Ert, Using International Law in Canadian Courts, supra note 41 at 76.
279 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 39 (emphasis added).
280 See for example: Quebec North Shore Paper Co. v. Canadian Pacific, [1977] 2 S.C.R.
1054, 1065-66; McNamara Construction (Western) Ltd. v. The Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 654
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when the now repealed s. 91 (1) of the Constitution Act, 186728 \ gave Parliament the power
over "the amendment from time to time of the Constitution of Canada,,282 (except for
certain expressly mentioned matters), the Supreme Court wrote in the Reference Re Senate
Reform that
the word "Canada" as used in s. 91(1) does not refer to Canada as a
geographical unit but refers to the juristic federal unit. "Constitution of
Canada" does not mean the whole of the British North America Act, but
means the constitution of the federal government, as distinct from the
. . 1 283prOVInCIa governments.
Thus, the mere use of the word "Canada" in the Letters is far from determinative as to
whether the document was meant to transfer all powers and authorities to the Governor
General in respect of Canada as a whole or simply those powers and authorities with
respect to the federal government.
As we have known since at least 1882, Crown prerogatives have been vested in both
the federal government and the provinces.284 No one seriously argues that the Letters Patent
[McNamara Construction (Western) Ltd.]; Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note
109,-r 7.
28\ That section was added to the then British North America Act in 1949 by British North
America (No.2) Act, 1949 (U.K.), 13 Geo. VI, c. 81. That subsection was repealed by the
schedule to the Constitution Act, 1982, item 1 and replaced by s. 4 (2) and by provisions
found in Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 70.
282 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 39 (emphasis added).
283 Reference Re Senate Reform, supra note 233 at 69-70.
284 Liquidators of the Maritime Bank, supra note 23. See also Canada (A.G.) v. Ontario
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were meant to transfer any powers and authorities from the Lieutenant Governor to the
Governor General. It would indeed appear far-fetched to claim that the Governor General
inherited all the provincial prerogatives by virtue of the Letters, simply because those
prerogatives were the King's to start with. Thus, as van Ert argues, "in respect of Canada"
must be read "to exclude those powers and authorities lawfully belonging to the sovereign
. if h . " 285In respect 0 t e provinces .
This has two consequences: first, insofar as provinces have acquired by any means
powers to make international agreements, the Letters Patent did not affect such powers in
any way. This would go against the federal exclusivity claim, to which I will tum in the
next section. But the second consequence here is that, if the words "in respect of Canada"
have to be read as "in respect of the federal government", then the Letters Patent add
nothing to the argument. In effect, thus read, it simply says that the King transferred his
authorities and powers in respect to the federal government to the Governor General, but it
does not establish that such powers and authorities include the plenary powers to make
treaties. In other words, this sends us back to the initial problem that the Letters were
supposed to help us solve: we still have to find what those powers, as opposed to those of
the provinces, really are.
(A.G.), [1894] 23 S.C.R. 458 [Canada v. Ontario (power ofpardon)] (prerogative of power
of pardon divided between the federal and the provincial governments).
285 G. van Ert, Using International Law in Canadian Courts, supra note 41 at 76.
148
Besides, Canada started making treaties on her own well before 1947. If it were the
Letters Patent that had granted the federal government the power to make treaties, then we
could not justify the validity of those treaties concluded by the Canadian government
(without ratification by King Edward VIII or Georges VI) prior to 1947. This would mean,
for example, that Canada would not have validly ratified the Charter of the United
Nations!286 If such treaties are constitutionally valid - in spite of not having been concluded
formally by the Monarch of the day - it means that the authority to make them did not
come from the Letters Patent. One has to find another source for the federal government's
treaty-making power. Thus, the Letters are not instructive in any way for the purpose of
deciding whether the federal government has plenary power to make treaties.
What has been said so far must not be read as suggesting that the Letters Patent
were simply declaratory with regards to treaty- making in all its aspects. There is one thing
over which we could imagine that the Letters Patent operated a real transfer of power in
relation to treaty-making, and that is in relation to what we call "Head of State" treaties.
"Head of State" treaties are highly formal treaties that are concluded by the Monarch him
or herself: they are treaties upon which the Head of the state him or herself puts his or her
seal. Peace agreements are characteristic of such treaties. This form of treaty was developed
at a time when treaties were assumed to create personal obligations between monarchs. As
personal obligations of monarchs were progressively replaced by obligations of states in a
286 Charter ofthe United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No.7 (ratified 9 November
1945).
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modernizing world, the fonnality involved with "Head of State" treaties became largely
unnecessary, if not burdensome, in the modem regulatory state. After all, treaties in the
modem world are not simply concerned with "inter-state" matters but are part of the
general tools of domestic governance. Thus, "Head of State" treaties were gradually
replaced by "intergovernmental treaties". The latter treaties are much less fonnal in
character and are concluded by members of governments following a general or specific
delegation of powers. That being said, before the Letters Patent, a good argument could
have been made that the Governor General did not possess the capacity to conclude "Head
of State" treaties because the Governor General lacked the necessary prerogative to truly
act as the Head of the state. However, we must note that this type of treaty has become so
rare at international law that it apparently has not been used once by Canada since the
Letters Patent were given to the Governor Genera1.287 What this discussion shows as a
general point is that, under Canadian constitutional law, the representative of the Crown,
even without the full attributes of the Head of the state, can authorise the government to
conclude treaties with foreign powers.288 More importantly, what it further demonstrates is
287 P. Hogg, Constitutional Law ofCanada, 1992, supra note 268 at 283 ~ 11.3.
288 See, for example, Labour Conventions case - SCC, supra note 135 at 476, where Duff
C.J. writes:
The Conference of 1926 categorically recognizes treaties in the fonn of
agreements between governments in which His Majesty does not formally
appear, and in respect of which there has been no Royal intervention. It is
the practice of the Dominion to conclude with foreign countries agreements
in such form, and agreements even of a still more infonnal character -
merely by an exchange of notes. (Emphasis added.)
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that any transfer of powers in the Letters Patent did not affect provincial matters; it was
simply a vertical transfer of powers from the King (or Queen) to the Governor General with
respect to federal matters.
2. The Prerogatives of the Crown
If the treaty-making powers of the federal government do not have a textual basis in
the Constitution nor do they come from the Patent Letters of 1947, it seems that they could
only flow, as in the United Kingdom, from the Crown's prerogatives.289
Crown prerogatives can only be understood when seen in light of the historical
development of state powers in the United Kingdom. The theory behind prerogatives is that
the King possesses all powers, privileges and immunities except those that the "King in
Parliament" has devolved to others. Therefore, since at least Albert Venn Dicey, royal
prerogatives are understood to be "the residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority, which
at any given time is left in the hands of the Crown".290 So the logic is one of Crown
diminishment of powers rather than one of Crown acquisition of powers. In other words,
289 We will explain in the next argument why those powers cannot flow from
"constitutional usage" or "constitutional conventions".
290AIbert V. Dicey, An Introduction to the Study ofthe Law ofthe Constitution (1885), 10th
ed. by E.C.S. Wade, (London (U.K.): Macmillan, 1965) at 424. See Reference re Effect of
Exercise ofRoyal Prerogative ofMercy Upon Deportation Proceedings, [1933] S.C.R. 269
at 272-73, and United Kingdom (A.-G.) v. DeKeyser's Royal Hotel, [1920] A.c. 508 at 526.
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the concept of Crown prerogative is antithetical with the idea that the Crown could acquire
prerogatives: either the Crown possesses a particular prerogative as it always has, or else it
has lost it by devolution.
This poses, at first sight, a hurdle in our understanding of the federal government
gradually acquiring treaty-making powers. In effect, how could the federal government
have acquired treaty-making power through gradually acquiring prerogative powers if such
powers are not subject to acquisition? It is one thing to say that the Crown possessed the
prerogative of first creditor,291 as of th~ moment when it was established, and it is another
to claim that it acquired that prerogative at some later point in time. And here, no one
claims that the federal government possessed plenary treaty-making powers right from the
start.
The answer to this problem is to be found in the fact that while prerogatives cannot
be created or acquired, the nature of the Crown itself changed over time.292 While the
Crown was initially understood to be "one and indivisible",293 this constitutional doctrine
291 See Liquidators ofthe Maritime Bank. supra note 23.
292 In writing this part about the transformation of the institution of the Crown, I benefited
greatly from Professor Andrew Heard's research presented in a 1990 text entitled
"Canada's Independence" that can be found on his website at the Simon Fraser University
at: http://www.sfu.cal~aheard/3 24/Independence.html.
293 See for example, Augustus H.F. Lefroy, A Short Treatise on Canadian Constitutional
Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1918) at 59-60: "The Crown is to be considered as one and
152
was slowly transformed. This was made necessary by several constitutional developments
that came with the Empire. We can discern two general stages in the transformation of the
unitary principle of the Crown. The first transformation involved the idea that while the
Crown might be one, it might have multiple instantiations. This transformation was made
necessary to make sense of litigations between two or more colonial governments caused,
for example, by the federal structures of Canada and Australia.294 At that stage, each avatar
of the Crown possessed both a distinct legal personality and the Crown prerogatives
necessary for their functioning295 (the Imperial prerogatives not being among those). This is
much like the idea of the Holy Trinity according to which there is "One God in Three
Persons,,296: the Crown is one but it is composed of many persons, each with their
indivisible throughout the Empire; and cannot be severed into as many kingships as there
are Dominions, and self-governing colonies."
294 See William H.P. Clement, The Law of the Canadian Constitution, 3rd. ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 1916) at 14-15.
295 See for example: Liquidators of the Maritime Bank, supra note 23 (prerogative of first
creditor possessed by both the Crown in right of Canada and the Crown in right of the
province); R. v. Gauthier, [1918] 56 S.C.R. 176 (provincial legislation can only bind the
federal Crown "by express terms or necessary intendment"); Quebec (A.-G.) v. Canada (A.-
G.), [1932] A.C. 524, (sub nom. In re Silver Bros. Ltd.) at 524 (revenues and properties of
the Crown in right of the Dominion and the Crown in right of the province are separate:
"There are two purses.").
296 As Carl Schmitt highlighted, many of our legal and political concepts have their roots in
theological concepts. He wrote, for example (Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, supra note
146 at 36):
All significant concepts of the modem theory of the state are secularized
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competences. The second type of transformation built on the first one and consisted in the
gradual thinning of the Imperial Crown in favour of the colonial Crowns. This happened
when the different Imperial prerogatives gradually started to be exercised by the colonial
Crowns and when the remaining Imperial Crown started acting only on the advice of the
governments concerned by such prerogatives.297 These two types of transformations
resulted in the fact that the Imperial Crown was stretched so thin that it was effectively
divided among the different governments.298 Thus, in this story, the prerogatives are not
theological concepts not only because of their historical development - in
which they were transferred from theology to the theory of the state,
whereby, for example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver
- but also because of their systematic structure, the recognition of which is
necessary for a sociological consideration of these concepts.
297 The Report of the 1926 Imperial Conference stated that Dominions "are autonomous
Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to
another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common
allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of
Nations" (Balfour Declaration, supra note 66.) That conference also laid down the basis for
the convention according to which the Crown seeks the authorization of the Dominion
before the Parliament can authorize the changes to the Royal Style and Titles. That
convention would later be recognized in the second paragraph of the preamble of the
Statute ~rWestminster, supra note 67. Following that Imperial Conference, the principle of
equality of status was pushed further to establish that only the Dominions had the right to
advise the Crown on matters related to themselves.
298 The abdication of King Edward VIII in 1936 further gave the opportunity to illustrate
the divisible nature of the Crown, at least in respect of the Irish Free State and South
Africa. Both the Irish Free State and South Africa adopted acts declaring that the abdication
took effect on different dates than the one stated in the British Parliament's act. When the
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British government, in 1937, informed the Dominion governments that it intended to
introduce in Parliament a bill to provide for a regent in case of the monarch's incapacity,
Dominions took the same position as they did during a 1935 conference: they did not feel
the need for it since they already had Governor Generals whom they thought could perform
royal tasks during the incapacitation of the monarch (see A. Berriedale Keith, "Notes on
Imperial Constitutional Law" (1937) 19 J.C.L. & I.L 264 at 265 and James R. Mallory, The
Structure of Canadian Government, 2nd. ed. (Toronto: Gage, 1984) at 36-37.) Thus, the
Dominions were not included in the bills adopted by the British Parliament over the issue in
1937, 1943 and 1953 and, therefore, according to s. 4 of the Statute of Westminster, supra
note 67, they were not affected by such legislation (see William P.M. Kennedy, "The
Regency Acts, 1837-53" (1953-54) 10 U.T.LJ. 248). In 1952, at a meeting of
Commonwealth governments, it was decided that "it would be in accord with established
constitutional position that each member country should use for its own purposes a form of
title which suits its own particular circumstances but retains a substantial element which is
common to all" (Canada, Office of the Prime Minister, Press Release, (12 December,
1952), online: Canada, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Documents on
Canadian International Relations, vol. 18, c.1, part 2, doc. 4 <http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.caldepartmentihistory/dcer/details-en.asp?intRefid=3500>. Also cited in Kenneth
C. Wheare, "The Nature and Structure of the Commonwealth" (1953) 47 American
Political Science Review 1016 at 1021). In the following months, the federal Parliament
adopted An Act Respecting The Royal Style and Titles, S.C. 1952-53, c.9 in which it used
the following formulation to refer to the Monarch: "Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of
God of the United Kingdom, Canada and Her other Realms and Territories Queen, Head of
the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith." (See William P.M. Kennedy, "The Royal Style
and Titles" (1953-54) 10 U.T.L.J. 83. The current statute is entitled the Royal Style and
Titles Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. R-12). The historian Nicholas Mansergh noted in 1953 that with
the "several - to be exact seven - Royal Titles describing in formal language the
relationship to the Crown of the seven member nations of the Commonwealth which are
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monarchies", "[t]he once heretical doctrine of the divisibility of the Crown was thus
embedded in the new orthodoxy". (Nicholas Mansergh, "The Commonwealth at the
Queen's Accession" (1953) 29 International Affairs 277 at 280). However, it must be noted
that Mr. Saint-Laurent, then Prime Minister, stated during the debate over the adoption of
the Canadian Act Respecting Royal Style and Titles that
Her Majesty is now the Queen of Canada but she is the Queen of Canada
because she is Queen of the United Kingdom and because the people of
Canada are happy to recognize as their sovereign the person who is the
sovereign of the United Kingdom. It is not a separate office. ... [I]t is the
sovereign who is recognized as the sovereign of the United Kingdom who is
our sovereign. '" (House ofCommons Debates, No. 95 (3 February 1953) at
1566)
In 1973, Australia chose to withdraw any reference to the United Kingdom in her change of
the formulation of the monarch for Australia and adopted the following one: "Elizabeth the
Second, by the Grace of God Queen of Australia and Her other Realms and Territories,
Head of the Commonwealth" (Royal Style and Titles Act 1973 (Cth.), Sch.). If there were
any remaining doubts about the complete separation of the Canadian Crown from the
British one in 1953, the separation was completed before the patriation of the Canadian
constitution. In R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte
Indian Association ofAlberta et aI., [1982] All E.R. 118 at 127-28 (C.A.) (leave to appeal
refused by the House of Lords (R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs, ex parte Indian Association of Alberta et aI., [1982] 2 All E.R. 140 (H.L.)) for
reasons that confirm the rightness of the substantive decision of the Court of Appeal), Lord
Denning even wrote that:
The Crown became separate and divisible, according to the particular
territory in which it was sovereign. This was recognised by the Imperial
Conference of 1926. ... henceforth the Crown was no longer single and
indivisible. It was separate and divisible for each self-governing Dominion
or province or territory.
Based on this opinion, he denied that the British Crown was responsible to Aboriginals for
duties owed to them by the Crown; the Canadian Crown did. It might be noted, however,
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gradually devolved to colonial governments, it is the Crown itself that was gradually
dislocated and with the dislocation of the Crown came the dislocation of the Crown's
prerogatives.
Those who argue that the federal Crown inherited the entire treaty-making
prerogatives only focus on the second type of Crown transformation, while forgetting about
the initial transformation that laid down the conditions of possibility for the second one to
occur. Thus, we have to examine how the prerogatives were to be divided within
federations to see if it is possible that the federal Crown might have inherited plenary
treaty-making powers.
It is well established that in Canada, at least since the Privy Council's decision in
1892 in Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada, that Crown prerogatives parallel
legislative powers and are determined by the latter.299 For example, the Privy Council,
that because of s. 41 (a) of the Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 70 the federal Parliament
might not be able to take the expression "United Kingdom" out of the Royal Style and
Titles of the Canadian monarch without unanimous consent of the provinces.
299 Liquidators of the Maritime Bank, supra note 23 (prerogative of preferred creditor and
of appropriation, more generally). See also Canada v. Ontario (power ofpardon), supra
note 284 (prerogative power of pardon for provincial offences); Bonanza Creek Gold
Mining Co., supra note 23 at 580 (power of incorporation) ("The distribution under the new
grant of executive authority in substance follows the distribution under the new grant of
legislative powers. In relation, for example, to the incorporation of companies in Ontario
with provincial objects, the powers of incorporation which the Governor-General or
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referring to the new distribution of powers that came with the Constitution Act, 1867, wrote
in 1916 in Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Co. that "[t]he distribution under the new grant of
executive authority in substance follows the distribution under the new grant of legislative
powers.,,300 In 1962, Justice Kerwin, writing for the majority of the Court in British
Columbia Power Corporation v. British Columbia Electric Company stated that
[i]n a federal system, where legislative authority is divided, as are also the
prerogatives ofthe Crown, as between the Dominion and the Provinces, it is
my view that it is not open to the Crown, either in right of Canada or ofa
Province, to claim a Crown immunity based upon an interest in certain
property, where its very interest in that property depends completely and
solely on the validity of the legislation which it has itself passed, if there is a
reasonable doubt as to whether such legislation is constitutionally valid.301
This dictum was later cited with approval in three unanimous Supreme Court decisions: in
Lieutenant-Governor possessed before the Union must be taken to have passed to the
Lieutenant-Governor of Ontario, so far as concerns companies with this class of objects");
Reference re Adoption Act (Ontario), [1938] S.C.R. 398 (provincial prerogative to appoint
judges, magistrates and justices of the peace); Canada v. Carroll, [1948] S.C.R. 126
[Canada v. Carroll] (the Lieutenant-Governor incarnates the Government of the province
for which s/he is appointed and it is not an office of the Governor General in Council). The
issue of Crown property and appropriation is a complex one in the Canadian federation. See
in general F. Chevrette and H. Marx, Droit constitutionnel, supra note 41 at 1105-21 and
Franyois Chevrette, "Dominium et imperium: I'Etat proprietaire et I'Etat puissance publique
en droit constitutionnel canadien" in Benoit Moore, ed., Melanges Jean Pineau (Montreal,
Editions Themis, 2003) 665.
300 Ibid. at 580.
301 British Columbia Power Corporation v. British Columbia Electric Company, [1962]
S.C.R. 642 at 644 (emphasis added).
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Amax Potash Ltd. v. Saskatchewan302 in 1977, in Canada (A. -G.) v. Law Society ofBritish
Columbia303 in 1982 and in Air Canada v. British Columbia (A._G./ 04 in 1986. Chief
Justice Laskin, together with Martland, Judson, Ritchie, Pigeon, Dickson and Beetz 11.
recognized in 1978 in Alberta v. Canada (Transport Commission) that "[t]he Constitution
of Canada distributes legislative power between a central Parliament and provincial
Legislatures and prerogative or executive power (which is formally vested in the Queen) is
similarly distributed to accord with the distribution of legislative power, thus pointing to
different, executive authorities.,,305 Chief Justice Dickson also wrote, in a concurring
opinion in 1990 in Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band, that "[d]ivisibility of the Crown
recognizes the fact of a division of legislative power and a parallel division of executive
power. If a principle so basic needed the confirmation of high judicial authority, it can be
found as far back as the Privy Council decision in Maritime Bank ofCanada (Liquidators
oj) v. Receiver-General ofNew Brunswick, [1892] A.C. 437 ... ,,306 More recently, in the
Reference Re Secession of Quebec,307 a unanimous Supreme Court referred with approval
to the section of the Liquidators ofthe Maritime Bank decision that established that Crown
prerogatives follow legislative powers.308
302 Amax Potash v. Saskatchewan, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 576.
303 Canada (A.-G.) v. Law Society ofBritish Columbia, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307.
304 Air Canada v. British Columbia (A.-G.), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 539.
305 Alberta v. Canada (Transport Commission), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 61 at 71 (emphasis added).
306 Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85 ~ 23.
307 Reference Re Secession ofQuebec, supra note 76 ~ 56.
308 The principles of Liquidators of the Maritime Bank, supra note 23 have also been
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The divisibility of prerogative powers along the same lines as the legislative powers
was well accepted by provinces that were arguing against the validity of the labour
conventions statutes as well as Duff C.J., Davis and Kerwin JJ. who thought that the
impugned statutes were valid in their Supreme Court decision.309 This is also the argument
that the Quebec government has put forward since the mid-1960s. 31 0
The notion of divisibility of prerogative powers means here that so long as no
plenary legislative power to implement treaties is recognized to Parliament, the federal
Crown can have no equivalent plenary prerogative to make treaties. As Bonanza Creek
Gold Mining Co. taught us, it is the executive prerogatives that flow from the legislative
powers and not the other way around.311 This is important to keep in mind in order to spot
unanimously approved in Patriation Reference, supra note 95 (majority and dissent).
309 See supra note 155ff. and accompanying text.
310 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. See also Anne-Marie Jacomy-Millette,
L'introduction et l'application des traites internationaux au Canada (Paris: Librairie
generale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1971). An English version of that book also exists:
Anne-Marie Jacomy-Millette, Treaty Law in Canada, supra note 41.
311 See also supra note 23 and accompanying text. That is why Gerald Morris (G.R. Morris,
"The Treaty-Making Power: A Canadian Dilemma", supra note 22 at 490) and Ivan C.
Rand (I.e. Rand, "Some Aspects of Canadian Constitutionalism", supra note 41) were
wrong when they argued that if the power of implementation logically involves the power
to negotiate treaties, as Mr. Gerin-Lajoie claimed, then the reverse proposition would be
equally true. The rule is that the prerogatives follow the legislative powers but it does not
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the circularity of certain types of arguments in favour of federal plenary treaty-making
powers: When the issue is that of who possesses treaty-making powers, proponents of the
federal government thesis often rely on an argument which is based in turn on their own
views of the division of legislative powers. However, when the issue comes up as to the
extent of the federal powers to legislatively implement treaties, proponents of the federal
thesis will often argue that since the Canadian government now possess the power to make
treaties with foreign countries, it would follow that it should also have the power to enforce
these treaties by appropriate legislation!312
I will examine in detail in Chapter 3 why Parliament does not and should not have
general powers to implement treaties in relation to what is now provinces' exclusive
legislative jurisdiction. However, it is worth making a few general remarks right away on
this issue.
First, it has been argued against the Labour Conventions case that the "present
interpretation of the Canadian constitution restricts the powers of the Federation far more
narrowly than they were ever restricted in the contemplation of Sir John Macdonald and the
necessarily mean that some executive powers could not come from other sources. This
point will be further discussed in section 2.c.
312 See A.B. Keith, "The Privy Council Decisions: A Comment from Great Britain", supra
note 112 at 430.
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other fathers of the federation".313 This argument should be moved out of our way quickly
by simply pointing out that, as many others have mentioned before, the "Fathers" did not
contemplate either that Canada would, one day, make treaties on her own. This goes to
show that whatever the "Fathers" had in mind in relation to the division of powers, the
current rules dealing with Canadian treaty-making cannot contradict their non-existing
views on that issue.
The second point that I want to make here is related to the arguments sometimes
advanced that since treaties are, by nature, "international", they cannot be about matters
that are "local or private",314 thus, they cannot be provincial matters. If they cannot be
provincial, they must then be federal. 315 Again, more will be said about extraterritoriality
and legislative powers later but it is worth making a few comments on executive powers
313 Ibid. at 429.
314 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 39 s. 92 (16) grants legislative powers to provinces
over "[G]enerally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province." Many
heads of provincial legislative powers refer to intraprovincial matters. For example, s. 92
(13) provides for provincial legislative powers over "Property and Civil Rights in the
Province".
315 See V.C. MacDonald, "The Canadian Constitution Seventy Years Later", supra note
112 at 419; B. Laskin, "The Provinces and International Agreements", supra note 40 at
106-108; R. J. Delisle, "Treaty-Making Power in Canada" in Ontario, Ontario Advisory
Committee on Confederation, Background Papers and Reports, vol. 1 (Toronto: Queen's
Printer, 1967) 115 at 132 [R. J. Delisle, "Treaty-Making Power in Canada"]; G.R. Morris,
"The Treaty-Making Power: A Canadian Dilemma", supra note 22 at 485.
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here. Vincent C. Macdonald, for example, thought that it was "absurd to say that a matter
which has become the subject of international agreement can yet be considered a matter of
a "private and local nature." ,,316 But it is certainly mistaken, as van Ert points out, "to
assume that the content of treaty obligations cannot be local or private. States today
conclude treaties that have as much to do with their own internal affairs as they do with
international affairs.,,317 Also, as Lome Giroux suggested, extraterritoriality refers to the
power of Parliament to make laws in relation to a matter or a person outside Canada's
borders: "It is different in the case of an international treaty or agreement, because what is
involved is an act of will that does not imply any extension of the executive power outside
the borders, since it produces its effects on the very territory ofthe signatory party. ,,3 18
316 V.C. MacDonald, "The Canadian Constitution Seventy Years Later", ibid. at 419.
Similar arguments were presented by B. Laskin, "The Provinces and International
Agreements", supra note 40 at 106; R. J. Delisle, "Treaty-Making Power in Canada", ibid.
at 132 and G.R. Morris, "The Treaty-Making Power: A Canadian Dilemma", ibid. at 485.
317 Gibran van Ert, "The legal character of provincial agreements with foreign
governments" (2001) 24 C. de D. 1093 at p. 1108 [G. van Ert, "The legal character of
provincial agreements with foreign governments"]. It is interesting to note that V.C.
MacDonald, "The Canadian Constitution Seventy Years Later", ibid. at 418, had also
recognized in 1937 that "[i]t is precisely in relation to matters within provincial competence
.. , that treaties have been and will be particularly desirable, e.g., social security and
industrial control legislation."
318 My translation. L. Giroux, "La capacite internationale des prOVInces en droit
constitutionnel canadien", supra note 23 at 266.
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3. Constitutional Conventions and Constitutional Usage
When faced with the fact that constitutional law does not support convincingly
Ottawa's argument, some thought that they could find support for their position in
constitutional usages or conventions. Duff C.l., for example, in the Labour Conventions
case - SCC claimed that:
As a rule, the crystallization of constitutional usage into a rule of
constitutional law to which the Courts will give effect is a slow process
extending over a long period of time; but the Great War accelerated the pace
of development in the region with which we are concerned, and it would
seem that the usages to which I have referred, the practice, that is to say,
under which Great Britain and the Dominions enter into agreements with
foreign countries in the form of agreements between governments and of a
still more informal character, must be recognized by the Courts as having the
force oflaw.319
Or, to take another example, Gerald Morris argued that
... [i]t is perhaps appropriate to attach less importance to any debate over
the precise source of the federal treaty-making power than to the fact that the
exclusive federal power to sign and ratify treaties has gone virtually without
serious challenge, either domestically or internationally, from the time
Canada assumed substantial treaty-making power until the past several
years. 320
However, this statement by Morris is not true. As we have seen in the Labour Conventions
case,321 Ontario and New Brunswick explicitly challenged the federal government's claim.
Quebec has also long protested this situation. As Minister Paul Gerin-Lajoie said in his
319 Labour Conventions case - SCC, supra note 135 at 477.
320 G.R. Morris, "The Treaty-Making Power: A Canadian Dilemma", supra note 22 at 484.
321 Supra note 19.
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address pronounced on April 12, 1965 in Montreal, before the Consular Corps:
II fut un temps oil I'exercice exclusif par Ottawa des competences
internationales n'etait guere prejudiciable aux inten~ts des Etats federes
puisque Ie domaine des relations internationales etait assez bien delimite ...
Mais de nos jours, il n'en est plus ainsi. Les rapports interetatiques
concernent tous les aspects de la vie sociale.322
Quebec thus opposed the federal claim from at least the 1960s on. Despite recognizing
Q 'b' . b" 323 G'b Eue ec s persIstent 0 ~ectlOn, I ran van rt, wrote:
As a matter of pure constitutional law, the Quebec argument seems a winner.
Yet the question of provincial treaty-making is not one of pure constitutional
law, for it also involves constitutional practice and international recognition.
It is here that the Quebec position breaks down. Canadian practice in treaty-
making points clearly towards an undivided federal treaty power, in spite of
Quebec's persistent objections.324
The author then goes on to try to find a possible power source in the "crystallization of
constitutional usage" for a general and exclusive federal treaty-making power because:
Only the 'crystallization of constitutional usage' argument offers any means
of reconciling Quebec's seemingly sound statement of the law, founded on
Maritime Bank, with the blunt reality that the federal claim is accepted by
most provinces and recognized by international practice.325
However, in an apparent reversal of position, van Ert ends up concluding that in his view
"Quebec's persistent objection has the effect of precluding the development of any
322 PIG" L" D· diG' d I I dau erm- aJOIe, lscours e Pau erin-Lajoie evant e corps consu aire e
Montreal, supra note 6.
323 G. van Ert, Using International Law in Canadian Courts, supra note 41 at 79.
324 Ibid. at 87.
325 Ibid. at 88. We will come back to the issue of the international practice in the next
argument.
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unwritten constitutional law in favour of exclusively federal treaty-making power".326 Thus,
"the blunt reality that the federal claim is accepted by most provinces and recognized by
international practice" would cut no ice at Canadian constitutional law. Even if he ends up
rejecting it, I propose to examine more closely the "crystallization" argument presented by
Gibran van Ert. The reason for doing so is that there are much stronger arguments to
oppose the "crystallization" argument than those found in van Ert's analysis.
As we know, constitutional conventions are rules - written or not - that: (a) govern
the functioning of political institutions; (b) are perceived as mandatory (by actors involved
in the institutions) because of their raison d'etre, their pertinence or their antiquity; (c)
serve to complete (or sometimes contradict) the formal legal constitution; and (d) may be
determined to exist by the Courts but will never be enforced by the latter. Gibran does well
to remind his readers that the first objection to the "crystallization" argument is that the
theory of the crystallization of a constitutional convention into constitutional law has been
clearly rejected by the Supreme Court in the Patriation Reference. 327 In the Patriation
Reference, the majority ofthe Court writes in very clear terms:
No instance of an explicit recognition of a convention as having matured
into a rule of law was produced. The very nature of a convention, as political
in inception and as depending on a consistent course of political recognition
by those for whose benefit and to whose detriment (if any) the convention
developed over a considerable period of time is inconsistent with its legal
enforcement.
326 Ibid. at 92.
327 Patriation Reference, supra note 95.
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The attempted assimilation of the growth of a convention to the growth of
the common law is misconceived. The latter is the product of judicial effort,
based on justiciable issues which have attained legal formulation and are
subject to modification and even reversal by the courts which gave them
birth when acting within their role in the state in obedience to statutes or
constitutional directives. No such parental role is played by the courts with
respect to conventions.328
Moreover, in that case the Court considered specifically the statement by Duff C.l.
reproduced above at page 163 and concluded that, at best, what that statement could refer to
was the" ... evolution which is characteristic of customary internationallaw,,329 but that it
could not describe the domestic constitution-making process. The Court writes: "There is
nothing in the other judgments delivered in the Labour Conventions case, either in the
Supreme Court or in the Privy Council that takes the matter there beyond its international
law setting or lends credence to the crystallization proposition urged by counsel for the
Attorney General of Manitoba ... ,,330
More importantly, I must add that even if the "crystallization of convention"
argument had been accepted, the argument would still fail because for crystallization to
happen, a convention must first exist. Referring to the majority's views in Patriation
Reference,331 a unanimous Supreme Court wrote in the Quebec Veto Reference332 that "the
328 Ibid at 774-75.
329 Ibid at 778.
330 Ibid. at 779.
331 Ibid. at 888.
332 Reference re Objection by Quebec to a Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1982] 2
S.C.R. 793 [Quebec Veto Reference].
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majority opinion held that precedents and usage did not suffice to establish a convention,
that they had to be normative and be founded on acceptance by the actors in the
precedents.,,333 In the Quebec Veto Reference this meant that while the Supreme Court
recognized that precedents clearly pointed in the direction of unanimity for any amendment
affecting provinces' legislative competence, no such convention had developed because, as
the majority had said in the Patriation Reference, "it does not appear that all the actors in
the precedents have accepted the unanimity rule as a binding one.,,334 Concerning the issue
of treaty-making powers, therefore, it would be clear that Quebec's persistent objection is
sufficient to declare that no constitutional convention recognizing a federal plenary treaty-
making power exists.
The argument developed by van·· Ert, however, relies on the distinction between
"constitutional conventions" and "constitutional usage". He is certainly right in pointing
out that a constitutional usage "is one which is constitutional in nature (meaning that it
333 Ibid. at 807 (emphasis added).
334 Ibid at 904 (emphasis added) cited by a unanimous Court in the Quebec Veto Reference,
supra note 332 at 808. The Supreme Court also cites in Quebec Veto Reference, ibid., the
Patriation Reference, ibid. at 894 and 901: "Indeed, if the precedents stood alone, it might
be argued that unanimity is required." and "It seems clear that while the precedents taken
alone point at unanimity, the unanimity principle cannot be said to have been accepted by
all the actors in the precedents". The unanimous Supreme Court then concludes (Quebec
Veto Reference, ibid.): "It necessarily follows that, in the opinion of the majority, one
essential requirement for establishing a conventional rule of unanimity was missing. This
requirement was acceptance by all the actors in the precedents." (Emphasis added).
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concerns the basic operation of government) but which lacks the obligatoriness that renders
its breach 'unconstitutional in the conventional sense",.335 But then, however, he believes
that while the Supreme Court rejected the crystallization argument for conventions, it did
not necessarily do so for constitutional usage.336 This is unconvincing. In general terms, if
the Supreme Court rejected the crystallization argument for conventions, it must a fortiori
have rejected the argument for usages.
More concretely, what van Ert seems to forget to mention is that a constitutional
usage is just that, a usage, a regularity of practice and not a rule.337 When a usage begins to
be perceived by those who are involved as no longer being a mere regularity, it may tum
into a constitutional convention if the practice becomes internalised by the actors as being
obligatory.338 It would therefore appear most surprising that a convention - which has an
obligatory nature - cannot crystallize into a constitutional law, whereas a mere usage - with
335 G. van Ert, Using International Law in Canadian Courts, supra note 41 at 90.
336 Ibid. at 89-92.
337 See, for example, P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 1992, supra note 268 at ~
1.1 O(c): "Conventions are often distinguished from "usages": a convention is a rule which
is regarded as obligatory by the officials to whom it applies; a usage is not a rule, but
merely a governmental practice which is ordinarily followed, although is not regarded as
obligatory" (emphasis added.)
338 Herbert L.A. Hart famously distinguished between the mere regularity of behaviour and
the rule-guided behaviour in Herbert L.A. Hart, The Concept ofLaw, 2nd ed. with postscript
by Jospeh Raz and Penelope A. Bulloch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) [H.L.A.
Hart, The Concept ofLaw] at 9-11 and 55-60.
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no obligatory nature whatsoever - could crystallize into something that would not only
have an obligatory nature but also a legal constitutional value. If the step from
constitutional convention to law was a long one, it is even longer from usage to law.
It seems that the reason why van Ert makes a wrong tum at this point of the
argument is because he closely associates constitutional usage with unwritten constitutional
law.339 He states that
[slome examples of unwritten laws of the constitution include: the rule that
the Crown is not the source of law; the doctrine of implied repeal; the rule
that customary international law is incorporated by the common law of
Canada; the requirement that treaties be implementat[ed] by legislation to
have domestic effects (a version of the prohibition on Crown legislation);
and the law of parliamentary privilege.34o
He then goes on to write that "[i]n short, unwritten constitutional laws have no single
author, no standard form, and no common pedigree. The most that can be said about them
as a general proposition is that they arise from constitutional practice and are given
imprimatur of law by the judges".34\ But, contrary to what van Ert asserts, this is not the
"most that can be said" about those unwritten constitutional laws. For one, the Supreme
Court explained at length the origins of unwritten constitutional principles in the Reference
Re Secession ofQuebec .342 Among other things, the Court stated that:
339 G. van Ert, Using International Law in Canadian Courts, supra note 41 at 90-92.
340 Ibid. at 91 (footnotes omitted).
34\ Ibid. at 92.
342 Reference Re Secession ofQuebec, supra note 76.
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In order to endure over time, a constitution must contain a comprehensive set
of rules and principles which are capable of providing an exhaustive legal
framework for our system of government. Such principles and rules emerge
from an understanding of the constitutional text itself, the historical context,
and previous judicial interpretations of constitutional meaning.343
In line with this statement, all the examples van Ert gives (except maybe one344), are in fact
343 Ibid. , 32.
344 The law of Parliamentary privileges is a complex case that has developed as a result of
legislation, the common law, the lex parliamentis, the Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 39
and the Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 70. But it cannot be said to have evolved around
practices that simply received the "imprimatur of courts"; the whole idea ofparliamentary
privileges was the refusal of the Parliament to be subjected to the Courts' powers... On
parliamentary privileges in Canada, see New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia,
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 319; Joseph P. Maingot, Parliamentary Privilege in Canada (Toronto:
Butterworth, 1982) (the French translation includes also a chapter on Quebec's National
Assembly: Joseph P. Maingot, Le privilege parlementaire au Canada (Cowansville: Les
editions Yvon Blais, 1987); John G. Bourinot, Parliamentary Procedure and Practice, 4th
ed. by Thomas B. Flint (Toronto: Canada Law Book Co., 1916); William F. Dawson,
"Parliamentary Privilege in the Canadian House of Commons"(1959) 25 R.C.E.S.P. 462;
William F. Dawson, "Privilege in the Senate of Canada" (1967) Public Law 212; John
Mark Keyes and Anita Mekkunnel, "Traffic Problems at the Intersection of Parliamentary
Procedure and Constitutional Law" (2001) 46 McGill L.J. 1037; Samuel 1. Watson, The
Powers of Canadian Parliaments (Toronto: Carswell, 1880); N. Ward, "Called to the Bar
of the House of Commons" (1957) 35 Can. Bar Rev. 529. For British sources, see John
Hatsell, Precedents of Proceedings in the House Commons, 3rd ed., vol.1 (London: T.
Payne, 1796); William Mackay et al., Erskine May's Treatise on the Law, Privileges,
Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, 23 th rev. ed., (London (U.K.): Butterworths Law,
2004); Charles H. McIlwain, The High Court of Parliament and its Supremacy: an
Historical Essay on the Boundaries Between Legislation and Adjudication in England
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common law rules that have been developed over time by courts, like the rest of the
common law. But, as argued above, it is not possible to point to anything that resembles a
slow and gradual development of the common law rules recognizing a federal plenary
treaty-making power. This is precisely the reason why some commentators have tried to
have recourse to other sources. Moreover, in light of the federal principle found by the
Supreme Court to be underlying the Constitution in the Reference Re Secession of
Quebec,345 it would appear surprising that such a rule could develop out of thin air.
Gibran van Ert eventually concludes that there is "quite simply, no legal answer" to
the question of the impact of Quebec's persistent objection to the development of an
unwritten constitutional rule recognizing an undivided federal power over treaty-making.346
However, he believes that "it is unfathomable to [him] that Quebec's long and continuing
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1910); Joseph Redlich, The Procedure ofthe House of
Commons (London: Archibald Constable & Co., 1903).
345 Reference Re Secession ofQuebec, supra note 76 ~ 56:
In a federal system of government such as ours, political power is shared by
two orders of government: the federal government on the one hand, and the
provinces on the other. Each is assigned respective spheres of jurisdiction by
the Constitution Act, 1867. See, e.g., Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of
Canada v. Receiver-General ofNew Brunswick, [1892] A.C. 437 (P.C.), at
pp. 441-42. It is up to the courts "to control the limits of the respective
sovereignties": Northern Telecom Canada Ltd. v. Communication Workers
ofCanada, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 733, at p. 741. In interpreting our Constitution,
the courts have always been concerned with the federalism principle,
inherent in the structure of our constitutional arrangements, which has from
the beginning been the lodestar by which the courts have been guided.
346 G. van Ert, Using International Law in Canadian Courts, supra note 41 at 92.
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opposition to the existence of an undivided federal treaty power could have no effect
whatever on the purported development of an unwritten constitutional law.,,347 Although I
do agree with him on this last point, I would say that there are sufficient legal arguments to
deny that any unwritten constitutional norm granting undivided treaty power to the federal
government exists. Therefore, once all this has been said, I do not think that we have to go
to the political principle of consent to reject, as van Ert does, the "crystallization"
argument.
4. International Law and International Legal Personality
Now that we have seen that nothing in Canadian constitutional law supports the
federal claim, some people have suggested that international law could offer a last
alternative argument. In general terms, it has to be mentioned at the outset that, whatever
that argument might have been worth 50 years ago, it is certainly not worth much today.
But in any case, the argument which needs to be answered on its own terms generally goes
along these lines348 : (1) Canada is now a "sovereign state"; (2) "sovereign states" have one
undivided international personality; (3) only that personality is allowed to make treaties at
international law; (4) since the federal government is the one habilitated to speak for
347 Ibid.
348 See, for example: B. Laskin, "The Provinces and International Agreements", supra note
40 at 108; J.-Y. Grenon, "De la conclusion des traites et de leur mise en ceuvre au Canada",
supra note 40 and G.R. Morris, "The Treaty-Making Power: A Canadian Dilemma", supra
note 22.
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Canada, it is the one only allowed to make treaties; (5) the constitution must necessarily
follow those international rules. While I agree with (l), to the extent that "sovereignty"
means anything today, I would dispute segments (2) and (5) as simply wrong, and would
further suggest that segments (3) and (4) beg the question that they are supposed to answer.
Since segment (4) is, on its face, question begging, I will skip it and will deal first with (5)
and then examine briefly (2) and (3) to show how this argument is yet another losing one
for Ottawa's claim.
The first segment of the argument relates to the assumption that the Canadian
constitution must necessarily - from a constitutional point of view - follow international
law. While one might wish that it would be so - from the point of view of international law
- it is simply not the case at Canadian constitutional law. To see why, I will examine
briefly how international law is incorporated into Canadian law.
Canadian authors generally claim349 that Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence on the
349 A. Bayefsky, "International Human Rights Law in Canadian Courts", supra note 41 at
118; M. Cohen and A. Bayefsky, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and
International Law", supra note 41 at 275; J. Claydon, "The Application of International
Human Rights Law by Canadian Courts", supra note 41 at 730; F. Rigaldies and J.
Woehrling, "Le juge interne canadien et Ie droit international", supra note 41 at 304; R. St
John MacDonald, "The Relationship Between International Law and Domestic Law in
Canada", supra note 41 at 88ff.; D.C. Vanek, "Is International Law Part of the Law of
Canada?", supra note 41 at 263.
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reception of customary law (as opposed to conventional law)350 adheres to the theory of
350 The cases most often cited are as follow: Buvot v. Barbuit, (1736) 3 Burr. 1481; Triquet
v. Bath, (1774) 3 Burr. 1478; R. v. Chung Chi Cheung, [1939] AC. 160 [Chung Chi
Cheung] (interpreted as adhering to an adoptionist approach by D.C. Vanek, "Is
International Law Part of the Law of Canada?", ibid. Contra: James Crawford, (1976-77)
48 Brit. YB. Int. L. 357); Dunbar v. Sullivan, (1907) 11 Ex. C.R. 179 at 188; Trendtex
Trading Corporation Ltdv. Central Bank ofNigeria, [1977] 1 All E.R. 881 at 903 (leave to
appeal to the House of Lords granted, but the case was settled out of court) [Trendtex]; I
Congreso del Partido, [1978] 1 Q.B. 500 (AC. U.K.); In the Matter Ofa Reftrence As To
The Powers Of The Corporation Of The City Of Ottawa And The Corporation Of The
Village OfRockliffe Park To Levy Rates On Foreign Legations And High Commissioners'
Residences, [1943] S.C.R. 208 [Foreign Legations case] (M. Cohen and A Bayefsky noted
in "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and International Law", supra note 41 at
277 that despite some ambiguities, this case tends to be considered by the doctrine as
accepting the adoptionist theory: see R. St John MacDonald, "The Relationship Between
International Law and Domestic Law in Canada", ibid. at 101-102; D.C. Vanek, "Is
International Law Part of the Law of Canada?", ibid. at 277-79; F. Rigaldies and J.
Woehrling, "Le juge interne canadien et Ie droit international", supra note 41 at 303. See
also: William A. Schabas, International Human Rights Law and the Canadian Charter - A
Manual for the Practitioner, 1st ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1991) at 19 [Schabas (1 st ed.)]);
Reftrence Re Exemption of us. Forces from Canadian Criminal Law, [1943] S.C.R. 483,
[1943] 4 D.L.R. 11 at 41 (Taschereau J.) (despite some ambiguities, this decision is also
considered by authors as favoring the adoptionist theory: see M. Cohen and A Bayefsky,
"The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and International Law", supra note 41 at
278; R. St John MacDonald, "The Relationship Between International Law and Domestic
Law in Canada", supra note 41, D.C. Vanek, "Is International Law Part of the Law of
Canada?", ibid. at 285, and J. Claydon, "The Application of International Human Rights
Law by Canadian Courts", supra note 41 at 730.); Municipality of Saint John v. Fraser-
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adoption. The theory of adoption claims that customary international law is automatically
adopted in domestic law without having to be "transformed" into a domestic norm through
legislative approval. Doubts have been expressed by Prof. Stephen l. Toope35 \ that Canada
has effectively adopted the British approach on the subject. Arguendo, let's agree with the
majority's view that customary rules are automatically incorporated into domestic law. And
equally for the sake of the argument, it seems unnecessary to draw a distinction between the
ius commune of Quebec (as found in the Civil Code ofQuebec (CCQ)) and the common
law, since a similar practice was provided for in French law even before civil law was re-
established in Quebec.352
Brace Overseas Corp., [1958] S.C.R. 263; Re Alberta Union ofProvincial Employees v. R.,
(1981) 120 D.L.R. (3fd) 590 (Q.B. Alta) (leave to appeal to the Supreme Court refused:
Dec.7, 1981) [Re A. UP.E.].
35\ Stephen Toope bases his doubts on three cases. See S.l. Toope, "The Uses of Metaphor:
International Law and The Supreme Court of Canada", supra note 41. He first cites and
comments at 292: "La Republique Democratigue du Congo v. Venne, [1971] S.c.R. 997
(where changes in customary law did not operate to affect Canadian domestic law); and
Reference Re Mineral and Other Natural Resources of the Continental Shelf, (1983) 145
D.L.R. (3d) 9 (Nfld. C.A.) (implicitly requiring transformation of customary law into
domestic law)." He then adds "In the recent Quebec Secession Reference, the Court offered
an at best enigmatic aside that it could not apply "pure" international law directly. If the
Court believed that customary international law could condition domestic law, then such an
application would be in no way precluded." (Citation omitted.)
352 Pierre Lardy, Laforce obligatoire du droit international en droit interne - Etude de droit
constitutionnel compare (Paris: Librairie generale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1966) at
97ff. The author refers to French decisions dating back to the relevant period.
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In general, Canadian scholars maintain that the adoption is automatic. It is true that
Professors Rigaldies and Woehrling353 have claimed that, strictly speaking, there is no real
automatic adoption since judges must proceed to the incorporation of the international rule
in domestic law. One might be tempted to think that this is simply an academic issue, but
the issue of whether the judge recognizes the customary international rule or rather actively
incorporates it in the domestic legal order is arguably an important one. Professors
Rigaldies andWoehrling's position risks defeating the very purpose of adoption. In effect,
to accept that the act of recognition of the customary rule by the judge is what "creates" the
parallel rule within our common law system runs the risk, depending on the strength that
we are willing to give to the principles of stare decisis and precedents, of freezing the
customary rule in the domestic legal order,354 thus defeating the very objective of the theory
of adoption which is to allow the domestic rule to espouse the international rule.355 In fact,
Professors Rigaldies and Woehrling have recognized that this seems to be the point of the
practice of adoption: "une fois la coutume adoptee et introduite dans l'ordre juridique du
353 F. Rigaldies and J. Woehrling, "Le juge interne canadien et Ie droit international", supra
note 41 at 304-05.
354 It is interesting to note that the stare decisis rule is not recognized by the International
Court of Justice. Article 59 of its enabling statute (Statute of the International Court of
Justice annexed to UN Charter, Jun. 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993) provides that
the decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties in a particular
case.
355 See for example Lord Denning's opinion in Trendtex, supra note 350 at 889-890.
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Canada, les juges se comportent generalement par la suite comme si, a leurs yeux, cette
norme conservait sa nature propre".356
Professors Rigaldies and Woehrling seem to have made the same mistake as some
versions of American Legal Realism which consider "no statute to be law until it is actually
applied by a court".357 H.L.A Hart replied to those Legal Realists that "[t]here is a
difference, crucial for our understanding of law, between the truth that if a statute is to be
law, the courts must accept the rule that certain legislative operations make law, and the
misleading theory that nothing is law till it is applied in a particular case in court.,,358
Similarly, Professors Rigaldies and Woehrling are right when they suggest that the courts
must accept the rule that the behaviours of international agents that constitute customary
international law make common law, but they are wrong when they suggest that customary
international law is not part of common law till it is applied by courts. This mistake rests on
a confusion between the validity ofa norm (i.e. its membership in a specific legal system),
on the one hand, and the official application of the norm, on the other. As Hart has taught
us, in a legal system, there are different types of "second order rules", that is, rules about
other rules. One of them is the "rule of recognition",359 which specifies what norms may
356 F. Rigaldies and J. Woehrling, "Le juge interne canadien et Ie droit international", supra
note 41 at 306. [Trans!.: "once adopted or introduced into the Canadian legal system,
judges then generally behave as if the custom kept its own nature."]
'57
-' H.L.A. Hart, The Concept ofLaw, supra note 338 at 65.
358 Ibid.
359 Ibid at 94-95.
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count as members of the system, while another set of secondary rules are the "rules of
adjudication",360 which specify who should adjudicate disputes and what procedures they
ought to follow. In a legal system, it may be true that a norm may not validly exist if those
charged with the application of the law by the legal system's "rules of adjudication" do not
recognize it. But the basis for the norm's existence within the system is the "rule of
recognition" that is applied by the adjudicators, and not the adjudicators' decision per se.
Therefore, it is sufficient for a norm to exist within a legal system that it be validated by the
system's "rule of recognition". While the rule of recognition may mandate it, there are no
reasons why, in principle, the rule of recognition could not validate within the domestic
legal system a norm that is identical to the customary international norm, without first
having this norm accepted by the courts. If it were otherwise, we would .be forced to
conclude that the normative content of customary international law would always be
applied retroactively to the cases presented in court. In the end, the theory of truly
automatic incorporation seems to be more in line with general principles of the common
law - and its dominant Blackstonian "declaratory" narrative361 - while corresponding to
actual judicial behaviour.362
360 Ibid at 97.
361 See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland (1765), vol. 1 (Buffalo
(N.y.): William S. Hein & Co, 1992) at 69-70. The doctrine has been updated and adapted
to make sense of prospective overruling (see In re Spectrum Plus Ltd. (in liquidation),
[2005] 2 A.C. 680, [2005] UHKL 41 (RL.) and (in the Canadian context) of prospective
constitutional remedies (Canada (A.-G.) v. Hislop, 2007 SCC 10 ~ 81-108).
362 That being said, courts nevertheless retain a certain degree of flexibility to define the
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However, in order to maintain "parliamentary sovereignty,,363 and the separation of
powers as between Parliament and the judiciary, the customary rule must yield to a clear
statutory provision.364 Similarly, a well-established common law rule will override the
customary international rule if they are in conflict.365 Custom thus should serve, according
to the argument, as a subsidiary, yet binding, source in the absence of a clear statutory
provision or an established common law rule.
A customary rule can also serve as an interpretative tool. Indeed, there seems to be a
customary norm that they apply in a given case.
363 This is a hyperbole that plays the role of a regulative idea in countries of the British
Commonwealth. It basically claims that Parliament is legally superior to courts and to the
Monarch (although She is a constituent part of the Parliament) and thus can adopt any law
it wishes to. Of course, in countries like Canada, these legislative powers are limited by a
series of constitutional constraints entrenched in their constitutions (e.g. division of powers
between the Parliament and provincial Legislatures, Charter of Rights, amending formulas,
etc.). On the history of the idea, see Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty ofParliament:
History and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
364 See for example: Mortensen v. Peters, (1906) 14 Scots L.T.R. 227; British Columbia
Electric Ry v. R., [1946] A.C. 527; Reference re Japanese Canadians, [1947] A.C. 87 at
104; Gordon v. R, [1980] 5 W.W.R. 668 at 671 (RC.S.C.), (1980) 22 RC.L.R. 17 (RC.
C.A.) (appeal dismissed on a another issue).
365 Chung Chi Cheung, supra note 350 at 168; M. Cohen and A. Bayefsky, "The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and International Law", supra note 41 at 276; F. Rigaldies
and J. Woehrling, "Le juge interne canadien et Ie droit international", supra note 41 at 304.
180
presumption under which Parliament and the legislatures do not wish to legislate contrary
to a customary law or a treaty law rule.366 For example, in the Foreign Legations case,367
366 See, for example: Foreign Legations case, supra note 350; The Ship "North·' v. K.,
(1906) 3 S.C.R. 385; Daniels v. R., [1968] S.C.R. 517; Society ofComposers Authors and
Publishers Association ofCanada Ltd. v. CTV Television Network Ltd., [1968] S.C.R. 676;
R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697; National Corn Growers Association v. Canada
(Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324 at 1371-1372 (per Gonthier J.) [National Corn
Growers Association]; Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister ofCitizenship and Immigration),
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 982 at 1019-1022 (per Bastarache J.) [Pushpanathan]; Salomon v.
Commissioners of Customs and Excise, [1967] 2 Q.B. 116 at 141-143 (U.K.) (Lord
Diplock); Bloxam v. Favre, (1883) 8 P.D. 101. Of particular interest is Baker v. Canada
(Minister ofCitizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at ~ 69-71 [Baker] where a
majority of the Supreme Court held that even when dealing with unimplemented treaties,
the "values reflected in international human rights law may help inform the contextual
approach to statutory interpretation and judicial review." The majority also quoted with
approval Ruth Sullivan, ed., Driedger On The Construction of Statutes. 3rd ed. (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1994) at 330: "[T]he legislature is presumed to respect the values and
principles enshrined in international law, both customary and conventional. These
constitute a part of the legal context in which legislation is enacted and read. In so far as
possible, therefore, interpretations that reflect these values and principles are preferred"
(emphasis added by the Supreme Court). See also F. Rigaldies and J. Woehrling, "Le juge
interne canadien et Ie droit international", supra note 41 at 308; M. Cohen and A.
Bayefsky, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and International Law", supra
note 41 at 280-281; A. Bayefsky, "International Human Rights Law in Canadian Courts",
supra note 41 at 120; Samuel G.G. Edgar, ed., Craies On Statute Law, 6th ed. (London
(U.K.): Sweet and Maxwell, 1963) at 461ff.; Peter St. J. Langan, ed., Maxwell On The
Interpretation of Statutes, lih ed. (London (U.K.), Sweet and Maxwell, 1969) at 152ft~;
Pierre-Andre Cote, Interpretation des lois, 2nd ed. (Cowansville (Qc): Editions Yvon Blais,
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the Supreme Court "read down,,368 an Ontario municipal tax by-law to exclude embassies
from its purview in order to comply with the customary rule concerning diplomatic
immunity.
This presumption against violation of international law should also imply that
powers delegated by Parliament or Legislatures should not allow for the infringement of an
international customary or treaty norm unless this power is expressly specified.369 In effect,
if Parliament is presumed not to want to violate international law, a fortiori it must be
presumed that it does not delegate powers to do so. We can therefore say that international
law generally takes precedence over delegated legislation (i.e. regulations) in that
Parliament rarely provides for, implicitly or expressly, the possibility of violating
international law. Obviously, this could be a powerful tool to implement international law
in the era of the regulatory state.
1990) at 347; H. Kindred, "Canadians as Citizens of the International Community:
Asserting Unimplemented Treaty Rights in the Courts", supra note 41 at 269; S.l. Toope,
"The Uses of Metaphor: International Law and The Supreme Court of Canada", supra note
41 at 294. More will be said about this presumption in the concluding remarks of this essay.
367 Ibid.
368 Despite no apparent sign of such intention, the Supreme Court interpreted the provincial
text in question as implicitly excluding embassies from its reach.
369 See for example: D.C. Vanek, "Is International Law Part of the Law of Canada?", supra
note 41; G.V. La Forest, "May the Provinces Legislate in Violation ofInternational Law?",
supra note 41; F. Rigaldies and 1. Woehrling, "Le juge interne canadien et Ie droit
international", supra note 41 at 308.
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In any event, the foregoing points serve as the basis on which some authors have
claimed that Canada and the provinces were bound by international law. Vanek,370 for
example, was of the view that neither Canada nor the provinces could legislate in violation
of international law, given the presumption that a power delegated by the Parliament in
London does not, unless expressly stated, empower to legislate contrary to international
law. Since the Constitution Act, 1867, does not contain any such mention, it would follow
that legislation cannot be introduced in Canada in violation of international law. This
argument seems difficult to defend in light of Canada's independence and the Statute of
Westminster and it ignores the fact that legislative powers possessed by Canada and the
provinces are not the result of "delegations", strictly speaking, as determined by the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Hodge v. R. 371 It must be noted here that even if
370 D.C. Vanek, "Is International Law Part of the Law of Canada?", ibid. at 263.
371 Hodge v. R., supra note 14. The Privy Council in Queen v. Burah, (1878) 3 A.C. 889
(P.C.), at 904-05 had previously stated about the "subordinated" legislatures created by the
Imperial Parliament that:
The Indian legislature has powers expressly limited by the Act of the
Imperial Parliament which created it, and it can, of course, do nothing
beyond the limits which circumscribe these powers. But, when acting within
those limits, it is not in any sense an agent or delegate of the Imperial
Parliament, but has, and was intended to have, plenary powers of
legislation. as large, and of the same nature, as those of Parliament itself.
(Emphasis added).
This latter statement was cited with approval by a unanimous Supreme Court in Reference
Re: Saskatchewan Natural Resources, [1931] S.C.R. 263.
While he was Dean, Rand J. also claimed that provinces could not legislate contrary
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Vanek's arguments were to be accepted, they could only go to limit federal or provincial
powers but not to grant such powers. Therefore, a further argument would have to be
developed as to the possible power-granting force of international law.
In any case, after having been systematically rejected by legal scholars, Vanek's
arguments were in tum rejected by the Supreme Court. For example, in Ordon Estate v.
Grail, the Court wrote:
Although international law is not binding upon Parliament or the provincial
legislatures, a court must presume that legislation is intended to comply with
Canada's obligations under international instruments and as a member of the
international community.372
to international law based on the argument that the jurisdiction on foreign affairs fell
entirely upon the Dominion (I.C. Rand, "Some Aspects of Canadian Constitutionnalism",
supra note 41 at 143-44). It is hard to reconcile this proposition with the decision rendered
in the Labour Conventions case supra note 19 as to legislative powers. Also, while he was
professor, La Forest J. also defended the thesis that provinces could not legislate in
violation of international law by invoking the constitutional doctrine of extra-territoriality
and, alternatively, for the reason advanced by Vanek (G.V. La Forest, "May the Provinces
Legislate in Violation of International Law?", supra note 41 at 81-87). The doctrine of
extra-territoriality is not of great assistance here because, as La Forest put it, it "was
developed to prevent violations of international law by the colonies" which could attract the
liability of the metropolitan State. It cannot be said that provinces are "colonies or
dependencies" of the federal government. Other arguments related to extraterritoriality will
be examined in depth in section 3.c.
3720rdon Estate v. Grail, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437 ~ 137 (per Iacobucci and Major 11 for the
Court) (emphasis added) [Ordon Estate].
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Perhaps more interesting for our purposes is the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Milne373
where the Court concluded that even if s. 11 (i) of the Canadian Charter clearly guarantees
less rights than Art. 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights374 (to
which Canada agreed to be bound), the latter international norm is not pertinent to interpret
the clear prescription of the Constitution. Also, Chief Justice Dickson and Justice Wilson
wrote in Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.):
The various sources of international human rights law - declarations,
covenants, conventions, judicial and quasi-judicial decisions of international
tribunals, customary norms - must, in my opinion, be relevant and
persuasive sources for interpretation ofthe Charter's provisions.375
373 R. v. Milne, [1987] 2 R.C.S. 512 at 527.
374 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 D.N.T.S.
171, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force 23 March 1976, accession by
Canada 19 May 1976) [I.CCP.R.].
375 Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 at 348
[P.S.A.C] (Dickson C.J. and Wilson J.) (dissenting on the result but not on this point)
(emphasis added). That statement has been quoted with approval by Gonthier, Cory and
Iacobucci n. (dissenting on another point) in R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 ~ 160 [R. v.
Zundel] and by retired Justice L'Heureux-DuM (Claire L'Heureux-DuM, "From Many
Different Stones: A House of Justice" (2003) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 659). The use of
international law merely as a "persuasive authority" to interpret the Constitution has been
discussed by many authors. See for example: Ken Norman, "Practising What We Preach in
Human Rights: A Challenge in Rethinking for Canadian Courts" (1991) 55 Sask. L. Rev.
289; Anne Bayefsky, International Human Rights Law., Use in Canadian Charter ofRights
and Freedom Litigation, Toronto, Butterworths, 1992 [A. Bayefsky, International Human
Rights Law., Use in Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom Litigation]; William A.
Schabas, International Human Rights Law and the Canadian Charter, 2d ed., Toronto,
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And they further added:
The general principles of constitutional interpretation require that these
international obligations be a relevant and persuasive factor in Charter
interpretation. '"
In short, though I do not believe the judiciary is bound by the norms of
international law in interpreting the Charter, these norms provide a relevant
and persuasive source for interpretation of the provisions of the Charter,
especially when they arise out of Canada's international obligations under
human rights conventions.376
In other words, whatever the rules for the interpretation of statutes or the common law,
international law in constitutional interpretation is merely a "relevant and pertinent source".
This means that it is not a binding subsidiary source. Thus, it does not automaticaly remedy
textual lacunae that may exist in the constitution, as it might do with infra-constitutional
Carswell, 1996; Daniela Bassan, "The Canadian Charter and Public International Law:
Redefining the State's Power to Deport Aliens" (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall L.J. 583; William
Schabas, "Twenty-Five Years of Public International Law at the Supreme Court of Canada"
(2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 174; Karen Knop, "Here and There: International Law in
Domestic Courts", supra note 41; G. van Ert, Using International Law in Canadian Courts,
supra note 41 at 91; Gaile McGregor, "The International Covenant on Social, Economic,
and Cultural Rights: Will It Get Its Day in Court?" (2002) 28 Man. L.J. 321; Anne W. La
Forest, "Domestic Application ofInternational Law in Charter Cases: Are We There Yet?"
(2004) 37 U.B.C. L. Rev. 157; Irit Weiser, "Undressing The Window: Treating
International Human Rights Law Meaningfully in the Canadian Commonwealth System"
(2004) 37 U.B.C. L. Rev. 113.
376 P.S.A.C., ibid. 349-50 (Dickson C.J. and Wilson 1.) (dissenting on the result but not on
this point).
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common law.
In any event, whatever the case may be for infra-constitutional norms, there are very
strong constitutional policy reasons to maintain the current Supreme Court's position on the
role of international law with regards to the Constitution. First, by limiting international law
to being simply a "relevant and pertinent" source rather than being a binding source of
constitutional law, this rule ensures that the executive branch will not be able to indirectly
circumvent the stringent amending formulas provided at Part V of the Constitution Act,
1982. A second reason is that it avoids the possibility that constitutional changes could be
caused by modifications in international customary norms without Canadians' approval. In
other words, it avoids granting outsiders the power to amend the Canadian constitution. In
effect, whatever we might think of the validity of the "persistent objector" doctrine at
international law,377 the fact remains that once a customary rule would have entered the
377 The "persistent objector" doctrine is to the effect that a state is not bound by a
customary rule of international law if that state consistently objected to that rule before it
became firmly established as a rule of customary international law. See Fisheries Case
(United Kingdom v Nonvay), 1951 ICJ 116 at 139; Ted L. Stein, "The Approach of a
Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law" (1985)
26 Harv. Int'l L.J. 457 and Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 5th ed.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) at 10. But see Anthony A. D'Amato, The Concept
of Custom in International Law (Ithaca (N.y.): Cornell University Press, 1971) at 233-63;
Jonathan Charney, "The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary
International Law" (1986) 56 Brit. y.B. Int'l L. 1 and Jonathan Charney, "Universal
International Law" (1993) 87 Am J IntI L 529 at 538-42.
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Canadian constitution, it would be very hard for Canadians to modify the new
constitutional rule because it would be subject to the same amending formulas as any
others.
Moreover, even if we were to apply the infra-constitutional standard of
incorporation of international law to remedy a textual lacunae, international law could not
be used to displace clear and well-established common law rules. Thus, it could not
displace the common law rule recognizing that the executive's prerogatives parallel
legislative competence.
Thus, the analysis could, and actually should, stop here.
However, for the sake of the argument, I will address segments (2) (""sovereign
states" have one undivided international personality") and (3) ("only that personality is
allowed to make treaties at international law") of the international law argument, to show
that they could not be used to support the federal government's exclusivist claim.
Segment (2) relies on a confusion that was common among earlier
publicists,378which consisted In erroneously equating "state sovereignty" with
378 See for example B. Laskin, "The Provinces and International Agreements", supra note
40 at 108 and J.-Y. Grenon, "De la conclusion des traites et de leur mise en amvre au
Canada", supra note 40.
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"international personality".379 This mistake is based on a "sovereignty bias", i.e. the idea
that at international law, only "sovereign states" have an international personality. This is
wrong. Having a "legal personality" means having the capacity to be a bearer of rights and
obligations. International law is made of all sorts of legal entities having all sorts of
different rights, powers and obligations.38o This is not a new phenomenon.381 For example,
379 See A.L.C. de Mestral, "Le Quebec et les relations internationales", supra note 41 at
220, discussing the confusion between "state sovereignty" and "legal personality".
380 Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff,
1995) at 16-17, writes: "It has often been said that only states are subjects of international
law. It is not clear what such statements mean, but whatever they mean, they are misleading
if not mistaken." (cited in Thomas D. Grant, "Defining Statehood: The Montevideo
Convention And Its Discontents" (1999) 37 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 403 at 405 [T.D. Grant,
"Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention And Its Discontents"].)
381 T.D. Grant, "Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention And Its Discontents",
ibid. at 405, for example, refers to Daniel Patrick O'Connell, International Law, 2nd ed.
(London (U.K.): Stevens, 1970) [D.P. O'Connell, International Law] where the latter writes
(at 80): "A half century ago the international lawyers could content themselves with the
proposition that "States only are subjects of international law"". Grant also refers to Ignaz
Seidl-Hohenveldern, Corporations in and Under International Law (Cambridge (U.K.):
Grotius Publications, 1987) writing (at 5): "The idea that public international law addressed
itself only to States and that therefore only States could be persons and subjects under
public international law was not abandoned until the end of the nineteenth century." and to
the famous Hans Kelsen who had already acknowledged that states were not the only
subjects of international law in the reformulation of his General Theory ofLaw and State,
trans. by Anders Wedberg (Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1949) at 342-48.
While these authors debate about when international started being populated by more than
simply "sovereign states", one can question whether international law was ever only
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the League of Nations itself had a legal personality, so did "A" mandates382 imposed on
parts of the former Ottoman Empire. The simple fact is that international law does not limit
itself to "sovereign states" even though those legal entities have been regarded in the Euro-
American international legal tradition - at least since the demise of the Holy German
Empire - as having the widest array of legal powers. But individuals, universities,
municipalities, non-governmental organisations, multinational corporations,
intergovernmental organisations, etc.383 all benefit from having restricted forms of
populated by such subjects except in the mind of certain jurists who simply dismissed many
other entities as being mere "exceptions" or "aberrations".
382 Quincy Wright, "Sovereignty of the Mandates" (1923) 17 Am. J. Int'l L. 691 at 696.
This article is also quite instructive as to the difficulties then encountered in trying to locate
"sovereignty" in the mandate system.
383 See for example, T.D. Grant, "Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention And Its
Discontents", supra note 380 at 405-406 wrote that "it does appear that modern
developments have increased the relative legal status of such actors. Strengthening the role
of the individual in international law is critical in this regard. Intermediate between states
and natural persons, corporations, political or religious parties or movements, organized
interest groups, transnational ethnic communities, and other non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) have proliferated and assumed a role in international society, and
this development, too, has required writers to reassess what can constitute a person under
international law." In footnotes, he refers, among other sources, to the European
Convention on the Recognition ofthe Legal Personality ofInternational Non-governmental
Organizations, 24 April 1986, Europ. T.S. No. 124; Barry E. Carter and Philip R. Trimble,
International Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1991) at 411 ("States, international
organizations, individuals, corporations, and other entities have varying legal status under
international law"); Jonathan I. Charney, "Transnational Corporations and Developing
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international status. Therefore, it is not surprising to read in standard international law
books like Oppenheim's International Law that there is "no justification for the view that
[member states of federations] are necessarily deprived of any status whatsoever within the
international community: while they are not full subjects of international law, they may be
international persons for some purposes.,,384 We can similarly read in Shaw's International
Law that federated states may be regarded as having a "degree of international
personality".385 In fact, let's remember that Byelorussia and Ukraine were admitted to the
United Nations in 1945, while they were federated states within the Soviet Union.386 Thus,
although international law recognizes that Canada has a legal personality, this in itself is
not sufficient to demonstrate that it is the only entity to do so within the territory of Canada.
In other words, Canada's international status does not in itself preclude provinces from also
having a form of international legal personality. That beingthe case, international law does
not preclude federations from being composed of multiple overlapping legal
personalities.387 Therefore, even if the Canadian constitution was bound to respect
International Law" (1983) 1983 Duke L.J. 748; P.K. Menon, "The International Personality
ofIndividuals in International Law: A Broadening of the Traditional Doctrine" (1992) 1 J.
Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 151; David J. Ettinger, "The Legal Status of the International Olympic
Committee" (1992) 4 Pace y.B. Int'l L. 97.
384 Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts, eds., Oppenheim's International Law, 9th ed.,
vol. 1 (Harlow (U.K.): Longman, 1992) at 249.
385 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 5th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997) at 197.
386 Ibid. at 196.
387 It is true that the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 26
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international law, in no way does international law force federations to have only one single
international personality for all possible purposes.
Even if international law required any federation to have only one legal personality
for all possible international purposes, one would have to make the additional hopeless
demonstration that international law (a) dictates through which domestic organs this legal
personality will express itself and, (b) dictates that it is only through the federal executive
that this could be done.388 One can simply point at the Belgian case - where certain federal
treaties can be negotiated and concluded by the federated parts in the name of the whole
federation - to show that any attempt at such demonstration would be fruitless. This is not
surprising because states are so diverse in their internal power structures (and because of
the so-called "internal sovereignty" doctrine), that international law has not developed
standard rules as to which institutions can conclude treaties binding on their states.
Again, these arguments on segment (2) are enough to put to rest the federal
December 1933, 165 1.N.T.S. 19 [Montevideo Convention], to which Canada is not a party,
states that (Art. 2): "[t]he federal state shall constitute a sole person in the eyes of
international law". While other parts of the convention might embody customary law, Art.
2 does not necessarily reflect the contemporary practice of recognizing the multiplicity of
international legal personalities both at the "supranational" and "infranational" levels in
Europe. This should not come as a surprise since the ideas of the "state" and of the
"government" have changed tremendously in the global regulatory age.
388 For a similar argument, see 1. Giroux, "La capacite internationale des provinces en droit
constitutionnel canadien", supra note 23 at 264.
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government's claim to a general treaty-making power based on the "international law
argument". Nonetheless, to conclude on this line of argumentative defence, I would like to
address its segment (3) (i.e. only fully sovereign states have the required international
personality to make treaties at international law).
In its more extreme form, this segment can be illustrated by Bora Laskin's opinion
according to which, "if a province presently purported on its own initiative to make an
enforceable agreement with a foreign state on a matter otherwise within provincial
competence, it would either have no international validity, or, if the foreign state chose to
recognize it, would amount to a declaration of independence ... ,,!389 This helps to highlight
the mistaken belief, held by certain commentators, that treaty-making is necessarily
associated with "state sovereignty". This is however far from being the case. After all, no
one would claim that international organizations are "sovereign". Nonetheless, they clearly
have the international capacity to make treaties. 390
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties391 provides at its Art. 6 that every
state possesses the capacity to conclude treaties. However, it must be noted that the Vienna
Convention is not meant to establish exhaustive rules about treaties: Art. 6 must be read as
389 B. Laskin, "The Provinces and International Agreements", supra note 40 at 111.
390 See the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International
Organizations or between International Organizations, supra note 238.
391 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, [1980] Can.T.S no. 37
[Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties].
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indicative of the type of entities covered by the Treaty rather than as indicative of the only
entities capable of concluding treaties at international law. In effect, Art. 3 a) specifies that
the Convention does not affect the legal validity of any other international agreement
concluded between a state and any "other subject of internationallaw".392
So if entities "less than sovereign" can make treaties, how about federated states?
Before answering this question, I need to add a few words on the notion of "state" for
treaty-making purposes at international law.
The Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties does not specify what a "state" is for
the purpose of the Convention. One must thus have recourse to other sources of
international law to identify what a "state" is for the treaty. "Textbook traditionalists" often
refer to Art. 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention,393 to which Canada is not a party, as ifit
stated the strict criteria of statehood in current international law. That provision states that
392 Ibid., Art. 3 a) reads:
International agreements not within the scope of the present Convention
The fact that the present Convention does not apply to international
agreements concluded between States and other subjects of international law
or between such other subjects of international law, or to international
agreements not in written form, shall not affect:
(a) the legal force of such agreements;
393 Montevideo Convention, supra note 387.
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"[t]he state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a
pennanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into
relations with the other states." But the usefulness of such criteria to distinguish between
states and other international entities is widely in doubt and it represents, at best, "soft law"
for those who did not ratify the convention.394 Nguyen Quoc Dinh, Patrick Daillier and
Alain Pellet criticized the Montevideo Convention for merely representing necessary but
not sufficient conditions for statehood.395 In general tenns, even to call those criteria
"necessary" is probably excessive. Highly eminent international law publicists such as
Joseph G. Starke and James Crawford have, for example, demonstrated that territory396 and
effectiveness397 of control are not even necessary, if we take into consideration the factor of
394 See, in general, on this and the other questions related to "statehood" T.D. Grant,
"Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention And Its Discontents", supra note 380.
395 On the general uselessness of the Montevideo Convention, supra note 387. to distinguish
states from other international subjects, see Nguyen Quoc Dinh, Patrick Daillier, Alain
Pellet, Droit International Public, 3d ed. (Paris: Librairie generale de droit et de
jurisprudence, 1994) 398-99.
396 Ivan A. Shearer, ed., Starke's International Law, 11 th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1994)
722-28. T.D. Grant, "Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention And Its
Discontents", supra note 380 at 436 also mentions the case of the French recognition of
Poland and Czechoslovakia during World War I, both "entities that never before enjoyed
any territorial control".
397 Crawford demonstrates that Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Baltic states were
still recognized as states by the Allied Powers after being annexed by nazi Gennany (James
Crawford, The Creation ofStates in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 78-
79 [J. Crawford, The Creation ofStates in International Law].
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recognition of statehood. It is also noteworthy here that the last criteria (the "capacity to
enter into relations with the other states") has been vastly criticised on the basis that it
represents more a consequence than a condition for statehood,398 and that it is not useful to
distinguish between "states" and other international actors on the basis of the capacity to
enter into international agreements since other entities also possess treaty-making
powers.399 Moreover, for the purpose of deciding which entity is a "state" under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, that last criteria is simply useless because it throws the
reader into a recursive loop: the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a
"state" can make treaties while the Montevideo Convention provides that a "state" is one of
the things that can make treaties ... Conceptions of statehood have in any event greatly
evolved in the last century and no definitive and exhaustive criteria have yet been adopted
by the whole of the international community for the purpose of deciding who or what
should be regarded as a state.
It actually appears very likely that federated states could be included in the word
"state" for the purpose of the Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties. This should not be
398 See for example: J. Crawford, The Creation ofStates in International Law, ibid. at 49;
Ingrid Detter, The International Legal Order (Brookfield (VT), Dartmouth, 1994) at 43;
Peter Malanczuk, ed., Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th ed. (New
York, Routledge, 1997) at 79.
399 See for example: D.P. O'Connell, International Law, supra note 381 at 284-85 and T.D.
Grant, "Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention And Its Discontents", supra note
380 at 434-435.
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surprising, since many federated states do have recognized treaty-making powers without
being qualified "sovereign states,,400: Belgium's "Regions" and "Communities",401
400 A report of the Venice Commission on this subject is very instructive. See Council of
Europe, Venice Commission/Commission de Venise, European Commission For
Democracy Through Law/ Commission europeenne pour la democratie par Ie droit,
Federated And Regional Entities And International Treaties: Report adopted by the
Commission at its 41th meeting, Venice, 10-11 December 1999, CDL-INF (2000) 3, online:
Venice Commission <http://venice.coe.int/docs/2000/CDL-INF(2000)003-
E.asp?MenuL=E> [Council of Europe, Federated And Regional Entities And International
Treaties].)
Also, there is a vast literature on the multi-layered diplomacy - diplomacy between
international organisations, states, federated states or regions, etc. See for example: Ivo
Duchacek, Daniel Latouche, and Garth Stevenson, eds., Perforated Sovereignties and
International Relations: Trans-sovereign Contacts of Subnational Governments (New
York: Greenwood Press, 1988); Hans J. Michelmann and Panayotis Soldatos, Federalism
and International Relations: the Role of Subnational Units (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1990); Brian Hocking, Localizing Foreign Policy : Non-Central Governments and
Multilayered Diplomacy (London (U.K.): Macmillan, 1993); Panayotis Soldatos,
"Cascading Subnational Paradiplomacy in an Interdependent and Transnational World" in
Douglas M. Brown and Earl Fry, eds., States and Provinces in the International Economy
(Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies Press, 1993) 45; Liesbet Hooghe, ed.,
Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Multi-Level Governance (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1996); Michael Keating and John Loughlin, eds., The Political
Economy of Regionalism (London (U.K.): Frank Cass, 1997); Eric Philippart, "Le Comite
des Regions confronte it la 'paradiplomatie' des regions de l'Union europeenne", in Jacques
Bourrinet, ed., Le Comite des Regions de I'Union europeenne (Paris: Editions economica,
1997); Francisco Aldecoa and Michael Keating, eds., Paradiplomacy in Action : The
Foreign Relations ofSubnational Governments (London (U.K.): Frank Cass, 1999); Charlie
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Jeffery, "Sub-National Mobilization and European Integration: Does it Make Any
Difference" (2000) 38 Journal of Common Market Studies 1; Bart Kerremans,
"Deterrnining a European Policy in a Multi-Level Setting: The Case of Specialized Co-
ordination in Belgium" (2000) 10 Regional and Federal Studies 1; Stephane Paquin, "La
paradiplomatie identitaire en Catalogne et les relations Barcelone-Madrid" (2002) 33
Etudes internationales 57; Stephane Paquin, La paradiplomatie identitaire en Catalogne
(Quebec: Presses de l'Universite Laval, 2003); Stephane Paquin, Paradiplomatie et
relations internationales. Theorie des strategies internationales des regions face a la
mondialisation (Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2004); Guy Lachapelle and Stephane Paquin, eds.,
Mastering Globalization: New Sub-States's Governance and Strategies (London (U.K.):
Frank Routledge, 2005).
401 Texte coordonne de la Constitution du 17 fevrier 1994 (Moniteur beIge, 17 fevrier 1994,
deuxieme edition) et mis it jour au 17 avril 2005, art. 167:
§ ler. Le Roi dirige les relations internationales, sans prejudice de la
competence des communautes et des regions de regler la cooperation
internationale, y compris la conclusion de traites, pour les matieres qui
relevent de leurs competences de par la Constitution ou en vertu de celle-ci.
§ 2. Le Roi conclut les traites, it l'exception de ceux qui portent sur les
matieres visees au § 3. Ces traites n'ont d'effet qu'apres avoir re<;u
l'assentiment des Chambres.
§ 3. Les Gouvernements de communaute et de region vises it l'article 121
concluent, chacun pour ce qui Ie concerne, les traites portant sur les matieres
qui relevent de la competence de leur Parlement. Ces traites n'ont d'effet
qu'apres avoir re<;u l'assentiment du Conseil.
§ 4. Une loi adoptee it la majorite prevue it l'article 4, dernier alinea, arrete
les modalites de conclusion des traites vises au § 3 et des traites ne portant
pas exclusivement sur les matieres qui reIevent de la competence des
communautes ou des regions par ou en vertu de la Constitution.
§ 5. Le Roi peut denoncer les traites conclus avant Ie 18 mai 1993 et portant
sur les matieres visees au § 3, d'un commun accord avec les Gouvernements
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de communaute et de region concernes.
Le Roi denonce ces traites si les Gouvernements de communaute et de
region concernes l'y invitent. Une loi adoptee ala majorite prevue a l'artic1e
4, dernier alinea, regIe la procedure en cas de desaccord entre les
Gouvernements de communaute et de region concernes.
402 See Constitucion Nacional De La Republica Argentina, Convencion Nacional
Constituyente, ciudad de Santa Fe, 22 de agosto de 1994, art. 124 (1):
Las provincias podnin crear regiones para el desarrollo econ6mico y social y
establecer 6rganos con facultades para el cumplimiento de sus fines y podnin
tambien celebrar convenios internacionales en tanto no sean incompatibles
con la politica exterior de la Naci6n y no afecten las facultades delegadas al
Gobierno federal 0 el credito publico de la Naci6n; con conocimiento del
Congreso Nacional. La ciudad de Buenos Aires tendni el regimen que se
establezca a tal efecto.
A translation of the National Constitution of the Argentine Republic provided by the
Political Database of the Americas, online: Edmund E. Walsh School of Foreign Service,
Center for Latin American Studies, Georgetown University
<http://www.georgetown.edulpdba/Constitutions/Argentina/argen94_e.html> reads:
The provinces are empowered to set up regions for the economic and social
development and to establish entities for the fulfillment of their purposes,
and they are also empowered, with the knowledge of Congress, to enter into
international agreements provided they are consistent with the national
foreign policy and do not affect the powers delegated to the Federal
Government or the public credit of the Nation. The City of Buenos Aires
shall have the regime which is to be established to that effect.
403 See Osterreichische Bundesverfassungsgesetze, Bundes- Verfassungsgesetz (B- VG), Art.
16 § 1-3. Art. 16 §1 provides:
Die Lander konnen in Angelegenheiten, die in ihren selbstandigen
Wirkungsbereich fallen, Staatsvertrage mit an Osterreich angrenzenden
Staaten oder deren Teilstaaten abschlieJ3en.
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Bosnia and Herzegovina's two "Entities",406 etc. And while the rejection of the proposed
("In matters within their own sphere of competence the Laender can conclude treaties with
states, or their constituent states, bordering on Austria." (Austrian Federal Chancellery,
Osterreichische Bundesverfassungsgesetze (Auswahl) / Austrian Federal Constitutional
Laws (selection) / Lois constitutionnelles de l'Autriche (une selection), English trans!. by
Charles Kessler and Peter Krauth (Vienna: Herausgegeben vom Bundespressedienst, 2000)
online: Legal Information System of the Republic of Austria (RIS)
<http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/info/bvg_eng.pdt»).
404 Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, art. 32.3 provides "(3) Soweit die
Lander fUr die Gesetzgebung zustandig sind, konnen sie mit Zustimmung der
Bundesregierung mit auswartigen Staaten Vertrage abschlieBen." ("Insofar as the Lander
have power to legislate, they may conclude treaties with foreign states with the consent of
the Federal Government." (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, (Berlin:
German Bundestag - Administration - Public Relations section, 2001), online: German
Bundestag
<http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/parliament/function/legal/germanbasiclaw.pdt> ))).
405 Constitution federale de la Confederation suisse du 18 avril 1999, Art. 56 provides:
56. Relations des cantons avec l'etranger
1. Les cantons peuvent conclure des traites avec I' etranger dans les domaines
relevant de leur competence.
2 Ces traites ne doivent etre contraires ni au droit et aux interets de la
Confederation, ni au droit d'autres cantons. Avant de conclure un traite, les
cantons doivent informer la Confederation.
3 Les cantons peuvent traiter directement avec les autorites etrangeres de
rang inferieur; dans les autres cas, les relations des cantons avec I' etranger
ont lieu par I' intermediaire de la Confederation.
406 Ustav Bosne i Hercegovine, art. I § 3 provides that the two "Entities" are the Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. Art. III § 2 (a) and (d) provide:
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Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe by the French and the Dutch voters in 2005
casts a large shadow over the Draft Constitution for Europe's future prospects, it is
nonetheless instructive to note that the proposed text contemplates that Europe's
constitutive units would keep their treaty-making powers in a vast array of jurisdictions.407
a) Entiteti imaju pravo da uspostavljaju posebne paralelne odnose sa
susjednim drzavama, u skladu sa suverenitetom i teritorijalnim integritetom
Bosne i Hercegovine....
d) Svaki entitet moze takodjer sklapati sporazume sa drzavama i
medjunarodnim organizacijama uz saglasnost Parlamentarne skupstine.
Parlamentarna skupstina moze zakonom predvidjeti da za odredjene vrste
sporazuma takva saglasnost nije potrebna.
("a. The Entities shall have the right to establish special parallel relationships with
neighboring states consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and
Herzegovina...." and "d. Each Entity may also enter into agreements with states and
international organizations with the consent of the Parliamentary Assembly. The
Parliamentary Assembly may provide by law that certain types of agreements do not
require such consent." (Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, English trans!., online:
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina <
http://www.ustavnisud.balpublic/down/USTAV_BOSNE_1_HERCEGOVINE_eng!.pdf
»).
407 Under the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ 2004/C 310/1 [Draft
Constitution for Europe], the Union's treaty-making powers remain an attributive
jurisdiction. Thus, Art. 1-13 (2) of the Draft Constitution for Europe, ibid., provides that
"[t]he Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international
agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is
necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or insofar as its
conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope" (emphasis added) and Art. 111-323
to 111-326 specify the scope and process of the Union's treaty-making powers. While, Art.
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After all, we have to remember that a preliminary verSIOn of Art. 6 of the Vienna
Convention - then Art. 5 (2) of the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties - explicitly
recognized a jus tractatum to federated states on the condition that the federal constitution
granted them such powers. 408 The International Law Commission, commenting on the
Draft Articles on the Law ofTreaties, declared that it
111-323 (2) provides that "[international a]greements concluded by the Union are binding on
the institutions of the Union and on its Member States", the Draft Constitution for Europe,
ibid., clearly contemplates that the constitutive units will retain treaty-making powers at
Art. 1-40 (5):
Member States shall consult one another within the European Council and
the Council on any foreign and security policy issue which is of general
interest in order to determine a common approach. Before undertaking any
action on the international scene or any commitment which could affect the
Union's interests, each Member State shall consult the others within the
European Councilor the Council. Member States shall ensure, through the
convergence of their actions, that the Union is able to assert its interests and
values on the international scene. Member States shall show mutual
solidarity. (Emphasis added.)
When a subject-matter would not "affect the Union's interests", Member States would not
owe others anything before "undertaking any action on the international scene or any
commitment". And, provided that Members States ensure that, "through the convergence of
their actions, the Union is able to assert its interests and values on the international scene"
and show "mutual solidarity", their obligation would be limited to consulting other Member
States before they would undertake a commitment that "could affect the Union's interests".
408 International Law Commission (lLC), Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with
commentaries, 18th Sess., Y.B.I.L.C. 1966, II, 177, 178, Art. 5 (2) ("States members of a
federal union may possess a capacity to conclude treaties if such a capacity is admitted by
the federal constitution and within the limits there laid down") [Draft Articles on the Law of
Treaties with commentaries].
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considered that it was desirable to underline the capacity possessed by every
State to conclude treaties; and that, having regard to the examples which
occur in practice of treaties concluded by member States of certain federal
unions with foreign States in virtue of powers given to them by the
constitution of the particular federal union, a general provision covering such
cases should be included.
Paragraph 2, therefore, is concerned only with treaties made by a unit of the
federation with an outside State. More frequently, the treaty-making capacity
is vested exclusively in the federal government, but there is no rule of
international law which precludes the component States from being invested
with the power to conclude treaties with third States. Questions may arise in
some cases as to whether the component State concludes the treaty as an
organ of the federal State or in its own right. But on this point also the
solution must be sought in the provisions of the federal constitution.409
Art. 5 (2) was dropped from the final version of the Convention after being voted down
following the active lobbying of Canada and other countries.4lo However, the states who
opposed the inclusion of Art. 5 (2) in the Convention did not do so on the basis that
federated states could not make treaties, but rather opposed it mainly on the basis that
making capacity solely dependent on the content of specific federal constitutions might be
taken as an invitation to other states to pass judgment on the internal affairs of such
federations. 411 At any rate, while Ivan Bernier and Gibran van Ert are of the view that the
409 Draft Articles on the Law ofTreaties with commentaries, ibid., at 192 (emphasis added).
410 Edward McWhinney (Book Review of Les Etats Federaux dans les Relations
Internationales : actes du colloque de Bruxelles, Institut de sociologie, 26-27 fevrier 1982/
Societe beige de droit international (S.B.D.I) (1984) 80 A.J.I.L. 998) reports (at 999) that
Art. 5 (2) "was deleted by a vote of the UN
General Assembly in plenary session (66 votes to 28, with 13 abstentions)".
4]\ J. S. Stanford, "United Nations Law of Treaties Conference: First Session" (1969) 19
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principles of the old Art. 5 (2) represents the orthodox position,412 it appears that even this
view may be too restrictive in light of current practices. As a matter of fact, it is dubious
that only a "federal constitution" could grant treaty-making powers to constitutive sub-
units, as the cases of the Faeroe Islands and Greenland in Denmark4I3 and the projected
European confederation illustrate.414 At any rate, whether the criteria refer to the "federal
constitution" or other internal sources of law for the international recognition of the treaty-
U.T.L.l. 59, 6l.
412 Ivan Bernier, International Legal Aspects of Federalism (London U.K.): Longman,
1973) 82 and G. van Ert, "The Legal Character of Provincial Agreements with Foreign
Governments", note 317.
413 Council of Europe, Federated And Regional Entities And International Treaties, supra
note 400 ("In almost all the states concerned, the entities' powers in relation to international
affairs are based on the constitution. The only exception is Denmark, where the relevant
powers of the Faeroe Islands and Greenland derive from laws on the self-governing status
of those regions. In Belgium, the constitutional provisions are amplified by the special law
on institutional reform of 8 August 1980 and by a number of "co-operation agreements"
between the federal state and the regions or language communities.")
414 Treaty-making powers are not granted to constitutive states by the Draft Constitution for
Europe, supra note 407, quite the contrary. Treaty-making powers are taken to rest, by
default, in the constitutive states of Europe and are thus recognized by their respective
material constitutions. It is rather as a matter of exceptional devolution from the
constitutive states to the European government that the latter would receive certain treaty-
making powers through the Draft Constitution for Europe, ibid. In other words, it would
not be the "federal constitution" that would grant constitutive states their treaty-making
powers because those states already possess their own treaty-making powers by virtue of
their own constitution, but the "federal constitution" would rather operate the limited
devolution to the central government of certain powers to make treaties on its own.
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making powers of federated states, this again sends the federal government begging for the
answer it was looking for: the international law rule ends up following what the domestic
law will say. In other words, international law basically takes the view that it is up to
domestic law to settle the issue as to whether or not sub-units will have the capacity to
make treaties. Therefore, those who wanted to use international law to argue that the federal
government necessarily had general treaty-making powers are again sent back to square
one.
Before concluding on this point, a few words need to be added for those who worry
that recognizing treaty-making powers to provinces might help those provinces in
achieving international recognition in the event of a declaration of secession. It should have
become clear to everyone as a result of the foregoing discussion that this is simply a non
sequitur. Those who have expressed this fear have never been able to point to a single case
in which the prior capacity to make treaties of a seceding federated unit has either been
determinative or has made the slightest difference in the decision of other states to
recognize or not that unit as a new "sovereign state". This is like hanging tightly to one's
belt and suspenders out of fear of losing one's hat! Because of the difficulties in arriving at
a fixed definition of what a "state" is in our rapidly changing international order, it appears
however that the criteria for determining the existence of a state are no more than an
incomplete list of "rules of thumb" for state recognition and that, in the end, what truly
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matters in the case of alleged secession is the political415 and legally underdetermined act of
.. 416
recogmtIOn.
After reviewing all the evidence, I come to the conclusion that none of the proposed
legal arguments is sufficient to support the claim made that the federal government has
plenary powers to make treaties. That being said, I will offer later417 an alternative theory
explaining how and why the federal government may, under certain conditions, conclude
treaties in relation to provincial matters. This theory will prove more respectful of the
general economy of the Constitution and the federalism principle.
415 Sir Hersch Lauterpacht famously wrote in 1947 that "[a]ccording to what is probably
still the predominant view in the literature of international law, recognition of states is not a
matter governed by law but a question of policy" (Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in
International Law (Cambridge (U.K.): Cambridge University Press, 1947) at 65).
416 For a similar opinion, see: Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Droit international public (Paris:
Dalloz, 2004) at 98. American officials have been quite blunt about this. For example,
Robert J. Delahunty and John C. Yoo, respectively former Special Counsel and former
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, with the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of
Justice during Georges W. Bush's presidency, wrote (Robert J. Delahunty and John C.
Yoo, "Statehood And The Third Geneva Convention" (2005) 46 Va. J. Int'l L. 131, 153):
When one surveys the practice of the United States in recognizing, not
recognizing, or derecognizing states, it is obvious that our Government does
not apply the Montevideo Convention tests of statehood in a value-neutral
manner. On the contrary, our governmental practice reveals that the decision
whether or not to recognize or derecognize a state is highly policy-laden.
417 See section 2.c.
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II. The Strong Policy Arguments Against Plenary Federal
Treaty-Making Powers
In addition to the weakness of the legal arguments in support to the federal claim,
there are strong policy arguments against recognizing to the federal government a general
power to make treaties that would cover both federal and provincial matters. This part of
the thesis will highlight a selection of those arguments. In the following sections, I will first
show that, to the extent that Canada gains from "speaking with one voice" in international
arena, this does not entail that the federal government should be the one speaking for all
(2.a.ii.l). Once I have shown that there are no necessary connections between the needs for
Canada to speak with a common voice and giving the federal government plenary treaty-
making powers, I will further show why it would actually be detrimental to Canada to
recognize such general treaty-making powers to the federal government. To do that, I will
rely on a discussion of the needs to align power with expertise (2.a.ii.2) and democratic
accountability (2.a.ii.3). Finally, I will explain why recognizing plenary treaty-making
powers to the federal government would not be good for national unity (2.a.iiA).
1. Many Ways to "One Voice"
The general policy claim made by those who would like to see the federal
government have plenary powers to make treaties can be summarized by the words of G.R.
Morris: "international affairs today is too crucial, complex and all-pervasive to permit the
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possibility of the nation speaking formally with more than one voice in any international
matters of significance".418 While the importance, complexity and pervasiveness of
international affairs today remains beyond doubt as a general notion, I do not believe,
however, that this context necessarily calls for federal plenary treaty-making powers.
As a preliminary matter, it must be acknowledged that the federal government can,
in principle, develop coherent positions on matters relevant to its own exclusive
jurisdictions such as on matters relating to the military, navigation, fisheries, banking,
copyrights, etc. However, as we will see later in the section dealing with the need to "align
power with expertise" (2.a.ii.2), there are institutional constraints that make that internal
cohesion hard to attain. Thus, dissonance between specific positions defended by the
different parts of the federal government is obviously to be expected. Although the federal
government has internal mechanisms to achieve coherence, cases will inevitably exist
where different departments will take inconsistent views until coherence is achieved by a
central agency such as the Prime Minister's office. Because this is generally an undeniable
difficulty for the "Canadian sovereignist,,419 position, I will examine it in more detail later.
For the moment, I will simply deal more specifically in this section with Ottawa's
apologists' worries about achieving coherence for international relations purposes on
provincial matters.
418 G.R. Morris, "The Treaty-Making Power: A Canadian Dilemma", supra note 22 at 497.
419 On "Canadian sovereignists", see supra at 135 and infra at 233.
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I need to start by clearly pointing out that provincial and territorial presence in
international relations does not, per se, preclude that singularity of a Canadian "voice".
What would really have the effect of causing "cacophonic voices" would be the lack of
adequate means to coordinate several provincial perspectives when an issue relates to their
own exclusive competences, or the lack of an appropriate mechanism to develop common
policies on issues that relate to matters of both federal and provincial jurisdictions. But it is
not at all clear why the federal government, when it has no jurisdiction on an issue and
when it has not been called upon to do the job, could effectively and legitimately decide
which province's interests should trump which other province's interest when they may
conflict. This is particularly true in contexts where the federal government is not
necessarily in a situation to create the incentives necessary for harmonizing all the
positions.
There are other means to achieve coherence than having decisions dictated by the
federal government. If the problem is to find an institution capable of harmonizing
provincial views, something akin to a modified Council of the Federation might very well
do the trick. The Council of the Federation is an intergovernmental organisation made up of
the Premiers of all Canadian provinces and territories.42o The Council recognized that
420 I note immediately that while I will be discussing here and later certain actions
undertaken by Canadian territories, I will not be discussing the issue of their constitutional
powers and limitations in this thesis. Those actions are simply presented as examples of
what political sub-units do within the Canadian federation.
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"[u]nder the Constitution, Canada's two orders of government are of equal status, neither
subordinate to the other, sovereign within their own areas of jurisdiction; and accordingly,
they should have adequate resources to meet their responsibilities".42I Therefore, the
Council aims, among other things, at "strengthening interprovincial-territorial co-
operation",422 "exercising leadership on national issues of importance to provinces and
territories and in improving federal-provincial-territorial relations,,423 and "promoting
relations between governments which are based on respect for the constitution and
recognition of the diversity within the federation".424 To the extent that the Council is only
composed of the Premier of each province and territory, it would obviously gain from more
democratic inputs. For example, if the Council were to become the institution through
which provinces were to develop their common foreign policies in relation to their
exclusive jurisdictions, it would certainly gain from including representatives of civil
society somewhere in the process. In other words, the Council would gain legitimacy by
moving from being simply a tool of "executive federalism" to a true institution of "federal
democracy".425 Be that as it may, the Councilor a similar institution where provinces and
421 Council of the Federation, Founding Agreement, December 5, 2003 (Charlottetown: 5
September, 2003) online: Council of the Federation
<http://www.councilofthefederation.ca/pdfs/850095003_e.pdf>, preamble [Council of the
Federation, Founding Agreement].
422 Ibid., art. 3 (a).
423 Ibid., art. 3 (b).
424 Ibid., art. 3 (a). Ibid., art. 3 (c).
425 For a critical overview of the current work of the Council of the Federation, see Jean
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territories are themselves represented could certainly achieve the goal of harmonizing
views for the purpose of presenting a common vision to the world.
This would not be a first. In Belgium, for example, the three "regions,,426 are
responsible for both developing the foreign policies of the country and representing the
country in international institutions on matters that pertain to their jurisdictions. Thus, when
an issue is a "regional" matter, representatives of the regional governments are the ones
representing Belgium as a whole and not the central government. This could be done in
Canada as well. In fact, this has been done in the past. Take for example, the "Council of
Ministers of Education, Canada" (CMEC) that was created in 1967 to coordinate provincial
and territorial actions in relation to education. According to CMEC's own website,
"CMEC's mandate internationally is that of coordinating the collective responsibility of the
provinces and territories for education where the activities concerned require experts,
delegates or reports that speak for Canadian education authorities as a whole.,,427 This
international role of the CMEC has long been recognized by the federal government. In
1977, the federal Foreign Affairs Minister concluded an agreement with the CMEC to the
effect that the latter would be able to recommend the composition of the Canadian missions
Leclair, "Jane Austen and the Council of the Federation" (2006) 15 Const. Forum 51.
426 "Regions" are the functional equivalents of provinces in Canada.
427 Council of Ministers of Education, Canada, CMEC and education-related international
activities, online: Council of Ministers of Education
<http://www.cmec.ca/international/indexe.stm>.
international activities].
[CMEC and education-related
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and to decide who would lead the mISSIOns to any international event in relation to
education.428 Also, this protocol, to which all provinces agreed, provides that it is the
provinces, through consensus, that determine the Canadian positions over educational
matters.429 The CMEC also maintains a permanent secretariat to sustain Canada's relations
with education-related international organisations.43o
Belgian regions have also developed mechanisms to produce such common policies.
In order to deal with the possibility of not being able to achieve a common position on a
subject, the three Belgian regions have found a powerful incentive to come up with an
agreement: either they develop a common position or Belgium as a whole takes no position
428Stephane Paquin, "Quelle place pour les provinces canadiennes dans les organisations et
les negociations internationales du Canada a la lumiere des pratiques au sein d'autres
federations?" (2005) 48 Administration publique du Canada/Canadian Public
Administration 477.
429 Ibid.
430 Ibid. The CMEC's website mentions that it has developed relations with a wide variety
of education-related international organisations (CMEC and education-related
international activities, supra note 427):
CMEC's international activities have traditionally involved three major
international organizations, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the Commonwealth. While other
partnerships have been formed with the Southeast Asian Ministers of
Education Organization (SEAMEO), the Council of Europe, the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) Education Forum, the Organization of
American States (OAS), and the Summit of the Americas process, both
OECD and UNESCO, as well as the Commonwealth, continue to playa
prominent role.
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whatsoever on the issue.431
While certain subjects might be amenable to such all or nothing approach, others
might be less so. And since there are more constitutive units in Canada than there are in
Belgium, this mechanism would probably not be appropriate for most issues requiring a
common position. However if we use a bit of our institutional imagination and knowledge
of comparative law, we can easily design a further mechanism that would weaken the
possibility of impasses (possibly, however, at the cost of limiting the incentives to
harmonize positions). For example, in order to avoid deadlocks on certain issues, we could
tamper the system by adding to it something similar to the principle of "constructive
abstention" developed by the European Union. The principle was developed and adopted
with the Treaty ofAmsterdam432 as a way out of a difficult conundrum in the development
of rules relating to European defence and security policy: how to accommodate the idea
that states should remain responsible for the decision of sending their own troops to combat
while, at the same time, allowing Europe to develop common defence position even in the
face of a lack of unanimity? The amendment to the Article J.l 0 of title V ("Provisions On
A Common Foreign And Security Policy") of the Treaty on European Union433 brought by
431 I would like to thank Stephane Paquin for informing me about this mechanism.
432 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty of the European Union, the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, 2 October 1997, [1997]
OJ C340/1 (entered into force 1 May 1999) [Treaty ofAmsterdam].
433 Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992, [1992] OJ. C224179, 31 LL.M. 247
(entered into force 1 November 1993) [Treaty on European Union].
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Art. 1 (10) of the Treaty ofAmsterdam was thus meant to solve that problem. It reads:
Decisions under this Title shall be taken by the Council acting unanimously.
Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not prevent
the adoption of such decisions.
When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its
abstention by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph.
In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that
the decision commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member
State concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or
impede Union action based on that decision and the other Member States
shall respect its position. If the members of the Council qualifying their
abstention in this way represent more than one third of the votes weighted in
accordance with Article 205(2) of the Treat~ establishing the European
Community, the decision shall not be adopted.4 4
We could build on this example to adopt a procedure aimed at constructing a
common interprovincial position over certain specified matters of international import.
According to this decision-making procedure, one or more provinces could decide to
abstain from the common position and their abstention would not count as negative votes
for the purpose of reaching unanimity. If a province "constructively abstained" and made
an official declaration pertaining to that abstention, that province would, moreover, not be
bound by that decision. A treaty, for example, agreed upon by the other provinces would
need to explicitly exclude the province in question from its application through a specific
reserve. The minimum number of supporting provinces could be uniformly set or could
vary according to the subject-matter of the decision to be taken. It might also be agreed,
434 The amendment has been integrated in the Consolidated Version of Treaty on European
Union, 12 December 2002, [2002] O.J. C325/5 at 18, Art. 23 (1).
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when setting up such a coordination mechanism, that provinces could still retain their
powers to make their own arrangements with the targeted partners if they disagreed with
the majority of the other provinces on certain subject-matters. One could think about issues
related to language, for example. After all, it might be useful to achieve unity of voice on
many issues but it might not be desirable, in light of Canada's diversity and minority rights,
to always develop a single position on every issue; that is the reason why we chose a
federal system after all! Following this line of reasoning, the agreement setting up this
procedure could specify an exhaustive list of subject-matters over which the procedure
would be applicable while leaving others to the discretion of provinces.
The purpose behind this brief sketch of institutional options IS simply to
demonstrate that the "one voice" trope does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the
federal government must necessarily have plenary powers to make treaties; there are many
other ways to achieve that objective. While I do believe that the available options might
constitute good starting points for negotiations that would lead to an agreement, I am not
necessarily committed to any of those specific institutional arrangements. But at any rate,
this type of decision-making procedure would certainly be much more attuned to the basic
principle of Canadian federalism highlighted by the Council of the Federation ("Canada's
two orders of government are of equal status, neither subordinate to the other, sovereign
within their own areas of jurisdiction,,435) than the federal sovereignist position too often
advocated by Ottawa while at the same time respecting the possible imperative of
435 Council of the Federation, Founding Agreement, supra note 421.
215
univocality.
Given the existing alternatives, those who defend Ottawa's claim to plenary treaty-
making powers must now demonstrate (l) that the federal government is necessarily in a
better institutional situation to achieve a "unity of voice", (2) that the unitary position will
be a well-informed one, and that it can do so while being more respectful than other
arrangements to the Canadian underlying constitutional values of (3) democracy and (4)
federalism. I have raised questions about the first standard in this section and I will now
present arguments demonstrating that the current general position of the federal
government also fails on criteria (2), (3) and (4).
2. The Need to Align Power with Expertise
Gerald Morris noted many years ago, when states were not organisations as
complex as there are today, that "[e]ven a unitary state today has extreme difficulty in
coordinating all aspects of its international re1ations.,,436 While it is true, as Morris also
pointed out, that "some measure of consistency is essential if a nation's influence is to be
used with any effectiveness in the pursuit of its objectives",437 consistency should not come
at the expense of expertise. Indeed, it is often worse to be wrong and resolute than to be
right and wavering.
436 G.R. Morris, "The Treaty-Making Power: A Canadian Dilemma", supra note 22 at 503.
437 Ibid.
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Thus, one important weakness that affects the ability to negotiate appropriate
international agreements for Canadians lies in the federal executive's assumed monopoly
over such negotiations. In effect, to be effective, power has to be aligned with
knowledge.438 This raises an important challenge to the Canadian sovereignists since the
federal government claims that it is under no obligation to consult provinces before
concluding international agreements affecting provinces' legislative jurisdiction. The
federal government has stated officially that it would not enter into treaties "dealing with
matters within provincial jurisdiction ... without prior consultation with the Governments
of the Provinces,,439 but refuses to recognize that it is bound by an obligation to consult.44o
438 The following reflection was triggered by a discussion that I had with Andrew Petter
and I would like to thank him for that.
439 Canada, Legal Bureau of the Department of External Affairs, Letter February 1, 1985,
supra note 60 from the Legal Bureau of the then Department of External Affairs responding
to a Council of Europe questionnaire.
440 A series of attempts at recognizing such obligation were made in Parliament. However,
they have all failed. The latest occasion was with Bill C-260, An Act respecting the
negotiation, approval, tabling and publication oftreaties, 1st Sess., 38th ParI., 2004, cls. 3
and 4 (as passed first reading by the House of Commons 3 November 2004 and rejected on
second reading by the House of Commons 28 September 2005) [An Act respecting the
negotiation. approval. tabling andpublication oftreaties] stated explicitly that:
3. The Government of Canada may,
without consulting the government of each
province, negotiate and enter into a treaty
in a sector within the exclusive legislative
authority of Parliament that does not affect
an area under the legislative authority of
the legislatures of the provinces.
4. The Government of Canada shall not,
without consulting the government of each
province in accordance with the
agreements entered into under section 5,
negotiate or conclude a treaty
(a) in an area under the legislative
authority of the legislatures of the
prOVInces; or
(b) in a field affecting an area under
the legislative authority of the
legislatures of the provinces.
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3. Le gouvemement du Canada peut, sans
consulter les gouvemements provinciaux,
negocier et conclure un traite dans un
secteur relevant exclusivement de la
competence legislative du Parlement qui
ne touche pas un secteur de competence
legislative provinciale.
4. Le gouvemement du Canada ne peut,
sans consulter Ie gouvemement de chaque
province conformement aux ententes
conclues aux termes de l'article 5, negocier
ou conclure un traite :
a) dans un secteur de competence
legislative provinciale;
b) dans un domaine touchant un
secteur de competence legislative
provinciale.
The bill was defeated on the second reading over disagreements about the "consultation"
requirement. In particular, the Liberal MPs, who were then forming a minority government,
were adamently opposed to the Bill because they believed that it would negate what they
conceived as the exclusive federal treaty powers. For example, the Honorable Dan
McTeague, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs said that "it is clear
that the member's efforts build on work done in the past by other members of the Bloc
Quebecois, in order, for one, to give the provinces powers that are clearly federal ones
under the Constitution. Not only is this set out in the Constitution but it was confirmed too
by the Supreme Court of Canada in the 1930s." (House o.fCommons Debates, No. 101 (18
May 2005) at 1815, online: Edited Hansard <
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Pub=Hansard&
Mode=1&Parl=38&Ses=1&Doc=101#T1815> (Hon. Dan McTeague) (emphasis added)
[House of Commons Debates, No. 101 (18 May 2005)]) . But the crux of McTeague's
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opposition would come a few minutes later:
The bill before us creates nothing new in this regard, but forces a straitjacket
on the Canadian government in having it consult its provincial partners.
The requirement to negotiate individual agreements with each province
under the pressure of an artificial timeframe, which this bill would create, is
not only useless, but the cost of it would be prohibitive and could produce
unexpected results. It could, potentially, oblige us to replace an efficient
system with something less flexible, creating uncertainty that does not
currently exist.
The bill before us raises another major concern in constitutional terms. Its
provisions would limit the government's power to conclude treaties in areas
of federal jurisdiction without consultation with the provinces. Canadian
constitutional law has provided for over 60 years that the power to negotiate
and conclude treaties lies exclusively with the federal government. This
power is essential to Canada's speaking with a single voice internationally.
Among the proposals made by the hon. member for Haute-Gaspesie-La
Mitis-Matane-Matapedia in Bill C-260, one of them mentions the royal
prerogative in right of provincial governments with respect to the negotiation
and conclusion of treaties in an area under the legislative authority of the
provinces.
I have to say, in no uncertain terms, this provincial prerogative does not exist
at this time.
As I already mentioned, the prerogative to negotiate and sign any
international treaties belongs only to the federal executive branch.
In that sense, Bill C-260 would violate the provision in the Constitution on
the allocation of jurisdictions. It bears repeating that the power of the
provinces to negotiate and conclude treaties simply does not exist.
An amendment of this scale to the constitutional order would require more
than a debate in this chamber. It would involve significant and lasting
changes to the Constitution. (Emphasis added.)
Mr. Wajid Kahn (Liberal) also held the view that "[u]nder our Constitution, the power to
conclude treaties belongs exclusively to the executive branch of the federal government.
This means that it is the federal executive that negotiates the treaties and agrees to commit
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Canada to international obligations." (Ibid. at 1840). Mr. Derek Lee (Liberal) repeated in
almost the same words what the Honorable Dan McTeague had said a few days earlier
((House of Commons Debates, No. 122 (23 June 2005) at 1740, online: Edited Hansard
<http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Pub=Hansard
&Mode=1&Parl=38&Ses=1&Doc=122#lnt-1372283> (Derek Lee)), Don Boudrias
(Liberal) also repeated the mantra that "Canadian constitutional law has provided for over
60 years that the power to negotiate and conclude treaties lies exclusively with the federal
executive, to the governor in council. This power is essential to Canada's speaking with a
single voice internationally, as it must." (Ibid. at 1805) and Ms. Yasmin Ratansi (Liberal)
declared that "Canadian constitutional law clearly establishes that the negotiation of a treaty
and signatory of a treaty are strictly in the purview of the federal executive." (Ibid. at
1810). While Ms. Alexa McDonough (New Democratic Party (NDP)) recognized the
shortcomings of the current federal ratification mechanism that excludes Parliament, she
claimed that (ibid. at 1750):
we have to be sure that we have preserved the ability of the federal
government, the Parliament of Canada, to act in the national interest. If we
create a process of consultation with provincial governments that is
cumbersome and impractical and that in fact can make it almost impossible
for the government to act in the national interest, then we have not created a
solution. We have created yet another problem.
Pat Martin (NDP) expressed his reservations in even stronger terms (ibid. at 1820):
No one province should have too much control over a national treaty. This is
where I find fault with the bill we are debating. There are good reasons that
no one rogue province and no one rogue state should be able to unilaterally
alter or compromise international treaties that exist between nation-states.
There is only one nation-state that we are dealing with in the Parliament of
Canada. It is the nation-state of Canada. That is all there is. I do not want to
encourage or lend succour or support in any way to anyone who envisions
some other nation-state within these hallowed chambers.
While the position of the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) presented by Mr.
Stockwell Day (House ofCommons Debates, No. 101 (18 May 2005), at 1850-55) seemed,
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If the federal government does not recognize an obligation to consult provinces when it
negotiate treaties on matters affecting provincial subject-matters, nor does it recognize that
it has an obligation to get provinces' consent before forming such agreements related to
provinces legislative powers. This basically means that the federal government is of the
view that it can conclude agreements on matters in which it has no expertise whatsoever.
Apart from the valid constitutional arguments in favour of recognizing mandatory
provincial involvement, it should by now be obvious that there are strong policy reasons for
doing so.
In fact, Ottawa's current position is quite anachronistic in light of the federal
government's own structure. In effect, now that foreign affairs are not simply about the
"high politics" of war and peace, but rather involve a wide range of domestic issues,
foreign affairs have been "domesticated" and are now conducted by a wide range of
initially, to be supportive of the Bill, the CPC ended up leaving only the Bloc Quebecois
voting in favour of the Bill. The Bill was thus defeated 54 (yeas) to 216 (nays) [37 (absent
or abstained)]. For previous efforts to have the obligation to consult, see among others: Bill
C-313, An Act respecting the negotiation. approval, tabling and publication of treaties, 1st
Sess., 37th ParI., 2001, cls. 4 (first reading by the House of Commons 28 March 2001); Bill
C-317, An Act to provide for consultation with provincial governments when treaties are
negotiated and concluded, 1st Sess., 37th ParI., 2001, cls. 4 (first reading by the House of
Commons 28 March 2001) and Bill C-214, Act to provide for the participation of the
House of Commons when treaties are concluded, 2nd Sess., 36th ParI., 1999, cls. 4
(rejected on second reading by the House of Commons 13 June 1999).
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departments - that is, where the expertise on the subject-matter lies. For example,
Environment Canada has been involved at different levels of international relations for
quite sometime. On its website, Environment Canada describes as follows its international
involvements:
For its part, Environment Canada has long been a contributor to the
Government of Canada's international environmental agenda by advancing
and sharing science and know-how, as well as through negotiations and
policy dialogue in international fora. To better address the environmental
challenges of our global environment, an approach to enhance knowledge,
innovation and partnerships, within Canada and internationally, has been
. initiated by Environment Canada.
The International Relations Directorate (IRD) plays the central policy and
coordination role for Environment Canada's international activities. It
provides strategic advice on international relations, develops the strategic
framework within which the Department's international activities are
managed, participates in the negotiation and implementation of international
agreements and MOUs [memorandum of understanding], and provides
policy and operational support to the Minister, DM [Deputy Minister] and
senior management on international activities. The directorate's
responsibilities also include managing the Department's bilateral and
regional relations (e.g. North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation) as well as participation in international organizations such as
the International Joint Commission, the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development, and the United Nations Environment
Program. 441
Even foreign affairs as such are divided in several departments within the federal
government: there is a Minister of Foreign Affairs, a Minister of International Trade, a
Minister of National Defence, a Minister of International Cooperation and a Minister
441 Canada, Environment Canada, International Relations: Welcome, online: Environment
Canada <http://www.ec.gc.calinternationallindex_e.htm>.
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Moreover, even the more purely technical knowledge about the conduct of "foreign
affairs" is scattered across several departments. Take, for example, the strong expertise that
the Department of Justice has developped on a variety of public international law issues.
This is not hidden but displayed on plain view by the Department:
The Department's international law work ensures integrated and proactive
legal advisory, policy and litigation services to a range of governmental
clients. The work covers issues central to Canada's interests, such as
international human rights and humanitarian law; national security; anti-
terrorism and transnational crime; international trade and investment law and
intellectual property law; family law and other international private law
matters; and international aviation, maritime and environmental law.
International Cooperation
The International Cooperation Group (lCG) promotes Canadian values of
justice and good governance by implementing projects abroad.443
One might have thought that the Department of Foreign Affairs had inherited the
capacity to coordinate all the federal departments in their international relations. However,
this has not happened. Pierre Elliott Trudeau's attempt to transform the then External
Affairs Department into a central agency akin to the Departmcnt of Financc, or the
Treasury Board, failed in large part apparently because the Department had very little other
442 The last two portfolios are currently held (2006/02/06 - ... ) by the same person (Hon.
Josee Verner).
443 Canada, Department of Justice, The Department: Our Work, online: Department of
Justice < http://www.justice.gc.ca/enidept/work.html>.
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power, other than persuasive reasons, to impose its position on other departments.444
Now, as Denis Stairs notes, "[s]ome of the Department [of Foreign Affairs]'s more
reflective officials express concern that their role is now less about the making of foreign
policy and more about providing support services to departments elsewhere in
government.,,445 That is because the federal government IS also realizing that the
Department of Foreign Affairs simply cannot replicate the substantive expertise of all the
other departments. This is the reality of modem bureaucratic politics. And because
globalization implies that the frontiers between the domestic and international politics are
blurring, it would be senseless anyway to try to develop two parallel federal governments -
one dealing with internal issues and the other dealing with the same issues externally.446
444 Denis Stairs, "The Conduct of Canadian Foreign Policy and the Interests of
Newfoundland and Labrador" in Collected Research Papers of the Royal Commission on
Renewing and Strengthening Our Place in Canada, vol. 2 (St. John's (NL): Royal
Commission on Renewing and Strengthening Our Place in Canada, 2003) 147, online:
Newfoundland & Labrador, Research Papers
<http://www.gov.nf.ca/publicat/royalcommJresearch/Stairs.pdf>.at 9. [Denis Stairs, "The
Conduct of Canadian Foreign Policy and the Interests ofNewfoundland and Labrador" with
references to online version].
445 Ibid. at 6-7.
446 The Canada School of Public Service Action-Research Roundtable on Managing
Canada-US Relations has produced a very instructive compendium that offers a snapshot of
the different channels of collaboration between certain federal institutions (Agriculture and
Agri-Food Canada, Bank of Canada, Canada Border Services Agency, Canadian Food
Inspection Agency, Canadian Space Agency, Citizenship and Immigration Canada,
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If the Department of Foreign Affairs cannot develop the expertise necessary to
conduct federal relations with respect to subject-matters of federal jurisdiction, we can
easily imagine the difficulties it faces in relation to provincial matters. And to the extent
that provinces are not necessarily included in federal negotiations and that the federal
government attempts to muzzle the provinces' international activity, Canada condemns
herself at being, to a large extent, reactive and ill-informed on issues related to provincial
jurisdiction. After all, initiatives are the products of expertise, means and incentives. And
the federal government not only lacks the expertise to deal with provincial issues at an
international level, but it also lacks the legitimate incentives to do so. This is what I will
discuss in the next section.
Competition Bureau, Environment Canada, Finance Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada,
Foreign Affairs Canada, Health Canada, Industry Canada, International Joint Commission,
International Trade Canada, Justice Canada, NAFTA Secretariat, National Defence,
National Energy Board, Natural Resources Canada, Parks Canada, Privy Council Office,
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (Portfolio), Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness Canada (Emergency Management and National Security Branch),
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Standards Council of Canada, Statistics Canada,
Transport Canada) and those of the United States. See Canada School of Public Service,
CSPS Action-Research Roundtable on Managing Canada-US Relations, Building Cross-
Border Links: A Compendium of Canada-US Government Collaboration by Dieudonne
Mouafo, Nadia Ponce Morales, Jeff Heynen,· eds. (Ottawa: CSPS Action-Research
Roundtable on Managing Canada-US Relations, 2004) (Chair: Louis Ranger) [CSPS,
Building Cross-Border Links: A Compendium ofCanada-US Government Collaboration].
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3. The Need to Align Power with Democratic Accountability
To the extent that one considers democratic accountability an important value,
allowing the federal government to make treaties in relation to provincial matters would be
worrisome for at least two reasons.
The first one is that it would allow for an "accountability mismatch": voters would
have a harder time identifying who is to praise (or who is to blame) for the policies
associated with the adopted treaties. This could have the effect, for example, of limiting the
efforts put towards the negotiation and adoption of a treaty that would be popular only in
one or a few provinces when the population of the other provinces is indifferent to the
issue, for the mere reason that the federal government would not gain much across the
country from investing resources in such a project. This phenomenon could be further
exacerbated if the treaty subject falls under the provincial jurisdiction and has no specific
and stable constituency to which it would appea1.447 On the other hand, this would allow the
federal government to get the credit for making a popular, yet costly, treaty while shifting
to the provinces the expenses of implementation and the blame for not doing so
appropriately.
447 This would help to explain, for example, the Canadian government's hesitant
participation in the work of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (see
Renaud Dehousse, Fediralisme et relations internationales (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1991) at
190.
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Second, this accountability mismatch has an important side-effect on the issue of
state responsibility at international law. Since there are no formal agreements on the issue
yet but only ad hoc arrangements when Canada's international responsibility is called into
question because of provincial (in)action, this puts Canada in a delicate situation. While in
the past, sanctions for not following international obligations were mostly diplomatic in
nature, monetary damages are now more important as commercial and investment treaties
have burgeoned. Until the federal government and the provinces come to an agreement on
the general issue of how responsibility should be allocated, the federal government has very
good reasons to avoid making treaties for which it cannot be sure that adequate
implementation will follow. But apart from the financial concerns, the issue of principle
here is that the proper demos should bear the costs of its international wrongdoings. When
one province is breaching international law on a matter related to her jurisdiction, it is
inappropriate to impose collective punishment on the population of all other provinces. If
the federal government and the provinces are equal in status and they each embody distinct
(although overlapping) political communities, responsibilities should fall squarely where it
belongs.
4. The Subsidiarity Principle, Existential Communities and
Functional Regimes
There is another reason why one should worry about democratic accountability, and
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this one is related to the democratic reasons that underlie the particular distribution of
powers in the Canadian federation. To that effect, the Supreme Court wrote:
The principle of federalism recognizes the diversity of the component parts
of Confederation, and the autonomy of provincial governments to develop
their societies within their respective spheres of jurisdiction. The federal
structure of our country also facilitates democratic participation by
distributing power to the government thought to be most suited to achieving
the particular societal objective having regard to this diversity.448
Recognizing a general federal power to make treaties in relation to provincial matters in an
era of globalization would simply ruin the federal principle. Subsidiarity, the hallmark of
federalism, would be irremediably destroyed. While other parts of the world are now
recognizing the increasing role of multilayered governance in order to better accommodate
local needs and diversity with the mutually beneficial pooling of resources, Canada would
to the contrary flatten its political landscape. Decisions relevant to one part of the political
community would be taken by another part of that community. The legitimate voice of the
provincial communities would be silenced to allow others to speak for them, to allow the
448 Reference Re Secession ofQuebec, supra note 76 at 109 ~ 58. See also Rinfret J in Nova
Scotia (A.-G) v. Canada (A.-G.), [1951] S.C.R. 31 [Nova Scotia (A.-G) v. Canada (A.-G.)],
34 who wrote:
The constitution of Canada does not belong either to Parliament, or to the
Legislatures; it belongs to the country and it is there that the citizens of the
country will find the protection of the rights to which they are entitled. It is
part of that protection that Parliament can legislate only on the subject
matters referred to it by section 91 and that each Province can legislate
exclusively on the subject matters referred to it by section 92.
This quote is cited with approval by the majority in the Patriation Reference. supra note
95.
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federal government's "single voice". This would not be good for Canada's unity.
As we have seen earlier, there are more ways than one to achieve a "singular"
Canadian voice in international relations. It seems, thus, that there is something more to the
trope of the singular voice than purely functional reasons. The real reasons seem to have
more to do with the fear that recognizing official roles to Quebec in international relations
would pull Quebeckers further away from the common federal project and would grant
ammunitions to Quebec's sovereignists in their bid for international recognition in the event
that they would win a future referendum. This is an erroneous perception: it is mistaken at
the legal level and it gets things totally in reverse at the political level. Let me explain.
As we have already seen, in the event of a "yes" vote in a future referendum on
Quebec's secession from Canada, the prior presence of Quebec on the international scene
would certainly not be determinant - or even be of any significant consequence - in other
countries' decision to recognize or not recognize Quebec as an independent country. Thus,
the "legal" concern is misplaced. The international system already recognizes that
international organisations and sub-national organisations can make treaties. Gone are the
days when there was a single international status at international law. Thus, in the event of
a "yes" vote, the relevant question would not be so much whether or not Quebec would be
recognized as an independent state, but rather what kind of rights and duties would be
recognized and what changes would occur in the respective situations of Quebec and
Canada in the current web of transnational structures and expectations. After all, in today's
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globalized world, state independence is quite a relative idea. But so does belonging.
And this leads to the political question underlying the current lack of agreement
between Canadian sovereignists and Quebec federalists. In order to clarify the source of the
problem and a possible way out, I need first to introduce a few conceptual tools.
We know that we now have, in the international arena, a multiplicity of legal
( . fi d d "1" .. 1·· 449 . .. 450statuses covenng states, e erate states, peop es , mumCIpa Itles, umversItles,
449 The Fourth Municipal Leaders Summit on Climate Change organized in Montreal in
parallel to the 11 th Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP11) and first Meeting of
the Parties (MOPl) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9
May 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, 31 I.L.M. 848 (entered into force 21 March 1994)
[UNFCCC] (the United Nations Climate Change Conference - Montreal 2005) offered a
recent example of the important international role that municipalities can play in
international relations. Not only were the municipalities able to lobby their own
governments, they also made commitments of their own including taking actions to "3.1
. . . achieve the emission reduction targets set forth in the International Youth Declaration
of 30% by 2020 and 80% by 2050 based on 1990 levels, building upon the actions already
taken by local governments that committed to a 20% reduction by 2010." Recognizing the
multiplicity of international actors needed to be mobilized to achieve their objectives, they
also committed to "3.6 Advancing partnerships and collaboration with national and sub
national governments, non-governmental organizations, corporate and industrial sectors, as
well as non-governmental organizations and community groups, in order to multiply
reduction potential." They also requested, among other things, that "4.1 Local governments
be recognized by the Conference of the Parties for the actions they have implemented and
are continuing, tangibly to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. ... ", "4.2 National and sub-
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international organisations, non-governmental organisations, multinational and
I
transnational corporations, individuals, etc.) to which are attached different rights, duties
and expectations that are often tailor-made to each type of status. In fact, the ontology of
this new world order is made of a wide variety of entities ranging from what I would call
national governments: recognize the fundamental role of local governments in mitigating
and adapting to climate change; partner with them to enhance their technical, human and
financial capacity and legislative authority; and fully engage them when making strategic
decisions on climate change policies" and that "National and sub-national governments
ensure that local governments have the opportunity to participate in emissions trading in
accordance with evolving domestic and international trading systems." (See Fourth
Municipal Leaders Summit on Climate Change, On the Occasion of the United Nations
Climate Change Conference (COP 11 and COP/MOP 1), World .Mayors and Municipal
Leaders Declaration on Climate Change (Montreal: 7 December 2005), online:
International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) - Local Government for
Sustainability <http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=2447>).
450 Apart from the networks of scientific cooperation and student exchange programs,
Universities are also becoming important international actors through their research and
policy centers that work, for example, on codifying international law and through their
international legal clinics that are actively involved in the international legal process. The
Centre d'etudes sur Ie droit international de la mondialisation (CEDIM) of the Universite
du Quebec a Montreal, for example, hosted in 2006 an int,ernational conference
"International Legal Clinics as New International Actors". The conference gathered key
clinical players from around the world to discuss not only strategies, and possible alliances
but also the very role of university legal clinics in our current world order. The Clinique
internationale de defense des droits humains de I'UQAM (CIDDHU) was launched at about
the same time. It is currently involved in cases related to human rights violations in
Colombia, Guatemala, HaYti, Dominican Republic, Burkina-faso, etc. 1
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"existential communities" to ''functional regimes" that are standing in a variety of ways to
one another. The multiplicity of types of actors and their different legal relations participate
in what many are now calling the development of a form of loose "international federalism"
of multi-layered governance.451 Rights, duties and expectations of the diverse entities that
now populate our world order will depend in part on their perceived situation on the
spectrum between the existential and the functional.
"Existential communities" are communities through which individual' selfuood is
451 See, for example, John O. McGinnis, "The Decline of the Western Nation State and the
Rise of the Regime of International Federalism" (1996) 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 903; Kenneth
W. Abbott, "Economic Issue and Political Participation: The Evolving Boundaries of
International Federalism" (1996) 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 971; Peter J. Spiro, "Foreign
Relations Federalism" (1999) 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1223; Daniel J. Elazar, "The State
System + Globalization (Economic Plus Human Rights) = Federalism (State Federations
Plus Regional Confederations)" (1999) 40 S. Tex. L. Rev. 555. This idea of nested political
organisations is not new nor is it associated with a single ideological current. In effect,
versions of those views can be found in the works of Johannes Althusius, Politica
Methodice Digesta (1603), trans. by Frederick S. Carney (Indianapolis: Liberty Press,
1995) or Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Le principe jederatif (1863) (Paris: M. Riviere, 1959).
For two thought-provoking reflections on polyarchy, see Roderick Macdonald,
"Kaleidoscopic Federalism" in Jean-Fran<;ois Gaudreault-DesBiens & Fabien Gelinas, eds,
Le federalisme dans tous ses etats / The States and Moods of Federalism (Cowansville
(Qc): Yvon Blais, 2005) 261 and Roberto Mangabeira Unger, What Should Legal Analysis
Become (London (U.K.): Verso, 1996) 148-163.
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constituted by a deep sense of "love",452 of loyalty and of identity, etc. to the other
members of the group. In other words, an existential community is what makes it possible
for the self to transcend the individual. Those communities, from the internal point of view
of committed members, are ends and not means. A paradigmatic case here would be the
Catholic view of the Church as the "corpus mysticum" of Christ.453 At the other end of the
spectrum, "functional regimes" are institutional mechanisms that are meant to solve
functional problems like coordination of behaviour. Those collective institutions are means
to achieve certain ends. A paradigmatic case here would be the International Organization
for Standardization (ISO). If any sense of identity result in the participation in the
functional regime, this is simply an incidental effect (except if the regime has been put in
place specifically for the purpose of inducing a sense of identity to its participants).
Obviously, whether an institution is primarily an existential one or a functional one can be
the object of heated controversy for people participating in that institution.
These ideas help to explain the constant misunderstanding between Quebec and
what is often referred to as the "rest of Canada" (ROC) by Quebeckers. Although the
"nation-state" is often taken to be an existential institution, multinational states are not
necessarily seen as such by all their members. This helps to understand both the comment
of the then sovereignist Premier of Quebec Lucien Bouchard in 1996 to the effect that
452 I do not intend to refer here to romantic love but rather something more transcending
than philia but not necessarily universal as agape.
453See Kantorowicz, The Kings Two Bodies, supra note 83.
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"Canada is divisible because it is not a real country,,454 and the ensuing furious reactions by
Canadian nationalists. One can read Bouchard's statement as meaning that Canada is not an
existential community but a mere functional regime. Thus, Canada could be fragmented at
will by the existential communities for which that regime was set up. For Canadian
nationalists, that was not only wrong descriptively but it was an insult to their sense of
identity because it negated their political existence. The reverse happens when English-
speakers do not understand why francophones in Quebec want to take special measures to
protect the French language as opposed to simply letting the "linguistic market" do its job.
Language for many francophones in Quebec is not a mere instrument of communication; it
is constitutive of the transcendent self.
Many political controversies unconsciously flow from disagreement over whether a
specific institution is primarily existential or whether it is primarily functional. The current
constitutional framework is imagined by "Canadian sovereignists" as instituting one
Canadian existential community (Canada) and ten mostly functional regimes (provinces),
while "Quebec sovereignists" imagine Quebec as their existential community being stuck
in a larger functional regime. Each desire a strong nation-state but they can't agree on
which institution embodies it. And to make matters a bit more complicated, it appears that,
to a large degree, even Quebec federalists tend to see themselves primarily as
454 Philip Authier, "Bouchard says no to partition" The [Montreal] Gazette (28 January
1996) AI.
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Quebeckers.455
There are two elements that results in increasing the tension between Quebeckers
and other Canadians that are relevant here. The first element is related to the way we
conceive states as existential communities and the second is associated with the political
455 For example, a Leger Marketing poll conducted for The Globe and Mail and Le Devoir
among 1,008 respondents throughout Quebec between April 20 and April 24, 2005 found
that 18% of respondents saw themselves as Quebecois only and 32% as more Quebecois
than Canadian, for a total of 50% of respondents who saw themselves more as Quebecois
than Canadian. Then, 35% of the respondents said that they are as much Quebecois as they
are Canadians. Only 7% of the respondents said that they were more Canadian than
Quebecois and 6% identified themselves as Canadian only. (The maximum margin of error
is ± 3,1%, 19 times out of 20. The poll results are available at Leger Marketing, The Globe
and Mail and Le Devoir, Press Release, "Quebec Poll" (27 April 2005), online: Leger
Marketing: <http://legermarketing.comJdocuments/spclm/050427ENG.pdf>). Another poll
conducted by Leger Marketing (for The Gazette and Le Journal de Montreal) among 2008
respondents throughout Quebec found that 58% of the respondents identified themselves as
"autonomistes" while other terms gathered much less support ("nationaliste" (55%),
"souverainiste (45%) and "federaliste" (33%)). The poll also found that 92% of the
respondents were "proud to be Quebecois" and 75% were "proud to be Canadians". These
numbers were surprisingly obtained while 54% of the respondents also said that they would
have voted "for sovereignty if a referendum on sovereignty with an offer of economic and
political partnership with the rest of Canada had been held" in the previous week. (The
maximum margin of error is ± 2,2%, 19 times out of 20. The poll results are available at
Leger Marketing, The [Montreal] Gazette and Le Journal de Montreal, Press Release,
"Quebec Survey" (14 May 2005), online: Leger Marketing
<http://legermarketing.com/documents/SPCLM/0505l6ENG.pdf>).
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psychology that flows from those conceptions.
In effect, one source of the Canadian problem is that many politicians in Canada and
Quebec are in fact "sovereignists". And here, I mean both Quebec independentists and
many Canadians who mistakenly call themselves "federalists". In fact, whether or not they
call themselves "sovereignists", they both use an arcane notion of sovereignty to frame
their political claims. In effect, the notion of sovereignty used by both Canadian
sovereignists (who claim that Canada must necessarily "speak with one voice", the federal
government's voice) and Quebec sovereignists (who claim that Quebec has reached her
maturity and must walk entirely on her own) is based in large parts on the "personification"
metaphor. The sovereign state is conceived as a "person" that has her "head", "arms",
"organs" and "members" that make a "body politic" with its own "will", "interests",
"dignity", etc. The state also acts as a person: it "protects" its "members" from "rogue
states" and other "enemies", it "demands" loyalty, its "organs" "provide" its "members"
with "support", it "educates" us, it "puts in place" market conditions, etc. That "person" can
be a "mother" or a "father",456 but an "uncivilised" or "underdeveloped" one is like a child
that needs help, perhaps a "tutor", a "protector" or a "mandator" to gain its autonomy and
to join the" international family". Canada's independence was portrayed that way: she
became mature enough to become independent from the "mother country". In fact, the
federal government's position in the Labour Conventions case was precisely couched in
456 Not only is the state sometimes said to be "paternalistic", but to it is even sometimes
called the "fatherland".
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terms of the "succession" from the "mother country". But in all those cases, the political
community is conceived as one unitary person: she "must speak with one voice".
That frame leaves little space for conceiving of the possibility of membership in
multiple existential communities. In fact, this conceptual metaphor does not leave space for
conceiving of a true federalism; federalism as the institutional expression of the idea that
individuals can belong to more than one existential community simultaneously. Federalism,
framed through that personhood metaphor, looks like a monster: it is a hydra, or Siamese
twins,457 with multiple heads. Conceived that way, federalism is necessarily pathological, it
is an unstable system that is called to reach its point of equilibrium either through
supremacy of the center or through independence of its components. From that conceptual
framework, dual loyalties are not conceivable. 458
457 Not surprisingly, that image of the Siamese twins has been used in Quebec literature to
describe the Canada/Quebec situation. See for example Jacques Godbout's metaphorical
novel Les tetes it Papineau (Paris: Le Seuil, 1981) where Siamese twins sharing one single
body debate whether or not they should undergo a surgery to be separated from each other.
However, this idea of a "body politic" that would have more than one "head" would be
"monstruous" is far from a new one. Otto Gierke described how, during the Middle Age,
the ecclesiastical party argued against the imperial party for a single "head" to the "mystical
body" that formed mankind in those very terms (see Gierke, Political Theories of the
Middle Age, supra note 5 at 22). It is not without irony that, today, it is the "statistically
Catholic" province that is countering the "one body, one head" argument coming from
provinces where Protestants are the majority.
458 For other criticisms of the state as person metaphor, see Edward L. Rubin, Beyond
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We need to understand the consequences of this "sovereignist" framework on
political psychology. This conception of sovereignty forces people to choose camps either
for Canada or for Quebec. That means not only that people have to choose between two
existential communities, but that the stakes of losing are incredibly high. Losing means
losing one's identity, one's chance of surviving one's death. Thus, this conception turns the
Camelot: Rethinking Politics and Law for the Modern State (Princeton: Princeton
Universtity Press, 2005). However, while I think that Rubin's crticisms are enlightening, I
am not convinced that his alternative metaphors taken from the fields of management and
engineering will do the job because they overemphasise the functional nature of the
institutional forms that existential communities may take. Doing so only highlights the fact
that such institutional arrangements attempt to meet the functional needs of individuals but
completely hides the fact that state institutions are meant to be the embodiment of
collective selves. If state institutions are nothing but service providers, then there is little to
differentiate them from any other service providers. The possibility of individual sacrifice
makes little sense in that context and is rather replaced by the question as to whether one
gets at least as much as one is giving. In that context, the strongest have little interests in
putting in place institutions that will weaken their positions. However, if the state is
conceived as the embodiment of a collective identity that transcends the life of individuals,
the possibility of solidarity based on something more than reciprocity opens up. From that
perspective, the individual is a part of a project that is bigger than her. Giving to others
make sense as an act of accomplishing one's role in the narrative of the collective life.
These thoughts make possible the idea of the survival of one's identity despite one's
individual death. In other words, the technical metaphors used to frame state institutions
might properly highlight their functional uses but they do so at the cost of hiding the
assumptions about collective transcendence that made them acceptable in the first place.
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situation into a zero-sum game. Any compromise is thus seen as treason. And this leads
Canadian sovereignists to perceive themselves as being involved in a "war" against Quebec
sovereignists.459 Therefore, cooperation and equal coexistence of the federal government
and the provinces are not truly intelligible from that frame of mind. This leads to strategies
that only increase tensions. In particular, Canadian sovereignists, fearing the loss of their
country and their identity, understand their position as one of having to "fight" provinces'
demands to have their jurisdiction respected.
Paradoxically, to the extent that the Canadian sovereignist strategy is built on the
459 This was clearly the vision behind the now infamous "sponsorship program" developed
after the 1995 referendum by the federal Liberals. That special sponsorship program was
put in place by Prime Minister Jean Chretien as a response to the rise of Quebec
sovereignism. The idea behind the program was that the Canadian government needed to be
more visible in Quebec so as to increase the sense of belonging to Canada among
Quebeckers. However, the program was plagued with financial improprieties, and
corruptions charges flew around. Among other things, it was recognized that public funds
were diverted to the federal Liberal party. Jean Chretien's successor, Paul Martin, set up a
commission of inquiry to look into the matter. As a result, many participants in the program
faced criminal charges and were convicted. However, what matters here is that even as
many witnesses recognized improprieties, they attempted to justify them by claiming that
they "were at war", and in those situations the ends justify the means. For example, Charles
Guite, the civil servant in charge of managing the program from 1996 to 1999, said during
his testimony to the commission "[w]e were basically at war trying to save the country...
When you're at war, you drop the book and the rules and you don't give your plan to the
opposition." (Daniel Leblanc, "Guite: 'When you're at war you drop ... the rules'" Globe
and Mail (Saturday, April 03, 2004) AI).
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idea that they have to "fight against" any legitimization of provinces' autonomy, they also
offend the very people that they are trying to bring into their camp. In other words, their
conceptual framework makes it harder for them to remember that membership in an
existential community is a matter of emotional attachment, of "love,,460 and that such
disposition cannot be imposed in a confrontational way. "Love me or else!" is not terribly
effective. The only possibility for a common future will reside in finding ways to
accommodate those conflicting senses of belonging.
The challenge of reconciling "diversity with unity,,461 is not simply an empty
slogan. What is at stake with the idea of self-government is primarily the idea that rules
ought to come from the self (thus, the existential community). At the same time, the very
idea of government is associated with the need for efficient collective decision-making and
effective implementation of collective policies (thus, the state is also a functional regime).
Federalism is an attempt to achieve the successful marriage of the existential longings of
different communities with their respective functional needs.
Giving more powers to the federal government while rejecting calls for needed
provincial powers has the exact opposite effects than what is hoped for by Canadian
sovereignists: the centripetal move causes a centrifugal reaction in Quebec. Keeping
Quebec in the federation will mean finding ways to reconcile and, hopefully, harmonize the
460 See supra note 452 for the meaning with which I use the term here.
461 Reference Re Secession ofQuebec, supra note 76 ,-r 43
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conflicting senses of what are the proper existential communities in Canada. To do so, I
will have to revisit the metaphors we use to make sense of our "being-together".
Even if we were to attempt to reframe the metaphor of the multiple "heads" of the
"body politic" by talking instead of the different "brain hemispheres", that will not do. The
goal will not be achieved by continuing to compare Canada to a "person".
Reconceptualising the Canadian state as a "body politic" with one brain made of one right
hemisphere and ten left hemispheres might seem like a good start but it would still be quite
misleading. The problem is not only with the head but also with the heart. Since the sense
of collective self is not being situated at the same place for everyone, the perceived
legitimacy of different state actions will not only depend on the general ideological
positions of individuals (right or left) but will also depend on the institutions that will carry
them out. For example, progressives have traditionaly been moved to build a strong
national government for the purpose of enhancing its capacity to foster welfare. However,
the problem has been that progressives in Quebec and progressives in the rest of Canada do
not agree on which one is the "national government".462
That is why "asymetrical federalism" has been proposed as a solution to this
differential sense of political belonging. It is not that other provinces do not represent
existential communities. They certainly do. However, in a contest of identity between
Canada and those provinces, it is plausible that the federal state might come on top more
462 I would like to thank Pierre Ducasse for suggesting this formulation to me.
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often for a majority of the citizens of those other provinces than it would be the case in
Quebec. In any case, if that situation were to change - and there are presently signs of that
coming from Alberta -, there will be demands coming from other comers than Quebec
asking for a limitation of federal interventions in provincial jurisdictions and an increased
demand for provincial leadership. For the moment, however, the Quebec demands are the
only ones coming from a province that are primarily based on identity claims and not
~ . I d 463lunctlOna nee s.
This helps to understand why Quebec might have, today, a more driven attitude
towards international relations than other provinces. Recognizing Quebec's claims should
not be seen as a threat to the Canadian federation but rather as a sign that the federation is
capable of accommodating multiple senses of belonging within its institutional setting. In
other words, it should be seen as evidence that the federation is capable of being flexible
enough to suit multiple interwoven existential communities. It should be seen as a sign of
success rather than failure.
***
To summarize the first part of this section, I would say that it is clear that the
federal government cannot count on any constitutional sources to justifY its claim to a
463 I note that many Aboriginal demands flow from the same reasoning.
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plenary treaty-making power, nor would it be a sound policy position to take in any event.
Building upon what has already been said in this past section, the next section will be
devoted to a discussion of the case for the recognition of provincial treaty-making powers.
b. Making the Case for Provincial Treaty-Making
Powers
In 1968, Gabon's National Minister of Education officially invited his Quebec
counterpart to participate in the annual conference of education ministers of francophone
countries.464 The invitation was sent directly to Quebec instead of going through Ottawa.
The then Quebec education Minister accepted, took part in the conference and was treated
with all the honours usually bestowed upon representatives of sovereign states. Although
education is clearly a provincial matter,465 Ottawa was quite upset: Lester B. Pearson wrote
a letter protesting to Gabon's government that it did not act according to intemationallaw,
and Canada subsequently broke off her diplomatic relations with Gabon. The situation grew
464 A summary of these events can be found in Prof. Jeoan-Herman Guay's historical project
Bilan du siecle: une base integree d'information sur Ie Quebec (Anonymous, "1968
Participation du Quebec a la conference de Libreville" in Jean-Herman Guay et ai., Bilan
du siecle: une base integree d 'information sur Ie Quebec, online: Universite de Sherbrooke,
Faculte des lettres et sciences humaines, Bilan du siecle
<http://bilan.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/pages/evenements/1934.html>).
465 S. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 39: "In and for each Province the
Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Education ... "
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even more tense between Ottawa and Quebec after the follow-up education conference held
in Paris in the same year, to which Quebec was again invited.466 These were combined with
several other incidents that increased the tensions between Ottawa and Quebec in that
period.467 Edward McWhinney, both a constitutionalist and an internationalist trained in the
views of the "New Haven school of international law", wrote in 1969 about this
controversy that:
Looking back, it may be suggested that unedifying public quarrels ... have
466 While Ottawa, again, expressed its discontent with the situation, the federal government
did not break its diplomatic relations with Paris. See Anonymous, "22 avril 1968 -
Participation du Quebec aune conference sur l'education aParis" in Jean-Herman Guay et
aI., Bilan du siecle." une base integree d'information sur Ie Quebec, online: Universite de
Sherbrooke, Faculte des lettres et sciences humaines, Bilan du siecle <
http://bilan.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/pages/evenementsI1902.html>.
467 For example, Quebec also participated in the creation, in 1969, of the "Conference des
ministres de la Jeunesse et des sports des pays de langue franyaise"(Confejes) (Anonymous,
"1969 - Creation de la Conference des ministres de la Jeunesse et des sports des pays de
langue franyaise" in Jean-Herman Guay et aI., Bilan du siecle." une base integree
d'information sur Ie Quebec, online: Universite de Sherbrooke, Faculte des lettres et
sciences humaines, Bilan du siecle
<http://bilan.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/pages/evenements/2073.html» and sent a separate
delegation from that of Ottawa to the 1969 international "francophonie" conference held in
Niamey (Niger) (Anonymous, "17 fevrier 1969 - Ouverture de la conference internationale
de la francophonie" in Jean-Herman Guay et aI., Bilan du siecle." une base integree
d'information sur Ie Quebec, online: Universite de Sherbrooke, Faculte des lettres et
sciences humaines, Bilan du siecle
<http://bilan.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/pages/evenements/2025.html>).
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been rather damaging to all of the parties involved, for they reveal a
preoccupation with old-fashioned, abstract and theoretical, questions of
where sovereignty lies and whether it is divisible in any sense - in short, an
atavistic preoccugation with the "symbols" of government at the expense of
the substance ... 68
Such conflicts are reminiscent of the controversies over diplomatic representation and
ceremonials in the decades that followed the Westphalian treaties and that prompted the
invention of the notion of "persona jure gentium" or, as we often translate it
(anachronistically469): "international legal personality".47o Contrary to what is too often
468 Gibran van Ert refers to this quote in G. van Ert, Using International Law in Canadian
Courts, supra note 41 at 87-88. The initial reference is E. McWhinney, "Canadian
Federalism and the Foreign Affairs and Treaty Power: The Impact of Quebec's Quiet
Revolution", supra note 41 at 13-14.
469 The latin word "gentium" does not translate literally into "international". In fact, the
very concept of "international" was not known at the time. In a theoretically sophisticated
and intellectually rewarding genealogy of sovereignty, Jens Bartelson writes about the
expression "international system":
To be sure, if we extend the range of application of the term international to
cover everything that takes place between states, we are entitled to speak of
something international in the Classical Age, even if the term itself was
never used by classical authors. By the same token, we are entitled to speak
of a system, since both Grotius and Pufendorf use the term to convey the
sense of a fundamental moral or legal unity underlying the accentuated
division into particular states. But if we by international system mean a
totality which is something more than the sum of its constituent parts, yet
something presumably distinct from a universal Respublica Christiana, we
have to wait another 200 years for its emergence within political knowledge.
(Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995) at 137 (footnotes omitted)). The author presents a genealogy of the idea of
"international" at 209-236 (ibid.).
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assumed, the Westphalian treaties did not so much establish the "modem sovereign state"
as they established a division of powers between the Emperor and the Princes in an effort to
salvage both the Holy Roman Empire and recognize the new authority of other political
players.471 Thus, that era was characterised by the opening up of the political space for a
470 The remaining of the current paragraph owes a great deal to the informations presented
in Janneke Nijman's erudite paper "Leibniz's Theory of Relative Sovereignty and
International Legal Personality: Justice and Stability or the Last Great Defence of the Holy
Roman Empire" I1LJ Working Paper 2004/2 (History and Theory of International Law
Series) online: New York School of Law, Institute for International Law and Justice
(I.I.L.J.) <http://www.iilj.org/papers/200412004.2%20Nijman.pdf> [1. Nijman, "Leibniz's
Theory of Relative Sovereignty and International Legal Personality"].
471 This is clear from Art. 62-63 of the Peace Treaty between the Holy Roman Emperor and
the King of France and their respective Allies, 24 October 1648 (Instrumentum Pacis
Monasteriensis), Die Westfalischen Friedensvertrage vom 24. Oktober 1648. Texte und
Ubersetzungen (Acta Pacis Westphalicae. Supplementa electronica, 1), online:
<http://www.pax-westphalica.de/>; Yale Law School, Avalon Project
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/westphal.htm>[IPM]andArt.VIII. 1 and VIII, 2 of
the Peace Treaty between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of Sweden, 24 October
1648 (Instrumentum Pacis Osnabrugensis), Die WesWilischen Friedensvertrage vom 24.
Oktober 1648. Texte und Ubersetzungen (Acta Pacis Westphalicae. Supplementa
electronica, 1), online: <http://www.pax-westphalica.de/> [IPO]:
[Art. VIII,l (PO = § 62 (PMI Ut
autem provisum sit, ne posthac in
statu politico controversiae·
suboriantur, omnes et singuli
electores, principes et status
Imperii Romani in antiquis suis
iuribus, praerogativis, libertate,
privilegiis, libero iuris territorialis
tam in ecclesiasticis quam politicis
exercitio, ditionibus, regalibus
horumque omnium possessione
vigore huius transactionis ita
stabiliti firmatique sunto, ut a nullo
unquam sub quocunque praetextu
de facto turbari possint vel
debeant.
[Art. VIII,2 (PO = § 63 (PMI
Gaudeant sine contradictione iure
suffragii in omnibus
deliberationibus super negotiis
Imperii, praesertim ubi leges
ferendae vel interpretandae,
bellum decemendum, tributa
indicenda, delectus aut
hospitationes militum instituendae,
nova munimenta intra statuum
ditiones extruenda nomine publico
veterave firmanda praesidiis nec
non ubi pax aut foedera facienda
aliave eiusmodi negotia peragenda
fuerint. Nihil horum aut quicquam
simile posthac unquam fiat vel
admittatur nisi de comitiali
liberoque omnium Imperii statuum
suffi'agio et consensu.
Cumprimis vero ius faciendi inter
se et cum exteris foedera pro sua
cuiusque conservatione ac
securitate singulis statibus
perpetuo liberum esto, ita tamen,
ne eiusmodi foedera sint contra
Imperatorem et Imperium
pacemque eius publicam vel hanc
inprimis transactionem fiantque
salvo per omnia iuramento, quo
quisque Imperatori et Imperio
obstrictus est.
[Art. VIII,l (PO = § 62 (PMI VIII.
And in order to prevent for the future
all Differences in the Political State, all
and every the Electors, Princes, and
States of the Roman Empire shall be so
establish'd and confirm'd in their
antient Rights, Prerogatives, Liberties,
Privileges, free Exercise of their
Territorial Right, as well in Spirituals
and Temporals, Seigneuries, Regalian
Rights, and in the possession of all
these things, by virtue of the present
Transaction, that they may not be
molested at any time in any manner,
under any pretext whatsoever.
Art. VIII,2 (PO = § 63 (PM] I. That
they enjoy without contradiction the
Right of Suffrage in all Deliberations
touching the Affairs of the Empire,
especially in the matter of interpreting
Laws, resolving upon a War, imposing
Taxes, ordering Levies and quartering
of Soldiers, building for the publick
Use new Fortresses in the Lands of the
States, and reinforcing old Garisons,
making of Peace and Alliances, and
treating of other such- like Affairs; so
that none of those or the like things
shall be done or receiv'd afterwards,
without the Advice and Consent of a
free Assembly of all the States of the
Empire
That, above all, each of the Estates of
the Empire shall freely and for ever
enjoy the Right of making Alliances
among themselves, or with Foreigners,
for the Preservation and Security of
every one of them: provided
nevertheless that these Alliances be
neither against the Emperor nor the
Empire, nor the publick Peace, nor
against this Transaction especially; and
that they be made without prejudice in
every respect to the Oath whereby
every one of them is bound to the
Emperor and the Empire.
(Anonymous translation (1713»
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[Art. VIII,l (PO = § 62 (PMI Et afin
de pourvoir a ce que d'oresnavant il ne
naisse plus de differens dans l'Etat
politique; Que tous & chacuns les
Electeurs, Princes, & Etats de I'Empire
Romain soient tellement etablis &
confirmez en leurs anciens droits,
prerogatives, libertez, privileges, libre
exercice du droit territorial, tant au
spirituel qu'au temporel, Seigneuries,
droits regaliens, & dans la possession
de toutes ces choses en vertu de la
presente Transaction, qu'ils ne puissent
jamais y estre troublez de fait par qui
que ce soit, sous aucun pretexte que ce
puisse estre.
[Art. VIII,2 (PO = § 63 (PM] Qu'ils
joUissent sans contradiction du droit de
suffrage dans toutes les deliberations
touchant les affaires de I'Empire, sur
tout ou il s'agira de faire ou interpreter
des Loix, resoudre une Guerre,
imposer un Tribut, ordonner des levees
& logemens de soldats, construire au
nom du public des forteresses
nouvelles dans les terres des Etats, ou
renforcer les anciennes de Gamisons,
& ou aussi il faudra faire une Paix, ou
des alliances, & de traiter d'autres
semblables affaires, qu'aucune de ces
choses ou de semblables ne soit faite
ou receue cy-apres sans l'avis & Ie
consentement d'une assemblee libre de
tous les Etats de I'Empire;
Que sur tout chacun des Etats de
l'Empire joUisse librement & a
perpetuite du droit de faire entr' eux, &
avec les Etrangers des alliances pour la
conservation & seurete d'un chacun;
pourveu neanmoins que ces sortes
d'alliances ne soient ni contre
I'Empereur & I'Empire, ni contre la
Paix publique, ni principalement
contre cette Transaction, & qu'elles se
fassent sans prejudice en toutes choses,
du serment dont chacun est lie a
I'Empereur, & aI'Empire.
(Translation by Johann Heiss (1684»
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multitude of authoritative institutions that were to different degrees autonomous from the
Emperor and the Pope. In light of the need to engage in diplomatic relations after the Thirty
Years War with different types of authorities, there were controversies as to who could
send different types of diplomats and what honours could be bestowed on them. For
example, there was a controversy as to whether the Duke of Brunswick-Liineburg in
Hanover - who was a prominent prince of the Empire (Reichsfiirsten) but not an Elector
(Kurfiirst) - could send ambassadors to the Nijmegen peace negotiations (1677-1679). The
Duke claimed to be the equal of the Electors, but France wanted to maintain a distinction
between the two statuses.472 Because the political landscape was evolving rapidly,
diplomatic usages were suffused with confusion. It is in that context that Leibnitz, who was
a counsel to the Duke of Brunswick-Liineburg, came up with the concept of "international
legal personality" as a solution to the changing ontology of world politics.473 Thus, the
concept of "international legal personality" was not developed to deal with "absolute
sovereigns" but rather precisely for the opposite reason: it was developed to deal with
entities enjoying different degrees of autonomy. In other words, the introduction of the
472 J. Nijman, "Leibniz's Theory of Relative Sovereignty and International Legal
Personality", supra 470 at 10-12.
473 Janneke Nijman demonstrates convincingly that (ibid. at 4) "Leibniz' introduction of the
concept [of "international legal personality"] resulted from an original attempt to preserve
the universal (medieval) structures propagated by the Pope and Emperor while
accommodating the emergence and the inclusion of new participants in the diplomatic
community and on the European stage."
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concept of "international legal personality" was a pragmatic solution to the problem that
arose from the need of different political players to engage with other political players of
different nature. And that solution involved the recognition of interlocking governments
with no absolute powers but rather powers distributed according to specific fields of
competence.
A similar strategy was adopted in 1971 between the federal government and the
Quebec government: many of the tensions between Ottawa and Quebec decreased when
both levels of governments disentangled themselves from the conceptual web of
"sovereignty" and agreed on the modalities of Quebec's admission to the international
"Agence de cooperation culturelle et technique de la francophonie" (now the "Agence
intergouvernementale de la Francophonie"). The agreement474 provided that Quebec would
have the status of a participating government with her own distinct representation from the
Canadian delegation, thus allowing Quebec to have an identified presence and her own
474 Quebec, Secretariat aux affaires intergouvernementales, Bureau des ententes, Ententes
intergouvernementales canadiennes deposees au bureau des ententes, Entente Canada-
Quebec concernant la participation du Quebec aux programmes de l'agence de
cooperation culturelle et technique (ACCT), 1971-024; reproduced as Modalites selon
lesquelles Ie gouvernement du Quebec est admis comme gouvernement participant aux
institutions, aux activites et aux programmes de l'Agence de cooperation, culturelle et
technique, convenues Ie 1er octobre 1971, entre Ie gouvernement du Canada et Ie
gouvernement du Quebec in Jaques-Yvan Morin, Francis Rigaldies and Daniel Turp, eds.,
Droit international public: Notes et documents, 1. 2, 3rd ed. (Montreal: Themis, 1997) at
462, Doc. No. 114A.
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voice on matters related to her own legislative competences.475
In fact, the conceptual framework built around the notion of "sovereignty" hinders
more than it helps in the search for pragmatic solutions to pragmatic problems. As
McWhinney recently wrote,
la notion de souverainete, cette formulation politique qui remonte au XVIIe
siecle et qui a ete erigee en imperatif categorique constitutionnel et
international des la fin du XIXe siecle. Inutile de dire que la notion classique
de souverainete s'avere de plus en plus inadaptee - tant en droit international
qu'en droit constitutionnel - dans une Amerique du Nord OU la
communication est instantanee, ou la transmission des donnees traverse les
frontieres et ou les decisions, qu'il s'agisse de questions cruciales de politique
economique et financiere ou de ~olitique de defense et de securite, se
prennent aun niveau transnationa1.4 6
Thus, if we do not entirely rid ourselves of the idea of "sovereignty", at least, we should not
let it hinder us in our search for the proper institutional settings that will satisfy our current
needs as overlapping existential communities.
While the case can be certainly made for completely leaving behind the old concept
of sovereignty, this argument will have to be left for some other occasion. What matters for
the moment is to recognize the following things: (1) "International status" does not
475 New Brunswick was also recognized a similar status in 1977. See Organisation
internationale de la Francophonie, "Canada Nouveau-Brunswick", online: Organisation
internationale de la Francophonie <http://www.francophonie.org/oif/pays/detail-
pays.cfm?id=118>.
476 Edward McWhinney, "Point de depart d'un dialogue fructueux" Le Devoir (12-13 July
2003) B5.
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necessarily rhyme with "sovereignty".477 Thus, it should not be controversial to say that
provinces have attained a certain international personality.478 This does not mean that they
are independent or "sovereign". It simply means that foreign states and other international
actors interested in dealing with the provinces have recognized that provinces have a degree
of internal and external autonomy in their decision-making processes that makes it both
possible and desirable to directly engage with them as distinct international entities.479 (2)
The flipside of this is that the ways in which provinces portray themselves as potential
international actors plays an important role in how other international actors will consider
possible interactions with them.
It is in light of the practical need to engage with other governments and
international actors, In order to successfully accomplish their domestic missions, that
provInces have started engaging In international relations and have started portraying
themselves as international actors. In the next two sections, I will give a brief overview of
the current international activities of provinces as presented by the provinces themselves (i)
and the nature of the international agreements that they may conclude (ii).
477S . 2 . 4ee sectIOn .a.I. .
478 A.L.e. de Mestral, "Le Quebec et les relations internationales", supra note 41 at 219-
223 and J.-Y. Morin, "La personnalite internationale du Quebec" supra note 41 at 303.
479 J-Y Morin, "La personnalite internationale du Quebec", ibid. at 274.
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i. The Self-Portraits of Provincial Involvement in
International Relations
Provinces and territories have developed their own international policies and
institutions to implement them. Thus, what I presented earlier as a brief overview of
Quebec's international activities480 is not exceptional in the Canadian federation. This
section will now simply paint a quick portrait of how provinces and territories481 describe
their own international practices. This should help in understanding that the domestication
of international relations is not a mere abstraction but has a rather concrete impact on the
ways provincial and territorial governments go about fulfilling their missions. It will also
highlight the ways in which those institutions send an image of themselves to potential
partners.482
480 See supra note 42ff and accompanying text.
481 See warning concerning "territories" at note 420.
482 Obviously, these self-images are not still-lifes; there are continually evolving. However,
for the purposes of this thesis, it appeared sufficient to highlight the vivacity of the diverse
self-expressions of provinces and territories as evidenced by specific artefacts relating to
their external self-image, which they produced at a specific point in time in the early 21 51
century. The specific activities in which each province and territory are engaged in are not
as important as the variety of such activities taken as a whole and the active self-
representations manifest in all of those institutions. (The information for this section was
first gathered in December 2005 and was updated in early April 2007.)
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British Columbia' Intergovernmental Relations Secretariat has an "International
Relations Section". That section "has overall responsibility for British Columbia's relations
with international governments.,,483 The government of British Columbia claims that "[t]he
activities of this section are an acknowledgement by the provincial government of the
strategic importance of sound international relations to the economy and the citizens of
British Columbia.',484 Among the objectives of that branch, one finds:
To work across government in leading and co-ordinating the development of
a strategic approach to British Columbia's international relations
To liaise with foreign governments, neighbouring U.S. States and other
Canadian jurisdictions on issues pertaining to British Columbia's
international relations
To support Ministries and Crown Corporations on specific international
issues, particularly those spanning a number of government agencies
To support the Premier for international visits
To act as the principal liaison between the Province of British Columbia and
the federal Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)
To assert a provincial role in international agreements and negotiations that
have a direct impact upon British Columbia
To maintain co-operation and economic arrangements with various sub-
national entities around the world, such as Eastern Cape Province in South
Africa
To maintain a dialogue with the United States (the western states in
particular) on subjects of transportation, trade, environment, and other fields
in order to foster international co-operative efforts
483 British Columbia, Intergovernmental Relations Secretariat, "International Section",
online: Government of British Columbia <http://www.gov.bc.caligrs/prgs/#inter>.
484 Ibid.
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To promote the regional interests of BC by maintammg a provincial
presence as a member of the Pacific North West Economic Region
(PNWER), the Council of State Governments (West), the Western
Governors' Association, and other regional organisations which offer a
framework for ongoing regional co-operation and interaction485
As it is clear from this language, British Columbia considers those efforts as "pertaining to
British Columbia's international relations".486 The same perspective is adopted by just
b . 487a out every provmce.
Alberta has a Minister of International and Intergovernmental Relations whose
mission is to "[a]dvanc[e] Alberta's interests internationally by building strategic
relationships with governments outside of Canada.,,488 The government of Alberta does
maintain direct contact with foreign governments489 and has an office in Washington co-
485 Ibid.
486 Ibid.
487 As we will see below, only Prince Edward Island is more vague on the issue. The
government talks about both national and regional relations. Those regional relations
include collaborations with the New England Governors. See Prince Edward Island,
Executive Council Office, "Intergovernmental Affairs", online: Government of Prince
Edward Island <http://www.gov.pe.caJeco/ia-info/index.php3> [Prince Edward Island,
"Intergovernmental Affairs"].
488 Alberta, Ministry of International and Intergovernmental Relations, "Our Mission -
International Relations", online: Government of Alberta
<http://www.iir.gov.ab.caJinternational_relations/our_mission.asp>.
489 See Alberta, Framework for Alberta's International Strategies (Edmonton: Alberta
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located in the Canadian embassy.490 Alberta has also developed "twinning" relations with
fourteen regions or federated states abroad.491
Saskatchewan's Ministry of Government Relations has an "International Relations
Branch" responsible "for the coordination, development and implementation of policies and
programs for Saskatchewan's relations with foreign governments and international
organizations.,,492 In particular, that branch has the responsibility to:
Lead in the development, negotiation and implementation of multi-sectoral
international agreements; Develop, coordinate and implement the
government's strategic framework for international relations, in
collaboration with DepartmentslAgencies; Staff the Premier and Minister on
missions abroad involving intergovernmental and multi-sectoral interests;
Co-manage, with the Protocol Office, the province's International Visitors'
Program; Manage the province's international development assistance
initiatives; and, Provide strategic and operational advice and sUf.E0rt to other
DepartmentslAgencies in pursuit of their international interests. 3
International and Intergovernmental Relations, 2000) reproduced online: Government of
Alberta <http://www.iir.gov.ab.calinternationalJelations/pdfs/3 .1.1-
%20AB_International_Strategies.pdf>.
490 Alberta, Ministry of International and Intergovernmental Relations, "Alberta
Washington Office", online: Government of Alberta
<http://www.iir.gov.ab.calinternationalJelations/alberta_washington_office.asp>.
491 Alberta, Ministry of International and Intergovernmental Relations, "Twinning
Relations", online: Government of Alberta
<http://www.iir.gov.ab.calinternationalJelations/twinningJelations.asp>.
492 Saskatchewan, Government Relations, "Intergovernmental Affairs", online: Government
of Saskatchewan <http://www.gr.gov.sk.calintergovernmental.htm>.
493 Ibid.
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Manitoba's international relations strategy is developed in a governmental
document entitled "Reaching Beyond Our Borders: The Framework For Manitoba's
International Activities".494 Manitoba identified as a key goal of her strategy the creation of
... opportunities for the involvement of the Province's partners in creating a
fully integrated and coordinated approach to international activities. The
Province will work with advisory bodies, Crown Corporations, Manitoba's
business community, educational institutions, non-government
organizations, the Government of Canada, and Manitoba's municipalities to
position Manitoba on the international stage.495
Up until September 2006, Manitoba had a Department of Intergovernmental Affairs and
Trade whose Minister was also responsible for International Relations Co-ordination. That
Department, among other things, "participate[s] in strategic partnerships with private sector
and non-government organizations and intergovernmental alliances.,,496 In November 2003,
the government of Manitoba created a "Federal-Provincial and International Relations and
Trade Division" in the Department of Intergovernmental Affairs and Trade "to coordinate
resources and expertise in international relations and business development" and to
494 Manitoba, Reaching Beyond Our Borders: The Framework For Manitoba's
International Activities, online: Government of Manitoba
<http://www.gov.mb.ca/international/index.html> [Manitoba, Reaching Beyond Our
Borders: The Framework For Manitoba's International Activities].
495 Ibid.
496 Manitoba, Intergovernmental Affairs and Trade, "Role and Mandate", online:
Government of Manitoba <http://www.gov.mb.ca/ia/aboutus/mandate.html>.
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coordonate the implementation of her "Reaching Beyond Our Borders" strategy.497 Among
the core functions of this Division were to
coordinate], monito[r] and repor[t] on the international actIvItIes
undertaken by provincial departments. This branch works with other
departments to provide strategic policy advice, analysis and support to
manage relationships with the United States and other international
jurisdictions and fosters strong, positive, and cooperative relationships with
key international partners. The branch supports the Province's involvement
with the Western Governors' Association, the Legislators' Forum, the
Midwestern Legislative Conference of the Council of State Governments,
and bilateral relationships with individual states. This branch also houses the
International Projects Initiative that coordinates the Province's involvement
in international development projects and helps our local firms to bid
successfully on them.498
With the Cabinet shuffle of September 2006, Mr. Scott Smith, who had been Minister of
Intergovernmental Affairs and Trade, was appointed to the newly created Department of
Competitiveness, Training and Trade.499 This Departement is now in charge of carrying the
"Reaching Beyond Our Borders" strategy.
One of the divisions in Ontario's Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs is the Office
of International Relations and Protocol (OIRP). The OIRP is responsible for leading
497 Manitoba, Reaching Beyond Our Borders: The Framework For Manitoba's
International Activities., "Objective One: Ensure a Strategic & Corporate Approach",
online: <http://www.gov.mb.ca/international/objective1.html>.
498 Ibid.
499 Government of Manitoba, News Release, "Infrastructure And Economic
Competitiveness Focus Of New Cabinet: Doer" (21 September 2006) online: Government
of Manitoba < http://www.gov.mb.ca/chc/press/top/2006/09/2006-09-21-05 .html>.
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... the conduct of Ontario's relations with foreign jurisdictions, and co-
ordinates official government events and ceremonies. It provides advice and
service to the Premier, the Minister, other ministers and the Lieutenant
Governor. OIRP works to advance Ontario's international objectives, which
are principally economic, by building and supporting Ontario's relations
with foreign jurisdictions, Foreign Affairs Canada and Canadian foreign
missions, the diplomatic and consular corps, and non-government
organizations with international activities. 50o
The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade has established "International
Marketing Centres" (IMCs) that are co-located in various Canadian diplomatic and
consular missions. There are IMCs in London, Los Angeles, Munich, New Delhi, New
York, Shanghai and Tokyo.50l Ontario also offers the services of "In-market Trade
Development Consultants" to help Ontario exporters develop markets in Brazil, Chile and
Mexico.502 It should however be noted that Ontario's websites are very quiet about her
international involvements. For example, one has to go to the Ministry of Natural
Resources' website and click on "Protecting Great Lakes Basin Waters,,503 to learn that
500 Ontario, Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, "About the Ministry", online:
Government of Ontario <http://www.mia.gov.on.calenglishlabout/aboutmia_en.html>.
501 Ontario, Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, "International Marketing
Centres", online: Government of Ontario <
http://www.ontarioexports.com/oei/redirect.jsp?page=EnglishiTarget_Your_Market/IMC.ht
ml>.
502 Ontario, Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, "In-Market Support", online:
Government of Ontario
<http://www.ontarioexports.com/oei/redirect.j sp?page=EnglishiTarget_Your_MarketiOntar
io Abroad.html>.
503 Ontario, Ministry of Natural Resources, "About the Ministry of Natural Resources",
online: Government of Ontario <http://www.mnr.gov.on.calMNR/>.
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Ontario is a participating member to the very important intergovernmental water
management regime put in place on the basis of the Great Lakes Charter (1985),504 the
Great Lakes Charter Annex (2001i 05 and the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin
Sustainable Water Resources Agreement (2005). 506 The latter agreement provides for the
creation of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Regional Body, an
innovative intergovernmental body responsible for overseeing the implementation of the
agreement.50? Premier McGuinty has been appointed chair of that body for 2007.508 When
one digs a bit more, one finds that Ontario and Quebec are also "associate members" of the
504 The Great Lakes Charter, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio,
Ontario, Quebec, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, 11 February 1985, Council of Great Lakes
Governors, online: <http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/GreatLakesCharter.pdf>.
505 The Great Lakes Charter Annex: A Supplementary Agreement to The Great Lakes
Charter, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Ontario, Quebec,
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, 18 June 2001, Council of Great Lakes Governors, online: <
http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/GreatLakesCharterAnnex.pdf>.
506 Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement,
Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Ontario, Quebec, Pennsylvania
and Wisconsin, 13 December 2005, online: Council of Great Lakes Governors <
http://www.cglg.org/projects/wateridocs/12-13-05/Great_Lakes-
St_Lawrence_River_Basin_Sustainable_Water_Resources_Agreement.pdf>.
50? Ibid. ss. 400-401.
508 Ontario, Ministry of Natural Resources, "Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin
Sustainable Water Resources Agreement", online: Government of Ontario
<http://www.mnr.gov.on.ca/mnr/water/greatlakes/index.html#PGL>.
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Great Lakes Commission composed of eight American states, Quebec and Ontario. 509 The
relative silence that Ontario displays about her international activities might be in part
explained by the important reduction of her involvement in the world with the
dismantlement, in the 1990s, of Ontario's network of bureaus abroad. But it might also be
seen as an indicator of her degree of satisfaction with the work done by the federal
government in defending her interests. Obviously, times have changed for Ontario since the
Labour Conventions case.
While all provinces and territories are actively and explicitly engaged in the realm
of international relations, it is mainly Quebec's actions that have been the focus of most of
the political and scholarly attention in the last forty years. This is in part because Quebec
has been the most outspoken province about her international relations since the 1960s.
However, Quebec's activities abroad started much earlier than that, as the Ministere des
Relations Internationales reminds us:
In 1871, Quebec began sending immigration officers to the United Kingdom,
continental Europe and the United States. From 1880 to 1883, Quebec's
representative in London also provided assistance to Quebec exporters. In
1882, the government appointed Hector Fabre as its agent-general in Paris to
act as "the accredited representative of the government of Quebec for all
negotiations falling within the jurisdiction of the province." The appointment
carne with a broad mandate, relatively clear instructions and a high level of
responsibility, since Hector Fabre reported directly to the Premier of
Quebec. Quebec appointed an agent-general to London in 1911 and then to
Brussels three years later. In 1940, the Act respecting the Agents-General for
the Province provided for appointments "to all countries and all places in the
509 Great Lake Commission des Grands Lacs, "Associate Members", online: < Great Lake
Commission des Grands Lacs http://www.glc.org/about/associate.html>.
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Dominion and abroad." Its goal was to promote Quebec's development
through exports, immigration, tourism, investment from abroad, and
relations with financial markets. Under this Act, the government appointed
an agent-general to New York City in 1943. Since June 1940, the appointee
had held the post of Secretary at Quebec's Trade and Tourism Bureau in
New York. SID
Morevover, as we saw in the introduction, Quebec has not been sitting on her hands since
the 1960s either. Willing to reaffirm its traditional positions and to clarify its new
objectives and strategies, the Quebec government released in 2006 an important policy
document entitled "Working in Concert", in which it reminds the readers that
Quebec .. , considers itself enabled to exercise the external attributes of the
functions it exercises internally. Over the years, it has put into place the
appropriate legal and institutional instruments to those ends. It has mandated
the Ministere des Relations internationales to lead the Government's
international initiatives, coordinate the actions of departments and agencies
in this regard, manage a network of representatives abroad, as well as
negotiate and enforce international agreements.
Today, Quebec has nearly thirty delegations, offices, and local
representatives in eighteen countries. More than 300 bilateral agreements are
now in effect with the national governments and federated states of nearly 80
countries. The Government of Quebec is a participating member of La
Francophonie and carefully monitors the work of international organizations
in matters regarding its jurisdiction and interests.S!!
Among other things, Quebec's "Working in Concert" recognizes the impact that an
increasing number of international instruments have on the government of Quebec's
510 Quebec, Ministere des relations internationales, "Legal and Historical Foundations"
(August 2006) 2 Quebec's International Initiatives 1 at 3; online: Gouvernement du Quebec
<http://www.mri.gouv.qc.ca/enipdf/action_internationale2.pdf>.
511 Quebec, Ministere des relations internationales, Quebec's International Policy: Working
in Concert (Quebec: Ministere des relations internationales, 2006) at 5; online:
Gouvernement du Quebec <http://www.mri.gouv.qc.ca/enipdf/Politique.pdf>.
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capacity to make collective choices, and the concomitant need to participate in the decision-
making processes that lead to the creation of such instruments. 512 It also acknowledges,
among other things, that Quebec's economy depends a great deal on foreign trade,513 that
new security concerns necessitate increased collaboration among different jurisdictions,514
that the promotion of Quebec's culture and identity requires the capacity to "reach out to
the world", 515 and that Quebec can contribute to the "cause of international solidarity".516 In
light of this, the government of Quebec wants to increase its participation in different
international organisations517 and in the negotiations of international, regional and bilateral
agreements that affect its interests.5lS It also wishes to build stronger ties with other
federated states and regions519 and to "create a greater synergy" with the organised groups
of the civil society in Quebec that are active internationally.520
"The Province of New Brunswick", unsuprisingly, "is increasingly involved III
512 Ibid. at 27.
513 For example, the policy paper highlights the fact that 52,8% of Quebec's GDP is due to
exports (ibid. at 43). See, in general, ibid. at 41-63.
514 Ibid. at 65-77.
515 Ibid. at 6, 79-89.
516 Ibid. at 91,93-101.
517 Ibid. at 28-30.
51S Ibid. at 30-35.
519 Ibid. at 36.
520 Ibid. at 37.
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international activities.,,521 Her Department of Intergovernmental Relations is divided into
many branches. The International Relations unit, for example, "facilitates inter-
departmental coordination of the Province's international activities with the aim of focusing
efforts towards the Province's strategic interests and achieving a higher level of presence
and success in the global community.,,522 One of the ways in which that unit advances those
goals is by providing "guidelines and support to departments and agencies of the Province
in negotiations and implementation of bilateral and multilateral arrangements with
international partners.,,523 New Brunswick is also quite involved in the "Organisation
internationale de la francophonie". There is a division of the Department of
Intergovernmental Relations, called the "Francophonie and Official Languages Branch"
(FOLB), which is specifically responsible for the coordination and promotion of the
activities of the New Brunswick government within the provincial, Canadian, and
. . 1F h' 524mternatlOna rancop ollIe.
In December 2005, Nova Scotia's Department of Intergovernmental Affairs
presented itself as being "responsible for coordinating the Province's relations with the
521 New Brunswick, Department of Intergovernmental Affairs, "International Relations":
Government ofNew Brunswick <http://www.gnb.ca/0056/Internationallindex-e.asp>.
522 Ibid.
523 Ibid.
524 New Brunswick, Department of Intergovernmental Affairs, "Francophonie/Offical
Languages": Government of New Brunswick
<http://www.gnb.ca/0056/Francophonie/index-e.asp>.
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Federal government, other Provinces and Territories and foreign governments at the
national and subnationallevels."525 One of the self-proclaimed goals of that Department is
to "Expand Nova Scotia's international linkages to support and promote Nova Scotia's
interests abroad. ,,526
Newfoundland and Labrador's "Intergovernmental Affairs Secretariat" IS
"responsible for the coordination of all policies, programs and activities of the Government
of Newfoundland and Labrador in relation to other sovereign governments.,,527 Among
other things, it "takes lead responsibility for the development of provincial policy in matters
525 Nova Scotia, Department ofIntergovernmental Affairs, "Welcome to the Department of
Intergovernmental Affairs", online: Government of Nova Scotia
<http://www.gov.ns.ca/iga/> (emphasis added); archived online at Internet Archive,
Wayback Machine, online: Internet Archive
<http://web.archive.org/web/20051228064032/http://www.gov.ns.ca/iga/>. As of 18 April
2007, the Department of Intergovernmental Affairs website (Nova Scotia, Department of
Intergovernmental Affairs, "Welcome to the Department of Intergovernmental Affairs",
online: Government of Nova Scotia <http://www.gov.ns.ca/iga/>) reads: "IGA coordinates
the Province's relations with federal, provincial and territorial governments as well as with
other governments" (emphasis added), thus dropping the specification about the nature of
those "other" governments (i.e. "foreign governments at the national and subnational
levels").
526 Nova Scotia, Department of Intergovernmental Affairs, "About Us", online:
Government of Nova Scotia <http://www.gov.ns.ca/iga/aboutus.htm>.
527 Newfoundland & Labrador, Intergovernmental Affairs Secretariat, "Overview", online:
Government of Newfoundland & Labrador <http://www.exec.gov.nl.ca/exec/iga/iga-
ovr.htm> (emphasis added).
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which do not fall under the responsibility of other departments (including defense, regional
development, and foreign affairs)".528
And in Prince Edward Island, where the population is of about 138 000 habitants,529
the Premier is also the "Minister Responsible for Intergovernmental Affairs",530 whose
responsibility is to "ensure that the province's interests are represented in national and
regional policy discussions.,,531 Among the tasks given to the staff of this department, we
528 Ibid. Since s. 91 (7) of the Constitution Act, 1867 gives Parliament powers over "Militia,
Military and Naval Service, and Defence", reference to the latter might seem surprising in a
list of tasks of a provincial authority. However, this is a good example where provinces
might have an interest in dialoguing and negotiating with the federal government. The
provincial departments' activity on defense matters is described in the following way by
Newfoundland and Labrador: "in consultation with other provincial departments and
agencies, Intergovernmental Affairs coordinates discussion with military officials and local
representatives related to planning issues and provincial interests. In recent years, defense
activity has focused upon flight training by allied forces in Goose Bay." (ibid.)
529 As of July 1, 2005, Prince Edward Island's preliminary data indicated that the
population was 138 113. See Prince Edward Island, Provincial Treasury (Economics,
Statistics and Federal Fiscal Division), 32nd Statistical Review 2005 (Prince Edward
Island: Document Publishing Center, 2006) at 6; reproduced at Government of Prince
Edward Island, online: Annual Statistical Review
<http://www.gov.pe.ca/photos/original/32annualreview.pdf>.
530 Prince Edward Island, Executive Council Office, "Members of the Executive Council",
online: Government of Prince Edward Island <http://www.gov.pe.ca/eco/>.
531 Prince Edward Island, Executive Council Office, Intergovernmental Affairs, online:
Government of Prince Edward Island <http://www.gov.pe.ca/eco/ia-info/index.php3>.
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find the following:
• coordinating and/or preparing briefing materials required for meetings
such as First Ministers Meetings, Annual Premiers Conferences, Council of
Atlantic Premiers, New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers;
• advancing and promoting the Province's interests in regional discussions,
initiatives and agreements;
• developing and implementing the Action Plan for Atlantic Regional
Cooperation and New England Governors-Eastern Canadian Premiers
resolutions .,.
So even the smallest province in Canada is actively involved with outside partners.
It is worth noting that "territories" - while their constitutional statuses do not raise
the same issues as that of the provinces - are also engaged in one form or another of
international relations. For example, Yukon's Executive Council Office "works to build
strong "government-to-government" relationships between the Yukon and Yukon First
Nation governments, and to foster effective relations with the governments of Canada, the
provinces and territories, and with other circumpolar jurisdictions such as the State of
Alaska.,,532 In 2006, the government of the Northwest Territory relied on its
"Intergovernmental Relations and Strategic Planning" division, to "develo[p], promot[e]
and maintai[n]" "relations with federal, provincial, territorial, Aboriginal and international
governments".533 Changes were recently brought to the structure of the Northwest
532 Yukon, Executive Council Office, "Executive Council Office ", online: Government of
Yukon <http://www.gov.yk.ca/depts/eco/index.html>.
533 Northwest Territories, Department of the Executive, "Department of the Executive",
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Territories' government, which created a new Department of Aboriginal Affairs and
Intergovernmental Relations. Among other things, it "is responsible for managing the
government's relationships with federal, provincial and territorial governments and with
circumpolar countries in all matters of intergovernmental significance.,,534 Finally, in
Nunavut, the "Intergovernmental Affairs Division of the Executive is responsible for the
management and development of government strategies, policies and initiatives relating to
federal, provincial, territorial, circumpolar and aboriginal affairs.,,535
From this overview one can draw a straighforward conclusion: gone are the days (if
they ever existed) when provinces and territories could simply act locally to accomplish
their domestic mandates, without caring about what might be going on outside of their
borders. Now, provinces and territories actively portray themselves as international actors
and they find willing counterparts ready to recognize them as potential partners and
interested in engaging in mutually beneficial actions.536 In short, provinces need to deal
online: Government of the Northwest Territories <http://www.executive.gov.nt.ca/>;
archived online at Internet Archive, Wayback Machine, online: Internet Archive
<http://web.archive.org/web/20051231153516/http://www.executive.gov.nt.ca/>.
534 Northwest Territories, Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Intergovernmental
Relations, "Intergovernmental Relations", online: Government of the Northwest Territories
<http://www.daair.gov.nt.ca/who-we-are/intergovernmental-relations.html>.
535 Nunavut, Executive and Intergovernmental Affairs, "Intergovernmental Affairs", online:
Government of Nunavut
<http://www.gov.nu.ca/Nunavut/Englishldepartments/EIA/ia.shtml>.
536 For a detailed overview of the collaboration channels developed by proVInces and
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with international partners, they officially recogmze that need, and they find willing
partners to satisfy this need.
H. The Legality of Provincial International Involvements
and Treaty-Making
1. At Canadian Constitutional Law
As we have seen earlier, the text of the Canadian constitution is silent about either
federal or provincial treaty-making powers. However, as we have also seen, treaty-making
is a prerogative of the Crown.537 Therefore, for provinces to possess treaty-making powers,
they must possess it through the Crown's prerogative.
R. J. Delisle opposed the idea that provinces could have inherited the prerogative to
make treaties. He wrote:
The position of provincial Lieutenant-Governors precludes the possibility of
the prerogative power being delegated to them. They are appointed not by
the Sovereign but by the Governor-General-in-Council by instrument under
territories with American institutions, see CSPS, Building Cross-Border Links: A
Compendium ofCanada-US Government Collaboration, supra note 446 at 155-217.
537 S 1 . 2ee .a.I. .
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the Great seal of Canada.538 They are removable by the Governor-General
and their salaries are fixed and provided by the parliament of Canada. There
is no direct contact with the Sovereign and, therefore, the Royal Prerogative
of treaty-making cannot directly descend upon them by any delegation
through Letter Patent or usage. 539
In short, Delisle claimed that the Lieutenant-Governors are the instruments of the
Governor-General.
But all this is to forget the Privy Council's OpInIOnS in the Liquidators of the
Maritime Bank ofCanada, 540 in Re The Initiative and Referendum Act,541 in Hodge v. R. 542
538 I note that a similar point was made by B. Laskin, "The Provinces and International
Agreements", supra note 40 at 108 to suggest that only the federal government may have
powers over foreign affairs.
539 R. J. Delisle, "Treaty-Making Power in Canada", supra note 315 at 132 (footnotes
omitted).
540 Liquidators ofthe Maritime Bank, supra note 23:
There is no constitutional anomaly in an executive officer of the Crown
receiving his appointment at the hands of a governing body who have no
powers and no functions except as representatives of the Crown. The act of
the Governor General and his Council in making the appointment is, within
the meaning of the statute, the act of the Crown; and a Lieutenant-Governor,
when appointed, is as much the representative of Her Majesty for all
purposes of provincial government as the Governor General himself is for all
purposes of Dominion government.
541 In re The Initiative and Referendum Act, supra note 233 at 942:
[t]he scheme of the Act passed in 1867 was thus, not to weld the Provinces
into one, nor to subordinate Provincial Governments to a central authority,
but to establish a central government in which these Provinces should be
represented, entrusted with exclusive authority only in affairs in which they
had a common interest. Subject to this each Province was to retain its
independence and autonomy and to be directly under the Crown as its head.
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Most importantly, this line of arguments was explicitely rejected by the Supreme Court of
Canada about 20 years before Delisle made his claims. It is worth quoting at length here the
very important statement made by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1948:
As a consequence of these judicial pronouncements, the nature of the
federal and provincial legislative and executive powers is clearly settled, and
a Lieutenant-Governor, who "carries on the Government of the Province",
manifestly does not act in respect of the Government of Canada. All the
functions he performs are directed to the affairs of the Province and are in no
way connected with the Government of Canada, and it is the functions that
he performs that must be examined in order to determine the nature of his
office....
It has been argued that the Honourable Mr. Carroll came within the
provision of the Act, because he was appointed by the Governor General in
Council, and because his salary was paid out of the Consolidated Fund of
Canada. The Governor General in Council is of course the instrumentality
through which, in view of the B.NA. Act, a Lieutenant-Governor is
appointed to represent directly His Majesty. And the Dominion Government
is also, under a provision of the same Act, obligated to pay the salary of the
Lieutenant-Governor. But I fail to see how this can affect the nature of the
functions performed. That the Lieutenant-Governor is appointed and paid by
the Dominion, does not alter the essentially provincial character of his office,
which is to carry on the Government of the Province.
The additional provisions of the Constitution, namely, that the
Lieutenant-Governor receives instructions from the Governor General, that
bills may be reserved for the signification of the Governor General's
pleasure, that an Act that has been sanctioned, may be disallowed by the
Governor General in Council, and finally that the Lieutenant-Governor may
be removed from office by the same authority, have I think, no important
Within these limits of area and subjects, its local Legislature, so long as the
Imperial Parliament did not repeal its own Act conferring this status, was to
be supreme, and had such powers as the Imperial Parliament possessed in the
plenitude of its own freedom before it handed them over to the Dominion
and the Provinces, in accordance with the scheme of distribution which it
enacted in 1867.
542 Hodge v. R., supra note 14 and opinion quoted thereof.
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signification.543
Those cases not only made it clear that provinces enjoyed Crown prerogatives but
confirmed that those prerogative powers are not "delegated" to them but are instead "first-
hand" prerogatives.
Moreover, as we have seen, in Canada, the prerogatives follow the division of
legislative jurisdictions. Whereas some might have doubted after the Liquidators of the
Maritime Bank ofCanada544 whether that case had established a general principle or simply
a rule applicable to the case at hand, the wide range of subsequent decisions restating the
principle in the widest possible terms should have put those doubts to rest. 545
Some authors, however, have attempted to argue that the foreign affairs prerogatives
is different from others. For example, Gerald Morris has claimed that
... the treaty-making power is an integral part of the broader foreign affairs
power and in actual practice it cannot be artificially separated from it. Nor
can general responsibility for foreign affairs be divided u£ into watertight
federal and provincial compartments on any sensible basis.5 6
While I do agree with Morris that treaty-making powers - being such an important tool in
the foreign affairs toolkit - are hardly detachable from the capacity to engage in
international relations, international experience as well as our own Canadian experience has
543 Canada v. Carroll, supra note 299 at 130-31.
544 Supra note 23.
545 See supra notes 299ff and accompanying text.
546 G.R. Morris, "The Treaty-Making Power: A Canadian Dilemma", supra note 22 at 490.
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shown that foreign affairs, to the extent that they are the external extension of internal
governing tools, are indeed as divisible as internal matters. 547
It is important to note here that the divisibility of the prerogatives III no way
threatens the federal government's powers over defence since s. 91(7) of the Constitution
Act, 1867 provides Parliament with the exclusive powers over "Militia, Military and Naval
Service, and Defence." But the "High Politics" of war and peace are no longer occupying
the place that they used to in the everyday life of international relations; economic
integration and transnational regulation of "domestic" issues have taken the prime place.
That is indeed why, as we have seen, provinces have for decades engaged in a variety of
diplomatic relations to fulfill their own domestic missions. Diplomacy, like treaty powers,
is not, in se, within federal plenary and exclusive jurisdiction.
In light of this, there are simply no constitutional reasons for denying provinces
prerogative powers to make treaties.
2. At International Law
As we saw earlier, the Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties548 provides at Art.
547 See, section 2.a.i.4. See also G. van Ert, "The Legal Character of Provincial Agreements
with Foreign Governments", supra note 317 at 1112 and G. van Ert, Using International
Law in Canadian Courts, supra note 41 at 82-83.
548 Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, supra note 391.
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6 that every "state" possesses the capacity to conclude treaties, and federated states satisfy
that requirement. 549 To the extent that foreign states rely on Canadian constitutional law to
determine if provinces have the power to conclude treaties, it should be more clearly
ackowledged that provinces do have the capacity to conclude treaties with those foreign
states.
However, while most states officially rely on the constitutional rules applicable to
federated states to determine their international capacity to conclude international
agreements, it is important to note that those foreign states will, to a large degree, consider
the federated states' practical capacities to commit themselves. States do not conclude
agreements for their mere pleasure; they do so because they believe that those agreements
will advance their interests. The flips ide of this is that even if federated states did not count
as "states" for the purposes of the Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, certain states
might still be willing to conclude agreements with them if they consider that such
agreements will further their interests. International law would not oppose it. We have to
remember that Art. 3 a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties clearly specifies
that it does not affect the legal validity of any other international agreements concluded
between a state and any other subject of international law. Thus, the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties is not meant to be exhaustive. This means that there could be treaties
between international entities that are not "states" within the ambit of the Vienna
Convention on the Law ofTreaties. As we have seen earlier in section 2.a.iA, there is little
549 S . 2 . 4ee sectIOn .a.I. .
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doubt that federated states could be considered international subjects. This is more
concretely the case if a foreign state is willing to consider a federated state as an
international subject for the purpose of concluding mutually beneficial agreements.
The fact that their might be treaties between states and other international entities
should only be surprising to those who still imagine treaties as being the highly formal
agreements between Monarchs otherwise living in a quasi state of nature mainly controlled
by customs and force. Times have changed and the ontology of that international arena has
changed as well. Monarchs are no longer the only actors inhabiting that space and the needs
of all the actors occupying that space require much more than a rudimentary social contract
of non-aggression. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties recognized that.
Additionally, it is important to remember that, for the purposes of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, a "treaty" "means an international agreemt~nt concluded between
States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular
designation".550 "Head of State" treaties are thus no longer the main treaties used in the
international arena. The abandonment of "Head of State" treaties in favour of
I
intergovernmental treaties reflects a change in the way we conceive the state and its roles.
While in the past, a treaty represented the solemn accord between two or more sovereigns
to settle inter-state issues, nowadays, international agreements deal with internal issues as
much as they deal with external issues, if not more. In fact, the primary function of the vast
550 Ibid.. Art. 2§ 1(a) (emphasis added.)
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majority of international agreements is no longer to set up and maintain the conditions for
internal governance by protecting polities from external interventions; the bulk of
international agreements are now meant to be, by themselves, instruments of governance.
That shift explains in part why international law as a whole has evolved from a system
mostly based on custom to a system embodied in treaties.551 This is not to say however, as
some "hyperglobalisationists" would have it, that agreements of the traditional sort are
disappearing. They are not. But it is to say that they no longer constitute the object of the
majority of international negotiations. And since international agreements are no longer
used primarily to seal the peace but rather to make all sorts of functional arrangements, this
also helps to explain the general trend in international law to move away from treaty
formalism, towards the use of a multitude of more flexible instruments to facilitate and
institutionalize functional agreements between a variety of governing institutions. In that
context, treaty formalism is considered more of a hindrance to the ability of governments to
take concerted actions effectively to accomplish their missions.
H is against the backdrop of the changes in international law that I have just
presented that I would like to layout additional arguments in favour of recognizing that
agreements between a province and a foreign state can be "treaties".
551 Over 158,000 treaties or international agreements entered into by Members of the
United Nation since the entry into force of the UN Charter (Dec. 141\ 1946) have been
registen~d with the Secretariat. See United Nations, United Nation Treaty Series,
"Overview", online: United Nations <http://untreaty.un.org/English/overview.asp>.
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a. Cooperation. Incentive Structures and Bindingness at
International Law
International relations are now a necessary aspect of any state's governance.
Because our modem means of communication and transportation have increased our
mobility, and because our economies are subject to evermore integrative forces, traditional
domestic issues increasingly contain transnational aspects. That is the main reason why
Canadian provinces have made intergovernmental agreements - both inside and outside
Canada - on issues such as "economic cooperation, cultural relations, family maintenance
orders, succession duties, the environment",552 and other such areas of regulation affected
by transnational factors. For example, agreements ensuring mutual assistance in the
administration of securities laws - a matter of provincial jurisdiction553 - have proven
necessary since, as the Supreme Court of Canada recently noted, "[t]here can be no
disputing the indispensable nature of interjurisdictional co-operation among securities
552 G. van Ert, Using International Law in Canadian Courts, supra note 41 at 72 (footnotes
omitted.)
553 Smith v. R., [1960] S.C.R. 776; Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, [1982] 2 S.C.R.
161; Global Securities Corp. v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), [2000] 1 S.C.R.
494 [Global Securities Corp. v. British Columbia (Securities Commission)]; Lymburn v.
Mayland, [1932] 2 D.L.R. 6; Gregory & Co. v. Quebec Securities Commission, [1961]
S.C.R. 584; R. v. W McKenzie Securities Ltd., (1966) 56 D.L.R. (2d) 56.
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regulators today.,,554 The Court added:
'" administrative arrangements between provinces and foreign authorities
are quite common. Without commenting on the constitutionality of any of
these arrangements, I would note simply that where, as here, there is a
clearly dominant intraprovincial purpose, the mere fact that the province is
co-operating with a foreign authority in the pursuit of that purpose will not
change the law's pith and substance ... 555
While validating the impugned statute, the Court held that "[0]btaining reciprocal
cooperation and uncovering violations abroad are both aspects of the Commission's
mandate, which fits easily within s. 92(13)."556
But for there to be cooperation, the instruments produced by the contracting parties
will often need to contain more than mere predictions of what the parties will do in
specified circumstances. In other words, such agreements will often have to be understood
as true commitments in order to be effective. And that is because of the different forms of
"collective action problems" that such agreements are trying to solve. Among those
problems, there are those that arise from the difficulty of coordinating actions
simultaneously, and others that arise from the difficulty of ensuring iterated cooperation
over an extended period oftime. Those different problems will call for different solutions.
554 Global Securities Corp. v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), ibid. at ~ 27. The
Court also cited Elizabeth R. Edinger, "The Constitutional Validity of Provincial Mutual
Assistance Legislation: Global Securities v. British Columbia (Securities Commission)"
(1999) 33 V.B.C. L. Rev. 169 at 176.
555 Global Securities Corp. v. British Columbia (Securities Commission)" ibid. at ~ 38.
556 Ibid. ~ 44.
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In that sense, it is true that informative statements about what other players will do
in specific future circumstances help to coordinate reciprocal actions by creating a focal
point around which players can adjust their behaviour. In a classic coordination problem, it
matters more to the players that everyone chooses an identical strategy, than what that
specific strategy is. A good example of a coordination problem concerns the choice of the
side of the road on which cars should be driving. If we assume that there are no intrinsic
reasons for choosing one side over another, that is, that there are no reasons for prefering
driving on one side or another apart from the behaviour of the other drivers, the problem
becomes one of coordinating everyone's individual choice to avoid frontal crashes and to
ensure the efficient use of the road. 557 In such circumstances, receiving information about
the focal point should be sufficient for rational players to fall into line, since coordinating
will bring about the biggest payoff for each one of them. In effect, in such situation, if one
player does not act according to the coordinated solution, every player loses, including the
defector. Thus, there are cases where it is true that parties might not want to be bound by
any obligation but merely want to exchange information about the future behaviour of the
557 Obviously, this factual assumption may prove to be false. There might be physiological
reasons to favour one side of the road to the other. For example, empirical experiments
might one day demonstrate that the brain of most drivers is hardwired to react more swiftly
to fast-moving objects coming from the left side than from the right (or vice versa). Also, it
must be noted that once the habit of driving on one side of the road has acquired a certain
degree of automatism among drivers, quitting that habit constitutes a significant cost that
will go against switching sides.
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players involved so as to adjust their own. But this particular case is far from covering all
the possible contexts where cooperation is sought. Coordination is far from exhausting the
range of problems that cooperation can address.
If we look at the mutual assistance agreement concernmg securities regulation
discussed above, one sees immediately that it does not fit into the simple coordination
model. In effect, if we consider the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
(S.E.C.)'s request in isolation from the future behaviour of its own or other players'
behaviour, it could appear cheaper for British Columbia to simply ignore the request made
by the S.E.C., than to go through the procedures necessary to provide the United States
agency with the requested information. Contrary to the coordination problem illustrated
above, here, British Columbia would increase - or at least not decrease - her payoff by not
following the statement it gave about her future behaviour. Thus, to lmderstand why British
Columbia did go ahead with the request - and even fought Global Securities Corp.
challenges up to the Supreme Court -, we need to have recourse to a wider range of
models.
"Game theory,,558 has developed a series of models to analyst: cooperation problems
558 This interdisciplinary field, developed at the confines of mathematics, economics and
politics, grew out of the path-breaking 1944 book by John von Neumann and Oskar
Morgenstern entitled Theory ofGames and Economic Behavior. Princeton University Press
recently released a new edition of that classic: John von Neumann a~ld Oskar Morgenstern,
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and examine ways to solve those problems. One such model is the famous "prisoner's
dilemma,,559, in which there are four possible outcomes to a two player game: (1) if A
cooperates, but B defects, B gets the highest possible payoff and A the lowest; (2) if B
cooperates and A defects, we get the reverse result; (3) if A and B cooperate, they each get
a bigger payoff than what cooperation paid in the previous two outcomes, but one that is
lower than defection in the previous two outcomes; finally (4) if A and B defect, they each
get a higher payoff than if they had cooperated in the first two outcomes but they each get a
lower payoff than if they had both cooperated. This could be illustrated in the following
matrix where each payoff is represented by a numeral:
B cooperates B defects
A cooperates A (3), B (3) A (0), B (5)
A defects A (5), B (0) A (1), B (1)
If this game is played only once (or if players know in advance how many rounds there will
be) and there is no third party to enforce any promise that they may have made to each
other before playing, both players will rationally opt for defection despite any cheap talk
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 60th-anniversary ed., introduction by Harold
Kuhn and afterword by Ariel Rubinstein (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
559 We apparently owe the name of this non-zero sum game to the Princeton mathematics
professor Albert William Tucker. However, the matrix itself was first introduced by Merrill
Flood and Melvin Drescher of the RAND Corporation. See William Poundstone,
Prisoner's Dilemma (New York: Doubleday, 1992) at 8,116-119.
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that they would have engaged in prior to the play. That is because they will want to
maximise their minimal payoff. But the problem here is that the equilibrium lies at a point
that is suboptimal for all participants. 56o In fact, A and B would be both better off if they
could cooperate. So what players would like is to achieve full cooperation to obtain the
highest possible payoff.
This model seems closer to the problem that British Columbia had to solve in
relations to securities regulation. If the British Columbia Securities Commission and the
S.E.C. cooperate, they will both achieve their respective objectives in a way that will offset
the costs of making the agreement and of providing the securities information sought by the
other player. But if only one cooperates, the cooperating party will have to pay for both the
costs of making the agreement and of providing the information, without receiving
anything in return, while the defecting party will have gained the same benefit as if both
parties had actually cooperated but without paying for the costs of providing the
information to the other player. Knowing this, both parties would rationally defect. If both
parties defect, they only incur the costs of making the agreement and no one gains any
benefit. But how could British Columbia ensure that the S.E.C. would cooperate so that
they could both achieve their optimal payoffs?
560 It is in fact at a suboptimal Pareto level. "Pareto optimization" happens when a
reallocation of goods makes at least one individual better off without making any other
individual worse off. A situation is "Pareto optimal" when no Pareto optimization is
possible.
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The first part of the answer is to be found in the fact that international players are
rarely engaged in one-shot games but are rather engaged in repeated games. While this
makes no difference for the coordination problem discussed initially - that is, the fact that
one drives one's car more than once does not change one's strategy -, it makes a big
difference in this context. In iterated "prisoner's dilemma" types of situation when the
number of games is not known in advance, it might actually become rational for all players
to cooperate right from the start if they are playing with the right players. The reason is that
the possibility of punishment in the following round will threaten to diminish the total
payoffs of the defector. Thus, the two players receive high payoffs over the long term as
long as they are both capable of resisting the short-term temptation to defect. For this to be
the case, it is important that players do not know in advance the number of iterations of the
game. In effect, if players know ahead of time the number of iterations of the game, they
will no longer have reasons to cooperate in the last round since there will be no possibility
of future retaliation; and since everyone should rationally defect in the last round, there will
be no reasons not to defect in the second to last, and the same reasoning applies back up to
the first round. The same reasoning applies moreover if one player can unilaterally put an
end to the iterated game. In other words, in such situations as when a player does not intend
or is not seen as intending to participate in the iterated game, cooperation will not be
possible because future defection will be assumed. That is why, for cooperation to be
possible, it is necessary for players to be convinced that others are taking part in the iterated
game. In fact, the very issue of keeping the game going or not can itself be conceptualised
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as being part of a larger collective action problem. So how can players ensure that they can
be taken seriously when they inform the other party that they truly intend to participate in
an iterated game?
In the absence of a third-party enforcer in international relations, different
mechanisms have been developed over time to ensure that promises could be made
credible. The classic example is that of the Monarchs who exchange sons to guarantee a
Peace Treaty.56! They make their promise credible by making defection more costly to their
own eyes than any possible benefit they may reap from defecting. Today's equivalent
strategy is bond posting. If governments do not necessarily post bonds in the form of hard
cash when they want to cooperate with others, they do something functionally equivalent:
they enlarge "the shadow of the future,,562 by explicitly recognizing their engagement and
56! This example is taken from Alan O. Sykes, "The Economics of Public International
Law" (July 2004) U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 216, at 19-20,
online: Social Science Research Network <http://ssrn.com/abstract=564383>. Thomas
Schelling had mentioned hostage exchanges as a commitment device in a footnote to his
article "An Essay on Bargaining" (1953) 46 American Economic Review 281 at 300 but we
had to wait for Oliver E. Williamson to give us a more detailed examination of the use of
"hostages" as a credible commitment device (see Oliver E. Williamson, "Credible
Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange" (1983) 73 American Economic
Review 519).
562 The expression is taken from Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New
York: Basic Books, 1984) at 124. Axelrod uses that expression many times in his book.
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thereby putting their reputation as trustworthy partners on the line. 563 In other words, they
can tum their cheap talk into something credible by "bond posting" their reputation through
formal acknowledgment of their engagement. If a government defects, not only does it risk
retaliation in the form of "tit for tat",564 but the other government gains the capacity to
damage one important asset of the defector: its reputation as a good partner. On the flipside,
the readiness to grant to the other party such a power over one's important asset signals
one's "low discount rate".565 It is important for "good players" to signal their low discount
rate in order to attract similar potential partners.
563 Because "reputation" is information about one's character as a game partner, it is highly
valuable. The more a player has a good reputation for cooperation, the easier it might be to
find willing partners to play with him. Thus, putting one's reputation on the line is a strong
self-imposed deterrent against defection. That is why the willingness of the player to put
such a valuable thing at the mercy of the other player also signals to them that he is
committed to cooperate.
564 "Tit for tat" is a classic strategy in iterated prisoner's dilemma games whereby one plays
the same move as the other player played in the previous round: if the other player
cooperated in the last round, one cooperates, if the other player defected, one defects in this
round.
565 The concept of "discount rate" corresponds to the value attributed by an agent to future
utility as opposed to present utility. An agent with a "low discount rate" is an agent that
does not discount much the value of future utility as opposed to present one. The opposite,
an agent with a high discount rate is an agent for which the present utility is worth much
more than a future one. The highest the discount rate of an agent, the highest is the
possibility for that agent to defect for a short-term benefit.
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But for all this to happen, there must be an agreement and that agreement must be
publicly known, otherwise the players' reputation has not been made vulnerable. In effect,
one's reputation could not be tarnished by the fact of not abiding by something by which
she or he was not publicly known to be bound to abide by.566 In other words, the agreement
must be thought to create valid obligations. Thus, these formal and public engagements
increase the costs of defecting to a point that might make it more expensive to defect than
to cooperate (in that sense, it restricts the possible actions of a short-term utility-maximiser)
and signal to other possible partners that the players have a low-discount rate, manifest in
that they accept to post bond with their partners through the acceptation of obligations.
But logically, for an obligation to arise, something more than the mere acts of will
of the partners is necessary: there needs to be a secondary rule recognizing that these types
of promises give rise to obligations. Otherwise, the mutual promises remain simple
predictions about the players' future acts. H.L.A. Hart summarized that point nicely when
he wrote:
... in order that words, spoken or written, should in certain circumstances
function as a promise, agreement, or treaty, and so give rise to obligations
and confer rights which others may claim, rules must already exist providing
that a state is bound to do whatever it undertakes by appropriate words to do.
566 The analysis as to whether or not a player intended to be bound is contextual. Each
instrument must be examined on a case by case basis independently from "its particular
designation" (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 391, Art.1 (1)) Thus,
whatever the agreement is called, the decisive factor should be the intention of the parties in
determining whether it has a binding effect.
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Such rules presupposed in the very notion of a self-imposed obligation
obviously cannot derive their obligatory status from a self-imposed
bl" b h 567o IgatlOn to 0 ey tern.
Because we are talking about agreements between distinct international subjects that may
not otherwise be subjected to the same "domestic law", the secondary rules that create
those obligations are thus of an international character.
Thus, binding oneself does not necessarily mean diminishing one's capacity. In fact,
it can be quite the opposite. While on the face of it, constraints are limits imposed on one's
action, certain constraints can in fact prove capacity-enhancing.568 As we have just seen,
international agreements may bring the benefits of cooperation, which would not be
otherwise available. But a party will not necessarily be ready to convey to another a benefit
unless that first party can be reasonably assured that the other party will hold its end of the
bargain. Thus, the ability to commit oneself and to offer some guarantees of such
commitment are often necessary to be taken seriously by would-be partners. Thus, the
capacity to effectively commit oneself enhances one's capacity to obtain the benefits of
567 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept ofLaw, supra note 338 at 225.
568 There are many ways in which constraints can prove to be capacity-enhancing. Different
forms of constraints can work to overcome passions, self-interest, hyperbolic discounting of
future gains, or strategic time-inconsistency, and can be used to neutralize preference
changes over time. See the two classics by Jon Elster on the topic: Jon Elster, Ulysses and
the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality, rev. ed. (Cambridge (U.K.): Cambridge
University Press, 1984) and Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound : Studies in Rationality,
Precommitment, and Constraints (Cambridge (U.K.): Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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cooperation.569 Provinces do need these benefits in our current world order.
The function of binding agreements in international cooperation is the reason why
many agreements have to be more than mere information about what one will do in future
circumstances. As Paul Gerin-Lajoie rhetorically asked in his famous speech pronounced in
1965 before the Consular Corps in Montreal: "Vne entente n'est-elle pas conclue dans Ie
but essentiel d'etre appliquee ... 7,,570 That is also why it is so artificial to simply talk
about "non-binding" agreements concluded by provinces. Many of those agreements can
only work because they have sufficiently raised expectations of cooperation through the
making of public commitments. Obviously, not all such international instruments are meant
to be binding, but the binding or non-binding character of an instrument ought to be
decided with the help of ordinary rules of treaty interpretation and not preconceptions about
the capacity of provinces to make treaties.
b. The Necessary Bindingness ofConstitutive Rules
There is a deeper argument in favour of recognizing that provinces sometimes enter
into truly binding agreements. The previous argument emphasised the fact that the
569 Obviously, putting one's reputation on the line and other forms of "bonds" will not
always sufJice to ensure respect for agreements and no general mechanism has yet been
developed in the international arena to prevent all possible cases of "efficient breach".
570 Paul Gerin-Lajoie, Address to the Consular Corps, supra note 6.
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incentive structures for governments to enter into many cooperative enterprises require that
provincial governments be able to enter into true agreements instead of merely making
predictive statements about their own future behaviour. One could simply deduce that
provinces possess the required capacity to enter into such agreements from the fact that
they have entered into many cooperative enterprises. And because many of these
agreements are only possible to the extent that parties undertake obligations, there must be
international secondary rules that underlie those agreements to tum them into obligations.
Now, the argument that I will highlight is related to the fact that many forms of cooperative
enterprises in which provinces are engaged in require an agreement as a necessary
condition of their existence. In other words, I am not talking about cases where parties
would not be willing to cooperate without an agreement, but rather about cases where
certain forms of cooperation would not even be possible, even in principle, without an
agreement.
The cases where such situations arise are those in which the agreement does not
merely state the mutual obligations of the parties but rather constitute the instruments by
which cooperation will be made possible. Institutionalised mutual trust through
intergovernmental "committees", "councils", "commissions", "agencies" is often necessary
to coordinate governmental actions to deal with cross-jurisdictional issues in our.
increasingly integrated world. Pure statements of intentions are not sufficient to set up those
institutions. This we have known at least since H.L.A. Hart's famous criticisms of John
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Austin's command theory of law. 571 In these situations, a form of intergovernmental
agreement is necessary to constitute those joint institutions because mere acts of will are
not sufficient. For an institution to be "created", there must be secondary rules setting it up
and specifying its powers. Those rules are "constitutive" in the sense that they specify the
criteria for the existence of the institution qua institution. Because agreements setting up
those institutions are constitutive, they are necessarily binding as the rules of chess are
binding on chess players; not following the rules does not necessarily mean that sanctions
will be imposed, it simply means that one is not participating in the common endeavour. In
that context, failing to respect the constitutive rules will mean failing to participate in the
common collaborative project that gave rise to the institution. Thus, bilateral or multilateral
agreements between federated states setting up institutions are necessary "binding" if those
institutions are to exist.
c. International Law and Legal Pluralism
I would suggest that many of the provincial agreements that take the forms
discussed in the last two sections could meet the requirements of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties572 • However, even if they did not, they could still qualify under other
international norms. Whether an agreement otherwise binding in the senses explored in the
57\ H.L.A. Hart, The Concept ofLaw, supra note 338.
572 Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, supra note 391.
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previous sections, but not satisfying the Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties573 could
be seen as legally binding at international law might appear at first a complex matter
because it seems to require us to identify precisely what international law is. In effect,
agreements cannot be "legally" binding in the abstract; they can only be so in reference to a
legal order. Thus, before examining the question as to whether or not an agreement might
be binding within a specific legal order, one has to settle the question of the relevant legal
order involved.
International law - or laws - cannot rely on centralised hegemonic institutions to
maintain a monistic view of law, and it is therefore more openly pluralistic than many
modem domestic state legal systems. H.L.A. Hart wrote, about 40 years ago "that there is
no basic rule providing general criteria of validity for the rules of international law, and that
the rules which are in fact operative constitute not a system but a set of rules, among which
are the rules providing for the binding force of treaties".574 I would suggest that this
statement remains largely true today; there is not a unique rule of recognition that unifies
exhaustively the rules of international law into a single system. The multiplication of
specialized international regimes (e.g. trade regimes, human rights regimes, water
management regimes, etc.) is a testimony to that fact. There might be rules of recognition
that give unity to specialized international legal regimes and there might be free-floating
primary and secondary rules that surround and sometimes penetrate those overlapping
573 Ibid.
574 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept ofLaw. supra note 338 at 238.
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regimes; but there is no single rule of recognition that currently unifies the whole body of
rules and institutions into a single system. In the absence of a totally unified international
legal system that would encompass all international legal regimes, there is no point in
denying the legal nature of provincial agreements and other international subjects anymore
than there is in denying the legal nature of any other international norm.
The absence of an effective third-party enforcer to sanction violations of the
agreements concluded by federated states should not distract us either. The same could be
said for most fields of international law. We have to remember that international law is not
exactly like domestic law: there is no true central legislative power and no general
compulsory jurisdiction at international law.
In the end, what matters is whether or not there is a secondary rule that can
transform the statements made by negotiating parties into obligations. Obviously, to the
extent that entities that are parties to the agreement consider the agreement legally binding,
there is no point in looking further. The question may remain as to whether one party could
challenge the binding nature of an agreement, the terms of which it is no longer interested
in fulfilling. It appears in any event that, when one looks at the state practices alluded to
earlier in this thesis and the observed willingness of states to be bound by agreements with
federated states, there is enough evidence to find a custom recognizing that treaties are
possible between a state and a federated state.
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c. A Plausible Legal Foundation for Federal Treaty Powers in
Relation to Provincial Matters: Provincial Delegation
After having demonstrated that the federal government does not possess exclusive
and plenary treaty-making power in relation to provincial matters, and after having shown
that provinces are capable of concluding treaties according to both Canadian constitutional
law and intemationallaw, it is now time to suggest a possible source for the federal treaty-
making power that is sometimes exercised by the federal government in relation to
provincial matters. The source is: provincial delegation.
As we know, cooperative federalism allows for flexibility through all sorts
delegation mechanisms. In light of the changing nature of the state - moving from a "public
order" state to a regulation and welfare state, many provinces were often glad to be able to
benefit from economies of scale that came with centralisation. Nova Scotia, for example,
even attempted to adopt legislation allowing for a delegation of legislative powers to the
Parliament on any "matter relating to employment in any industry, work or undertaking in
respect of which such matter is, by Section 92 of The British North America Act, 1867,
exclusively within the legislative jurisdiction" of the province. Such attempt at "horizontal
delegation" was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 575 The following year,
575 Nova Scotia (A.-G) v. Canada (A.-G.), supra note 448.
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however, the Supreme Court allowed "diagonal delegation" (i.e. delegation of regulatory
power to the executive of the other level of government).576 If such delegation is possible,
then nothing stops provinces from delegating either expressly and under certain conditions
a part, or the totality, of the exercise of their treaty powers to representatives of the federal
government - as Quebec has done by adopting s. 22.1 of An Act respecting the Ministere
d R I ·· . I 577 . 1" 1 hr h . 578es e atlOns mternatlOna es - or Imp IClt y t oug acqUlesence.
576 Prince Edward Island (Potato Marketing Board) v. HE. Willis Inc., [1952] 2 S.C.R.
392.
577 An Act respecting the Ministere des Relations internationales, supra note 35. In
particular, s. 22.1 provides that
The [Quebec] Minister [of International
Relations] may agree to the signing of such
an accord by Canada.
The Government must, in order to be
bound by an international accord
pertaining to any matter within the
constitutional jurisdiction of Quebec and to
give its assent to Canada's expressing its
consent to be bound by such an accord,
make an order to that effect. The same
applies in respect of the termination of
such an accord.
Le ministre [des Relations internationales
du Quebec] peut donner son agrement it ce
que Ie Canada signe un tel accord.
Le gouvernement doit, pour etre lie par un
accord international ressortissant it la
competence constitutionnelle du Quebec et
pour donner son assentiment it ce que Ie
Canada exprime son consentement it etre
lie par un tel accord, prendre un decret it
cet effet. II en est de meme it l'egard de la
fin d'un tel accord.
578 For provincial purposes, this turns on its head Bora Laskin's views according to which
"[i]n the present state of Canadian constitutional law and applicable international law, a
province can engage in dealings with a foreign government only through the authority of
the national government, and it would in that respect be really a delegate of the national
government. The latter is entitled to determine how and by whom it will be represented
abroad." (B. Laskin, "The Provinces and International Agreements", supra note 40 at 111.
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This legal proposition intensifies only slightly the role of the proVInces in the
federal government's action abroad, and formalises the federal government's official
commitment, i.e. not to enter into treaties "dealing with matters within provincial
jurisdiction ... without prior consultation with the Governments of the Provinces".579 The
obligation to consult provinces when negotiating an international agreement that will
merely affect their jurisdiction might flow as much from courtesy as from constitutional
law. However, Rinfret J.'s position in the Labour Conventions case - SCC makes it clear
that provincial consent over treaties in relation to their legislative competence could be
derived from provinces' prerogatives and is therefore necessary.580
Obviously, the federal government would not need such a provincial delegation of powers
when its actions are related to its own jurisdiction.
579 Canada, Legal Bureau of the Department of External Affairs, Letter February 1, 1985,
supra note 60 from the Legal Bureau of the then Department of Extemal Affairs responding
to a Council of Europe questionnaire.
580 This seems to be more solid ground on which to base that obligation than the one
suggested by Allan Gotlieb and Eli Lederman, "Ignoring the provinces is not Canada's
way" National Post (3 January 2003) A14 who claimed that:
. .. by ratifying the Kyoto Protocol without first consulting with and
obtaining the support from the provinces, the federal government has
departed from a long-standing practice, so consistent in nature and
fundamental to the Canadian Constitution that it may be considered a
constitutional. convention, or arguably, an unwritten constitutional rule.
At any rate, I will not pass judgment here on the capacity of the Parliament to implement
the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 11
December 1997, UN Doc. FCCCICPI1997/L.7/Add.1, 37 LL.M. 22, online: United Nations
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While these legal propositions will obviously make "Canadian sovereignists"
unhappy, they are the ones with the surest legal foundations and the ones that lead to more
Framework Convention on Climate Change
<unfccc.int/essential_background/Kyoto-protocol/itemsIl678.php> (entered into force 16
February 2005).
On a supposed uniform practice of seeking consent from provinces before ratifying
international agreements related to their jurisdiction, see also Allan Gotlieb, "Only one
voice speaks for Canada" The Globe and Mail (5 October 2005) A23 where Gotlieb,
writing in an otherwise distinctive Canadian sovereignist tone, nonetheless claims that
Ottawa ratifies agreements in areas of provincial concern "only after receiving the
concurrence of the provinces". Max Yelden, "Quebec Already Speaks for Canada" The
Globe and Mail (17 October 2005), online: The Globe and Mail (web-exclusive comment)
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20051017.wcommentl017/BNSt
orylNational/> also writes that "[a]s to Madame Gagnon-Tremblay's fourth point, that
Quebec's consent be obtained before treaties are signed, Mr. Gotlieb makes clear that
treaties in areas of domestic provincial jurisdiction are not ratified without provincial
consent and prior consultation. This has been the case for a very long time.") Benoit
Pelletier, Quebec's current Liberal Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs disagreed with
Gotlieb and others on whether or not, in fact, "Canada has ... always effectively sought
provincial and territorial concurrence before signing and ratifying international treaties
dealing in matters of provincial jurisdiction." (Benoit Pelletier, "To refuse provincial input
in international negotiations is to condemn our federation to a state of perpetual stagnation"
The Globe and Mail (12 October 2005), online: The Globe and Mail (update)
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20051011.wwebex1012/BNStory
>.) However, it is clear from Pelletier's complaint that he does not disagree with the
principle.
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democratic outcomes. It is true that Canada might be forced to abstain from concluding
certain treaties because of a lack of provincial support in certain areas, but the use of a
"federal clause" or a "reservation" are ways to minimise the effect of such abstention by
certain provinces. These tools show that, contrary to what Dean Rand (as he then was)
feared, a divided treaty power does not necessarily amount to giving provinces a veto
power that risks "sterilising national action". 581 One might complain that those
consultations and internal negotiations could cause additional delays, but this is not
necessarily something to be lamented since such a process may promote better informed
d . 582consent an stronger commItments.
Institutionally speaking, I would suggest, however, that in order to develop more
effective coordination mechanisms between provinces and the federal government, a
common agreement should be negotiated. 583 The willingness of provinces to negotiate a
581 I.C. Rand, "Some Aspects of Canadian Constitutionnalism", supra note 41 at 143. Rand
also feared that such division would result in an "inverting of the underlying scheme of
Dominion and provincial relations." (Ibid.) However, if both levels are constitutionally
equals, there is simply no logical space for such inversion.
582 A.L.C. de Mestral, "L'evolution des rapports entre Ie droit canadien et Ie droit
international un demi-siecle apres l'affaire des conventions internationales de travail",
supra note 112 at 310-311.
583 I have mentioned possible elements that might contain such an agreement in sections
2.a.ii.l and 2.a.ii.3. Of course, as long as the agreement would not be entrenched, it would
only have political weight (see Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.), [1991] 2
S.C.R. 525) but it could be transformed into a constitutional convention. After being tested
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compensation mechanism in case they are held responsible for Canada's violation of an
international obligation should be a serious incentive for the federal government to
participate in such negotiations. Apart from compensation schemes that could be
developed, one could also think of creating external incentives towards compliance, by
using what has been called "double-decker treaties" (e.g. treaties that are ratified by both
levels of government). 584 Finally, it has been argued that "[t]he more important the treaty to
a foreign government, and the more substantial the pecuniary interests involved, the more
over a certain period of time and improved in light of experience, that agreement could also
be entrenched when the political conditions would be favorable.
584 On "double decker" treaties, see C. Schreuer, "The Waning of the Sovereign State:
Toward a New Paradigm ofInternational Law?", supra note 104 at 457:
The European Community has developed a different technique to deal with
treaties straddling State and Community competences. These treaties are
concluded in the form of 'mixed agreements' to which the Members as well
as the Community are formal parties. This 'double decker' method may be
an interesting model for future solutions. (Footnotes omitted.)
The author also refers to other examples, such as the "ratifications of multilateral treaties by
Byelorussia (now Belarus) and the Ukraine while they were still Soviet Republics, in
addition to the Soviet Union". For further readings on "mixed agreements", Christoph
Schreuer suggests: Henry G. Schermers, "International Organizations as Members of Other
International Organizations" in Rudolf Bernhardt et aI., eds., Volkerrecht als
Rechtsordnung, internationale Gerichtsbarkeit, Menschenrechte: Festschrift fur Hermann
Mosler (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1983) 823 at 826-831 and David O'Keefe and Henri G.
Schermers, eds., Mixed Agreements (Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983).
On the issue of mixed agreements, see also Joni Heliskoski, Mixed Agreements As A
Technique For Organizing The International Relations Of The European Community And
Its Member State (New York: Kluwer Law International, 2001).
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resolute would be the demand that Ottawa be the guarantor of the undertaking.,,585 The
institutional schemes suggested here adequately respond to that argument. In the end, what
foreign governments will want is adequate assurance that treaty obligations will be
respected and, as first-year law students learn very quickly, they will be happy to find out
that there is more than one entity that can be called to answer in case of a breach!
***
What we have seen in this chapter should be enough to refute the arguments of the
"Canadian sovereignists" who want all foreign affairs powers in the hands of the federal
government. Their position is wrong in terms of public policy and it is legally without
foundations, unless, of course, the Labour Conventions case is reversed. The following
chapter will present the legal arguments offered in favour of reversing that decision and
will show that they are all ill-founded. In particular, I will show how reversing the Labour
Conventions case would drastically alter Canadian constitutionalism.
585 G.R. Morris, "The Treaty-Making Power: A Canadian Dilemma", supra note 22 at 501.
3. Trying to Find Our Own Path Beyond the Labour
Conventions Case: Treaty Implementation in the
Canadian Federation (or Why We Should Not
Reverse the Labour Conventions Rules)
Despite renewed approval of the Labour Conventions case586 by the courts,587
constant support for it by all successive Quebec governments (sovereignists and federalists
alike), and general endorsement of it by Francophone constitutionalists, the decision has
586 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19.
587 As we have seen earlier, there is L'Heureux-DuM and McLachlin JJ.'s recent (albeit
confusing) support for the decision's rule on the division of legislative powers in Thomson
v. Thomson, supra note 265 at 611. For further approvals of the decision, see for example:
Patriation Reference, supra note 95 (MartIand and Ritchie J1., dissenting opinion on the
"legality" question but not on this point), Foreign Legations case, supra note 350 (three
separate opinions of Taschereau J. (in the majority), Kerwin and Hudson JJ. (dissenting) of
a panel of five); Saxena v. Thailand (Kingdom), [1997] B.C.J. No. 1511, ~ 15 (unanimous
decision of the B.e. e.A.); Alberta Union ofProvincial Employees v. Alberta [1980] 120
D.L.R. (3d) 590 (Alta. Q.B.) (affirmed 130 D.L.R. (3d) 191, leave to appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada (Martland, Ritchie and Dickson JJ.) refused December 7, 1981); British
Columbia Packers Ltd. v. Canada (Labour Relations Board), [1974] 2 F.e. 913 ~ 48-49.
The Supreme Court had expressed doubts about the Labour Conventions case, supra note
19 in earlier decisions (see MacDonald v. Vapor Canada Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134
[MacDonald v. Vapor Canada Ltd.] and Schneider v. The Queen, [1982] 2 S.e.R. 112).
However, as we will see later, despite the marked willingness to overrule older precedents
that characterized that period, the Court has decided that it is wiser to leave the rules
expounded by the 1937 Privy Council decision in place.
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often been seen as a mistake in English Canada. In fact, many English-speaking writers
would ultimately like to see the decision reversed. The argument most often made by those
who support a reversal is that the federal government must have plenary and exclusive
powers over both treaty-making and treaty-implementation; otherwise Canada's negotiation
position is weakened and her ability to enter treaties is severely diminished. However, I
have never seen this claim substantiated with any concrete example. Those who argue that
the current system weakens Canada's ability to negotiate effectively have yet to come up
with the empirical evidence to support such claim. At least prima facie, the claim seems
baseless from the sheer number of international agreements to which Canada has agreed. In
fact, I am tempted to suggest that, on this issue, things have not changed much since Justice
La Forest said in the 1970s that the important role that Canada plays in international
relations should be sufficient to put to rest the claim that the Labour Conventions case
crippled Canada's ability to negotiate effectively. 588
In this chapter, I will show why reversing the Labour Conventions case would be a
terrible thing for the general economy of the Canadian constitution and for federalism in
particular. To do so, I will examine each of the different sources invoked by those who
want to reverse the decision and show why it does not make sense to follow them. Thus, in
588 G.V. La Forest, "Labour Conventions Case Revisited", supra note 112 at 148. See also
A.L.C. de Mestral, "L'evolution des rapports entre Ie droit canadien et Ie droit international
un demi-siecle apres l'affaire des conventions internationales de travail", supra note 112 at
310-311.
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section 3.a. I will start by explaining why s. 132 of the Constitution Act, 1867 should not be
revived. The following section (3.b.) will be devoted to showing why we should not use the
"national concerns" doctrine of s. 91 to create a plenary federal power to implement
treaties. Section 3.c. will respond to arguments based on the federal Parliament's exclusive
extra-territorial legislative powers. Finally, in section 3.d. I will comment on the difficulties
of using the amending formula of the Constitution to reverse the effects of the Labour
Conventions case and what such difficulties should tell us about the illegitimacy of a
potential judicial reversal of that precedent. As Gerard La Forest has pointed out, the
balance struck in the latter case took into account many factors and is secured by historical,
cultural, political and geographical considerations and it should not be lightly tampered
with. 589
589 G.V. La Forest, "Labour Conventions Case Revisited", supra note 112 at 147-150. See
also: A.L.C. de Mestral, "L'evolution des rapports entre Ie droit canadien et Ie droit
international un demi-siecle apres l'affaire des conventions internationales de travail" supra
note 112 at 321.
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a. Section 132 Cannot be Judicially Revived
Let me begin by addressing arguments about judicially reviving s. 132 that are
presented at frequent intervals.59o Usually, those supporting such change are convinced that
this would be a good idea as a matter of policy and not much time is spent developing legal
arguments that would support their position. However, to reverse a Privy Council precedent
that has been in place for three quarter of a century and upon which reliance has been put
(including by the federal government and its international partners591 ), one must have very
strong arguments. These do not exist. Instead, I think that there are strong arguments
against reversing the Privy Council.
To better understand the original purpose of s. 132,592 it is useful to examine how
590 See for example, V.C. MacDonald, "The Canadian Constitution Seventy Years Later",
supra note 112 at 416; Torsten H. Strom and Peter Finkle, "Treaty Implementation: The
Canadian Game Needs Australian Rules" (1993) 25 Ottawa L. Rev. 39 at note 74 and
accompanying text.
591 See Canada, Legal Bureau of the Department of External Affairs, Letter February 1,
1985, supra note 60.
592 The "purpose" of a constitutional provision is not determined by the subjective beliefs of
politicians who pushed for the adoption of that provision (see H. Cyr, "L'interpretation
constitutionnelle, un exemple de postpluralisme", supra note 169). However, because we
presuppose that constitutional provisions are adopted for a reason, we assume that they
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the Framers arrived at its current wording. Initially, Resolution 30, adopted at the
Conference of Delegates from the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick,
Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island held in Quebec in October 1864, read:
The General Government and Parliament shall have all powers necessary or
proper for performing the obligations of the Federated Provinces, as part of
the British Empire, to Foreign Countries, arising under Treaties between
Great Britain and such Countries. 593
Nothing was said about Parliament's power to enact laws to implement Imperial treaty
obligations relating to the federal field of powers. The Delegates must have assumed that
such a provision was not necessary since Parliament would already have the powers to
implement such obligations within its regular legislative jurisdiction. Thus, the Delegates
assumed that, without a specific indication to the contrary, treaty implementation would
normally be the responsibility of the legislature that has jurisdiction over the subject-matter
of the treaty in question.
Then, at the London Conference of Delegates from the Provinces of Canada, Nova
reflect a certain purpose. The initial purpose of a provision is thus a theoretical construction
based on the circumstances of its adoption and created with the help of a series of
interpretative heuristics (e.g. statements of intention, mischief rule, expected effects of the
provision, etc,). As most theories, the best ones will be the ones that are coherent, simple,
exhaustive in their explanation, etc.
593 The Quebec Resolutions, October 1864 (The 72 Resolutions), reproduced in William
P.M. Kennedy, Statutes, Treaties and Documents ofthe Canadian Constitution, 1713-1929,
2nd ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1930) at 544 (emphasis added.) [W.P.M
Kennedy, Statutes, Treaties and Documents ofthe Canadian Constitution, 1713-1929].
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Scotia and New Brunswick held at the Westminster Palace Hotel in December 1866, the
Delegates adopted a modified version of the initial resolution that replaced the expression
"Federated Provinces" by "Confederation".594 While this new expression was more concise,
it was also more ambiguous. Was the expression "Confederation" meant to include both the
"General Government" as well as the provinces? If so, why change the wording if they
assumed that the General Government would normally have the power to implement
Imperial treaty obligations with respect to subject-matters falling within its own
jurisdiction? It was certainly not because the Delegates did not want the Imperial
Parliament to intervene in Canadian domestic affairs to perform Great Britain's obligations.
In effect, it simply stated that Parliament would have such powers but did not propose to
amend s. 1 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865595 adopted less than two years earlier
and that provided that "An Act of Parliament or any Provision thereof shall in construing
this Act be said to extend to any Colony when it is made applicable to such Colony by the
express Words or necessary Intendment of any Act of Parliament". A plausible
interpretation for this change of wording is that it intended to mark a complete unitary
integration of authority in the "General Government" in relation to any international
obligations arising from membership to the Empire.
But the final version of the project got rid of the ambiguity and provided that
The Parliament and Government ofCanada shall have all Powers necessary
594 Ibid. at 614.
595 Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865 (U.K.), 28 & 29 Vict., c. 63.
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or proper for performing the Obligations of Canada or of any Province
thereof, as Part of the British Empire, towards Foreign Countries, arising
under Treaties between the Empire and such Foreign Countries. 596
The first thing to notice is that the drafters left behind the expression "General
Government" and replaced it with "Government of Canada". Also, it clearly separated the
"Obligations of Canada" from those of "any Province" arising under Treaties between the
Empire and foreign countries. But why then include the expression "Obligations of
Canada" if we already know that Parliament could legislate to implement such obligations?
A possible explanation lies in the substitution of the expression "General Government" by
"Government of Canada". The former expression portrayed the federal government as a
"General Government" that would sit above the "Federated Provinces" in a hierarchically
integrated unity. This is no longer the case with the expression "Government of Canada".
The expression "Government of Canada" is open to more than one conception of the role of
the federal government in the constitutional architecture. We can read s. 132 as giving us a
clue as to the nature of that government in that structure: by stating that both "Canada" and
"any Province" may have obligations of their own as parts of the British Empire, s. 132
indicates that the federal government has a distinct existence from that of the provinces and
that it may have obligation of its own. In other words, s. 132 highlights the fact that Canada
is neither a confederation in which the provinces have delegated powers to a central
institution while keeping for themselves the entire attributes of "self-governing colonies",
nor is it a unitary state in which provinces are delegates or subordinates597 of the "General
596 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 39, s. 132 (emphasis added).
597 I distinguish here "subordinate" entities from "delegated" entities. The first type is taken
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Government". Section 132 confinns that Canada is a federation. And again, the fact that s.
132 was deemed necessary to grant legislative power to Parliament to perfonn Imperial
obligations related to provincial subject-matters simply confinns that it was expected that,
without such express provision, Parliament would not otherwise have such power.
But whether they were dealing with Canada's obligations or the provinces', the
drafters were concerned with those obligations that were flowing from their participation in
the British Empire and not any other. Thus, the initial purpose of s. 132 was to ensure the
perfonnance of international obligations undertaken by the Imperial government in respect
to the Dominion and the provinces. As I said earlier, at the time the Constitution Act, 1867
was adopted, it was not anticipated that Canada and the provinces would one day be
directly involved in international relations. 598 They were subordinated to the greater
interests of the Empire. Thus, only the Imperial government was thought able to incur
international obligations. And only the Imperial government was thought to be able to incur
responsibility for failing to respect the obligations undertaken. This means that s. 132 had
little to do with either the provinces or the "Dominion" self-governance but rather to do
with the international situation of the Imperial government. Thus, s. 132 was adopted for
the purpose of ensuring that the Imperial government would not be held in violation of her
to have at least some authority independently from a grant of power by its political superior
while the second type of entity refers to an entity that receives all of its authority from that
political superior.
598 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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international obligations. As we have seen earlier in the Aeronautics Reference, the
Dominion was meant not only to have the right to perform Imperial obligations for her and
the provinces, "but also the obligation, to provide by statute and by regulation that the
terms of the Convention shall be duly carried out. ,,599
Therefore, the initial purpose of that section was to grant the necessary powers to
protect the Imperial government from violations of its international obligations by its
subordinates. Now that the Empire has vanished, that initial purpose has expired since the
entity that was meant to be protected no longer exists. To be clear, this is not a case like the
issue of changing how "banking" works,600 rather this is a case more like the one we would
face if banking were to simply disappear. It is not simply that the mode of being of the
initial object has changed, it is rather that the object itself no longer exists.
599 Aeronautics Reference, supra note 125 at 77 (emphasis added).
600 Alberta (A.G.) v. Canada (A.G.), [1947] A.C. 503 [In re Alberta Bill of Rights Act] at
516-17:
The question ... is whether operations of this sort fall within the connotation
of "banking" as that word is used in s. 91 of the British North America Act.
Their Lordships entertain no doubt that such operations are covered by the
term "banking" in s. 91. The question is not what was the extent and kind of
business actually carried on by banks in Canada in 1867, but what is the
meaning of the term itself in the Act. To take a what may seem a frivolous
analogy, if "skating" was one of the matters to which exclusive legislative
authority of the Parliament of Canada extended, it would be nothing to the
point to prove that only one style of skating was practised in Canada in 1867
and argue that the exclusive power to legislate in respect of subsequently
developed styles of skating was not expressly conferred on the central
legislature. (Emphasis added.)
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Those who want a new version of s. 132 to be revived suggest that purposive
interpretation is not enough. As Lord Sankey famously stated, the Constitution is a "living
tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits".601 As I have written
elsewhere, I agree with "progressive interpretation" of the Constitution.602 However, the
use of progressive interpretation is more limited in the context of federalism than in the
context of Charter rights because the extension of one jurisdiction risks affecting the
political balance achieved by the framers. And in that context, "progressive interpretation"
might create a fear of the "bait and switch" phenomenon, thus hindering future revisions of
the scope of provincial and federal jurisdictions.603
601 Edwards, supra note 82 at 136.
602 See for example, Hugo Cyr, "Why The Rules Governing The Division Of Legislative
Powers Over Marriage And Divorce Favour The Recognition Of Same-Sex Marriages",
brief presented to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human
Rights (Ottawa: 8 April 2003) and Hugo Cyr, "La conjugalite dans tous ses etats : la
validite constitutionnelle de « l'union civile » sous l'angle du partage des competences
legislatives" in Pierre-Claude Lafond et Brigitte Lefebre, eds., L 'union civile nouveaux
modeles de conjugalite et de parentalite au 21e siecle (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 2003) 193
[H. Cyr, "La conjugalite dans tous ses etats : la validite constitutionnelle de « l'union civile
» sous l' angle du partage des competences legislatives"].
603 The "bait and switch" phenomenon happens in two stages. First, law-makers are induced
to act in a certain way because expectations are created that if they do so certain
consequences will (or will not) follow. Once the law-makers act according to the
inducement, either those who created the expectations or other participants who remained
silent during the inducement phase act wilfully in such a way that the consequences
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Recently, Deschamps J. wrote for a unanimous Supreme Court in Reference re
Employment Insurance Act (Can.), ss. 22 and 23 that "[a] progressive interpretation cannot
expected by the law-makers will not be realized. The law-makers are thus fooled into
adopting something they do not necessarily want. See, for example, William N. Eskridge,
Jr. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1994)
at 284-85 where he illustrates how the American Congress can been frustrated by courts
shifting interpretive rules. And once burnt, twice shy.
Arguably, the fear of the "bait and switch" phenomenon was partly responsible for
the failure of the Meech Lake Accord. In effect, many opponents to the Accord feared that
no matter how much the "distinct society" clause may have been described as mainly
"hortatory or symbolic" (Peter W. Hogg, Meech Lake Constitutional Accord Annotated
(Toronto: Carswell, 1988) at 13) at the time of its adoption by many of its supporters
outside Quebec, the clause might still allow the judiciary to extend Quebec's legislative
jurisdiction in unwanted directions.
A majority of the Supreme Court recognized the "bait and switch" problem in the
slightly different context of private orderings between insurance companies in their
interprovincial dealings when it wrote:
The courts should strive to give full effect to voluntary, interprovincial
arrangements that seek to overcome some of the practical difficulties
inherent in our federal structure. The danger, however, is that if the courts
overstate the effect ofthese voluntary arrangements, and thereby impose on
the parties obligations that were never in their contemplation, cooperation
may no longer beforthcoming. [Emphasis added.]
(Unifund Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. ofBritish Columbia, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 63,2003
SCC 40 ~ 103 (Justice Binnie for McLachlin C.J. and Iacobucci and LeBel 11.) [Unifund
Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. ofBritish Columbia]
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... be used to justify Parliament in encroaching on a field of provincial jurisdiction.,,604
How could the extension of one jurisdiction not encroach on the other if the division of
powers is exhaustive?
The solution is to increase the size of the pie instead of redistributing its shares. In
other words, this is made possible when the extension of power of one jurisdiction does not
diminish the sphere of powers of the other and it does not create new areas for exercising
an overriding power over the other jurisdiction. A good example of this type of situation is
the progressive interpretation of s. 91 (26) granting Parliament power over "marriage and
divorce" to include same-sex marriages.605 That was a case in which the extension of the
federal power was in line with the initial objective of maintaining the stability of the
matrimonial status of persons moving from one part of the country to another. The
progressive interpretation did not restrict in any way the provinces' powers to adopt laws
on other forms of civil statuses606 and it did not create new areas for overriding federal
legislation. But here, the extension of federal power that would result from bringing back a
modified form of s. 132 would not only "encroach on a field of provincial jurisdiction", it
604 Reference re Employment Insurance Act, supra note 97 ~ 10. Deschamps J. repeats that
principle in the conclusion to her judgment (~ 76): "The evolution of the scope of a
constitutional head of power cannot result in encroachment on a power assigned to another
level of government."
605 Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698.
606 See H. Cyr, "La conjugalite dans tous ses etats : la validite constitutionnelle de « l'union
civile» sous l'angle du partage des competences legislatives", supra note 602.
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would simply allow for the invasion of the entire jurisdiction. I think that we could end the
analysis right here. However, for the sake of dealing with the issue once and for all, I will
examine it further.
Justice Deschamps also wrote in Reference re Employment Insurance Act that "[i]f
an issue [of federalism] comes before a court, the court must refer to the framers'
description of the power in order to identify its essential components, and must be guided
by the way in which courts have interpreted the power in the past.,,607 The Supreme Court
wants to ensure that legislative powers will evolve only incrementally and that changes can
still be related to an initial purpose or that it will at least be in line with a general body of
caselaw. Here, reviving s. 132 can rely on none of these rationales. In fact, as we have seen
earlier, far from being an incremental change of minor importance, a revival of a new
version of s. 132 would mean the destruction of Canada's federal structure. We would not
be doing away with only one essential component of one head of power but with the very
idea of "heads of powers" for the federal Parliament.
It is true, however, that while courts tend to refuse the "shifting purposes" doctrine
for statutes,608 the Supreme Court has been willing, in the past, to accept that the initial
607 Reference re Employment Insurance Act, supra note 97 ~ 10.
608 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at 335 (for the Court, Dickson J., as he
then was): "Furthermore, the theory of a shifting purpose stands in stark contrast to
fundamental notions developed in our law concerning the nature of "Parliamentary
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purpose of a section might not be determinative for its validity. The Supreme Court, in
certain circumstances, might sometimes be willing to re-think partially its interpretation of
the division of powers. It is true, for example, that Chief Justice Laskin wrote in 1978 in R.
v. Zelensky609:
New appreciations thrown up by new social conditions, or re-assessments of
old appreciations which new or altered social conditions induce make it
intention". Purpose is a function of the intent of those who drafted and enacted the
legislation at the time, and not of any shifting variable." See also R. v. Edwards Books and
Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 ~ 86 (Dickson C.J., Chouinard, Le Dain n.); Irwin Toy Ltd. v.
Quebec (A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 ~ 48 (Dickson C.J., Lamer and Wilson n.); R. v.
Zundel, supra note 375 ~ 45ff. (McLachlin J. as she then was, per La Forest, L'Heureux-
DuM, Sopinka n); M v. H, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 ~ 197 (Gonthier J., dissenting); Delisle v.
Canada (Deputy A.G.), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989 ~ 77 (Cory and Iacobucci n., dissenting).
However the Supreme Court has qualified that doctrine by accepting that there might be
multiple initial purposes to a statute (R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 ~ 65
(Gonthier and Binnie n., per McLachlin C.J., Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache n. concurring,
Deschamps J. dissenting in part but concurring on this point (see ~ 284) [R. v. Malmo-
Levine]) and by describing the initial purpose in more general terms than might have been
used to describe the purpose initially in order to allow for the possibility of "shift in
emphasis" (R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 ~ 84-86 (Sopinka J. per Lamer C.J. and La
Forest, Cory, McLachlin, Stevenson and Iacobucci n.); R. v. Zundel, supra note 375 ~ 190-
195 (dissent by Cory and Iacobucci n, Gonthier J.); R. v. Malmo-Levine, ibid. ("The
purpose and character of the legislation remained the same, but new means were added to
advance the original objectives of health and public safety.")).
609 R. v. Zelensky, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 940, 951 [R. v. Zelensky]. See also Clark v. Canadian
National Railway Co., [1988] 2 S.C.R. 680 ~ 42-43 [Clark v. Canadian National Railway
Co.]
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appropriate for this Court to re-examine courses of decision on the scope of
legislative power when fresh issues are presented to it, always remembering,
of course, that it is entrusted with a very delicate role in maintaining the
integrity of the constitutional limits imposed by the British North America
Act.
But this statement by Chief Justice Laskin, put in its historical context, also casts light on
the issue before us. 1978 was a particularly difficult year for the doctrine of precedents in
the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice had voted for expressly overruling at least four Privy
Councilor Supreme Court precedents610 in that year and bluntly stated in a fifth case that
"this Court is not bound by judgments of the Privy Council any more that it is bound by its
own judgments".611 That last case is of particular interest to us: Capital Cities
Communications v. CR. TC 612 At issue in that case was, inter alia, Parliament's power to
regulate television signals coming from outside Canada and to regulate the further
retransmission of such signals within Canada. Chief Justice Laskin, writing for the
majority, referred to the Radio Reference.613 He recalled that both the Aeronautics
610 Reference re: Agricultural Products Marketing Act, 1970 (Canada), [1978] 2 S.c.R.
1198 (Laskin C.J. overruling Lower Mainland Dairy Products Sales Adjustment Committee
v. Crystal Dairy, [1933] A.C. 168); Hill v. R., [1977] 1 S.C.R. 827 (Laskin C.J., in dissent,
voting to overrule Goldhar v. R., [1960] S.C.R. 60); McNamara Construction (Western)
Ltd., supra note 280 (Laskin C.J. overruling Farwell v. R., (1893) 22 S.C.R. 553; Paquette
v. R., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 189 (Martland J. for the Court overruling in part Dunbar v. R., (1936)
67 C.C.C. 20, [1936] 4 D.L.R. 737).
611 Capital Cities Communications v. CR.TC, supra note 221 at 161.
612 Ibid.
613 Radio Reference. supra note 130.
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Reference614 and the Radio Reference "invited a consideration of federal treaty-
implementing powers".615 Although he thought that the Privy Council in the Radio
Reference had said that Parliament could implement treaties by virtue of its "Peace, Order
and Good Government" powers,616 he nonetheless stated that he needed "not pursue that
aspect for the purposes of the present case.,,617 Laskin C.J. simply stated that "[a]lthough
this Court is not bound by judgments of the Privy Council any more that it is bound by its
own judgments, I hold that the Radio case was correctly decided under the terms of ss. 91
and 92(10)(a)".618 That was an interesting opinion in light of his serious doubts expressed
about the Labour Conventions case619 in his obiter in MacDonald v. Vapor Canada Ltd. !620
614 Aeronautics Reference, supra note 125.
615 Capital Cities Communications v. C.R. rc., supra note 221 at 154.
616 Ibid. at 154-55 ("[The Privy Council did hold in the Radio case that federal legislation
implementing the International Radiotelegraph Convention of 1927, to which Canada was a
party as an independent signatory, was competent to Parliament as being for the peace,
order and good government of Canada, since it dealt with a matter that was not explicitly
mentioned in s. 91 or s. 92 of the British North America Act.]")
617 Ibid. at 154.
618 Ibid. at 161.
619 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19.
620 MacDonald v. Vapor Canada Ltd., supra note 587 at 169 ("Although the foregoing
references would support a reconsideration of the Labour Conventions case, I find it
unnecessary to do that here because, assuming that it was open to Parliament to pass
legislation in implementation of an international obligation by Canada under a treaty or
Convention (being legislation which it would be otherwise beyond its competence), I am of
the opinion that it cannot be said that s. 7 was enacted on that basis.")
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I will come back to this point a little later. But first, let's see how far the R. v. Zelensky
argument could lead us.
When' we examine the use to which R. v. Zelensky has been put, we discover that it
has only been used once by the Supreme Court to interpret any other legislative heads of
power than 91 (27) ("criminallaw,,).621 In Clark v. Canadian National Railway Co.,622 the
Supreme Court had to decide whether the limitation period against personal injuries in the
federal Railway Act623 was ultra vires. The Court notes (before discussing the changing
circumstances that may justify revisiting a previous case that had found a similar section to
be valid) that:
In this Court, the characterization of the manner in which the Court dealt
with the issue some seventy years ago is, of course, not determinative. It
remains, however, that the Court would be less willing to interfere with a
decision arrived at after full argument and deliberation ... 624
621 See for example, R. v. 80 (80) [80S}, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 254; RJR-MacDonald Inc. v.
Canada (A. G.), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 ~ 28 (La Forest J., L'Heureux-DuM and Gonthier JJ,
dissenting) ("In developing a definition of the criminal law, this Court has been careful not
to freeze the definition in time or confine it to a fixed domain of activity"); R. v. Hinchey,
[1996] 3 S.C.R. 1128 ~ 30 ("I agree with this description. Parliament, therefore, retains the
power to designate the specific acts which it considers harmful to the State. The criminal
law is not "frozen as of some particular time": R. v. Zelensky, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 940 at p.
951.").
622 Clark v. Canadian National Railway Co., supra note 609.
623 Railway Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. R.-2.
624 Clark v. Canadian National Railway Co., supra note 609 at ~ 39.
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This poses a serious problem to those who would want to bring back s. 132 from the dead;
the "new social conditions" - Canada's international independence from the United
Kingdom and Canada's autonomous treaty-making activities - were already there in the
early 1930s and were appreciated and taken into serious consideration by the Privy Council
when they decided the Radio Reference625 in 1932 and the Labour Conventions case in
1937.626 Moreover, the Court reversed its old precedent in Clark v. Canadian National
Railway Co., because it did not fit anymore with the general body of constitutional law that
had grown around the issue of application of general provincial laws to s. 92(10)
undertakings. That was the type of situation that Deschamps J. was referring to earlier
without mentioning this case. Again, I repeat, nothing of that sort has happened here. Quite
the contrary; s. 132's obsolescence is well integrated in the Canadian constitutional fabric.
That being said, let's return to the restraint shown by Laskin C.l. in Capital Cities
Communications v. C.R. r c. 627 and MacDonald v. Vapor Canada Ltcf28 considering its
well-know opposition to the decision of the Privy Council in the Labour Conventions case.
This restraint might be quite surprising coming from a judge who did not hesitate to
overrule precedents. But to better understand Laskin C.J.'s reluctance to reverse the Labour
625 Radio Reference, supra note 130.
626 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19.
627 Capital Cities Communications v. c.R.rc., supra note 221.
628 MacDonald v. Vapor Canada Ltd., supra note 587.
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Conventions case and the Radio Reference, 629 at least with regard to s. 132, one has to
recall what he said in R. v. Zelensky about the Supreme Court's duty to always remember
that "it is entrusted with a very delicate role in maintaining the integrity of the
constitutional limits imposed by the British North America Act". And when one reads his
previous writings, things get even clearer: Bora Laskin had written that s. 132 is "obsolete
unless its words are tortured to meet the present international position, and this is too much
to expect of the Courts". 630
In effect, there are strong textual arguments against frankensteinisation of s. 132.
Even if we wanted to give the most evolving purposive interpretation to that section, we
would need to have that interpretation square off with the explicit text of the provision. To
revive s. 132 in order to apply it to modem days would require us to read down the
expressions "as Part of the British Empire". Chopping five words from a provision of the
Constitution Act, 1867 without a formal constitutional amendment is already quite
demanding. Once there, we are not far away from the seven words that compose "Property
and Civil Rights in the Province" of s. 92 (13)... And it is not all; we would also need to
take out a sixth word: the second "Empire" would also have to go. But we could not just
take that last word out; we would have to replace it by something else lest the sentence
629 Radio Reference, supra note 130.
630 Bora Laskin, Laskin's Canadian Constitutional Law: Cases, Text and Notes on
Distribution ofLegislative Power, rev. 4th ed. by Albert S. Abel & John I. Laskin (Toronto:
Carswell, 1975) at 218.
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becomes meaningless. What should it be replaced by? "Canada or any Province" or only
"Canada"? Reading in one or the other would also force us not only to decide whether the
federal executive has the capacity to conclude treaties in relation to matters within
province's legislative competence, but also whether provinces have the constitutional
capacity to conclude international agreements. Not that I want to be too much of a
textualist, but it seems that such changes require more than a little creative reading.
Therefore, any attempt to revive s. 132 judicially ought to be defeated. The only
way to achieve that goal would be through a formal constitutional amendment. This is
clearly unrealistic at the moment. Not only because there would not be that much
enthusiasm on the part of provinces for such a change, but also because it would not simply
require a technical change in the constitution; it would mean changing the deep structure of
the Constitution and, to a large extent, do away with federalism as an entrenched
constitutional principle.631
b. Section 91 and the Federal Powers Over the "Peace,
Order and Good Government"
It IS well-established that by virtue of the words "Peace, Order and Good
631 Reference Re Secession ofQuebec, supra note 76.
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Government" found in the introductory paragraph of s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867,632
the federal Parliament has the necessary powers to adopt legislation in relation to provincial
matters in cases of emergency - including economic emergency.633 That being the case,
suffice to say here that, except in the most curious circumstances,634 Parliament could not
invoke its emergency powers to justify implementing treaty obligations that would
otherwise fall within the jurisdiction of provinces. In effect, if there is ever again a situation
in which legislative measures to be taken by Parliament are made "temporarily necessary to
meet a situation of ... crisis imperilling the well-being of Canada as a whole and requiring
Parliament's stern intervention in the interests of the country as a whole",635 that exeptional
632 The introductory paragraph of s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 reads:
It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and
good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the
Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of
the Provinces; and for greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the
Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Section, it is hereby declared that
(notwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclusive Legislative Authority of
the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters coming within the Classes of
Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say, ...
633 Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373 [Reference re Anti-Inflation Act].
634 The only possible circumstances that I could imagine for that being the case would be if
(a) another state credibly threatened Canada with invasion if it did not implement a specific
treaty and provinces were refusing to do so, or (b) if provinces were unwilling to implement
essential conditions of a peace treaty between Canada and a belligerent country and the
provinces' unwillingness to abide by the treaty threatened to continue the armed conflict.
These appear to be improbable scenarios.
635 Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, supra note 633 at 425.
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crisis of a national magnitude would not, in all likelihood, be caused by the specific need to
implement any particular treaty. Rather, it will be caused by a truly concrete emergency
situation that will require a stem federal legislative action of a temporary nature. Nobody
could seriously suggest that treaty implementation, in itself, could constitute an emergency
in the constitutional sense, nor even in the colloquial one.
Thus, what is more relevant for our purposes here is to examine the other branch of
the "Peace, Order and good Government" powers that has been called the "national
concerns" doctrine.636
Historically, two opposite interpretations were given to that doctrine. According to
the first one - very favourable to a high degree of centralisation -, Parliament could adopt
uniform laws for the entire country on any matter of "national concern". I will call this
interpretation the "Canadian Sovereignist Position". According to the second interpretation
- more restrictive than the first one and more in line with the federal principle -, the federal
Parliament only has jurisdiction over matters of "national concern" to the extent that those
matters have not in any way been granted to provincial legislatures. In other words, the
existence of a "national concern" might be necessary but it is not a sufficient condition for
the existence of a federal power in relation to that matter; there is also the need to establish
the residual character of the specific power claimed. I will call this interpretation the
"Canadian Federalist Position".
636 See supra notes 169,242-260 and accompanying text.
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The following excerpts from the famous Russell v. R. and Local Prohibition case
will illustrate those two interpretations very well:
Russell v. R. as a "Canadian Sovereignist Position":
The declared object of Parliament in passing the Act [the Canada
Temperance Act] is that there should be uniform legislation in all the
provinces respecting the traffic in intoxicating liquors, with a view to
promote temperance in the Dominion. Parliament does not treat the
promotion of temperance as desirable in one province more than in another
but as desirable everywhere throughout the Dominion.637
Local Prohibition case as a "Canadian Federalist Position":
[T]he exercise of legislative power by the Parliament of Canada, in
regard to all matters not enumerated in s. 91, ought to be strictly confined to
such matters as are unquestionably of Canadian interest and importance, and
ought not to trench upon provincial legislation with respect to any of the
classes of subjects enumerated in s. 92. To attach any other construction to
the general power which, in supplement of its enumerated powers, is
conferred upon the Parliament of Canada by s. 91, would, in their
Lordship's opinion, not only be contrary to the intendment of the Act, but
637 Russell v. R., supra note 168 at 841. Again in relation to the Canada Temperance Act,
that position was taken in Reference re Canada Temperance Act, supra note 169 at 205
where Viscount Simon wrote:
In their Lordships' opinion, the true test [of the Peace, Order and good
Government power] is the real subject matter of the legislation: if it is such
that it goes beyond local or provincial concerns or interests and must from its
inherent nature be the concern of the Dominion as a whole ... . Then it will
fall within the competence of the Dominion Parliament as a matter affecting
the peace, order and good government of Canada, though it may in another
aspect touch on matters specially reserved to the provincial legislatures.
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would practically destroy the autonomy of the provinces. If it were once
conceded that the Parliament of Canada has authority to make laws
applicable to the whole Dominion, in relation to matters which in each
province are substantially of local or private interest, upon the assumption
that these matters also concern the peace, order, and good government of
the Dominion, there is hardly a subject enumerated in s. 92 upon which it
might not legislate, to the exclusion ofthe provincial legislatures. 638
Now, once that has been said, I must add immediately that the tension that existed
between the two interpretations has been authoritatively resolved in favour of the Canadian
Federalist Position in the Reference re Anti-Inflation Act.639 In effect, Justice Beetz, for the
majority on this point,640 clearly decided in favour of the second interpretation, the
federalist position. It is worth reproducing here a relevant excerpt:
I fail to see how the authorities which so decide lend support to the first
submission [that the containment and the reduction of inflation fall within
the competence of Parliament as matters affecting the peace, order and good
government of Canada]. They had the effect of adding by judicial process
new matters or new classes of matters to the federal list of powers. However,
this was done only in cases where a new matter was not an aggregate but had
a degree of unity that made it indivisible, an identity which made it distinct
from provincial matters and a sufficient consistence to retain the bounds of
form. The scale upon which these new matters enabled Parliament to touch
on provincial matters had also to be taken into consideration before they
were recognized as federal matters: if an enumerated federal power
designated in broad terms such as the trade and commerce power had to be
construed so as not to embrace and smother provincial powers (Parson's
case) and destroy the equilibrium of the Constitution, the Courts must be all
the more careful not to add hitherto unnamed powers of a diffuse nature to
the list of federal powers.
638 Local Prohibition case, supra note 169 at 360 (per Lord Watson (emphasis added».
639 Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, supra note 633.
640 With the concurrence of Martland, Ritchie, Pigeon and de Grandpre JJ.
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The "containment and reduction of inflation" does not pass muster as
a new subject matter. It is an aggregate of several subjects some of which
form a substantial part of provincial jurisdiction. It is totally lacking in
specificity. It is so pervasive that it knows no bounds. Its recognition as a
federal head of power would render most provincial powers nugatory.641
Thus, the question to be asked here is whether the implementation of treaties related
to provincial matters is a "new subject matter" of "national concern" in the sense of the
Supreme Court's ruling. If the containment and reduction of inflation "is an aggregate of
several subjects some of which form a substantial part of provincial jurisdiction",642 the
implementation of treaties related to provincial subject-matters is certainly also an
aggregate of subjects of exclusive provincial jurisdiction which could hardly be seen as a
new subject-matter.
Such was the view of the Privy Council in the Labour Conventions case.643 As we
have already seen, the Privy Council interpreted its opinion in the Radio Reference 644 and
said that there were no separate and specific legislative competences over implementation
of treaties. The legislature that had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of a treaty also had
the jurisdiction to implement the treaty.645 Many English-speaking commentators have
641 Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, supra note 633 at 458.
642 Ibid.
643 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19.
644 Radio Reference, supra note 130.
645 Labour Conventions case.supra note 19 at 353:
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questioned the soundness of that apparent reversal.646 Those commentators have argued that
s. 92 does not grant treaty implementation powers to provinces,647 that "it seems absurd to
For the purposes of ss. 91 and 92, i.e., the distribution of legislative powers
between the Dominion and the Provinces, there is no such thing as treaty
legislation as such. The distribution is based on classes of subjects; and as a
treaty deals with a particular class of subjects so will the legislative power of
performing it be ascertained.
646 See, for representative examples, V.C. MacDonald, "The Canadian Constitution Seventy
Years Later", supra note 112; F.R. Scott, "The Consequences of the Privy Council
Decisions", supra note 112 and P. Hogg, Constitutional Law ofCanada, 2002, supra note
217at,-r17.2.
647 F.R. Scott, "The Consequences of the Privy Council Decisions", ibid. at 486,
commenting on the Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 ironises that "Section 92 of the
British North America Act, enumerating the provincial powers, has thus a new subsection
added to it, namely 'The implementing by legislation of treaties between Canada and
foreign countries relating to property and civil rights in the provinces.'" Nonetheless, Scott
was forced to recognize that the state of the law was that "the implementation of treaties
and conventions is split between Dominion and provinces in accordance with the judicial
view of its subject matter under the headings of sections 91 and 92" (Frank R. Scott,
"Constitutional Adaptations to Changing Functions of Government" (1945) 11 Canadian
Journal of Economics and Political Science / Revue canadienne d'economique et de
science politique 329 at 332). The centralist element of Scott's Canadian Sovereignist
constitutional thought was quite in evidence in the latter article. In effect, he argued in that
article, among other things, that "[w]hile an established convention leaves little doubt that
we can amend our constitution whenever a mere majority of our Senate and House of
Commons demand it (even when, as the opposition of Quebec to the amendment of 1943
showed, a provincial legislature opposes the change) nevertheless the practice of travelling
abroad for such national legislation seems too incongruous to survive for long even among
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say that a matter which has become the subject of international agreement can yet be
considered a matter of a private and local nature".648 They seem convinced that the proper
reading of Viscount Dunedin's view in the Radio Reference649 is that there being no
specific provisions dealing with the implementation of treaties binding on Canada (and the
provinces), there is a gap that should be filled by the "Peace, Order an Good Government"
powers of the Parliament. Opposed to those views, Gibran van Ert has recently argued in a
very thoughtful article that: "[i]t is mistaken to assume that the content of treaty obligations
cannot be local or private. States today conclude treaties that have as much to do with their
own internal affairs as they do with international affairs.,,650 Let's dig a little deeper.
It is useful to recall here that when the "national concern" doctrine is applied, it
entails the recognition of a permanent and exclusive jurisdiction to the federal Parliament.
a people so constitutionally afraid of changing their constitution as are the Canadians."
(Ibid. at 331). If the Federal Parliament had been able to amend the Constitution as it saw
fit without giving any weight to the will of provinces, Canada would no longer have been a
federation but would have been transformed into a unitary state in which provinces would
be mere delegates of the centre. It is thus not surprising that someone ready to tum Canada
into such a unitary state did not have quandaries about centralising treaty implementation
powers.
648 V.C. MacDonald, "The Canadian Constitution Seventy Years Later", supra note 112 at
417.
649 Radio Reference, supra note 130.
650 G. van Ert, "The Legal Character of Provincial Agreements with Foreign Governments",
note 317 at 1108.
325
That was the opinion of the Privy Council65 \ and the majority's view in the Reference re
Anti-Inflation Act. 652 In effect, as Justice Beetz wrote:
Furthermore, all those powers would belong to Parliament permanently; only
a constitutional amendment could reduce them. Finally, the power to
regulate and control inflation as such would belong to Parliament to the
exclusion of the Legislatures if, as is contended, that power were to vest in
Parliament in the same manner as the power to control and regulate
aeronautics or radio communication or the power to develop and conserve
the national capital (Aeronautics, Radio, Johannesson and Munro cases); the
provinces could probably continue to regulate profit margins, prices,
dividends and compensation if Parliament saw fit to leave them any room;
but they could not regulate them in relation to inflation which would have
become an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction.653
Considering that in the present state of development of international law, treaties have
much to do with domestic affairs, the Privy Council's warning in the Labour Conventions
case that giving Parliament powers to implement treaties relative to provincial matters
"would appear to undermine the constitutional safeguards of provincial autonomy,,654 rings
even louder today.
65\ See supra note 638 and accompanying text.
652 Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, supra note 633.
653 Ibid. at 444. In R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401 at 433 [R. v.
Crown Zellerbach Canada], Le Dain J. for the majority wrote:
... what was emphasized by Beetz J. in the Anti-Inflation Act reference - that
where a matter falls within the national concern doctrine of the peace, order
and good government power, as distinct from the emergency doctrine,
Parliament has an exclusive jurisdiction of a plenary nature to legislate in
relation to that matter, including its intra-provincial aspects.
654 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 352.
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And if we want to take the measure of what would have been the consequences of
accepting the doctrine defended by the Dominion in the Labour Conventions case in
today's world, we can take two simple examples. We can easily see how absurd the results
of that doctrine would have been by considering the impact a federal power to implement
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR.]655 and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCP.R.]656 would have had on
provincial legislatures. Because Art. 2 (1) of the ICESCR. provides that "Each State
Party to the Covenant undertakes to take steps ... with a view to achieving progressively
the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate
means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures", it would mean that
provinces could no longer adopt statutes "with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of [those1 rights". In effect, according to the residual powers doctrine, those
powers are exclusive. Therefore, provinces could no longer adopt laws striving to recognize
the "right to work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living
by work which he freely chooses or accepts",657 and in that context, they could not establish
programs that "include technical and vocational guidance and training programmes,
policies and techniques to achieve steady economic, social and cultural development and
655 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966,
Can. T.S. 1976 No. 46, 993 V.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976) [ICESCR.].
656 ICCP.R., supra note 374.
657 ICESCR., supra note 655, Art. 6 (1).
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full and productive employment under conditions safeguarding fundamental political and
economic freedoms to the individual.,,658 In fact, provinces could no longer adopt statutes
on a large array of work-related issues: fair wages, health and safety measures in the
workplace, limitation of working hours, public holidays,659 trade unions,660 etc. Gone
would be the provincial measures on social security.661 Gone would be the provincial
maternity leaves programs, the child protection programs.662 To put it even more bluntly,
gone would be all provincial measures intended to ensure that everyone has "an adequate
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and
housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.,,663 I am not even talking
about the total provincial exclusion from the health sector,664 from education665 and from
"the conservation, the development and the diffusion of science and culture.,,666 And when
Canada ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - if we were to
follow the federal view defended in the Labour Conventions case- , provinces would have
also lost the power to adopt laws protecting life,667 protecting freedom of thought,
658 Ibid, Art. 6 (2).
659 Ibid, Art. 7.
660 Ibid, Art. 8.
661 Ibid, Art. 9.
662 Ibid, Art. 10.
663 Ibid, Art. 11 (l).
664 Ibid, Art. 12.
665 Ibid, Art. 13-14.
666 Ibid, Art. 15 (2).
667 ICCP.R., supra note 374, Art. 6.
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conSCIence and religion,668 of expression,669 of peaceful assembly,670 of association
(including to form and join trade unions).671 They would have lost power to adopt measures
protecting against medical or scientific experimentation without free consent672 and
protecting against forced labour and personal servitudes.673 Provincial powers in relation to
"property and civil rights" would also be drastically reduced since they could no longer
provide rules to protect families,674 nor could they put in place property regimes that would
ensure one's freedom to choose one's residence.675 Provinces could no longer protect
individuals against "arbitrary or unlawful interference with [their] privacy, family, home or
correspondence" nor against "unlawful attacks on [their] honour and reputation".676
Provinces would have lost control over all judicial, legislative and administrative means to
ensure that remedies are available in case any of those rights were infringed.677 Even more
fundamentally, provinces could no longer grant legal personality678 to physical persons!
This absurdity seems to know no limits. If Parliament had plenary powers to implement this
668 Ibid., Art. 18.
669 Ibid., Art. 19.
670 Ibid., Art. 21.
671 Ibid., Art. 22.
672 Ibid., Art. 7.
673 Ibid., Art. 9.
674 Ibid., Art. 23.
675 Ibid., Art. 12 (1).
676 Ibid., Art. 17.
677 Ibid., Art. 2 (3).
678 Ibid., Art. 16.
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Covenant, provinces would no longer be able to establish their own electoral laws and they
would no longer be able to hire their own employees!679
This is a very small sample of the possible consequences that would have flowed
from acceptance of Ottawa's position here. And as we know, international law has been
dramatically transformed in the last 75 years by a shift from a legal system primarily based
on customs to one increasingly based on treaties. To give us an idea of the order of
magnitude of the phenomenon, over 158,000 treaties or international agreements entered
into by Members of the United Nation have been registered with the United Nations
Secretariat since the entry into force of the UN Charter (Dec. 141\ 1946).680 If the Attorney
General for Canada's argument had prevailed, there would be about nothing left of
provincial jurisdiction.
However, one might be tempted to point out that the end of the excerpt of the
Reference re Anti-Inflation Act quoted earlier681 suggests a possibility of "double aspect",682
679 Ibid., Art. 25 (b) provides that every citizen has the right "[t]o vote and to be elected at
genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held
by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors" and parag. (c)
guarantees the right "[t]o have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his
country."
680 See supra note 551.
681 See supra note 653 and accompanying text.
682 As we have seen earlier, the Privy Council stated in Hodge v. R., supra note 14 at 130
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subject to a possible federal paramountcy rule. I would respond that in addition to the fact
that it is clearly obiter, it is also very doubtful that it would be applicable to the two
Covenants given as examples above. In effect, the powers, duties and responsibilities they
establish are so broad and are so broadly put that if the legislative jurisdiction to implement
them were given to the federal Parliament, one fails to see what place could be left to
provincial legislation.
Also, Justice Beetz writing for a unammous Supreme Court explained in Bell
Canada v. Quebec (Commission de fa sante et de fa securite du travail), that for the double
aspect doctrine to operate, there must be two distinct aspects of the matters in question to
be regulated.683 Because treaties are not ends in themselves but are rather legal instruments
- like statutes and regulations - for the accomplishment of certain purposes, treaty
implementation is not a purpose that can be distinguished from the substance of the treaty
that is being implemented. That was clearly the logic followed by the Supreme Court in
that "subjects which in one aspect and for one purpose fall within s. 92, may in another
aspect and for another purpose fall within s. 91". See supra note 143 and accompanying
text.
683 Bell Canada v. Quebec (Commission de fa sante et de fa securite du travail), [1988] 1
S.C.R. 749 ~ 299:
The exact correspondence of these two objectives indicates that there are not
two aspects and two purposes depending on whether the legislation is federal
or provincial. In my opinion, the two legislators have legislated for the same
purpose and in the same aspect. Yet they do not have concurrent legislative
jurisdiction in the case at bar, but mutually exclusive jurisdictions.
(Emphasis in the original.)
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Global Securities Corp. v. British Columbia (Securities Commission),684 when it evaluated
the validity of a provincial statute that was implementing an agreement between the
securities commissions of British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec and the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission. The Court wrote that" . . . the mere fact that the
province is co-operating with a foreign authority in the pursuit of that [clearly dominant
intraprovincial] purpose will not change the law's pith and substance".685 In fact, even when
the Court found that one of the two main purposes of the impugned provision was
"ensuring cooperation from other jurisdictions", it was understood as a mere means
"enabling the Commission to carry out its domestic mandate effectively.,,686 Thus, treaty
684 Global Securities Corp. v. British Columbia (Securities Commission)" supra note 553.
685 Ibid. at ,-r 38. This is an implicit repudiation of the thesis that Bora Laskin defended
years before he was appointed to the bench. In his article B. Laskin, "The Provinces and
International Agreements", supra note 40 at 111, Laskin argued that if a province purported
to implement an agreement made with a foreign state on a matter otherwise within
provincial competence, the implementing legislation would be vulnerable as being action
taken under a non-existing power to enter into international commitments. The Supreme
Court, like the Privy Council in the Labour Conventions case, supra note 19, expressly
stated that it did not have to examine the constitutional validity of the agreement to decide
on the validity of the legislation (see,-r 38).
686 Ibid. at ,-r 32. The full citation is "I therefore agree with the Commission that one of the
dominant purposes of s. 141(l)(b) is obtaining reciprocal cooperation from other securities
regulators, thus enabling the Commission to carry out its domestic mandate effectively."
The other dominant purpose of the impugned provision was "discovering wrongdoings by
British Columbia registrants in other jurisdictions" (subtitle between ,-r 32 and ,-r 33).
This example also goes to show how impractical the suggestion made by Peter
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implementation cannot be said to be an aspect distinct from the substantive aspect of a
statute.
Moreover, if we were to find a "federal aspect" in treaty implementation, this would
provoke a truly radical change in our constitutional framework. In effect, reversing the
Labour Conventions case687 and allowing the federal Parliament to legislatively implement
any treaty would thus convert all exclusive provincial powers into concurrent ones,688
allowing the federal Parliament to always have the last word on provincial matters by virtue
of the federal paramountcy rule. Obviously, as Vincent C. MacDonald warned us,
"jurisdiction is not to be denied by mere capacity for abuse by the federal government".689
However, here, we are talking of something of another magnitude. To put it simply,
provinces would lose their equal status with the federal power by becoming truly
Hogg (P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 1992, supra note 268 at 296) would be to
confine the Labour Conventions case ruling to treaties concerned only with the
harmonization of the domestic law of states or the promotion of shared values in domestic
law - as opposed to treaties under which the party states undertake reciprocal obligations to
each other. The problem is that states undertake reciprocal obligations in order to achieve
internal purposes. The conceptual barrier between Hogg's two categories does not stand.
687 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19.
688 A.L.C. de Mestral, "L'evolution des rapports entre Ie droit canadien et Ie droit
international un demi-siecle apres I'affaire des conventions internationales de travail",
supra note 112 at 307.
689 V.C. MacDonald, "The Canadian Constitution Seventy Years Later", supra note 112 at
416.
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subordinated to Parliament and they would be reduced to a status akin to municipalities.
This would certainly not be a minor reinterpretation of the Constitution but rather an
important amendment to it690 : it would change the very heart of the division of legislative
powers. Courts should certainly restrain themselves from making such a radical amendment
to the Constitution.
All of these consequences of claiming that Parliament has the power to implement
treaties related to provincial matters through the "national concern" doctrine would
obviously be dreadful for the Canadian federation. Fortunately, however, we need not to
worry too much about those potential consequences because, as we are about to see, treaty
implementation simply does not meet the applicability criteria of the "national concern"
doctrine.
After having written a long analysis of the caselaw on the "Peace, Order and good
Government" powers, Justice Le Dain writing for the majority in R. v. Crown Zellerbach
Canada,691 clearly approved Justice Beetz's analysis of the "national concern" doctrine in
Reference re Anti-Inflation Act.692 Indeed, Le Dain J. writes:
690 A.L.C. Mestral, "L'evolution des rapports entre Ie droit canadien et Ie droit international
un demi-siecle apres l'affaire des conventions internationales de travail", supra note 112 at
307; 1.-Y. Morin, "La personnalite internationale du Quebec" supra note 41 at 296.
691 R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada, supra note 653.
692 Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, supra note 633.
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For a matter to qualify as a matter of national concern in either sense it must
have a singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly distinguishes
it from matters of provincial concern and a scale of impact on provincial
jurisdiction that is reconcilable with the fundamental distribution of
legislative power under the Constitution.693
And it is certain that his opinion was shared not only by the three judges concurring with
his opinion (Chief Justice Dickson and McIntyre and Wilson JJ.) but also by the dissenting
judges (Beetz, Lamer and La Forest JJ.). The latter dissented on the application of Beetz's
method of analysis by Le Dain J. and not at all with the method itself.694 Writing the
dissenting opinion, La Forest J. expressly approved Justice Beetz's analysis695 and further
added:
The need to make such characterizations from time to time is readily
apparent. From this necessary function, however, it is easy but, I say it with
respect, fallacious to go further, and, taking a number of quite separate areas
of activity, some under accepted constitutional values within federal, and
some within provincial legislative capacity, consider them to be a single
indivisible matter of national interest and concern lying outside the specific
heads of power assigned under the Constitution. By conceptualizing broad
social, economic and political issues in that way, one can effectively invent
new heads of federal power under the national dimensions doctrine, thereby
incidentally removing them from provincial jurisdiction or at least abridging
the provinces' freedom of operation.696
The foregoing shows that the relevant question is still this one: has the federal
693 R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada, supra note 653 at 432.
694 Le Dain J. held that salt waters, including intraprovincial ones, were a new subject
matter and that the Parliament could control their quality.
695 R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada, supra note 653 at 453.
696 Ibid. at 452.
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jurisdiction to implement treaties related to provincial matters the "singleness,
distinctiveness and indivisibility" necessary to trigger the application of the peace, order
and good government doctrine? In my opinion, the answer to that question is certainly "no"
because such jurisdiction would be "an aggregate" of exclusive provincial matters. The fact
that those matters would not be taken in isolation but would be seen in relation to the
implementation of a treaty is insufficient to give them the required distinctiveness.
After the excerpt reproduced above,697 Le Dain J. added the following:
In determining whether a matter has attained the required degree of
singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly distinguishes it from
matters of provincial concern it is relevant to consider what would be the
effect on extra-provincial interests of a provincial failure to deal effectively
with the control or regulation of the intra-provincial aspects of the matter.698
That test, generally referred to as the "provincial inability" test, possibly relevant for
example in the case of pollution of interprovincial waterways, has obviously not the same
relevance for the issue of federal implementation of treaties related to provincial matters.
However, a closely related argument is sometimes put forward in support of such a federal
power: the absence of extraterritorial provincial powers. I will now tum to that point in the
next section.
697 Supra note 693.
698 R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada, supra note 653 at 432.
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c. Extra-Territoriality or the "Sufficient Connection"
Doctrine
It is well-established that provincial legislatures' power to adopt extra-territorial
statutes is limited.699 For example, a majority of the Supreme Court recently stated that
"[t]his territorial restriction is fundamental to our system of federalism in which each
province is obliged to respect the sovereignty of the other provinces within their respective
legislative spheres, and expects the same respect in retum.,,700 The question then is: When
699 The introductory paragraph of s. 92 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 39, reads: "In
each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters coming
within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say ... " (emphasis
added.) Also, the exercise of many of the most important powers granted to provincial
legislatures by virtue of that section is limited to "the province". For example, s. 92 (13)
reads "Property and Civil Rights in the Province" (emphasis added.)
I should note that until the adoption of s. 3 of the Statute of Westminster, supra note 67, in
1931, the Federal Parliament also lacked the capacity to adopt extraterritorial statutes. The
Extra-Territorial Act, 1933, S.C. 23-24 Geo.V., c.39 was adopted by the federal Parliament
to specify that this new power could also apply to federal statutes adopted prior to 1931.
Same is now to be found at Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-21, s. 8 (3). In Society of
Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of Internet
Providers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427, 2004 SCC 45 ,-r 54 [S.o.C.A.M v. C.A.lP.], the Court held
that absent "clear words or necessary implication to the contrary", there was a presumption
against the extraterritorial extension of federal laws.
700 Unifund Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, supra note 603 ,-r 51
(Binnie J. for McLachlin C.J. and Iacobucci and LeBel JJ.).
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implementing a treaty dealing with a provincial subject-matter, does a provincial legislature
run afoul its constitutional limitations against acting extra-territorially?
I am urged to ask this question by authors who argue that the content of a treaty
cannot be said to be "local" or "provincial" in nature and that, consequently, treaty
implementation is necessarily a federal matter. 701 However, this argument is wrongheaded.
After all, under what federal heading of powers would such treaty content fall? For as we
have just seen, the power to implement treaties in relation to provincial subject matter
cannot flow from the general and residuary powers of the "Peace, Order and Good
Government" clause of s. 91 Constitution Act, 1867.
However, one might attempt to reformulate the extra-territorial argument to suggest
that if treaty implementation, in itself, is by its very nature an extra-territorial matter, then,
maybe it could fall within Parliament's exclusive jurisdiction. This argument would at least
have an air of plausibility in light of the fact that scholars of past generations often
explained provinces' inability to adopt extra-territorial statutes by reason of an Imperial
desire to avoid having colonial legislatures violating international obligations binding on
the Empire. 702 This would lead to the following question: If a province were to adopt
legislative provisions inconsistent with a binding international treaty, could such legislative
701 See supra notes 314-316.
702 G.V. La Forest, "May the Provinces Legislate in Violation ofInternational Law?", supra
note 41.
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provisions be declared unconstitutional on the basis of the purportedly extra-territorial
character of international violations?
In that vein, Mark A. Luz and C. Marc Mille have recently argued that, in the
context of the current globalization, new types of treaties have been adopted that create
civil rights of an international nature and that, being of such international nature, they
escape provincial jurisdiction on the basis of the extra-territorial doctrine. 703 They write:
703 Luz and Miller identifY three "indicators" of how globalization has "permeated and
transformed international law" (Mark A. Luz and C. Marc Miller, "Globalization and
Canadian Federalism: Implications of the NAFTA's Investment Rules" (2002) 47 McGill
L.J. 951 at 96lff [M.A. Luz and C.M. Miller, "Globalization and Canadian Federalism:
Implications of the NAFTA's Investment Rules"]): the increase in number and scope of
regulatory treaties, the degree of legal institutionalisation of international dispute resolution
mechanisms and the individualisation of remedies. By their last indicator, they want to
emphasise the extent to which states now not only grant substantive rights to non-state
actors, but also procedural mechanisms to enforce them. In particular, they refer to the
growth in the number of foreign direct investment ("FDI") treaties that allow for direct
investor-state arbitration. Under those FDI treaties, foreign investors need no longer rely on
the politically contingent espousal of their claim by their home state. This often means that
(a) foreign investors will be able to directly sue the state that has deprived them of the
rights recognized by a FDI treaty, (b) the state in question will already have accepted
compulsory jurisdiction of an international arbitration board when it adhered to the FDI
treaty, and (c) the arbitral decision will be enforceable in the domestic court of the state.
Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement between the Government of
Canada, the Government ofMexico and the Government ofthe United States, 17 December
1992, Can. T.S. 1994 No.2, 32 I.L.M. 289 & 605 (entered into force 1 January 1994)
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The premise that provinces are legislatively bound within their jurisdictions
has important implications for their ability to deal with the realities of
globalization. As typified by the NAFTA, subject matters that would have
traditionally fallen into provincial power now take on an importance that
transcends provincial boundaries. As outlined above, an investment or an
investor covered by Chapter 11 can certainly be strictly intraprovincial. If
Chapter 11 falls legitimately within the federal trade and commerce power,
however, and incorporates principles of customary international law,
investors in fact have civil rights that are "extra-provincial"; that is, they
enjoy rights and privileges that exist by virtue of federal legislation and
international law but operate in an intraprovincial context. The NAFTA has
granted investors access to a new international mechanism of dispute
resolution that is independent from the control of the respondent
("NAFTA") is taken as a prime example of such mechanisms.
I note that these processes are often presented as processes of "depoliticisation" of
trade in favour of predictability and efficiency. However, we have to understand that
"depoliticisation" is a political tool of governance like many others. Rules are supposed to
substitute for the discretion of domestic politicians and are made difficult to change or
difficult to violate, therefore reassuring investors. However, under the veil of neutrality,
depoliticisation often operates by shifting the decision-making powers to a different
political arena. This is the case with FDI treaties and the arbitrations board attached to
them. Once the system is in place, politicians can claim that they cannot be blamed for the
depoliticised decisions but can benefit from any positive outcome by suggesting those
outcomes are the product of other actions of their own. On the politics of depoliticisation,
see Peter Burnham, "New Labour and the politics of depoliticisation" (2001) 3 Brit. J. of
Pol. and Int'! ReI. 127 and on the risk of "accountability mismatch" caused by
depoliticisation, see Mariana Mota Prado, "Independent Regulatory Agencies and the
Electoral Accountability of the President" (Paper presented to the Seminario en
Latinoamerica de Teoria Constitucional y Politica 2004, Oaxaca, Mexico, 10-13 June,
2004), online: Seminario en Latinoamerica de Teoria Constitucional y Politica
<http://islandia.law.yale.edu/sela/SELA%202004/MotaPradoPaperEnglishSELA2004.pdf>.
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governments. This reality goes beyond their "foreign investor" status.
However, for those investors who qualify under the tenns of Chapter 11,
their remedy is international, based on the NAFTA. The enforcement of any
arbitral awards is based on international conventions (ICSID, New York
Convention, Inter-American Convention), some of which have been directly
adopted into domestic law. Thus, it can no longer be asserted that these are
"local investors" in the sense that they are territorially bounded by provincial
jurisdiction. The rules applicable to those individuals are in fact
. . I 704extraterrltona.
Whether we try to recast the problem as one of the international law consequences
of improper treaty implementation or one of substantive international rights, these are
simply variations of the thesis mentioned earlier according to which anything that is
"international" cannot be, at the same time, of a "local" or a "provincial" nature. To put it
differently, the argument goes along this line: anything that flows from international law is
exogenous and, consequently, extra-territorial. However, this is not the way extra-
territoriality is conceived by Canadian constitutional law. It is thus worth examining more
carefully exactly what that doctrine of extra-territoriality entails for provincial legislatures.
Let's begin with two very telling examples of the application of the so-called "extra-
territorial" doctrine by the Supreme Court of Canada. First, in Global Securities Corp. v.
British Columbia (Securities Commission)" the Supreme Court held that a province could
use her investigative powers to order the production of documents in order "to assist in the
administration of the securities laws of another jurisdiction", namely, in that case, the
704 M.A. Luz and C.M. Miller, "Globalization and Canadian Federalism: Implications of the
NAFTA's Investment Rules", ibid. at 985 and 986.
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United States, and that a statute to that effect - even if it could seem at first sight
extraterritorial - was perfectly valid.705 In that case, the two valid objectives identified by
the Court for the impugned provisions were "obtaining reciprocal cooperation from other
securities regulators, thus enabling the [British Columbia Securities] Commission to carry
out its domestic mandate effectively,,706 and "uncovering foreign violations of securities
laws by domestic registrants".707 The assistance provided by the province to foreign
jurisdictions was thus deemed to have a sufficient connection with the provincial interests
in question. In a somewhat similar way, the Supreme Court concluded in an earlier case,
Ontario (A.-G.) v. Scott,708 that Ontario was not legislating on civil rights outside her
territory when she adopted a statute ordering Ontario husbands who had deserted their
wives in England, to pay alimonies due to the latter who remained in England. The
connection between that legislative measure and the province was held to be clearly
sufficient because, on the one hand, the husbands targeted by the statute were Ontario
residents and, on the other hand, the reciprocal nature of the legislative measure would help
deserted wives in Ontario whose husbands fled to England. For those reasons, the help
provided to the wives in England had a connection with the interests of the province of
Ontario.
705 Global Securities Corp. v. British Columbia (Securities Commission)" supra note 553.
706 Ibid. at,-r 32.
707 Ibid. at,-r 36.
708 Ontario (A.-G.) v. Scott, [1956] S.C.R. 137 [Ontario (A.-G.) v. Scott].
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One could say - as Fran<;ois Chevrette and Herbert Marx did about twenty-five
years ago - that in its most general sense, extra-territoriality entails an "absence de lien ou
de connexite entre la mesure adoptee et les inten~ts et pouvoirs de l' autorite publique qui
l'adopte".709 In a series of recent decisions, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized, and
stated unequivocally, that what really matters here is the sufficiency of the connection
between the province and the object being allegedly covered by the provincial
authorities.710 The reason for this is quite evident: because law does not deal directly with
709 Chevrette and Marx, Droit constitutionnel, supra note 41 at 1176. On extraterritoriality,
see also P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2002, supra note 217, ch. 13 and
references found therein. We note that the Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, Part
I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c.11 raises many difficulties in relation to extraterritoriality, but it will not be necessary to
address these issues here.
710 I use the expression "provincial authorities" because issues of extra-territoriality might
arise not only in relation to provincial legislatures but also in relation to courts. In effect,
courts are often asked to take part in multi-jurisdictional litigations. That is why, both the
common law and civil law have long developed rules to attribute jurisdiction and to choose
which laws will be applicable in such cases. These rules are often imperfectly referred to as
"conflict of laws" rules (an expression that unfortunately downplays the importance of
jurisdictional issues) or "private international law" (an expression that eclipses the public
nature of allocation rules and hides the reality of the regulatory government). They are in
fact the rules developed by a legal system to specify its relations with other legal systems.
Therefore those rules are necessary for any well-functioning legal system that has to
interact with peers. And because of the principle of territoriality adopted by many legal
systems, these relational rules often have an extra-territorial aspect in the sense that they are
meant to deal with legal cases in which not all of the relevant elements are situated within
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their state.
Thus, for example, the rules meant to ensure that courts have jurisdiction to hear the
cases brought before them - the doctrine of "jurisdiction simpliciter" - may include a
reference to territoriality. This is the case for courts in Canada. In order to respect the
purposes of the federation, courts must verify in inter-provincial cases that they have a "real
and substantial connection" with the subject matter of the litigation (see Moran v. Pyle
National (Canada) Ltd., [1975] 1 S.c.R. 393 [Moran v. Pyle National (Canada)]; Morguard
Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.c.R. 1077 [Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De
Savoye], 1106; Hunt v. T&N pIc, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289 [Hunt v. T&N pIc]; Tolofton v. Jensen;
Lucas (Litigation Guardian oj) v. Gagnon, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022 [Tolofton v. Jensen; Lucas
(Litigation Guardian oj) v. Gagnon]; Holt Cargo Systems Inc. v. ABC Containerline N V
(Trustees of), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 907, 2001 SCC 90, at para. 71; Spar Aerospace Ltd. v.
American Mobile Satellite Corp., [2002] 4 S.C.R. 205,2002 SCC 78 [Spar Aerospace Ltd.
v. American Mobile Satellite Corp.]; Unifund Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. ofBritish
Columbia, supra note 603 ~ 54 and Beals v. Saldanha, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416, 2003 SCC 72).
This evaluation is done through a flexible approach that cannot be reduced to an exhaustive
set of rules to be mechanically applied (Spar Aerospace Ltd. v. American Mobile Satellite
Corp., ibid. ~ 52 (LeBel J. for a unanimous court)). However, the Supreme Courts hinted
that there might not be any specific constitutional requirements applicable to the
determination ofjurisdiction simpliciter in international cases as opposed to inter-provincial
ones (Spar Aerospace Ltd. v. American Mobile Satellite Corp., ibid. ~ 54).
Once jurisidiction simpliciter is established, the question offorum conveniens may
arise: the court might have a "real and substantive connection" to the case but it might not
be the best jurisdiction to hear a case. See for example Art. 3135 C. c. Q. ("Even though a
Quebec authority has jurisdiction to hear a dispute, it may exceptionally and on an
application by a party, decline jurisdiction if it considers that the authorities of another
country are in a better position to decide.") However, at common law, "the existence of a
more appropriate forum must be clearly established to displace the forum selected by the
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tangible objects but deals with intangible things such as "rights", "duties", "corporations",
etc., we cannot expect the territorial principle to apply in a purely physical sense. "Rights",
"duties" and "corporations" are conceptual entities that do not occupy a physical space but
plaintiff" (Amchem Products Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board),
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 897, 921 (Sopinka J., for the Court)).
Finally, once proper jurisdiction is established, there might still be an issue of
"choice of law", that is, it is possible that the law to be applied by the local court might not
be the lex loci. Thus, a series of rules usually exist to identify which laws pertaining to the
case are applicable. Take for example, the CCQ.'s rule regarding legal persons: "[t]he
status and capacity of a legal person are governed by the law of the country under which it
was formed subject, with respect to its activities, to the law of the place where they are
carried on." (Art. 3083 para. 2 CCQ.) Or, to take a different example, in Castillo v.
Castillo, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 870, 2005 SCC 83, the Supreme Court decided that the
substantive law to be applied by an Alberta court was the law of the jurisdiction where the
car accident occurred - California - and that substantive law included the limitations law of
that jurisdiction. That being the case, the Californian limitations period had extinguished
the rights of action of the plaintiff.
At any rate, this also means that the law of a province may be applied by courts in
other provinces to the extent that it satisfies the inter-systemic relational rules in place. This
has not traditionally been seen as an "extra-territorial" application of a provincial law but
simply as the application of the provincial law to a local issue by a foreign court. However,
in this section, the immediate focus of our attention will not be on those jurisdictional
issues but rather will be directed at the issue of the possible invalidity or inapplicability of
provincial statutes by reason of insufficient territorial connection. That being said, to the
extent that the inter-systemic relational rules that are "conflict of laws" rules and "private
international law" ensure that there is a sufficient territorial connection between local courts
and the cases presented to them, they will not fall victim of the extra-territoriality doctrine.
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rather are conceptual entities that exist in a shared understanding of the world. Thus, we
must conventionally attribute a location to those entities. The location of the tangible thing
to which those conceptual entities are related is just one of the ways in which we connect
law with space. Thus, whether we locate those conceptual entities where the tangible thing
to which they relate are situated711 or we locate them where those entities were "created",712
where the event to which they are attached occurred713 or where those conceptual entities
are meant to make a practical difference in people's actions, we are ultimately only looking
to draw a connection between those entities and the physical world construed by the legal
system. Thus, truly the most important thing to understand when we are dealing with the
so-called "extra-territoriality" doctrine is that we are not first and foremost dealing with a
rule against any external consequences of provincial actions as with a doctrine requiring a
sufficient connection between the provincial interests and legislative measures adopted by
711 See for example: British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2005] 2 S.C.R.
473, 2005 SCC 49 at ~ 30 [British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco] where Justice Major
wrote for the Court: "Where the pith and substance of legislation relates to a tangible matter
- i.e., something with an intrinsic and observable physical presence - the question of
whether it respects the territorial limitations in s. 92 is easy to answer. One need only look
to the location of the matter. If it is in the province, the limitations have been respected, and
the legislation is valid. If it is outside the province, the limitations have been violated, and
the legislation is invalid."
712 For example, the status and capacity of a legal person is governed, under Quebec's inter-
systemic relational rules (Art. 3083 para. 2 CCQ), by the law of the location where it was
formed.
713 See for example, for a car accident: Unifund Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. ofBritish
Columbia, supra note 603.
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h . 714t at prOVInce.
This is reflected in the method of analysis established by the Supreme Court to deal
with claims of territorial overreach by provincial legislatures. When examining the validity
714 As we have seen earlier at note 699, because of the presumption against extra-territorial
applications of federal statutes, courts also had to develop analytical tools to apply those
statutes in a way that would respect the territoriality principle. It is interesting to note here
that the Supreme Court used the exact same generous methodology in the case of the
federal Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 as it did when dealing with provincial statutes.
See for example S.o.CA.M v. CA.lP., supra note 699 at,-r 57 and 60:
The applicability of our Copyright Act to communications that have
international participants will depend on whether there is a sufficient
connection between this country and the communication in question for
Canada to apply its law consistent with the "principles of order and fairness .
. . that ensure security of [cross-border] transactions with justice" ...
The "real and substantial connection" test was adopted and developed by this
Court in Morguard Investments, supra, at pp. 1108-9; Hunt v. T&N pic,
[1993] 4 S.C.R. 289, at pp. 325-26 and 328; and Tolofton, supra, at p. 1049.
The test has been reaffirmed and applied more recently in cases such as Holt
Cargo Systems Inc. v. ABC Containerline N V (Trustees of), [2001] 3 S.C.R.
907, 2001 SCC 90, at para. 71; Spar Aerospace Ltd. v. American Mobile
Satellite Corp., [2002] 4 S.C.R. 205, 2002 SCC 78; Unifund, supra, at para.
54; and Beals v. Saldanha, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416, 2003 SCC 72. From the
outset, the real and substantial connection test has been viewed as an
appropriate way to "prevent overreaching ... and [to restrict] the exercise of
jurisdiction over extraterritorial and transnational transactions" (La Forest J.
in Tololson, supra, at p. 1049). The test reflects the underlying reality of
"the territorial limits of law under the international legal order" and respect
for the legitimate actions of other states inherent in the principle of
international comity (Tolofton, at p. 1047). A real and substantial
connection to Canada is sufficient to support the application of our
Copyright Act to international Internet transmissions in a way that will
accord with international comity and be consistent with the objectives of
order and fairness.
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of a provincial statute in light of the territorial restrictions imposed on provincial
legislatures, the Supreme Court states that one must follow these analytical steps:
The first step is to determine the pith and substance, or dominant feature, of
the impugned legislation, and to identitY a provincial head of power under
which it might fall. Assuming a suitable head of power can be found, the
second step is to determine whether the pith and substance respects the
territorial limitations on that head of power - i.e., whether it is in the
province. If the pith and substance is tangible, whether it is in the province is
simply a question of its physical location. If the pith and substance is
intangible, the court must look to the relationships among the enacting
territory, the subject matter of the legislation and the persons made subject
to it, in order to determine whether the legislation, if allowed to stand, would
respect the dual purposes of the territorial limitations in s. 92 (namely, to
ensure that provincial legislation has a meaningful connection to the
enacting province and pays respect to the legislative sovereignty of other
territories). If it would, the pith and substance of the legislation should be
d d . d' h . 715regar e as sItuate m t e provmce.
The Court also notes that "[i]ncidental or ancillary extra-provincial aspects of such
legislation are irrelevant to its validity.,,716 Also, because the analysis is not a mechanical
one, the analysis is highly context-dependent and the degree of connection required will
vary according to the subject matter of the dispute,717 the type ofjurisdiction claimed,718 the
715 British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco, supra note 711 at ~ 36 (emphasis added.)
716 Ibid. at ~ 28, referring to Reference re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act,
[1984] 1 S.C.R. 297 at 332 [Reference re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act],
and Global Securities Corp. v. British Columbia (Securities Commission)" supra note 553
at ~ 24.
717 Unifund Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, supra note 603 ~ 65:
"[i]t appears from the case law that different degrees of connection to the enacting province
may be required according to the subject matter of the dispute."
718 In Unifund Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, ibid. at ~ 80, the
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f . h d·· I d 719type 0 ng ts or utles mvo ve, etc.
However, it is true that when the issue is not one of constitutional validity per se but
rather one of the applicability of an otherwise valid provincial statutes to matters that may
have extra-territorial aspects, a majority of the Supreme Court held that what constitutes a
"sufficient connection" is not entirely resolved by looking at "the relationship among the
majority suggested that "[t]he required strength of the relationship varies with the type of
jurisdiction being asserted. A relationship that is inadequate to support the application of
regulatory legislation may nevertheless provide a sufficient "real and substantial
connection" to permit the courts of the forum to take jurisdiction over a dispute. This
happens regularly.") This last-cited passage must be kept in mind when reading an earlier
statement found in that opinion according to which, "[a]s will be seen, a "real and
substantial connection" sufficient to permit the court of a province to take jurisdiction over
a dispute may not be sufficient for the law of that province to regulate the outcome"
("Unifund Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. ofBritish Columbia, ibid. ~ 58). In light of the
quote that preceded it, that last statement should probably not be read as affirming that
provincial legislatures cannot set up provincial courts that would have inter alia the power
to settle issues that simply have a "real and substantial connection" to the province. After
all, the Supreme Court recognized in Ontario (A.-G.) v. Scott, supra note 708, the power of
the Ontario family court to make maintenance orders against an Ontario resident for the
benefit of his deserted wife in England.
719 For example, "[m]erely going through the air space over Manitoba" was judged to be an
insufficient connection with the province to allow for the imposition of a provincial tax
"within the Province" (R. v. Air Canada, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 303 at 316) However, for product
liability purposes, the presence of the manufacturer in the province is not necessary;
knowledge of the distribution within that province is sufficient (A/oran v. Pyle National
(Canada), supra note 710 at 409).
349
enacting jurisdiction, the subject matter of the legislation and the individual or entity sought
to be regulated by it".72o In effect, the majority states that "[t]he applicability of an
otherwise competent provincial legislation to out-of-province defendants is conditioned by
the requirements of order and fairness that underlie our federal arrangements" and that
those principles, "being purposive, are applied flexibly according to the subject matter of
the legislation".721 The principles of order and fairness are meant to "ensure security of
transactions with justice",722 to ensure that a province's autonomy will be respected723 and
that other provinces will not stop her from applying her own valid laws on her own
territory,724 that the overlap between provinces' laws will be limited725 and that the choice
720 Unifund Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. ofBritish Columbia, supra note 603 ~ 56.
721 Ibid. ~ 56. Similarly, in Hunt v. T&N pIc, supra note 710 at ~ 56, the Court wrote: "This
does not mean, however, that a province is debarred from enacting any legislation that may
have some effect on litigation in other provinces or indeed from enacting legislation respecting
modalities for recognition of judgments of other provinces. But it does mean that it must
respect the minimum standards oforder and fairness addressed in Morguard."
722 Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, supra note 710 at 1097.
723 Unifund Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. ofBritish Columbia, supra note 603 ~ 51, see
supra note 700 and accompanying text.
724 For example, by adopting a "blocking statute" prohibiting the production of business
documents outside of the province: Hunt v. T&NpIc, supra note 710. It is worth noting that
the latter decision was rendered in the inter-provincial context and relied heavily on the
idea that Canada was an integrated country. It is quite unclear whether a case involving a
foreign country would yield the same result. The fact that the Court only declared the
impugned act "constitutionally inapplicable to other provinces" (ibid. at ~ 67) and did not
declare it totally invalid may be an indication that one could expect a different result in a truly
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of law applicable will not be unfair to the parties involved in a litigation. 726 But all this
should in no way detract us from the fact that the driving force of the analysis is still the
issue of the sufficiency ofthe connection between the province and the subject matter of the
legislation and this is because comity between provinces that are members of an integrated
.: d' . If' . I 727Ie eratlOn reqUIres mutua respect 0 prOVInCIa autonomy.
A good illustration of how this doctrine of "sufficient connection" comes into play
international case.
725 Tolofton v. Jensen, supra note 710 at 1051: "Many activities within one state necessarily
have impact in another, but a multiplicity of competing exercises of state power in respect
of such activities must be avoided."
726See for example, Unifund Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. ofBritish Columbia, supra
note 603 ~ 72
727 In British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco, supra note 711 at ~ 35, the Supreme Court
seems to equate the "sufficient connection" doctrine to the respect for the two underlying
purposes of s. 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 that it identified as being" . .. to ensure
that provincial legislation both has a meaningful connection to the province enacting it, and
pays respect to "the sovereignty of the other provinces within their respective legislative
spheres"" (ibid. at ~ 27.) In effect, the Court writes at ~ 35: "In Churchill Falls, an
examination of those relationships indicated that the intangible civil rights constituting the
pith and substance of the Newfoundland legislation at issue were not meaningfully
connected to the legislating province, and could properly be the subject matter only of
Quebec legislation. Put slightly differently, if the impugned Newfoundland legislation had
been permitted to regulate those civil rights, neither of the purposes underlying s. 92's
territorial limitations would be respected."
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is provided by the recent Unifund Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia
case. 728 In that case, the Ontario Insurance Act729 provided that Ontario insurers who paid
the statutory no-fault accident benefits (SAB) to Ontario residents injured in motor vehicle
accidents were entitled to seek indemnification from the insurers of any heavy commercial
vehicle involved in the accidents according to fault determination rules set out by
regulations. The SAB covered accidents occurring anywhere in North America. Unifund,
having paid the SAB to two of its clients for an accident that occurred in British Columbia,
requested the indemnification provided for by the Ontario Insurance Act from the Insurance
Corporation of British Columbia (ICBC) which covered the negligent truck driver who had
cause the accident. The ICBC is the only provider of motor vehicle insurance in the British
Columbia and, probably for that reason, the British Columbia legislation does not contain
loss transfer provisions. The ICBC refused to pay alleging that the Ontario scheme of loss
transfer was inapplicable to accidents occurring in another province. Justice Binnie pointed
out that the ICBC is not authorized and does not in fact carry business in Ontario and the
accident occurred in British Columbia. 730 Justice Binne wrote:
The most that can be said for the respondent [Unifund Insurance] in this case
is that the fact of a motor vehicle accident in British Columbia triggered
certain payments in Ontario under Ontario law. However, the fact the
Ontario legislature has chosen to attach legal consequences in Ontario to an
event (the motor vehicle accident) taking place elsewhere does not extend its
legislative reach to a resident of"elsewhere".
728 Un(fund Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. ofBritish Columbia, supra note 603.
729 Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 1.8.
730 Unifund Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. ofBritish Columbia, supra note 603 at ~ 82.
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The Court thus decided that even if Ontarians had been injured in the accident, the
connection between Ontario and the British Columbia insurer was insufficient to allow for
the application of the Ontario Insurance Act to the ICBC. If it were otherwise, Ontario
could have attached any benefits to an out-of-province accident and then could have asked
outsiders to reimburse the Ontario insurers,731 thus effectively regulating out-of-province
behaviours. And the flipside of that would have been that British Columbia insurers could
have been liable for whatever benefits other jurisdictions in Canada - and the rest of the
world - decided to attach to events occurring in British Columbia, thus undermining that
province's autonomy.
Now that I have looked more closely at the "sufficiency of connection" doctrine, I
can come back to Global Securities Corp. v. British Columbia (Securities Commission),
and Ontario (A.-G.) v. Scott to see how absurd it would be to pretend that the
implementation of international agreements would, by nature, constitute an invalid extra-
territorial provincial act. Whether or not those two cases were concerned with binding
treaties as understood by orthodox international lawyers does not matter; what matters is
that there were certainly international agreements concluded prior to the adoption of the
reciprocal statutes. No one would have thought of making the argument that because those
statutes were adopted as a consequence of those agreements - however informal they were
- the statute were of an extra-territorial nature. If a provincial statute implementing an
731 Ibid. at~ 101.
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international treaty fails to meet the requirements of "sufficient connection" doctrine, it is
because of its content, not because it is implementing a treaty.
Examining a case where a provincial law was deemed to fail the territoriality test
will further help understand why treaty implementation, in itself, does not raise issues of
extra-territoriality. A provincial statute that would modify contractual rights situated
outside of the province would be judged to violate the "extra-territorial doctrine" - unless
its extra-territorial effects were simply incidental. That is why the Supreme Court was of
the opinion that a provincial law purporting to end a "Power Contract" for the purchase of
hydro-electric power by an out-of-province buyer - a contract deemed by the provincial
government too generous to the buyer - was ultra vires after concluding that the contractual
rights in question were situated outside of that province.732 In that case, the very purpose of
the legislation was extra-territorial. The situation would be quite different if we were
concerned with a vast provincial program to help ailing municipalities that contained
incidentally, as one of its many components, lowering of the interest rates on the cities'
bonds. Obviously, the modification of the interest rates may affect the out-of-province
732 Reference re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act, supra note 716. For other
examples of provincial laws deemed ultra vires for unconstitutionally modifying out-of-
province contractual rights, see: Royal Bank of Canada v. R., [1913] A.C. 283; Ottawa
Valley Power Co. v. Hydro-Electric Power Commission, [1937] O.R. 265 (C.A.);
Beauharnois Light, Heat and Power Co. v. Hydro-Electric Power Commission of
Ontario, [1937] O.R. 796 (C.A.) and Credit-Foncier Franco-Canadien v. Ross, [1937] 3
D.L.R. 365 (Alta. C.A.).
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rights of creditors, however this incidental effect was judged constitutionally unproblematic
by the Privy Council.733
It is important to highlight here that there is all the difference in the world between a
right given by an international treaty and a right situated outside of a province. With regard
to domestic law, the former is not effective as long as it has not been transformed and
integrated. On this point, we have to remember that transnational or international laws are
not directly constitutive of property law and basic market rules; they are meant to be
second-order rules that apply to those primary constitutive rules. In other words,
transnational and international laws are not functioning on the same plane as domestic
laws; they recognize second-order rights. 734 As we have seen, provinces get into trouble
when they attempt to legislate in ways that modify domestic (first order) rights that exist
outside of their territorial jurisdiction. But the same reasoning does not apply to second-
order rights and Luz and Miller seem to make a surprising mistake here. There are clearly
strong territorial connections between the property and the civil rights situated within the
province and that same province.
The so-called "extra-territoriality doctrine" thus has nothing to do with the idea that
Canadian provinces lack jurisdiction on anything that is exogenous to them. If it were
733 Ladore v. Bennett. [1939] A.C. 468 (P.C.).
734 See also L. Giroux, "La capacite internationale des provinces en droit constitutionnel
canadien", supra note 23.
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otherwise, this would lead to the self-defeating claim that provinces lack jurisdiction to
adopt regulations aimed at social norms that have grown outside of the state.735 The
doctrine, as applied and interpreted by the case-law, also has nothing to do with a pretended
impossibility of provinces to legislate against international law since the courts have clearly
recognized that provinces can do SO.736 In fact, assimilating public international law to
735 If a provincial legislature were to be prohibited from regulating norms outside of itself it
would fail to meet almost all of its purposes. Apart from regulating non-norm-guided
. behaviour, it would be forced into a recursive loop on itself.
736 See, for example, Ordon Estate, supra note 372 at 526 (Iacobucci and Major JJ. for a
unanimous court): "Although international law is not binding upon Parliament or the
provincial legislatures, a court must presume that legislation is intended to comply with
Canada's obligations under international instruments and as a member of the international
community." (Emphasis added.) See also L. LeBel and G. Chao, "The Rise of International
Law in Canadian Constitutional Litigation: Fugue or Fusion? Recent Developments and
Challenges in Internalizing International Law", supra note 41 and Stephane Beaulac,
"Arretons de dire que les tribunaux au Canada sont « lies » par Ie droit international"
(2004) 38 R.J.T. 359. No one seriously claims today that a provincial statute would be
constitutionally invalid by the mere fact that it goes against international law. None of the
legal reasons advanced by those who argued that Parliament or provincial legislatures were
not allowed to legislate against international law could stand today. For example, Vanek
(D.C. Vanek, "Is International Law Part of the Law of Canada?", supra note 41) was of the
view that neither Canada nor the provinces could legislate in violation of international law
given the presumption that a power delegated by the Parliament in London does not, unless
expressly stated, empower to legislate contrary to international law. Vanek's argument was
that since the Constitution Act, 1867, does not contain any such mention, it follows that
legislation cannot be introduced in Canada in violation of international law. This argument
cannot be defended in light of Canada's independence and it clearly ignores the fact that
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extra-territorial law and, following that, deducing that provinces lack jurisdiction to
implement it demonstrates a clear lack of understanding of what is the so-called "extra-
territoriality doctrine", if not of international law itself. It is not with this kind of weak
legislative powers possessed by Canada and by the provinces are not the result of
"delegations" (see Hodge v. R., supra note 14). While he was Dean, Rand J. claimed that
provinces could not legislate contrary to international law since he claimed that jurisdiction
on foreign affairs fell entirely upon the Dominion (I.C. Rand, "Some Aspects of Canadian
Constitutionnalism", supra note 41 at 143-44). It is hard to reconcile this proposition with
the decision rendered in the Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 348, where the
Judicial Committee declared that powers of the federal Crown in the sphere of international
relations had nothing to do with the way in which international obligations were
implemented in Canada. Indeed, in the words of Lord Atkin: "The question is not how is
the obligation formed, that is the function of the executive: but how is the obligation to be
performed and that depends upon the authority of the competent Legislature or
Legislatures". Finally, while he was professor, La Forest J. also defended the thesis that
provinces could not legislate in violation of international law by invoking the constitutional
doctrine of extra-territoriality and, alternatively, for the reason advanced by Vanek (G.V.
La Forest, "May the Provinces Legislate in Violation ofInternational Law?", supra note 41
at 81-87). The doctrine of extra-territoriality is not of great assistance here because, as La
Forest J. put it, it "was developed to prevent violations of international law by the colonies"
(ibid, 82) which could attract the liability of the metropolitan State. Canada is no longer a
British colony and it cannot be said that provinces are "colonies or dependencies" of the
federal government. However unsatisfactory the ad hoc nature of responses to breaches of
international obligation - customary or conventional - that flow from a lack of
comprehensive agreement between the federal government and provinces over their mutual
responsibility in such cases, this ad hoc nature does not justify a constitutional amendment
limiting provincial legislative powers.
arguments that one will be able to justify reversing the Labour Conventions case.
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d. Constitutional Amendments
It is clear that the federal Parliament does not possess the power to implement
treaties related to provincial matters and that courts could not make that constitutional
amendment without stepping outside of their legitimate powers. As we have seen, changing
the rules here would not be a minor evolutive adjustment, it would mean in-depth
transformation of the Canadian constitutional structure. The only avenue remaining for
those who would like to change the current division of powers is to go through the formal
constitutional amendment process provided at Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982. 737 And,
as we will see, the very demanding amending formulas applicable to those changes are
there to buttress the argument that those changes would not simply be minor institutional
adjustments and that courts would have no business making those sweaping changes.
What would be the relevant amending procedures here?
Because it would transfer to Parliament the powers to adopt laws that would
otherwise be of provincial jurisdiction, this amendment would clearly "derogat[e] from the
legislative powers, the proprietary rights or any other rights or privileges of the legislature
or government of a province" and would seem therefore to require, according to s. 38 (2) of
737 Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 70.
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the Constitution Act, 1982, "a resolution supported by a majority of the members of each of
the Senate, the House of Commons" and "resolutions of the legislative assemblies of at
least two-thirds of the provinces that have, in the aggregate, according to the then latest
general census, at least fifty per cent of the population of the provinces".738 This is the
default amending formula for matters affecting both federal and provincial powers (the
"7/50" formula).739 It is purposefully difficult to achieve because it involves changing the
738 Subss. 38 (1) and (2) of the Constitution Act, 1982, ibid. provide that:
38. (1) An amendment to the Constitution of Canada may be made by
proclamation issued by the Governor General under the Great Seal of
Canada where so authorized by
(a) resolutions of the Senate and the House of Commons; and
(b) resolutions of the legislative assemblies of at least two-thirds of
the provinces that have, in the aggregate, according to the then latest
general census, at least fifty per cent of the population of the
prOVInces.
(2) An amendment made under subsection (1) that derogates from the
legislative powers, the proprietary rights or any other rights or privileges of
the legislature or government of a province shall require a resolution
supported by a majority of the members of each of the Senate, the House of
Commons and the legislative assemblies required under subsection (1).
739 Other aspects of the Canadian constitution that affect only one level of government are
subject to less stringent rules. See, for example, ss. 44 and 45 of the Constitution Act, 1982,
ibid. that provide that
44. Subject to sections 41 and 42, Parliament may exclusively make laws
amending the Constitution of Canada in relation to executive government of
Canada or the Senate and House of Commons.
45. Subject to section 41, the legislature of each province may exclusively
make laws amending the constitution of the province.
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basic federal deal.
Moreover, assuming that the above amending formula is applicable, even if the
federal government were to be able to garner the support of seven provinces representing
more than 50% of the population, this would not be the end of the story. For s. 38 (3) of the
Constitution Act, 1982 also provides that
(3) An amendment referred to in subsection (2) shall not have effect in a
province the legislative assembly of which has expressed its dissent thereto
by resolution supported by a majority of its members prior to the issue of the
proclamation to which the amendment relates unless that legislative
assembly, subsequently, by resolution supported by a majority of its
members, revokes its dissent and authorizes the amendment.
Therefore, the amendment would not be effective in the provinces that opposed the
amendment. If, for example, Alberta and Quebec decided to opt out of a constitutional
amendment granting Parliament the powers to implement treaties in relation to provincial
matters, the amendment would have no effect on the legislative powers of those two
provinces. 74o That "opting-out" clause is there to ensure that no changes in the legislative
powers of provinces would be forced upon an unwilling province. This was meant to
protect the original deal of the federation. The fact that this is the only "opting-out" clause
of the Constitution shows the importance of respecting provinces' powers.
740 Also, to the extent that the amendment would have the effect of transferring "provincial
legislative powers relating to education or other cultural matters from provincial
legislatures to Parliament, Canada shall provide reasonable compensation to any province
to which the amendment does not apply." (See Constitution Act, 1982, ibid., s. 40.)
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But that is not all. There are tricky aspects to the issue of transfer of the provincial
Crown prerogative to conclude international agreements to the federal Crown. As we have
seen earlier, Crown prerogatives were originally divided between the Crown in right of
Canada and the Crown in right of each province following the division of legislative
powers. Thus, the prerogatives vest in the Crown in right of each government. As we have
seen earlier, provinces can delegate to the federal government the exercise of their Crown
prerogative powers to conclude international agreements in relation to provincial matters.
However, if the provincial governments were willing not only to delegate such powers but
to go further and operate a complete devolution - i.e. completely taking away from the
provincial Crown certain prerogatives and giving them to the federal Crown -, this could
give rise to difficult amendment problems. Indeed, while provincial legislative powers can
be transferred from the provinces to the Parliament through the "7/50" formula, according
to s. 41 of the Constitution Act, 1982, any "amendment to the Constitution of Canada in
relation" to the "office of the Queen, the Governor General and the Lieutenant Governor of
a province" requires "resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons and of the
legislative assemblies of each province".741 The latter amending formula is known as the
741 Emphasis added. Constitution Act, 1982, ibid., s. 41 reads:
41. An amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to the following
matters may be made by proclamation issued by the Governor General under
the Great Seal of Canada only where authorized by resolutions of the Senate
and House of Commons and of the legislative assemblies of each province:
(a) the office of the Queen, the Governor General and the Lieutenant
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"unanimity" formula. Therefore, in order to adopt an amendment stripping the provincial
Crown of some of its prerogatives and transferring them in the fullness of their original
status to the federal Crown, unanimity would be required. But would that also affect the
modification of the legislative powers?
A difficult question to answer here is whether or not a legislative transfer can
indirectly do what it cannot do directly (i.e. modify the basic attributes of the Crown in
right of the provinces without having gone through the s. 41 process). Again, let's
remember, the question is not whether legislatures can or cannot limit or constrain the
extent of Crown prerogatives through regular statutes. They obviously can. We are talking
about something else here; we are talking about plucking out a Crown prerogative and
vesting it in another entity. In In re The Initiative and Referendum Act,742 the Privy Council
declared invalid a provincial statute that amounted to a constitutional amendment that was
giving away to a new entity (a popular legislature) the Crown power to veto certain bills.
The Privy Council wrote
The references their Lordships have already made to the character of the
office of Lieutenant-Governor, and to his position as directly representing
the Sovereign in the Province, renders natural the exclusion of his office
from the power conferred on the Provincial Legislature to amend the
constitution of the Province. The analogy of the British constitution is that
on which the entire scheme is founded, and that analogy points to the
impropriety, in the absence of clear and unmistakable language, of
construing s. 92 as permitting the abrogation of any power which the Crown
Governor of a province; ...
742 In re The Initiative and Referendum Act, supra note 233.
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possesses through a person who directly represents it.743
Because it seems here that the only "clear and unmistakable language" "permitting the
abrogation of [the] power which the Crown possesses through a person who directly
represents it" is found in s. 41 of the Constitution Act, 1982, it is possible that unanimity
might be required.
At any rate, if such a transfer of prerogative powers could be achieved following the
"7/50" formula, which I seriously doubt, again, I note that the dissenting provinces would
not be affected according to s. 38 (3) of the Constitution Act, 1982.
Whether we refer to the stringent requirements of the "7/50" formula to transfer
treaty implementation powers from provincial legislatures to Parliament, the provincial
"opting-out" clause aimed at protecting the rights and powers of dissenting provinces or the
unanimity requirement to transfer the provincial Crown prerogative to conclude
international agreements related to provincial matters to the federal Crown, all three
demonstrate show how seriously such transformations are taken by the very text of the
Canadian constitution. Moreover, one thing should be clear by now: reversing the Labour
Conventions case744 would not simply mean reversing a single precedent, it would mean
reversing a long list of well-established constitutional rules and such reversals would have a
743 Ibid. at 943.
744 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19.
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dramatic impact on the many threads that compose the constitutional fabric of Canada.
Again, this should give pause to judges who would be disposed to overturn any of the
already well-established constitutional rules discussed in this essay. Bypassing the proper
constitutional amendment procedure through a judicial amendement in the form of a
reversal of the Labour Conventions case745 would be tantamount to a constitutional coup.
And what might be broken by the illegitimate stroke of a judicial pen, might not be fixed
without the right alignment of stars that has been eluding Canada since 1867.
745 Ibid.
Conclusion
This thesis began by suggesting that the Canadian constitution was better seen not
through the looking glass of "sovereignty" but rather through the constitutionally
entrenched principle of federalism.
In the first chapter, I revisited the famous Labour Conventions case and put it back
in its legal and political context. In particular, I highlighted how the "Canadian
sovereignist" vision was articulated by the federal government, how it was rebutted by the
federalist arguments presented by provinces and finally, how it was ultimately defeated by
the Privy Council. That decision was thoroughly analysed to show how well it was
integrated in an already formed body of constitutional law.
I then demonstrated in the second chapter that under current constitutional law,
treaty-making powers are divided according to the same lines as the division of legislative
competence. Thus, the federal government may make treaties in relation to federal
legislative matters while provinces may do the same in relation to provincial matters.
Therefore, only through a provincial delegation of powers is the federal government able to
conclude treaties in relation to provincial matters. All other potential alternative sources for
such a federal power have turned out to be empty. Strong policy reasons support those
constitutional rules and nothing in international law prohibits such an arrangement. As we
have seen, international law is not only open to a multitude of international players but it
welcomes that diversity. Globalisation is not about the flattening out of international actors,
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it IS about the development of networks of governance operating at all levels of
government. This helped to explain why the recognition of provincial treaty-making powers
entails no consequence whatsoever for any potential claim of independence because treaty-
making power is no longer seen as solely the attribute of "independent states".
The third chapter focused on rebutting the claim made by certain scholars that the
Labour Conventions case should be overturned. Most of the policy reasons for maintaining
the status quo in relation to that case were presented in the previous chapter. Therefore, I
concentrated my efforts on the purely constitutional arguments involved in the debate. I
have shown clearly that reversing the Labour Conventions case would not merely entail
reversing a simple precedent but would rather mean ripping apart large portions of the
current Canadian constitutional fabric. In effect, the decision fits in a complex yet mostly
coherent web of rules and precedents that would need to be overturned as well if the
Labour Conventions case was reversed. And whether that reversal were done through a
resurrection of s. 132 or through a radical transformation of the "Peace, Order and Good
Government" powers of s. 91, this would have tremendeous consequences for the
federation. If it were done through s. 91, for example, it would require transforming the
"Peace, Order and good Government" powers so as to allow for the possibility of covering
aggregates of exclusive provincial matters. If this were done, all formerly exclusive
provincial powers could be turned into exclusive federal powers. I have also shown that the
arguments based on the allegedly extraterritorial nature of treaty implementation display a
profound lack of understanding of the way that latter doctrine works in Canadian
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constitutional law. Finally, I have also shown that the Canadian constitution's amending
procedures support the claim that the actual rules dealing with the division of powers over
treaty-making and treaty implementation ought not to be modified lightly. In fact, those
rules ensure that provinces' rights will be protected against any attempt by the federal
government or by other provinces to impose a change on their powers. A fortiori, there are
good reasons for not judicially trampling on those provincial rights. Bypassing the most
deeply entrenched rules of the Canadian constitution would be out of character for a body
that owes its existence to the respect of the rule oflaw.
Now that all these things have been said, nothing stops the federal government and
the provinces from improving on the actual practices without violating the constitutional
structure in which they operate. I have already suggested a series of ways in which the
current practices could be improved by formalising in an intergovernmental agreement the
general modalities of intervention on issues that are of common interest to the federal
government and one or many provinces. Among other things, I have suggested the possible
creation of an interprovincial coordinating body that would establish common positions -
when possible - over provincial matters and that would be able to take the proper initiatives
to achieve common goals. I suggested that this coordinating body should be open to the
participation of civil society to prepare nuanced positions that will reflect the interests of
the people it is supposed to serve. I also suggested that while provinces could represent
themselves in the international arena to the extent that the host institutions are ready to
accept them and that the unified voice of the provinces could speak for Canada in
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international institutions dealing with provincial matters, provinces could also decide, if
they so wished, that the federal government could act as their mandatee in certain instances.
The details would have to be worked out through negotiations between those governments
interested in perfecting the actual system. However, if the federal government ever needed
an incentive to participate in such negotiations, the fact that it might be able to conclude an
agreement that would set the rules for the internal allocation of liability in case of
international law violations should help.
In the remaining part of this conclusion, I want to open up two other avenues of
reform. While this essay was mainly interested in the interplay between the constitutionally
entrenched principle of federalism and treaty powers, other constitutional principles are at
play here. I did mention briefly how the federalism principle is connected to the democratic
principle746 but my exploration of the links between the latter principle and treaty powers
has been very limited. I will thus conclude this thesis by adding a few remarks on how the
exercise of treaty powers could better respect the democratic principle.
There have been many complaints about the lack of systematic democratic
participation from the preparation phase of treaty negotiation (when issues and strategies
are defined) to its conclusion and about the frequent lack of transparency of the process. 747
746 Reference Re Secession ofQuebec, supra note 76.
747 See, for example, J. Harrington, "Scrutiny and Approval: The Role for Westminster-
style Parliaments in Treaty-Making", supra note 41; J. Harrington, "Redressing the
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An obvious way in which we could increase the accountability of the executive in treaty-
making is through the increased participation of parliamentarians in the process. This could
be done in several ways. First, we could establish publicity rules to inform parliamentarians
about the nature of the treaties being contemplated, the issues they raise and the likely
consequences of the adoption of such treaties (e.g. obligations contemplated, budgetary
impacts, need for legal reforms, etc.). This information would be provided in time for
parliamentarians to examine the issues and influence the position that will be taken by the
government during the negotiations. Second, we could increase executive accountability in
treaty-making through the requirement of parliamentary "assent" prior to ratification. This
could be done in different ways. For example, we could have a "positive assent"
mechanism which would require parliamentarians to adopt a resolution supporting
ratification for that ratification to be effective. We could do the reverse with a "no-
Democratic Deficit in Treaty Law Making: (Re-)Establishing a Role for Parliament", supra
note 41; G. van Ert, Using International Law in Canadian Courts, supra note 41 at 68-71;
Daniel Turp, "Un nouveau defi democratique: l'accentuation du role de parlement dans la
conclusion et la mise en oeuvre des traits internationaux" in Canadian Council on
International Law, The Impact of International Law on the Practice of Law in Canada :
Proceedings ofthe 27th Annual Conference ofthe Canadian Council on International Law,
Ottawa, October 15-17, 1998/ L'influence du droit international sur la pratique du droit au
Canada: travaux du 27e congres annuel du Conseil canadien de droit international,
Ottawa, 15-17 octobre, 1998 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) 115 [Daniel
Turp, "Un nouveau defi democratique: l'accentuation du role de parlement dans la
conclusion et la mise en oeuvre des traits internationaux"]. I owe most of the suggestions
presented in this paragraph about parliamentary procedural reforms to Joanna Harrington.
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rejection" mechanism whereby contemplated treaties accompanied by an explanatory
memorandum would be tabled and unless objections were raised by parliamentarians within
a certain delay, the executive could go ahead and ratify the treaty. We could have a mixed
system where "important" treaties would be subjected to "positive assent" while others
would go through the "no-rejection" test.748
One might argue that the above was rejected by the Privy Council when it wrote in
the Labour Conventions case that "Parliament, no doubt, ... has a constitutional control
over the executive: but it cannot be disputed that the creation of the obligations undertaken
in treaties and the assent to their form and quality are the function of the executive
alone.,,749 However, this could certainly be read to mean only that the executive has an
exclusive jurisdiction over the formal act of "creation of the obligations" through a formal
assent to the "form and quality" of treaties. Also, let's remember that the issue here is one
of executive prerogative and, by definition, prerogatives can be legislatively limited.75o At
the federal level, up until the late 1960s, important treaties were tabled for parliamentary
748 This was the system proposed at the federal level by the defunct bill C-260, An Act
respecting the negotiation, approval, tabling andpublication oftreaties, supra note 440.
749 Labour Conventions case, supra note 19 at 348 (emphasis added).
750 For example, Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 39, s. 15, entrenches certain military
prerogatives: "The Command-in-Chief of the Land and Naval Militia, and of all Naval and
Military Forces, of and in Canada, is hereby declared to continue and be vested in the
Queen." On the distinction between limiting prerogatives and completely transferring them
qua prerogatives to another entity, see section 2.a.i.2.
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approval before ratification.751 At the provincial level, Quebec offers an interesting model.
The province has adopted simple procedures that allow for elected officials' input in
relation to international agreements falling in its jurisdiction.752 Among other things, the
statute setting up the procedures provides that important international agreements753 "must,
to be valid, be signed by the Minister, approved by the National Assembly and ratified by
the Govemment.,,754 Every "important international agreement" must first be tabled in the
National Assembly with an explanatory note on the content and effects of the
75\ See Daniel Turp, "Un nouveau defi democratique: l'accentuation du role de parlement
dans la conclusion et la mise en oeuvre des traits internationaux", supra note 747.
752 An Act respecting the Ministere des Relations internationales, supra note 35.
753 An "important international commitment" is defined at An Act respecting the Ministere
des Relations internationales, ibid., s. 22.2 al.2:
The expression "important international commitment" means an
international agreement referred to in section 19 or an international accord
referred to in section 22.1 and any instrument relating to either of them,
which, in the opinion of the Minister,
1) requires, for its implementation by Quebec, the passing of an Act or the
making of a regulation, the imposition of a tax or the acceptance of an
important financial obligation;
2) concerns human rights and freedoms;
3) concerns international trade; or
4) should be tabled in the National Assembly.
754 Ibid., s. 20 al. 3 provides: "Subject to section 22.5, international agreements referred to
in section 22.2 must, to be valid, be signed by the Minister, approved by the National
Assembly and ratified by the Government."
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commitmene55 and (except in case of an emergency756)" ... unless the Assembly, with
the unanimous consent of its members, decides otherwise, the motion shall be the subject of
a two-hour debate that may not begin before the lapse of 10 days after the tabling of the
commitment.,,757 Finally, "the ratification of an international agreement or the making of an
order referred to in the third paragraph of section 22.1 758 shall not take place, where it
concerns an important international commitment, until the commitment is approved by the
755 Ibid." s. 22.2 al.l.
756 Ibid." s. 22.5 provides that:
The Government may, in case of urgency, ratify an important international
agreement or make an order referred to in the third paragraph of section 22.1
relating to an important international accord before it is tabled in or
approved by the National Assembly. The Minister shall table the agreement
or accord in the National Assembly together with a statement setting out the
reasons for the urgency within 30 days after the ratification or the making of
the order or, if the National Assembly is not sitting on that date, within 30
days of resumption.
757 The entire s. 22.3 ofAn Act respecting the Ministere des Relations internationales, Ibid.,
reads:
The Minister may present a motion proposing that an important international
commitment tabled in the National Assembly be approved or rejected by the
Assembly. No prior notice is required if the motion is presented immediately
after the tabling of the commitment. Unless the Assembly, with the
unanimous consent of its members, decides otherwise, the motion shall be
the subject of a two-hour debate that may not begin before the lapse of 10
days after the tabling of the commitment. The only amendment that may be
received is an amendment proposing to defer the approval or rejection of the
commitment by the Assembly.
758 Ibid., 22.1 al.3 reads: "The Government must, in order to be bound by an international
accord pertaining to any matter within the constitutional jurisdiction of Quebec and to give
its assent to Canada's expressing its consent to be bound by such an accord, make an order
to that effect. The same applies in respect of the termination of such an accord."
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National Assembly.,,759
These types of procedures involve legislative bodies only in the decision to ratify
treaties and not necessarily in the implementation of them. However, the use of such
procedures could help solve a debate that is currently dividing courts and scholars in
Canada over the issue of the "presumption of conformity to international law". 760 I will
briefly say a few words about the debate and then conclude by offering a suggestion to
solve the dispute.
On one side of the debate, we find those who want to maximize the use of the
presumption of conformity to ensure that governments are respecting their international
obligations as much as possible. Those people argue that courts must always choose the
interpretation that is most in compliance with international law - or to put it in stronger
terms: "In choosing among possible interpretations of a statute, the court should avoid
interpretations that would put Canada in breach of such [international] obligations". 761 Prof.
759 Ibid.. s. 22.4.
760 See supra note 366ff and accompanying text.
761 Ordon Estate, supra note 372 ~ 137 (per Iacobucci and Major JJ for the Court). The full
text reads: "Although international law is not binding upon Parliament or the provincial
legislatures, a court must presume that legislation is intended to comply with Canada's
obligations under international instruments and as a member of the international
community. In choosing among possible interpretations of a statute, the court should avoid
interpretations that would put Canada in breach of such obligations ... " (reference omitted.)
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Kindred states clearly the rationale behind that general presumption: "States are bound to
fulfill their treaty obligations and may not invoke domestic law as justification for their
failure to do so. Courts will not purposefully place the state in breach of international law
by their decisions if such a consequence can be avoided.,,762
On the other side of the debate, we find those who believe that respecting
international obligation is important but that it should not be done at the expense of the
democratic will of the people. They thus favour a more restrictive approach to the use of
the presumption. It is true that the Supreme Court once held that reference to the text of an
international treaty required an ambiguity, latent or patent, in domestic legislation and that
in the absence of such an ambiguity, given the principle that clear legislation must take
precedence over treaty law, the international agreement could not dictate the interpretation
to be given to a domestic norm.763 However, the Supreme Court relaxed its position in 1990
in National Corn Growers Association.764 In its ruling, the Court declared among other
things that it is reasonable to refer to the international agreement in the process of
determining the existence of such ambiguity and that patent ambiguity was not required.765
However and surprisingly, the question was recently raised again by the Supreme Court and
762 H. Kindred, "Canadians as Citizens of the International Community: Asserting
Unimplemented Treaty Rights in the Courts", supra note 41 at 272.
763 Schavernoch v. Foreign Claims Commission et aI., [1982] 1 S.C.R. 1092 at 1092 and
1101.
764National Corn Growers Association, supra note 366.
765Ibid, at 1371-1372.
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there might still be doubts about the nature of the current rule. 766
While the goal of the second group is quite worthy, the way they propose to achieve
it is impractical and normatively inconsistent. After all, every good lawyer knows that legal
language can be made to look ambiguous or clear, depending on the needs of a client and
the skills of the advocate. And if we were to examine the factual situations of the cases in
which the courts have refused to look at the text of the treaties and compare them with
those of the cases in which the courts used the international instrument to interpret the
statute in question, we might be surprised to discern patterns that better explain these
discrepancies than what might be predicted by formal legal doctrine. For example, it is
possible that courts will be more sensitive to treaty obligations when they are aware of
strong international enforcement mechanisms related to the treaty in question. It might be
the case that courts are effectively more careful with bilateral treaties where there is a
possibility of "tit for tat" than with multilateral treaties where enforcement often raises
"collective action" problems. All that is to say that if the goal is to ensure that it is the
elected members of legislative bodies who will decide whether or not a treaty obligation is
to be respected, then this method fails because it leaves it entirely to the discretion of the
judges through their ability to characterise a statute as being ambiguous or not.
766 See the analysis by Sh~phane Beaulac of Schreiber v. Canada (A.G.), [2002] 2 S.C.R.
269 in Sh~phane Beaulac, "Recent Developments on the Role of International Law in
Canadian Statutory Interpretation" (2004) 25 Stat. L. Rev. 19.
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Also, by casting this debate as one over whether or not courts need to find an
"ambiguity" to invoke the presumption of conformity, the groups are artificially pitting
themselves one against the other. And that is because it is clearly possible to achieve the
objectives of both groups without having to invoke the impractical need to find an
ambiguity before applying the presumption of conformity. This is where ratification
approval by the relevant legislative assembly could come into play. If the presumption of
conformity only applied to situations where ratification had been approved by the relevant
legislative assembly, there would be no need anymore to argue over the futile question as to
whether a specific provision is ambiguous or not and intemationallaw would have received
the democratic imprimatur required. It is much easier to verify whether or not an assembly
has adopted a motion supporting the ratification of a treaty than determining whether or not
a judge or another will find a statutory disposition ambiguous. Of course, this modest
proposal does not have to affect the rule to the effect that treaty implementation, to the
extent that it would requires alteration of domestic law, requires proper legislation.
Finally, as I mentioned earlier, this thesis stayed very close to well-established
constitutional law precedents to examine how Canadian federalism could meet the current
needs of existential communities that recognize themselves in Canada and in Quebec.
However, conspicuously absent from this narrative - as it has sadly been too often the case
in the history of the last few hundred years - were the Aboriginal groups. Out of respect for
their desire for self-definition, I preferred not to try and to force them in any of my own
conceptual categories. In particular, many of the arguments presented here referred to the
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Crown as the symbol of the public authority and the logic of the argument was almost
entirely intrasystemic. The issue of an Aboriginal jus tractatum will quite possibly have to
be examined on a different basis. But we will have to wait for someone else to write that
story.
In the meantime, I hope that I have been able to present a few useful ideas about the
interconnectness of our current world and the call for a world federalism that is no longer
based on sovereignty but rather on the harmony of overlapping existential communities and
functional regimes.
***
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